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This thesis discusses the penalty rule in English law. Pre-arranged provisions 
concerning the estimation of due damages in event of the promisor' breach are of 
considerable practical importance. When such provisions are enforceable they are 
called liquidated damages clauses. However, English law courts will not enforce these 
provisions where they are categorised as penalty clauses. A penalty clause is a 
contractual provision which provides that in the event of a breach of contract the 
de,faulting party shall pay to his contractual partner a sum which is unconscionable 
and extravagant in relation to the loss that is likely to result from breach. Despite the 
fact that the non-enforcement of penalties seemed to be well recognised at least by the 
seventeenth century the penalty rule remains elusive and controversial. This thesis 
tentatively suggests a New Approach which in some circumstances would involve a 
different solution than the application of existing law. The thesis also builds upon a 
comparison with Jordanian law. 
This thesis has been divided into SIX chapters.' The first chapter examines the 
historical development of penalty clauses and also introduces the New Approach. The 
second chapter critically examines the existing test, i.e. the sum being extravagant and 
unconscionable, for the invalidity of penalty clause. Chapter three considers the 
principle that the penalty rule is only applicable on breach and the loss to be estimated 
for application of this rule. The general principle under English law, which gives a 
court no power but to declare the invalidity of a penalty is dealt with in chapter four. 
The circumstance where the injured party's actual loss exceeds the stipulated sum is 
the object of examination in chapter five. Chapter six discusses whether the penalty 
rule should be applied to a provision that requires a forfeiture of money already paid 
taking into consideration that the only difference between a forfeiture clause and a 
stipulated damages clause is that under a forfeiture clause the sum is paid before 
breach. In the last part of this thesis a summary of the thesis including suggestions for 
the improvement of the current law are put forward. 
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Introduction 
Asquith LJ stated that: 
"As has often been pointed out, parties at the time of contracting contemplate not 
the breach of the contract but its performance"l 
However commercial contractors often seek to plan for breach. In light of this some 
contracts go so far as to include a predetermined sum of money as "agreed damages" in 
case such breach arises. Such plans are acceptable to the courts as long as the amount of 
agreed damages is a genuine estimation of the loss that would be done by the breach. An 
agreed damages clause is urged because the clause serves numerous goals. Such clause 
averts the often-difficult tasks of assessing the promisee's loss and of determining how 
much of that loss is legally recoverable2• It avoids any uncertainty and delay resulting 
from relegating the matter to court to specify the damages and it reduces expenses of 
using judicial process where the parties determine that the costs of negotiation are less 
than the contemplated costs of litigation upon breach. It serves the promisor in enabling 
him with some degree of certainty to know beforehand what the extent of his liability 
would be in the event of breach. Finally, a party concerned foremost with performance, 
especially a timely performance, may use such a clause in the hope that it will provide a 
further inducement for performance. 
For hundreds of years courts of equity have dealt carefully with a contractual stipulation, 
which requires from the defaulting party to pay a certain sum of money to the injured 
party in the event of breach. As such the courts have always given a relief against such 
stipulation where it was operating as in terrorem of the defaulting party rather than as a 
genuine pre-estimate of the loss likely to be suffered on the occurrence of breach. Sir 
I The Victoria Laundry Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 at 540 per Asquith LJ 
2 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 54-55 per Lord Woolf. 
See also Geest, Gerrit and Wuyts, Filip. "Penalty Clauses and Liquidated Damages". In Elgar, Edward. 
"Encyclopedia of the Law and Economics". 2000. Vol. 3. PI41 where it is pointed out that: "Such clauses 
avoid that judges have to compute damages ex post. It is well known that judges may have serious 
difficulties in finding out the true losses. This holds especially for subjective harm. It is impossible for a 
judge to know the promisee's preferences precisely. Nor can he rely on what the promisee tells him, 
because the latter has no incentive to reveal his preferences in an honest way. This kind of preferences 
revelation problem does not arise when the loss is determined ex ante. At that time the parties are still free 
to enter the contract or not. .. An ex ante estimation is also useful for other forms of damage which are 
Thomas More first pointed out this approach when he attempted unsuccessfully to 
persuade the court to give relief with regard to money bonds3 and its effect has been re-
stated in a modern form by Lord Diplock in Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport 
Ltat. His Lordship referred to this approach as "The equitable rule against penalties" and 
stated confirming that the agreement on damages in advance: 
" ... Must not offend against the equitable rule against penalties; that is to say, it 
must not impose upon the breaker of primary obligation a general secondary 
obligation to pay to the other party a sum of money that is manifestly intended to 
be in excess of the amount which would fully compensate the other party for the 
loss sustained by him in consequence of the breach of the primary obligation"S 
It seems that the reason for making a penalty clause in contract unenforceable is that it is 
used as a mean of applying pressure on the promisor so as to compel him into fulfilling 
the principal contractual obligations. Enforcing such a stipulation may have the effect of 
entitling the promisee to recover far more than compensation for the loss caused by the 
failure of performance. The principle is that parties must not punish each other by 
imposing a penalty but might lawfully contract that one will be bound to compensate the 
other for losses caused by not fulfilling his undertakings under the contract. Thus the 
object of penalty conflicts with the compensatory principle adopted by the English case 
law in which the purpose of damages is to merely compensate the injured party rather 
than to punish the breaching party, as English law has always denied any role for the 
punishment in the enforcement of contracts6• Therefore "The rule ... that the court will not 
enforce a penalty clause so as to permit a party to a contract to recover in an action a sum 
greater than the measure of damages to which he would be entitled at common law is 
well established,,7 
difficult to prove. The costs of foregone chances are one example. Lacking clear evidence, courts will 
underestimate such losses". 
3 This is what has been indicated by Lord Mansfield in Wyllie v. Wilkes (1780) 2 Doug KB, 522-523. See 
also for that Jobson v. Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026, at 1032. 
4 Photo Production Ltd v. Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827. 
S Ibid. At 850 per Lord Dip10ck. See also Scandinavian Trading v. Flota Ecuatoriana [1983] 2 AC 694, at 
702. 
6 Downes, T. Antony. " A Textbook On Contract ". 5ed. 1997, reprinted 1999. P 324. 
7 Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 142. 
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This stance of the unenforceability of penalty clauses is enforced by well known 
distinction between liquidated damages clauses and penalty clauses 8. The historical 
origins of this principle shed some light on its original rationale. It developed from 
equitable interference to grant relief against the harshness of penal bonds where the legal 
rules permitted double recovery through penalty bond under seal. This principle of equity 
was later adopted by courts of common law and still constitutes the base for the penalty 
doctrine, which makes penalty clause void and unenforceable. However courts later 
began to realise, that, in certain situations where actual damages could not be readily 
ascertained, promises to pay a stipulated sum in the event of a breach were a valid 
alternative to the uncertainty of a jury's award9• Therefore, it should be noted that this 
intervention by courts to grant relief against penalties would not be possible if the 
assessment of damages was impossible. This distinction constituted the starting point for 
the discrimination between penalties and liquidated damages. 
The development of precise rules for this distinction culminated in the Duniop case10 
where the following definition introduced. When an agreed sum represents a genuine pre-
estimate of damages it is regarded as a valid liquidated damages clause and should be 
awarded irrespective of actual loss suffered. While on the other hand, where the sum 
fixed by the contractors bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated loss, it is an 
exorbitant and excessive, and will be treated as an invalid penalty. Indeed in the leading 
case of Dunlop11 Lord Dunedin distinguish~d penalty from liquidated damages saying 
that "the essence of a penalty is a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the 
offending party ... ". However cases applying this definition do not rely on this statement 
and they focus on a definition of a liquidated damages clause and a penalty clause is 
simply defined as its negative counterpart12• This is to say that a penalty is a clause that 
8 This is what has been incorporated by the leading case Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & 
Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
9 Harwood, William. "Comments: Liquidated Damages: A Comparison of The Common Law and the 
Uniform Commercial Code". Fordham Law Review, (1977) 45, 1349. 
10 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
11 Ibid. At 86 per Lord Dunedin. This phrase was also found in by lord Halsbury where said (at 10) that 
.... .it is simply a penalty to be held over the other party in terrorem" [1905].AC 6, at 10. 
12 Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 509. 
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provides for something in excess of a "genuine ... pre-estimate of damage" 13. It is 
suspected that the above statement is able to draw the distinction between liquidated 
damages and penalty, as there are cases in which the sum stipulated might be a penalty in 
spite of the fact that there has been no intimidation or threat against that partyl4. This 
doubt was clearly raised by Lord Radcliffe in an important statement that: 
" I do not myself think that it helps to identify a penalty to describe it as in the 
nature of threat "to be enforced in terrorem" ... I do not find that that description 
adds anything of substance to the idea conveyed by the word "penalty" itself, and 
it obscures the fact that penalties may quite readily be undertaken by parties who 
are not in the least terrorised by the prospect of having to pay them and yet as I 
understand it, entitled to claim the trotection of the court when they are called 
upon to make good their promises" 1 
Once the court refuses to enforce a "penalty clause" the injured party is relegated to his 
right to claim unliquidated damages action for the breach actually committed if there was 
no agreement on damages in advance. The above common law rule, rule against penalties, 
is the subject of this research. 
It was said that: 
"Many more complex and intrinsically less tractable subjects have been reduced 
in order; this one, from the struggles of the English Judges with it before the 
Revolution to the present time, remains oddly elusive" 16 
Despite the fact that the non-enforcement of penalties seemed to be well recognised at 
least by the seventeenth century this rule remains elusive, puzzling and always subject to 
controversy. The penalty jurisdiction is associated with an enormous labyrinth of much 
criticised 17 distinctions and obscure jurisprudence. Its real scope of operation is also 
perceived to be in decline, as recognised by the fact that the penalty jurisdiction is "the 
anomaly, not the rule,,18. Apart from the separate point of whether court's intervention to 
\3 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 86 per Lord Dunedin. 
14 This is illustrated in providing for a single lump sum made payable upon breach of several events. See 
infra. P 135. 
IS Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600, at 622 per Lord Radcliffe. 
16 Callanan Road Improvement Co. v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co, (1947) 190 Misc 418, at 419. 
17 See for example, Muir, Garry. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law Review. 
(1985) 10503. Kaplan, Philips R. "A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages". Southern 
California Law Review. (1977) 55 1055. 
18 McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 5th ed. Macmillan. 2003. p 444. 
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render a penalty clause unenforceable is justified at all, there are many unsatisfactory 
aspects of applying the penalty doctrine itself. As the penalty jurisdiction is only 
applicable where there has been a breach of contract, it excludes from its scope some 
contractual provisions which may be oppressive and disproportionate penalty clauses, as 
they are carefully drafted by a professional in such a way as not to arise on a breach of 
contract19~ striking down a clause for technical reasons though it may be regarded as a 
genuine pre-estimate of actualloss2o and, evading the penalty jurisdiction by changing in 
form rather than in substance and the accuracy of the current test for invalidating penalty 
clause are all an object of debate. 
In spite of its very long history, there remains enough ambiguity in the law to make it 
worth the effort for the defaulting party to challenge the agreement in order to avoid his 
contractual undertakings. Clearly reform of the law of penalty clauses in contract is 
necessary to reduce this uncertainty which defeats the purpose of agreeing on damages in 
advance from the outset. How, then, could the operation of penalty clauses be more 
effective? Or rather what policy should the law pursue, particularly if the current position 
of English law is unsatisfactory itself and for international purposes where penalty clause 
is recognised in most jurisdictions whilst it is not in English law? Consequently the writer 
has tentatively suggested a New Approach, which is a step on the right direction of 
removing or rather reducing the controversial aspects in this area of the law. This New 
Approach, as a theoretical case, is presented in the first chapter. 
Furthermore this thesis is not only confined to the law of penalties, but also included an 
important study regarding the application of penalty clause rules to the forfeiture of 
money already paid by way of deposit and instalments. There is doubt as to how far the 
penalty jurisdiction extends to forfeiture of a sum of money already paid. It seems that a 
deposit is a guarantee for performance by the payer and can not be recovered and its 
retention and the retention of the whole pre-paid instalments may effectively act as the 
imposition of penalty. The law fluctuated in dealing with forfeiture clauses particularly 
19 This can be observed in the problem of breach in Hire-Purchase contract. Infra. P 92. 
20 This is the case where there is a single lump sum payable on breach of one or different obligation of 
varying significance. Infra. P 141. 
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where these clauses were of penal nature. Moreover it follows from the nature of the 
penalty clause that the agreed sum will normally be more than the loss suffered by the 
injured party as a result of breach. However, it might be less than the loss suffered 
especially where the sum is provided for to be payable on the occurrence of one of 
several breaches of different significance. Shall such an agreed damages clause be subject 
to the legal controls imposed upon limitation clause? And what is the possibility of the 
application of penalty clause rules to clause that accelerates undue instalments to be 
payable forthwith? 
This thesis extends to an examination of Jordanian law. English law relies on the case law. 
This gives the judges flexibility to construe and change the law according to what 
constitutes the public interest. In contrast Jordanian law relies entirely on legislation 
enacted by the House of Parliament without giving any role to the judges other than the 
application of legal rules. Jordanian civil law considers the penalty clause valid from the 
outset. A penalty clause is legitimate and court should uphold the validity of a penalty 
clause so long as the terms of the clause are met. However, courts have the power to 
adjust the amount of penalty clause. A comparison has been introduced when it was 
necessary. 
Therefore, it is hoped that the following objectives have been achieved in this research: 
1- A comprehensive study of the penalty clause jurisdiction in English case law 21 
including an examination of when a court is justified in interfering with the freedom 
of contract otherwise enjoyed by the parties. 
2- To develop a New Approach to the existing distinction between penalties and 
liquidated damages. 
3- To analyse the forfeiture of deposits and instalments. Though they have a common 
origin penalty and forfeiture clauses have evolved separately. An attempt to apply 
penalty clause rules to those clauses has been made, as there is no ostensible 
theoretical reason why those clauses are treated differently from penalty clauses. Also 
6 
to consider the relation between penalty clause rules and acceleration and limitation 
clauses. 
4- Despite the importance of the subject under consideration from the point of view of 
present-day international commercial contracts, the literature on the subject from the 
comparative aspect in both England and Jordan, as opposed to materials on each legal 
system, is not plentiful22• This scarceness has prompted the writer of this research to 
attempt to make, when necessary, some comparisons with Jordanian civil law to 
indicate the differences between fairly different legal systems and the way that each 
can better the other. 
This thesis has been divided into six chapters. Chapter one addresses the historical 
development of penalty clauses since the fourteenth century until the establishment of the 
modem law of penalties. This chapter also deals with the introduction of New Approach 
that the writer developed as a theoretical case for the improvement of existing law. It 
examines the criticism of judges and commentators of the current rule. The demise 
criterion, i.e. intention of parties and whether the parties wording concludes the matter as 
to the nature of agreed damages clause and the existing test, i.e. the sum being 
extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the loss that likely to be suffered on 
breach at the time of making the contract, for the invalidity of penalty clause and all 
issues related to its application are dealt with in chapter two. This includes the effect of 
hypothetical situation, effect of the inequality of bargaining power and the time for 
determining the invalidity of penalty clause and whether actual loss has any effect on that. 
Chapter three is devoted to the scope of operation of penalty clause jurisdiction. Rule 
against penalty clause is only applicable where there has been breach of contract and this 
principle is capable of causing difficulties in case of early termination in hire purchase 
contract. Two situations, i.e classifying a term into condition and acceleration clause, are 
capable of giving the promisee a chance to evade penalty clause rule were also 
21 Some indications to the legislative intervention have been showed, when essential, by considering some 
statutory provisions where they were necessary to extenuate the unsatisfactory aspects of case law. 
22 Rather no attempt was made in this regard in Jordan. This research wilJ be of great and magnificent 
importance for the development of legal rules of penalty clauses in Jordan. 
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approached. In addition this chapter sought to examine the pre-estimated loss as the loss 
which should be assessed for the purpose of activating the test for the invalidity of 
penalty clause. Chapter four focuses on the power given to the court under existing 
English case law. It deal with the general principle under English law, which gives the 
court no power but to declare the invalidity of agreed sum as a penalty and relegate the 
injured party to an unliquidated damages action in order to claim his compensation for 
the loss he has suffered on breach. 
Where the injured party's actual loss exceeds the stipulated sum in contract, two cases 
were distinguished. Where the sum is upheld as liquidated damages the injured party is 
limited to the amount agreed upon, no less no more. This situation seems to resemble a 
limitation clause, however the rules of limitation provision were never applied to the 
situation above and therefore a distinction was made between a limitation clause and a 
liquidated damages clause. While on the other hand there is some doubt whether the 
injured party is limited to claim up to the amount agreed upon when the amount is held to 
be a penalty. These issues are looked at in chapter five. Chapter six discusses whether the 
penalty clause rules could be applied to a provision that requires a forfeiture of money 
already paid taking into consideration that the only difference is that under forfeiture 
clause the sum is paid before breach. This chapter firstly dealt with forfeiture of paid 
instalments where two kinds of relief were approached: extension of time to the promisor 
to make the payment and recovery of paid instalment. It also deals with the forfeiture of 
deposit where a detailed analysis is introduced to answer the following questions: how 
can relief against forfeiture of a deposit be granted? And what is the possibility of the 
application of penalty clause rules to forfeiture of the sum paid by way of deposit? Lastly 
a summary, conclusions, the outcomes of New Approach and suggestions for the 
improvement of the current law were put forward. 
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Chapter One: Historical Outline of Penalty Clauses and the New 
Approach 
O-Introduction 
Penalty clauses have a very long history in English case law. This area of the law has 
developed from Equity, which granted relief against the harshness of penal bonds. 
Although it could be said that the question in relation to penal bonds could be traced back 
to the fourteenth century, the penalty rule emerged in the seventeenth century. Thus the 
equitable principle of granting relief against such bonds was adopted by courts of law and 
remains today as the foundation for the rule that penalties are unenforceable. This rule 
and the development of liquidated damages clauses were well established in the 
beginning of twentieth century. The evolution of penalty clause jurisdiction over the 
centuries until it reached the point of the modern case law, which culminated in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd 23, where rules for distinguishing 
penalties from liquidated damages were set out by Lord Dunedin, will now be examined. 
It would seem that the existing English case law as to penalties is unsatisfactory for the 
reasons, which will be observed when analysing the subject matter in the next chapters. 
Therefore, a New Approach, which raises a presumption in favour of the enforcement of 
penalty clauses, is introduced and exposed as a new perspective to the penalty clauses in 
the next section of this chapter. 
Thus this chapter is devoted to deal with the following issues: 
1- Penalty bond 
2- Evolution of penalty clause jurisdiction over centuries 
3- The New Approach 
I-Penal bond 
1:1 what is a penal bond? 
The history of the penalty rule was originally associated with the penal bond subject to 
conditional defeasance and also with the obligation to pay a greater sum in the event of 
23Dun/op Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltdv. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
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failure to pay a smaller amount. In medieval times the majority of actions on contract 
brought in the common law courts were actions of debt sur obligation. In such an action 
the injured party (creditor) had to produce a sealed instrument wherein the defaulting 
party (debtor) had confessed himself to be obliged to the creditor. This sealed instrument 
had been called "obligation" or "bond,,24. 
In reality such a bond was used by the parties to a transaction to enforce unilateral or 
bilateral promises. It contained a promise by a debtor to pay a certain sum of money to a 
creditor if another promise was not fulfilled by a certain date. If the undertaking was 
performed by the appointed date the bond would become void. In other words, the bond 
was conditioned of defeasance (the condition is usually written on the back of the bond) 
in the event that the terms of the promise were not fulfilled. The essential language25 of 
the money bond was as follows: Suppose, for instance, that A proposed to lend B £1000. 
B would execute a bond in favour of A for a larger sum, normally twice the sum lent, i.e. 
£2000, to be paid on an appointed day. The bond would be made subject to a condition of 
defeasance that if A paid the £1000 before the appointed date, the bond would be null. As 
well as the ordinary conditional bond there was a more sophisticated method, which was 
commonly used in the case of bilateral agreements. In these agreements the parties could 
make an indenture under seal setting in it the terms of the agreement. They would then 
each execute a bond of even the same date binding each other to pay what was usually a 
penal sum in the event of non-performance of the terms of the agreement. 
It should be noted from the above discussion that in spite of the fact that the common 
bond frequently acknowledged the existence of a debt due to the creditor, it was not a 
device to prove the debt, but was the method, which created the debt that owed by the 
debtor. Consequently, the creditor should show the bond to the court to have the right of 
action; if it was lost or ruined the creditor's right was also lost. On the other side, once 
24 Baker, J H. "An Introduction to English Legal History". 30d ed. 1990. P 368-370. Simpson, A.W.B. "A 
History ofa common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. P 88. Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations 
for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law Review. (1985) 10 503, at 504. 
2S Henderson, Edith G. "Relief from bonds in the English Chancery: Mid-Sixteenth Century". American 
Journal of Legal History (1974) 18298. 
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the debt in the bond was paid, it should be taken or destroyed by the debtor; otherwise he 
would be at some risk as that the main method to show that he paid the debt26. 
What made the penal bonds appropriate to be used as a security for the performance of 
different contracts is its flexibility where it is capable of casting all transactions in its 
form (such as money transaction, i.e, loan and sale of land)27. Furthermore, the bond 
received its popularity from the unambiguous imposition of the obligation. By 
performing the main obligation of the penal bond the debtor can keep himself safe and 
secure and avoid the penal sum stipulated in the bond. This is to say unless the condition 
of the bond was strictly performed, the entire amount of the principal obligation under the 
bond would remain due and payable. On top of that, the common use of penal bonds28 in 
medieval times was because of the obvious attraction from a creditor's point of view in 
contract, which is fixing a penalty in advance instead of its estimation by the juries. Also 
it made suing on a bond easier for the creditor, as it puts the burden of proof of 
performance of the condition upon the debto~9. 
1:2 Penal bond and general rule against usury 
Before the evolution of the penalty rule at common law where the court began to 
distinguish between liquidated damages and penalties3o, the penalty stipulated by private 
agreement and imposed by the bond was first viewed with some suspicion by the court as 
tending to be usurious. However, the general rule against usury in medieval common 
law3 ! did not apply to the penal bond since the penalty was in the nature of compensation 
for non-payment or non-performance. The difference between the transaction that 
involved usury and that involved penal bond was in determining the purpose of the sum 
taken in excess of the principal. Suppose that A bound himself as a debtor to pay £3000 
in case he did not pay £1500. Therefore if he paid the £1500 on time the bond, which 
26 Simpson, A.W.B. "A History ofa common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. P 95. 
27 Ibid. P 112-113. 
28 Although agreements under seal could have been used by an action of covenant. So the unpopularity of 
the action of covenant led to a proper development of action of debt. 
29 Simpson, A.W.B. "A History ofa Common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. P 117. 
30 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6. 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 
31 At this time the usury was sin and crime. 
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compels him to pay the double, would be void. However if he did not pay on time, he 
would be bound to pay the £3000 as compensation for the loss suffered by the creditor. 
On the other side, the usury is a sum of money that a debtor is bound to pay for the use of 
money lent by a creditor. In this situation the creditor was certain at the time of making 
the loan of money that he would be paid the sum of money stipulated for the use of the 
principal and not in case of the penal bond32• 
2-Evolution of penalty clause over centuries 
2:1 Penal bond in the fourteenth century 
The court of chancery had been established in the latter half of the fourteenth century as a 
result of the petitions which had been raised to the chancellor asking for relief from 
wrongs not granted by the common law or where the common law remedy had been 
insufficient. Equity was seen as "a ruled kind of justice", which tended to mitigate the 
harshness and danger of the common law that resulted from the traditions of consistency, 
which were growing around the courts. In other words, as the common law was inflexible 
at that time the chancery was an obvious forum for redress33• In Umfraville v. Lonstede34 
Beresford J. showed his unwillingness to enforce the penal stipulation. In this case the 
defendant Lonstede bound himself to pay the sum of £100 to the claimant Umfraville in 
the event that he had not delivered a written document by a certain day. The defendant 
failed to do so. The claimant claimed that the condition had not been fulfilled and 
demanded the penalty, while the defendant insisted that the claimant had suffered no loss 
and was ready to deliver the writing. Beresford J. said to the claimant: 
"You demand this debt because the writing was not delivered, and he says that 
before now he has tendered it, and that he tenders it now. Therefore it is well that 
you receive it. Moreover, this is not, properly speaking, a debt, it is a penalty, and 
with what equity (look out!) can you demand this penalty" 
It is clear that by the end of the fourteenth century, the idea of giving any relief against 
penalties was rejected by the courts of common law. They insisted on the enforceability 
of the penalty clauses. In other words, the common law courts insisted on giving the 
32 Simpson, A.W.B. "A History ofa Common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. P 114. 
33 Jones, WJ. "The Elizabethan Court ofO Chancery". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1967. P 447. Baker, J H. 
"An Introduction to English Legal History". 3nd ed. 1990. P 372. 
12 
parties the freedom to make their agreement and perfonn its tenns. The law governing 
bonds was a tough law, inspired by the general philosophy that it is not the business of 
the courts to remake private contracts; having made their bed the contracting parties must 
lie in ies. This means that the common law courts were still not giving any consideration 
to the fact that any penalty might not have been reflecting the true losses suffered upon 
breach. 
2:2 Fifteenth and sixteenth century 
It would appear that during the fifteenth century the courts of equity granted relief in the 
case of common money bond in cases of fraud, mistake or against the lost or destroyed 
instrument. Therefore the chancellors had started to intervene in relation to bond and 
grant relief in different circumstances36• First: the case where the debtor may have paid 
the debt however because he had left the bond in the creditor's hand was subject to 
another demand to pay the debt again. In other words, the chancellor intervened where 
the debtor had satisfied the bond on time and failed to take a fonnal acquittance by which 
the debtor could have proved the satisfaction of the sum of money stipulated in the 
bond37• In addition to this case the debtor prayed for more time as in spite of the fact that 
he had been willing and able to pay, some unexpected accident had hindered him doing 
so by the nominated date38• However in this century there had been no clear general 
jurisdiction to relieve against penalties, as such. 
In sixteenth century the jurisdiction to grant relief had blossomed and the chancery began 
to grant relief against penal bonds. It was established that the penal bonds had a 
compensatory function and so it was inequitable for the creditor to be overcompensated. 
Viz, the creditor should not be allowed to recover compensation in excess of the loss 
34 YB 2&3 Edw II Selden Society. P 58. 
3S Simpson, AW.B. "A History of a Common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. PP 112-
113. 
36 At Common law courts, the debtor had been still liable for the entire amount of the bond in these 
circumstances. 
37 Baker, J H. "An Introduction to English Legal History". 3nd ed. 1990. P 372. Marsh, Norman. "Penal 
Clauses in Contract: A Comparative study". Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law. 
P950] 32 66, at 69. 
8Jones, WJ. "The Elizabethan Court of Chancery". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1967. P 439. Holdsworth, Sir 
William. "A History of English Law". Methuen & Co Ltd. 1923. Vol. V . P 330. 
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suffered as a result of breach39• However, it was only in the mid-sixteenth century that 
chancery was prepared to make a serious effort to apply the theory of compensatory 
function. Chancery had become ready to go behind the form and put the theory in 
practice by asking in each ~ase whether the penalty ought to be forfeited if the general 
purpose of the law was to compensate rather than to punish4o. It should be noted that all 
these efforts were from the side of chancery courts and not from the common law courts 
where the creditor could still have the right to recover the entire penal sum in the bond. 
However, the chancellors did not also intervene to grant relief against paying the amount 
of penal bond on the ground that the sum due was simply a penalty as such. 
2:3 Penal bond in the seventeenth century 
2:3:1 The decline of penal bond 
The attitude of the court of chancery towards penal bonds from the end of sixteenth 
century and the beginning of the seventeenth century demonstrated the decline of the 
penal bond and extension of the rel,ief granted by the court itself. Sir George Cary 
summed up the practice of the chancellors at that time in a work based upon notes taken 
by William Lambard (d. 1601) who became a Master in Chancery in the year 1592. Sir 
George Cary said41 that: 
"If a man be bound of a penalty to pay money at a day or place, by obligation, and 
intending to pay the same, is robbed by the way; or hath intreated by some other 
respite at the hands of obligee, or cometh short of the place by any misfortune; 
and so failing of the payment, doth nevertheless provide and tender the money in 
short time after; in these, and many such like cases, the Chancery will compel the 
obligee to take his principal, with some reasonable consideration of his damages, 
(quantum expediat) for if this was not, men would do that by covenant which they 
now do by bond." 
He carried on pointin& out the case where the obligor has satisfied the most part of money 
bond and tendered the residue after the due date. He stated that: "If the obligee have 
received the most part of the money, payable upon the obligation at the peremptory time 
and place, and will nevertheless extend the whole forfeiture, immediately refusing soone 
39 Baker, J H. "An Introduction to English Legal History". 3nd ed. 1990. P 370. 
40 Simpson, A.W.B. "A History of a Common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. P 123. 
Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law Review. (1985) 10503, at 
505. 
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after the default, to accept of the residue tendered unto him, the obligor may find aid in 
Chancery,,42. 
Sir George Cary made it clear in the above quotation that relief should not be granted 
unless hardship is suffered by the debtor. In other words, by the end of sixteenth century 
and the beginning of seventeenth century the jurisdiction of relief was available on the 
same grounds that settled from the fifteenth century: mistake, accident and hardship. For 
example, where an accident prevented a debtor to pay on time, i.e. the payment after the 
due date, or if the greater part of the debt was paid before the due date, he received the 
Chancery's relief. However, it was clear that the chancellors had not yet begun to grant 
relief against penalties simply on the ground that they were penalties43. 
2:3:2 Reception of rule against penalties 
The basis for the relief, which had been evolved by the end of sixteenth century and, the 
beginning of seventeenth century, had been extended later in the seventeenth century. 
The extension was embraced with the reception of the penalty rule. It had become 
established that the court of chancery would relieve against money penal bonds on the 
payment of principal, interest and costs. In other words, by the aforementioned time, 
which was the time in which rule against penalties was received, equity started to prevent 
the recovery of penalty. This jurisdiction had been well illustrated in Friend v. Burgh44 
where it was said that: "the plaintiff being in execution, the defendant would not 
discharge him without payment of the penalty of the bond, which he having done, the 
court decreed the defendant to refund all, except the principal, interest and costs." 
Also relief was given against penalties due and payable for non-performance of covenant 
on payment of costs and damages. In this case the practice of the jurisdiction was for the 
Chancery to grant relief against penalty on condition that the debtor had paid damages. 
This had been made by sending the matter to a trial at law to estimate the damages on a 
41 See for that Simpson, A.W.B. "A History of a Common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
1987. P 118-119. 
42 Ibid. P 119. 
43 Ibid. 
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quantum damnifictus. 45 This case was illustrated in Wilson v. Barton46• The fonn of relief, 
which was granted in this case, was the grant of an injunction against the enforcement of 
the penal bond and sending the case at trial for assessing the damages on a quantum 
damnifictus. 
However, it should be noted that this intervention by the courts to grant relief against 
penalties (either against money penal bond or money perfonnance bond) would not be 
possible if the assessment of damages was impossible. Thus, if the amount agreed upon 
between the parties was appropriate damages for the loss suffered, the court would not 
intervene. That is, the test, which had come to be applied to distinguish penalties from 
liquidated damages, was based on the feasibility of compensation47. In Tall v. Rylamt8 
the agreement was between two fishmongers. The claimant gave the defendant a bond for 
£20 "conditioned to behave himself civilly and like a good neighbour and not to 
disparage his goods". Later on, the claimant asked one of the defendant's customers why 
he went to the defendant whose fish, the claimant said, stunk and so the defendant lost his 
customer. Because of this the defendant sued on bond and received a judgment. The 
claimant appealed to the Chancery to be relieved against penalty claiming that there was 
no substantial loss suffered by the defendant to recover the money penal bond and the 
defendant claimed also that there was no way to measure the damages. The court of 
Chancery declared that the demurrer of the defendant should be allowed by accepting the 
penalty stipulated as reasonable damages for him. 
As a result it can be said that where the assessment of compensation was possible the 
court would intervene to grant relief against penalties. However, Lords Keeper at the 
same time declared that: "this was not to be a precedent in the case of a bond of £ 1 00 or 
the like,,49. This indicated the fact that the court might not have relieved where the 
44 Friend v. Burgh [1679] Rep T Finch 437; 23 ER 238. 
4S Yale, DEC. "Lord Nottingham's Chancery Cases". Vol. 11,79 Selden Society. 1961. PIS. 
46 Willson v. Barton (1671-2) Nels. 148; 21 ER 812. 
47 Yale, DEC. "Lord Nottingham's Chancery Cases". Vol. 11,79 Selden Society. 1961. P 16. 
48 Tall v. Ryland (1670) 1 Ch. Ca. 183; 22 ER 753. Small v. Lord Fitzwilliams [1699] Prec. Ch. 102; 24 ER 
49. 
49 Ibid. At 184 and 753 respectively. 
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assessment of damages was impossible, however the court would not allow the recovery 
ofa penalty where it would be extravagant, i.e. ifit would have been £100. 
What became clear is that by the end of the seventeenth century the established 
jurisdiction to relieve against penalties by the courts of Chancery had become settled and 
rules for distinguishing penalties from liquidated damages began to emerge. The 
jurisdiction which equity had thus established over bonds in which a penalty had been 
inserted to secure the payment of principal and interest, and over the bonds and covenants 
conditioned on the performance of a particular act, was a serious challenge to the 
common law courts. This challenge was met not by prohibiting equitable modification of 
penalties but by giving the common law courts via acts of parliament the powers, which 
the court of chancery already enjoyed5o. Therefore, what was the effect of the legislative 
intervention on the matter of relief against penalties? 
2:3:3 Legislative Intervention 
In the late seventeenth century the common law courts started to adopt the approach of 
the courts of Chancery in granting relief against the penal money bond. Consequently, the 
legislator, by enacting 1696-97 Act and 1705 Act, intervened to declare the jurisdiction 
of the common law courts to grant relief against penal bonds. The (1696-97) Act5! gave 
the claimant, upon any bond or any penal sum for non-performance of any covenants, the 
right to assign as many breaches as he would think fit. Then it was the jury's duty to 
assess the damage suffered as a result of the breach or breaches concerned. The judgment 
could be entered for the whole penalty but the claimant could only recover the damages 
as the jury has assessed them52• 
It should be noted that the 1696-97 Act regulated the situation where the penal bond was 
conditioned for the non-performance of any covenant or agreement. This is to say that the 
act had not encompassed the situation where the penal bond was conditioned for the 
50 Marsh, Norman. "Penal Clauses in Contract: A Comparative Study". Journal of Comparative Legislation 
and International Law. (1950) 3266, at 69. 
51 Statute of8 & 9 Will. III. 
52 Ibid. Section 8. 
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payment of a certain sum on an appointed date. This is because as it can be inferred from 
the stipulation of the statute, where the obligation was a payment of sum of money the . 
damages suffered would be precisely determined and so there is no need for the 
intervention of the jury to determine that. However, in the event that the bond was for 
non-performance of any covenant the damage would need to be assessed by the jury to 
achieve equity. 
By the 1705 Act53 the common law courts were granted the jurisdiction to relieve against 
a penal bond if the debtor paid the amount of money, interest and cost due on the money 
bond even though the payment was late. Furthermore, the practice of the common law 
courts had been not to consider the debtor discharged if he had not taken a formal 
acquittance or release. As a result he would be subject to another action by the creditor. 
However, under the 1705 Act if the debtor paid the principal, interest and costs to the 
court he would be discharged. In other words, the payment would be considered as 
evidence of the satisfaction of the debt even though there was no formal acquittance 
taken54. 
The enactment of the statutes did not entail termination of the jurisdiction of the 
Chancellors. Though relief against penalties had been obtainable by the common law 
courts at the provisions of the statutes (1696-7 and 1705), the debtor had still had the 
right to seek relief from the courts of Chancery55. The jurisdiction that was given to the 
common law courts by the above two statutes did not deprive the courts of chancery of 
granting relief against penalties where the debtor could not receive any help at law56. 
Thus, the debtor sought relief in equity when he was unable to tender the principal, 
interest and costs at the time when the action was brought before the common law courts. 
2:4 Eighteenth Century 
The position, which equity had reached by the end of the seventeenth century for 
distinguishing penalties from liquidated damages was dependant on whether the 
S3 Statute of 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16. 
S4 Ibid. Sections 12 and 13. 
ss In cases when the provisions of statutes were not applied. 
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assessment of damages was possible or not. The difficulty and impossibility of assessing 
damages meant equity would not grant relief as the compensation here was thought to be 
liquidated damages. However it would grant relief where the assessment of damages was 
possible as the estimation in this instance was thought to constitute a penalty. This 
principle continued to develop into equity at eighteenth century. In Peachey v. The Duke 
of SomerestS7 Lord Macclesfield had declared the jurisdiction of relief against penalties 
where it was inserted to secure money. He said that: "The true ground of relief against 
penalties is from the original intent of the case, where the penalty is designed only to 
secure money and the court gives him all he expected or deserved"s8 
What is noticeable in this case is that the jurisdiction to relief against penalties was 
narrow, as it was not applied unless the penalty was stipulated in the deed to secure a sum 
of money. Subsequently, this limit upon relief had attracted the attention of equity since 
the penalty may serve to secure some obligations other than the payment of money. 
Therefore, in Sloman v. Walter 59 the jurisdiction was restated in a wider terms to include 
granting relief where the penalty was to secure the performance of a covenant. This case 
was concerned an agreement to run a coffee-house in which the claimant had the right to 
run the business and the defendant to use the room. The claimant gave the defendant a 
bond of £500, a penalty to secure his right of the enjoyment of using the room as agreed. 
When the court carrie to decide whether the £500 was in reality intended as a penalty or 
not, Lord Thurlow held the bond was unenforceable as it was a penalty. His Lordship had 
extended a wider scope for the jurisdiction of granting relief to include the case where the 
penalty was inserted to secure an object other than money. He stated that: 
"The only question was, whether this was to be considered as a penalty, or as 
assessed damages. The rule, that where a penalty is inserted merely to secure the 
enjoyment of a collateral object, the enjoyment of the object is considered as the 
principal intent of the deed, and the penalty only as accessional, and, therefore, 
only to secure the damage really incurred, is too strongly established in equity to 
be shaken,,6o 
56 Codd v. Wooden (1790) 3 Bro ee 73; 29 ER 415 
57 Peachey v. The Duke ofSomerest (1721) 1 Strange 447; 93 ER 626 
58 Ibid. 
59 Sloman v. Walter (1784) 1 Bro. c.e. 418; 28 ER 1213. 
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Accordingly, where the sum stipulated as a penalty was to secure another obligation, such 
as in this case the enjoyment of using the room, relief against penalty would be granted to 
the claimant. 
It can be concluded that the principle distinguishing penalties, which the court would 
relieve against, and liquidated damages, which the court would not do so, had become 
settled by the end of the eighteenth century as follows: "if the sum fixed represented an 
agreement by the parties as to the amount of the damages, in a case where it would be 
otherwise difficult to ascertain the quantum, the sum fixed was not a penalty, and could 
be recovered as liquidated damages,,61. 
2:5 Nineteenth Century Developments 
The modem law of penalties and liquidated damages doctrine emerged at the beginning 
of nineteenth century when the court chose to disregard the intention of the parties as 
expressed in the contract 62. At this time the courts developed the principle of the 
unenforceability of the penalty clause. This development has been established after the 
common law courts dealt with Astley v. Weldon63 which was "the spark" and Kemble v. 
Farren64 which was the "flame,,65. 
In Astley v. Weldon 66 there was an agreement between an owner of a theatre and an 
actress in which the latter was paid a small salary and required to observe a number of 
covenants including to perform and attend at the theatre subject to the fines established at 
the theatre. It was provided for in the agreement that each party would be responsible to 
pay the other £200 in the event of any default. This sum was neither described in the 
agreement as liquidated damages nor a penalty. When the actress defaulted, the owner of 
60 Ibid. At 419 and 1214 respectively. 
61 Fletcher v. Dyche (1787) 2 TR 32, at 36-37; 100 ER 18. 
62 See for details about the intention test, which was adopted first by the English case law to distinguish 
between liquidated damages and penalties. See infra. P 47. 
63Astley Weldon (1801) 2 B& P 346; 126 ER 1318. 
64 Kemble v. Faren (1829) 6 Being 141; 130 ER 1234. 
6S Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law Review. (1985) 10503, at 
508. 
66 Astley Weldon (1801) 2 B & P 346; 126 ER 1318. 
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the theatre brought an action to recover the sum stipulated. It was held that the sum 
stipulated was a penalty. Chambre J. said that: "there is one case in which the sum agreed 
for must always be considered as a penalty, and that is, where the payment of a smaller 
sum is secured by a larger" 
In Kemble v. Farren67 the facts were not unlike the facts of Astley case. However, in the 
former the parties to the agreement had stipulated that in the event of not performing the 
contractual obligations either party should pay £1000. This sum was described in the 
agreement as liquidated damages. In reality this case was considered as a milestone in the 
law of penalties where the court refused to apply the intention of the parties as expressed 
and held the sum stipulated as a penalty. From this case onward the description given by 
the parties in the contract was no longer conclusive in determining the nature of the 
stipulated sum either as a liquidated damages or penalty. 
2:6 Establishment of rules that distinguish penalties from liquidated damages in the 
twentieth century 
The rule against penalties had become established at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. At this time the state of the modem English case law has been clarified by the 
House of the Lords. After the courts had decided to disregard the intention of the parties 
as the test for determining the nature of the agreed damages, the House of Lord 
introduced the new test. The new test was based on the notion that if the sum stipulated is 
extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss that might be 
suffered as a result of breach, it will be struck down as a penalty68. This is what has been 
firstly put forward in Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos 
yzquierdo Y Castaneda 69, and marked then in Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co 
Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd70, which is regarded as the milestone of the current 
law of penalties. In the latter case the House of Lords were required to determine the fate 
67 Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234. 
68 Infra. P 52. 
69 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6. 
7°Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
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of the distinction between penalties and liquidated damages and to state the principles 
upon which the relief ag~inst penalties would be granted7l • 
2.7 Jordanian civil law 
Jordanian civil law is described as one of the Roman law family, which was not, in 
general, averse to penal damages in excess of the actual loss suffered. Penalty clause was 
the appropriate method of guaranteeing the performance of a particular contractual 
obligation and providing pre-estimate of damages in the event of the non performance of 
the chief undertaking72• Though one of the objects of the enforcement of penalty clauses 
was to compensate the promisee for his actual losses, their enforcement was mainly to 
compel the promisor to perform and penalise him in case of non performance 73 • 
Therefore in classical Roman law all penalty clauses were enforceable irrespective of 
their excessiveness. 
Unlike in English law, the provision, which required one of the parties to a contract to 
pay a sum of money by way of penalty for the non-performance of the principal 
obligation 74, has not a very long history in Jordanian Law. 
Although Majalt Al-Ahkam Adlieh as a law of contract was applied in Jordan, it had no 
indication or stipulation with regard to penalty clauses. Therefore it should be noted that 
the rules governing penal stipulations were first codified in Law of civil procedures of 
195275• In this law it was remarkable that the incentive of the makers of the law was to 
introduce solutions for the developments in transactions between the people and to avoid 
any difficulties they might encounter in enacting a modem civil law. This was the 
71 This case will be an object of explanation throughout the work. 
72 Marsh, Norman. "Penal Clauses in Contract: A Comparative Study". Journal of Comparative Legislation 
and International Law. [1950] 32, p 66. 
73 Ibid. Benjamin, Peter. "Penalties, Liquidated damages and Penal Clauses in Commercial Contracts: A 
Comparative Study of English and Continental Law". The International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 
(1960) 9, 600. At 607. 
74 It should be mentioned that the principal method to fulfill the obligations under Jordanian civil law is to 
compel the debtor to carry out his contractual undertakings in accordance with the terms set out in that 
contract. This issue will be approached in the second chapter. 
7S Published in the formal Journal No. 1113. 1952. P 288. 
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position until the enactment of the Jordanian civil law of 1976, which replaced the civil 
procedures law 1952 in regulating penalty clauses in contracts 76. 
Thus Jordanian civil law and also the regulation of principles of _ agreed penalty 
stipulations have a recent birth in almost late twentieth century. This law contains article 
364, which controls the rules of penalty clauses as follows: 
1- Contracting parties may stipulate, in their contract, the amount of damages in advance. 
This contractual term is called "liquidated damages or penalty clause~'. 
2- The courts may, upon the request of either party, increase or decrease such damages 
to make it equal to the actual damage sustained by the injured party. Any agreement 
to the contrary shall be null and void. 
It is interesting to not that Jordanian law still abides by Roman law and enforces penalty 
clauses in contracts. Therefore there is no reason to distinguish penalty clauses from 
liquidated damages so long as they are both enforceable. However as the other legal civil 
systems Jordanian law has shifted from the literal enforcement of penalty clauses to the 
position of granting courts the discretion to adjust these clauses if asked by the parties. 
The rule of adjustment is of public policy whereas the parties cannot stipulate in their 
agreement that the amount of penalty cannot be reduced or increased by the court. This is 
to say that any agreement to expropriate the power of adjustment from courts is null and 
void. It is sufficient to indicate the words of the above two parts of article 364, as it will 
be an object of comments and analysis in following parts of this thesis. 
3- ANew Approach 
3.1 Introduction 
The current position of English case law regarding penalty clauses is open to criticism. 
The mechanical application of the current rules may lead to the invalidation of many of 
stipulated damages clauses 77 leaving the injured party to resort to the court again to prove 
76 Civil Cassation. No. 391187. Bar Association Journal. 1990. P 234. 
77 Where they are penalties. 
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his actual loss. As a result some of the advantages gained in agreeing on damages 
beforehand are lost. Therefore this section seeks to develop a new approach to the 
enforceability of stipulated damages clauses. 
Numerous judges and commentators have expressed their exasperation and criticism of 
the current penalty rule and called for reform. The confusion of the courts and 
commentators about the distinction between an enforceable liquidated damages clause 
and an unenforceable penalty clause arises from an irrational legal rule. In Robophone 
Facilities Ltd v. Blanes, Lord Justice Diplock remarked that the English case law rule 
against penalties has defied rationalism. He pointed out that the court always refuses to 
enforce penalty clauses in contracts stating that: "I make no attempt, where so many 
others have failed, to rationalise this common law rule,,79. 
Criticism can also be observed in some American cases80. In 1854 a New York Court of 
Appeal remarked that even: "The ablest judges have declared that they felt themselves 
embarrassed in ascertaining the principle on which the decisions [distinguishing 
liquidated damages from penalties] ... were founded" 81. This comment has remained 
remarkablely effective. Therefore it was subsequently commented that "It is not to be 
denied that there is some conflict, and more confusion, in the cases; judges have been 
long and constantly complaining of the confusion and want harmony in the decisions 
upon this subject,,82. In Evans v. Moseley83 it was said about the law of penalties that: 
"There is no branch of the law on which a unanimity of decision is more difficult to find, 
or on which more illogical and inconsistent holdings may be found". Also in Sanders & 
78 Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128. 
79 Ibid. At 142. 
80 See for these cases Harwood, William. "Comments: Liquidated Damages: A Comparison of The 
Common Law and the Uniform Commercial Code". Fordham Law Review, (1977) 45, 1349. Clarkson, 
Kenneth, Miller, Roger and Muris, Timothy. "Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Non Sense?" 
Wisconsin Law Review. [I978] 351. Coopersmith, Jeferey. "Comments: Refocusing Liquidated Damages 
Law for Real Estate Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots of the Penalty Doctrine". Emory Law 
J ourna!. (1990) 39 267. 
81 Cotheal v. Talmage (1854) 9 N.Y. 551, 553. 
82 Jaquith v. Hudson (1858) 5 Mich 123, at 132. 
83 Evans v. Moseley (1911) 84 Kan, 322, at 324 
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Ables v. Carter84 it was stated that: "What construction should be placed on contracts 
[where damages are liquidated], is a question which has long vexed and perplexed the 
courts both of this country and of England". Therefore it was observed that: "No branch 
of the law is involved in more obscurity by contradictory decisions than whether a sum 
specified is an agreement to secure performance will be treated as liquidated damages or 
a penalty,,85. 
Another well-known contract law academic, Treitel G H observed in his book that: 
"The COMMON LA W rules for distinguishing between penalties and liquidated 
damages manage to get the worst of both worlds. They achieve neither the certainty of 
the principle of literal enforcement, since there is always some doubt as to the 
category into which the clause will fall, nor the flexibility of the principle of 
enforcement subject to reduction, since there is no judicial power of reduction. On the 
other hand, they place an undue premium on draftsmanship ... the chief danger is to 
"home-made" clauses which may be invalidated even though they are not intrinsically 
unfair" 86 
Attention should also be paid to the English Law Commission proposal of 199387• The 
Commission recommended the revision of the English law of liquidated damages. It 
included new rules to replace the current distinction b~tween liquidated damages and 
penalties. It establishes a strong presumption in favour of the enforceability of all agreed 
damages clauses. It however gives the court the power to reduce the amount of agreed 
damages in certain cases. The proposal recognizes a manifestly disproportionate criterion 
as a basis for claiming the reduction of the stipulated sum. However where the court, 
after taking all the circumstances88 into consideration, is satisfied that "it is reasonable for 
the stipulated sum to be recovered, the court shall award the stipulated sum" 89. This 
proposal is further evidence that the law in this area is in need of revision. 
84 Sanders & Ables v. Carter (1893) 91 Ga 450, at 451. 
8S Giesecke v. Cullerton (1917) 117 N.E 777, at 778. 
86 Treite1, S. H. "Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Comparative Account". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 
1988. P 233. 
87 See McGregor, Harvey. "Contract Code". Drawn up on behalf of the English Law Commission. 1993. P 
132-135. 
88 At the time of contracting, breach and trial. 
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Therefore the current law needs new rules to govern the agreement of parties to a contract 
on damages beforehand. In essence there is a need to adopt a New Approach supporting 
the idea of freedom of contract, whilst achieving justice which the current law seeks to 
meet under the existing position relating to penalties. However removing all penalty 
clauses out of a contract is not the best solution to achieve fair treatment and a fair deal 
between parties. Thus there should be a better policy to follow, which makes the English 
Law meets the international demands where in most legal systems penalty clauses are 
legally enforceable while in others notably in English Law they are not. 
3.2 What is the New Approach 
The New Approach runs as follows: 
1- When the contract provides that a party who fails to perform is to pay an agreed 
penalty90 as damages, the court shall award the specified sum no greater no smaller 
and irrespective of the actual loss suffered91 • 
2- However, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, the court will have the 
power to reduce the amount of penalty where it is manifestly disproportionate to the 
actual loss. 
3- The court will also have in a very limited case the power to increase the penaltl2 
where it is manifestly derisory in comparison with the actual loss provided such 
penalty was a result of domination of defaulting party over the injured one. 
3.3 Exposition of the New Approach 
3.3.1 Enforcement of all penalty clauses subject to courts' power of modification 
While, not denying all judicial intervention over penalty clauses, the New Approach93 
calls for the enforcement of all penalty clauses without proof of loss and irrespective of 
89 The proposal gives example of this case any relevant commercial or trade practice. See article 445 (a) of 
the proposal. 
90 Or whatever it is called in the contract: stipulated sum, agreed damages, liquidated damages or any term 
indicates the agreement on damages between the parties in advance. 
91 Without proof of loss and irrespective of the amount of the provable loss, however the party seeking to 
avoid the clause should prove the sum being manifestly disproportionate to the actual loss. 
92 This point will be dealt with when approaching the situation where penalty turns out to be less than 
actual loss suffered. Infra. P 187. 
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the amount of the provable loss, and that any judicial intervention to reduce the sum 
stipulated should be seen as an exceptional measure. In other words, the New Approach 
establishes a strong presumption in favour of the injured party that the amount estimated 
under the penalty clause is the proper recoverl4• However, to enforce all penalty clauses, 
regardless of their harshness, would be inequitable9s• What is therefore suggested is that 
the court may, in certain circumstances, have the power to reduce an agreed penalty 
clause in line with the actual 10ss96. It is only where the sum stipulated is manifestly 
disproportionate97 to the actual loss suffered upon breach98 that the court will be able to 
93 To see how the New Approach differs from alternative approaches see infra P 169-173. 
94 Fenton, James. "Liquidated Damages as Prima Facie Evidence". Indiana Law Journal. (1975) 51 189, at 
197. 
9S They are arbitrary liquidated damages set high enough in order to compel performance and deter breach 
without the genuine assent of the defaulting party and without relation to the actual damages. In such a case 
there is no real agreement between the parties concerning the penalty clause. See for this note Hatzis, 
Aristides. "Having the Cake and Eating it Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil Contract 
Law". International Review of Law and Economics. (2003) 22 381, at 393. 
96 However in order to determine whether the agreed penalty is manifestly disproportionate to actual loss 
the court is to take into account all circumstances existing at the time of contracting, at breach and at trial. 
97 Under the existing law as to penalties the courts will not intervene to strike down penalty clauses in 
contracts unless the requisite degree between the sum stipulated and likely actual loss, as cases describe it, 
is "Unconscionable", "Extravagant", "out of all proportion" and "exorbitant". The Principles of European 
Contract Law use the term "grossly excessive". Article 9.509 provides that: 
(2) However, despite any agreement to the contrary the specified sum may be reduced to a 
reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the loss resulting from non-
performance and the other circumstances." 
However under the New Approach to rebut the presumption raised in favour of the enforceability of the 
penalty clause the defaulting party should show evidence that the amount agreed upon in the clause is 
manifestly disproportionate to the actual loss. Put another way, the New Approach recognises a manifestly 
disproportionate criterion as the basis for claiming a reduction of the stipulated sum. It could be said that 
the selection amongst the different alternatives of "Manifestly disproportionate" as the preferred criterion 
makes little difference to the outcome. It only emphasises that the court will have the power of reduction 
when the stipulated sum is too great to represent ajust compensation. Therefore the mere fact that the sum 
stipulated is in small way in excess of actual loss will not excite courts intervention. "But it is thought that 
"manifestly disproportionate" is to be preferred as a more sober tenn, free from the emotive overtones of 
the others" (See McGregor, Harvey. "Contract Code". Drawn up on behalf of the English Law Commission. 
1993. P 132-135) 
The verbal formula, i.e. manifestly disproportionate, adopted in the New Approach is the same as in 
Contract Code (CC). It is the tenn "grossly excessive" which the Principles of European Contract Law 
(PECL) adopt. In the end the words used may make little practical difference. Both CC and PECL make all 
penalty clauses enforceable and so support the idea of raising a presumption in favour of the enforceability 
of all penalty clauses adopted under the New Approach. However the substantial difference between these 
systems and the New Approach is that in the provisions relevant to the exercise of power of reduction in the 
CC and PECL are not to some extent clear. Article 4451b of CC provides the court a power to "award any 
lesser sum that it considers reasonable". Article 9.509 of the PECL provides that: "the specified sum may 
be reduced to a reasonable amount". It appears that the PECL directs the court to only consider the actual 
loss without any reference to the circumstances envisages at the time the contract is made. Therefore Both 
CC and PECL simply leave the matter to the discretion of the court to reduce the stipulated sum to a 
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control and exercise its power to reduce it. However what does the actual loss mean in 
this context? 
3.3.1.1 The actualloss99, which is relevant under the New Approach 
It is well established that the agreed damages clause is inserted in contract in favour of 
the injured party as a protection against the losses he might suffer upon breach. It should 
be noted that in the event that the defaulting party proves that the amount of penalty is . 
manifestly disproportionate to actual lossloo, the reduction of the agreed penalty is still a 
policy working in favour of injured party. The court's power of reduction will not destroy 
the protection the parties sought to give the injured party under the penalty clause. The 
injured party may quite probably recover (under the New Approach) more by way even 
of a reduced penalty than he would have recovered by way of damages in the absence of 
a penalty clause. This is because it is the actual loss rather than the recoverable loss, 
which is relevant to the exercise of the power of reduction. Accordingly the court should 
take into consideration every legitimate interest of the injured party. The court therefore 
might consider not only the pecuniary losses but also the non-pecuniary losseslol , which 
are not always recoverable by the ordinary way of damages. This means that the actual 
reasonable amount and only CC directs the court to only consider that if custom and trade practice indicates 
that penalty clauses are appropriate in certain cases then the clauses should be enforced. In contrast under 
the New Approach the court would reduce the sum to actual loss. The approach explicitly directs the court 
to consider all the lawful interests of the injured party. (See for the meaning of actual loss infra P. 28). 
Furthermore under the New Approach the court will take into consideration that a manifestly 
disproportionate penalty clause might still be enforceable as demonstrated in the three circumstances below. 
In other words, the New Approach directs the court to consider the circumstances as envisaged at the time 
of making the contract. See infra P. 30-36. 
98 This means that when the stipulated sum is merely in excess of the loss actually sustained does not give 
the court the right to modify it. 
99 To know how it differs from the recoverable loss see infra P 108-109 which includes the meaning of the 
recoverable loss under the existing law. 
100 The amount of reduction under the new approach should be in line with actual loss. This is because ifit 
was the recoverable loss that is relevant there would be no point at all for the agreement on damages in 
advance since the matter would be always of estimating the damages by the court. For the advantages of 
estimation of damages beforehand see the introduction (p I) of the thesis. 
101 For example the courts have consistently refused to allow recovery of damages for distress from a 
breach of a commercial contract. However recent case suggested that such recovery may be expanding. 
Farley v Skinner [2001] 3 WLR 899. See for this Halson, Roger, Bradgate, Robert and others. "The Law of 
Contract". 2nd ed. Butterworth. 2003. P 1448-1450. 
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loss, for the purposes of reducing the agreed penalty in the event that the defaulting party 
has proved it was manifestly disproportionate to loss, might include: 
1- What the injured party can recover under unliquidated damages, i.e. recoverable loss 
under the so-called rule in Hadley v. Baxendale102 • 
2- Damages for losses which are too remote under the so-called Hadley v. Baxendale 
rule as suggested by Diplock LJ in Robophone case, but not for losses that could be 
mitigated under the rule ofmitigationl03• 
3- The court might consider the pure speculative losses and non-pecuniary losses that 
are not recoverable at law when it exercises its discretionary power of reduction. 
By accepting the New Approach the notion of making a distinction between liquidated 
damages and penalties will no longer exist as according to the suggested approach the 
penalty clause will no longer be struck out of the contract. The court will not wholly 
disregard such kinds of clauses. Rather it will have the authority to reduce their amounts 
in line with the actual loss. This test enables full compensation to the injured party since 
the clause will be enforced as long as the defaulting party is unable to show that actual 
loss is substantially less than the amount of penalty. 
3.3.2 Advantages of the New Approach 
The New Approach will promote the advantages that derive from the prior agreement of 
damages beforehand. The parties often draft agreed damages clauses in the hope that such 
clauses will prevent the need for future litigation with its attendant costs. Such costs 
could be avoided if the law calls for the enforcement of all agreements on damages in 
advance. The New Approach will go some way to achieving this purpose through the 
following advantages. 
102Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 156 ER 145. 
103 See the remoteness and mitigation rules explained infra. P 109-113. 
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3.3.2.1 The New Approach leads to greater respect for the doctrine of freedom of 
contract 
The New Approach will be preferable to the existing law as a way to reconcile agreed 
damages clauses with the doctrine of freedom of contract. One approach for bringing the 
agreed damages clause into conformity with freedom of contract rules is to re-establish 
the basis of the bargain. This could be done by giving the court a power to reduce and not 
strike down manifestly disproportionate agreed damages clause. If the parties truly 
intended to provide an alternative to litigation through the incorporation of an agreed 
damages clause, then this intention should be recognised. Instead of invalidating the 
provision as the existing law of penalties has a tendency to favour, courts should be given 
a discretionary power to reduce its amount in line with actual loss suffered. This is to say 
granting courts authority to reduce the sum stipulated when it is manifestly 
disproportionate to actuallosslO4 • Therefore it is a valuable reason to say that: the general 
rule that contracts should be respected. This has been pointed out in Export Credits 
Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products COIOS: 
"It is not and never has been for the courts to relieve a party from the 
consequences of what may in the event prove to be an onerous or possibly even a 
commercially imprudent bargain" 
The courts appear to be reluctant to free parties from a bad bargain and are keen to 
uphold freedom of the parties to a contract in the way they choose. What the parties have 
agreed should be normally enforced. "Any other approach will lead to undesirable 
uncertainty especially in commercial contracts"106. Courts should not intervene to reduce, 
under the New Approach, agreed penalty clauses in contracts unless the substantive 
unfairness is manifest. This is because the court should not easily use equity to grant 
relief against penalties but instead will give effect to the express terms of the contract. 
Any relief granted by the court should be seen as an exceptional measure. 
104 DiMatteo, Larry A. "A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Elimination the Law of Liquidated Damages". 
American Business Law Journal. (2001) Vol. 38. Part 4 633, at 728. 
lOS Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399. 
106 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 59. See also 
Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966 ] All ER 128, at 142 per Diplock LJ. 
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3.3.2.2 The New Approach will give courts a power to consider the matter at the 
time of contracting and at breach 
Courts will not be restricted to the time of contracting in order to examine whether or not 
a penalty clause is manifestly disproportionate to actual loss. In the event of litigation 
court will be entitled to make a thorough investigation to ensure whether or not it is 
appropriate to intervene and exercise its power of reduction. Enabling the court to reduce 
the amount payable under a penalty clause facilitates the way to enforcing as closely as 
possible what the parties have agreed in advance. Parties to a contract may have had 
different reasons to stipulate for a penalty manifestly disproportionate to the recoverable 
loss. Therefore it does not suffice for the defaulting party in order to claim a reduction to 
prove that the sum stipulated is manifestly disproportionate to the recoverable loss if the 
court is satisfied that in the circumstances and particular facts of the case the clause 
should be enforceable. Put another way, the clause might seem a manifestly 
disproportionate in comparison with the recoverable loss. But under the New Approach 
the clause would still be enforceable as it should be compared with the actual loss 
suffered. Therefore the sum stipulated should be manifestly disproportionate to the actual 
loss in order to excite the courts' intervention. This might occur in the following 
situations: 
Firstly, a manifestly disproportionate penalty might have been included in the contract 
because the parties knew that in the event of non-performance the injured party would not 
be properly or satisfactorily compensated through an unliquidated damages action. In 
other words, the enforcement of the parties' agreement would permit them to correct for 
undercompensation by the conventional remedies for breachl07. Undercompensation may 
occur when the damages can not be recovered for disappointment and distress that might 
result from a breach of a commercial contrad08• It may also arise in many commercial 
contracts where the rule against recovery of uncertain damages prevents full 
107 This is already supported by the remarks of Diplock LJ in Robophone Facilities v. Blank [1966] 3 All 
ER 128. According to this view it can be said that the actual loss and not recoverable loss which will be 
considered to the exercise of the power of reduction. By doing this the injured party would recover more 
than he would have recovered under the nonnal way of damages. See the difference between recoverable 
loss and actual loss above. 
108 Hayes v. James and Charles Dodd [1990] 2 All ER 815. In this case Staughton LJ stated (at 823) that: "I 
would not view with enthusiasm the prospect that every shipowner in the Commercial Court, having 
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compensation for breachl09• For example, when actual loss is in the nature of predicted 
profits, recovery may be refused on the ground that such loss is purely speculativello, i.e 
the claimant can not show that any profit will be made I II. Consequently although these 
losses may be expected and predictable at the time of making· the contract, they may be 
difficult to prove at the time of breach, and so contribute to undercompensation for a 
breach 112. Without an enforceable penalty clause intending to liquidate damages, the 
injured party may fear that the defaulting party will have insufficient incentive to perform, 
if he realises that the damages he has caused will not be provable and so escape from his 
liability to compensate for the losses sustainedl13 • 
Secondly, the injured party may also have paid a price higher than the normal one under 
the contract to obtain the other party's agreement in order to stipulate for penalty greater 
successfully claimed for unpaid freight or demurrage, would be able to add a claim for mental distress 
suffered while he was waiting for his money". 
109 Kaplan, Phillip R. "A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages". Southern California 
Review. (1977) 55 1055, at 1058-1059. 
I \0 There is no substantial chance to make the profits. A clear example, in which the court refused to award 
damages as the loss was so speculative, can be found in the classic example of this principle in the 
Australian case of McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission (1951) 84 CLR 377. In this case the 
court was able only to award damages to the claimants to compensate them for their expenses incurred in 
making an attempt to fulfill their contractual duties. 
IIIHowever it should be noted that where the loss is not purely speculative, but there is a real loss of chance 
the court will attempt the measurement of the loss and award damages accordingly. The court will attempt 
to put some value on an expectation even what is lost is no more than an opportunity to take the risk of 
making a profit, rather than a certain loss of a speculative profit. A clear example for that can be found in 
Chaplin v. Hicks [1911] 2 KB 786. In this case the claimant made a contract to enter a beauty contest. She 
won the earlier stages and prevented from competing in the final stages of the contest contrary to the terms 
of the contract. She was able to recover damages for that lost opportunity, although there was no certainty 
that she would have been successful. It can be said that despite the opportunity to succeed was something 
uncertain (likely), the loss of it was certain damage and the claimant should be compensated for. The court 
could not assess the likelihood of the claimant winning the contest but they awarded her damages of £ I 00 
to represent her loss of a chance to win the contest. The distinction in here is made between the cases in 
which the there is a real or tangible loss of a chance of obtaining the prize in the case and where the loss is 
mere speculative when the claimant could not show that any profit would be made. This distinction was 
clearly confirmed in Allied Maples Group Ltd v. Simmons & Simmons [1995] 4 All ER 907 where the 
Court of Appeal held that the claimant was entitled to succeed in its action since it had established on the 
balance of possibilities that there was a substantial chance of negotiating a better deal and not merely a 
speculative chance. This was reaffirmed in Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) 
v. Ali [1999] 4 All ER 83 which was concerned of loss of chance of employment. See for this Poole, Jill. 
"Textbook on Contract". 7111 ed. Blackstone Press. 2004. P 417-418. 
112 An example in wartime procurement contracts it may be impossible to establish the losses caused by 
delay or defective performance by the promisor. 
113 Sweet, Justin. "Liquidated Damages in California". California Law Review. (1972) 60 84, at 86. 
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than the actual loss that might be suffered as a result of breach 114. If the injured party can 
feel secure that a contractual penalty will be enforced, he will benefit by certainty and 
adequacy of compensation. This can not be achieved under the existing penalty rule, as 
the invalidation of penalty clause in this situation ignores the risk allocations that have 
been made at the time of making the contract. The fairness inquiry should, as a first step, 
address itself to the fairness of the entire contract process from the negotiation until the 
time of breach. If the negotiation process works properly then it can be said that the 
penalty clause reflects the fact that the parties have capitalised the risk of breach and 
included this value in the pricel1S• This is to say that the defaulting party might have 
agreed on the amount of penalty clause, as the injured party in return agreed to a price 
higher than the usual price. It would be improper to refuse the enforcement of a penalty 
clause in such a situation. In other words, the non-enforcement of penalty clause may be 
seen as a reverse penalty. The defaulting party profited from receiving a higher price for 
stipulating illusory insurance by way of an unenforceable agreed damages clause. If a 
court drops the penalty clause out of the contract, there remains a possibility that the 
unliquidated loss recognised by the court may not completely recompense the injured 
party for the losses he insured against by way of higher contract price. 
In the two situations just discussed if non-performance arises and there is an absence of 
judicial power of reduction, the penalty may be struck down as unconscionable and the 
injured party's only way would be to resort to a claim for unliquidated damages. It was 
seen that the parties may agree on damages beforehand to avoid such a remedy as it 
would sometimes be insufficient to compensate the injured party and operate to the 
advantage of the defaulting party who breached the contract. However, granting the 
courts a power to reduce the stipulated sum would, in the event of litigation, prevent the 
114 DiMatteo, Larry A. "A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Elimination the Law of Liquidated Damages". 
American Business Law Journal. (2001) vol. 38. Part 4 633, at 697. Kaplan, Phillip R. "A Critique of the 
Penalty Limitation on Liquidated Damages". Southern California Review. (1977) 55 1055, at 1072. 
115 For instance, suppose that X agreed to sell his building, which was worth £400,000, for £500,000. Yin 
order to accept this higher price inserted in the contract an agreed penalty clause of £900,000 and X agreed 
to contract on this. Thus why such an agreement on damages in advance should not be respected and 
enforced? 
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defaulting party from achieving unfair advantages l16 • In other words, the new approach 
helps to preclude the defaulting party from taking advantage in the event that he ensures 
penalties will be struck down. This is because under the existing law he will pay less than 
the damages payable if the agreed penalty is upheld and no burden of proof is cast upon 
him, but the injured party who should furnish proof of his actual loss. Thus, in order to 
avoid the risk of systematic undercompensation to the injured party, it is preferable to 
give effect to the contractual penalties accompanied with the courts' authority to reduce 
their amount in line with the actual loss suffered. 
Thirdly: where the usual practice of a certain trade adopts a policy of inserting penalty 
clauses negotiated at arm's length, it would seem that the intention of the parties is 
preferable to be appJiedll7. Put another way, if custom and trade usage indicate that a high 
agreed damages clause is appropriate in certain situations then it should be enforced. This 
is clearly illustrated in charterparty cases in the event of improper detention of ship by 
charterer. A demurrage clausell8 is sum of money agreed by the charterer to be paid as 
liquidated damages for delay beyond a stipulated or reasonable time for loading or 
unloading. In some old cases this extra time has been referred to as 'lay days that have to 
be paid for,\I9. However in the modern cases it has been authoritatively stated that the 
provisions as to demurrage quantify the whole of the damages resulting from the 
charterer's breach of contrad20 in detaining the vessel beyond the stipulated timel21 and 
the charterer's liability for such damages is to pay the amount of demurrage, no less no 
116 Mattei, Ugo. "The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts". The American 
Journal of Comparative Law. (1995) 43 427, at 441. 
117 McGregor, Harvey. "Contract Code". Drawn up on behalfofthe English Law Commission 1993. P 132-
134. 
118 See Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 
36 I, at 4 I 5 per Lord Hodson. The President of India v. Lips Maritime Corporation [1988] AC 399, at 422 
~er Lord Brandon. 
19 Lilly v. Stevenson (1895) 22 R 278, at 286 per Lord Trayner. 
120 See The President of India v. Lips Maritime Corporation [1988] AC 395, at 422 per Lord Brandon: "I 
deal first with what demurrage is not. It is not money payable by the charterer as the consideration for the 
exercise by him of the right to detain a chartered ship beyond the stipulated lay days. If demurrage were, 
that, it would be a liability sounding in debt. I deal next with what demurrage is. It is a liability in damages 
to which a charterer becomes subject because, by detaining the chartered ship beyond the stipulated lay 
days, he is in breach of contract". Halson, Roger, Bradgate, Robert and others. 'The Law of Contract'. 2nd 
ed. Butterworth. 2003. P 1499. 
121 See for details Mocatta, Alan, Mustill, Michael and Boyd, Stewart. "Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills 
of Lading". 19th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 1984.P 305-308. 
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more. Hence under the current law as a matter of commercial practice and habit 
demurrage clauses are normally considered valid liquidated damages l22since the sum is 
payable on breach and graduated in line with the size of that breach 123. 
Therefore the court does not uphold or accept the claim that the sum stipulated is 
inadequate one for dem~rrage, as it is, as Lord Hodson stated in Suisse case "quite clear 
on the authorities l24 that the parties need not agree on a true estimate of damage. They are 
perfectly entitled to agree on a low rate"l2S. However attention should be paid to the case 
of Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos126. In this case an owner chartered his vessel to a 
charterer to load a full and complete cargo of sawed timber for the United Kingdom. The 
charter provided for loading in a fixed time and if the vessel were detained beyond this 
time, demurrage was to be paid at so much a day. The charterer exceeded the stipulated 
time and the court held the owner to be entitled to demurrage and damages for the loss he 
has incurred. Thus, it might be asserted 127 that the outcome of this case supports any 
owner to claim that his damages are not limited to demurrage. However it seems that this 
argument is unsound. It should be noted that damages were given in addition to 
demurrage in Aktieselskabet case, as delay there gave rise to breaches of further 
obligations, i.e. to load a full and complete cargo, for which damages are recoverable.l28. 
This is clearly clarified in Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centralem where Lord Hodson stated that: "I do not find that the 
[shipowners] can find support from the decision of the Court of Appeal in the case of 
Aktieselskabet Reidar v. ArcosJ3O "131. The verdict in this case was based on the fact that 
122 Chandris v. Isbrandtsen-Moller Co Inc [1951] 1 KB 240. Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement 
Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kalen Centrale [1967] AC 361. 
123 For more details about graduated sum as valid liquidated damages when it slides on the right direction, 
i.e the stipulated sum graduates in line with the seriousness of the breach, see infra. P 148. 
124 Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd [1933] AC 20. Chandris v. Isbrandtsen-
Moller Co Inc [1951] 1 KB 240. 
125 Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361, 
at 421. 
126 Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos [1927] 1 KB 352. 
127 This was argued by the appellant in Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361. 
128 See for details Mocatta, Alan, Mustill, Michael and Boyd, Stewart. "Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills 
of Lading". 19th ed. London Sweet & Maxwell. 1984. P 308. 
I29Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361. 
130Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos [1927] 1 KB 352. 
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"damages were payable as for dead freight beyond the sum due for demurrage"132. This is 
because if the ship had been loaded within the stipulated time, the ship would have 
loaded and earned freight on a summer deck load. In fact as the delay took place, the 
vessel sailed with a winter deck load only, i.e. with 306 standards short of the 850 
standards of timber which could have been loaded in summer deck133. Therefore there 
was a breach in respect of which the damages in addition to demurrage were granted, 
which was separate from the delay. 
Therefore the fact that the New Approach depends on the actual loss rather than the 
probable loss as pre-estimated does not change the reality that as a matter of custom and 
commercial convention demurrage clauses should normally be paid by the charterer. 
Thus where the charterer is in breach \34 the court will not accept his claim 135 that the 
owner's loss was much smaller than the stipulated sum. This situation is well illustrated 
in the existing law in the case of Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V 
Rotterdamsche Kolen CentraleJ36• In this case a charterparty fixed a certain periods of 
time for the loading and unloading of cargo and £1000 payable on delay. The charterer 
under a consecutive voyage charter deliberately delayed the ship beyond the agreed lay-
days and the shipowner therefore claimed for the lost freight. However his damages were 
held to be limited to the amount of demurrage. Lord Wilberforce stated that: "as a matter 
of commercial opinion and practice demurrage clauses are normally regarded as 
liquidated damages clauses". Nothing changes under the New Approach as a charterer 
can not avoid paying demurrage payments to a shipowner and without having the latter to 
prove the loss he suffered in consequence. 
131 Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361, 
at 407. 
\32 Ibid. 
133 The difference in loading between summer and winter was a compliance with law down to he winter 
marks which should be less than summer one. 
134 That he did not use the ship as contracted but refused to perform the contract. 
135 For example to show evidence of the availability of another charterer and the freight might increase or 
any other justification that the owner has suffered no loss. See Hayes v. James and Charles Dodd [1990] 2 
AlJ ER 815. 
\36 Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kalen Centrale [1967] AC 361, 
at436. 
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3.3.2.3 The New Approach will put the burden of proof on the defaulting party if he 
claims reduction 
It is submitted that where the amount of actual damage is difficult or complex to prove, 
putting the onus of proof that the stipulated sum is in line with such damage upon the 
injured party will destroy the protection that the parties have given to him under the 
contractl37 when entering into contract and agreeing on damages beforehand. Therefore 
where "the nature of the damage is such that proof of it is extremely complex, difficult 
and expensive"138 is the very situation where failure to enforce the agreed penalty clause 
is an infringement of the power of the contract. Under the New Approach in the event 
that the amount of penalty clause appears to be manifestly disproportionate in the light of 
the actual loss, the onus of proof will not be upon the injured party. Rather the approach 
raises a presumption in favour of the injured party that the amount agreed upon is the 
proper recovery. Then the party seeking to avoid the clause has the opportunity to rebut 
this presumption by persuading the court that the amount selected is manifestly 
disproportionate to the loss actually sustained 139. That is, according to the proof provided 
by the defaulting party, it is for the court to intervene and investigate and only enforce, by 
its power to reduce the penalty amount, the penalty clause to reflect accurately the injured 
party's actual loss. 
In this connection it is interesting to note that in spite of the fact that the reduction of 
penalty amount favours the defaulting party, the inclusion of such a clause would still to 
the benefit ofthe injured party in the following aspects: 
I-The mere existence of penalty clause in a contract will affect the burden of proof. The 
injured party will not be asked to provide proof of the damage he has sustained. Rather it 
137 As a result it was said that basing the intervention of the court in penalty clauses on the actual loss 
sustained affects the main importance of agreeing on damages in advance, which is to avoid the difficulty 
and costs of proving the actual loss at the time of breach. See for this argument Macneil, Ian R. "Power of 
Contract and Agreed Remedies". Cornell Law Quarterly (1962) 47(4) 495, at 508. 
138 Clydebank Engineering and shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, at 
11 per Lord Halsbury. 
139 See Fenton, James. "Liquidated Damages as Prima Facie Evidence". Indiana Law Journal. (1975) 51 
189, at 204-205. Sweet, Justin. 60 "Liquidated Damages in California". California Law Review. (1972) 84, 
at 143-144. 
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is the defaulting party who will be asked to prove that the injured party has not sustained 
any loss or that the loss was very much less than the stipulated sum. 
2-It is not sufficient for the defaulting party to prove that the assessment of damages 
contained in penalty clause is simply more than the damage actually suffered. Rather he 
must show evidence that the agreed penalty is manifestly disproportionate to the damage 
in order for the court to reduce its amount. Even in this situation the court may not reduce 
the amount of penalty to be in line with the recoverable loss, but to be in line with the 
actual loss. 
3.3.3 Support for the New Approach 
3.3.3.1 Historical background of penalty clause 
English case law was not always reluctant to enforce penalty clauses stipulated by the 
contracting parties 140. Until at least the late seventeenth century and the development of 
the rule by Court of Chancery, which branded them as unconscionable, penal bonds were 
readily enforced by common law courts. In other words, the common law courts insisted 
on giving the parties the freedom to make their agreement and perfonn its tenns. The 
parties were given the right to make jointly their bond, which was a sealed instrument 
proving the debt of a creditor and including a condition of defeasance. This bond was 
strictly enforced and in order to secure perfonnance it always contained a promise to pay 
a specified sum of money in case of breach irrespective of the actual loss suffered. The 
law of bond was inspired by the general philosophy that it is not the business of the 
courts to restructure private agreements; as they made bed the contracting parties should 
lie on it141. This means that the common law courts did not give any consideration to the 
fact that the penalty might not have been reflecting the true losses suffered as a result of 
breach. Furthennore the reason why the penal bond was enforceable until the 
140 Hatzis, Aristides. "Having the Cake and Eating it Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil 
Contract Law". International Review of Law and Economics. (2003) 22381, at 384. Hillman, Robert. "The 
Limits of Behavioral Decision Theory in Legal Analysis: the Case of Liquidated Damages". Cornell Law 
Review. (2000) 85 717, at 727. 
141 Simpson, A.W.B. "A History ofa Common Law of Contract". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1987. P 112-
113. 
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development of the rule against penalties was that in theory their function was to 
compensate the injured party. 
3.3.3.2 European and international developments 
The New Approach will operate in conformity with and respond to the European and 
international developments which call to provide some degree of unification in the rules 
regarding penalty clauses. 
Agreed damages clauses are widely used in international trade transaction. However, the 
way in which these clauses are dealt with varies between different legal systems, which 
result in considerable uncertainty regarding the right of parties until it is decided which 
law is applicable. Many attempts have been made to deal with this situation in order to 
pave the way for unification at an international level. All attempts clearly confirm the 
presumption that penalty clauses are enforceable and the court may reduce the amount 
payable under them. It has been remarked that the differences in dealing with penalty 
clauses between different legal systems need a greater degree of harmonization, however 
achieving such a degree of reconciliation is not an easy task. In spite of this fact moves to 
improve the situation have been made and can to a large extent overcome the problems 
standing in the way. 
The first attempt made within the European Council culminated in the formation of the 
Resolution (78) 3 on "penalty clauses in civil law" 142. It is noted that most of European 
states uphold the rule of classical Roman law under which all penalty clauses were 
enforceable even the most excessive clauses. However such classical doctrine of literal 
enforcement was shifted from to give the courts a power to adjust penalty clauses 143. 
Therefore there is no sense to differentiate penalty clauses from liquidated damages since 
they are both enforceable. In contrast English law penalty clauses are by no means 
enforceable. The council noted that England and Belgium are the only countries in 
Europe that do not grant courts a power to rewrite penalty clauses. In order to provide 
142 This Resolution was adopted by the Committee of Ministers on January 20, 1978. 
143 Though it prevailed in France until it was amended as late as 1975. 
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some unifonnity144 between the common law's concept of penalty and the civil law, 
which tends not to examine liquidated damages clauses, the council adopted this 
resolution. This Resolution assumes that penalty clauses are, in general, enforceable, and 
also provides for the refonnation of such clauses. It states that "The sum stipulated may 
be reduced by the court when it is manifestly excessive,,145. It made this provision as a 
rule of public policy when it carried on stating that "any stipulation contrary to the 
provisions of this article shall be void,,146. Furthennore, the Resolution recommended that 
the governments of the member states should take into consideration the principles in the 
appendix to their Resolution when preparing new legislation on this subject. Also the 
Principles of European Contract Law provides that: 
"(1) Where the contract provides that a party which fails to perfonn is to pay a 
specified sum to the aggrieved party for such non-perfonnance, the aggrieved 
party shall be awarded that sum irrespective of its actual loss. 
(2) However, despite any agreement to the contrary the specified sum may be 
reduced to a reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation to the loss 
resulting from non-perfonnance and the other circumstances." 147 
International developments, which called for some degree of harmonization in the area of 
penalty clause, were embodied in 1983 via UNCITRAL148 that embraced "unifonn rules 
on liquidated damages and penalty clauses .. 149 for international contracts and gave the 
court the power to reduce the amount of penalty. This authority was incorporated in 
article F where it provided that: 
144 For international law comparison with regard to penalty clauses, see DiMatteo, Larry A. "A Theory of 
Efficient Penalty: Elimination the Law of Liquidated Damages". American Business Law Journal. (2001) 
vol. 38. Part 4 633, at 651-655. 
145 Article 7 of European Council Resolusion (78)3 on "Penalty clauses in civil law". The Committee of 
Ministers on January 20, 1978. This position was confirmed againl996- by the Commission of European 
Contract Law which has recently produced a text with a clause (article 4.508) on "Agreed Payment for 
Non-Performance" in the Principles of European Contract Law. This article also dealt with the agreement 
on damages in advance and confirmed the enforceability of such agreement in favour of the injured party 
for non performance by the defaulting party. However it provides that: "despite any agreement to the 
contrary the specified sum may be reduced to a reasonable amount where it is grossly excessive in relation 
to the loss resulting from the non-performance and the other circumstances". Also the Unidroit Principles 
have a virtually identical provision in article 7.4.13. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Article 9.509. See also article 7.4.13 of Unidroit Principles for International Commercial Contracts, 
which includes the same provision of European Contract Law. 
148 United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. Yearbook. Vol. XIII: 1982. United Nations, 
New York, 1984. Another attempt was made by the UNCITRAL when produced principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (Rome 1994), which contained an article on penalty clauses. 
149 Ibid. P 27. 
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"The agreed sum may be reduced if it is shown to be grossly disproportionate in 
relation to the loss that has suffered by the obligee, and if the agreed sum cannot 
reasonably be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate by the parties of the loss likely 
to be suffered by the obligee". 
As a result the General Assembly of the United Nations recommended that states should 
give serious consideration to the rules and where appropriate implement them in the form 
of either a model law or a convention. 
It would seem that all attempts either at a European or International level support what 
has been suggested in this work. At both levels there is a call to unify the rules governing 
penalty clauses by accepting their enforceability, whilst giving the power to the court to 
reduce their amount if it is evidently excessive in relation to the loss actually sustained. 
This is another reason suggests that the current law of penalties is in need of reform. 
3.3.3.3 The decision of the Jobson v Johnson case 
The Jobson v. Johnson l5o case is one of the strongest supports to this perspective where 
the court decided not to strike the penalty down and reduce its amount to be compatible 
with the actual loss. In this case the defendant contracted with the claimants to purchase 
ordinary shares in a football club for £350,000 payable in instalments. It was provided 
that if the defendant (purchaser) failed to pay any of the instalments he would be required 
to retransfer the shares for £40,000. This amount was neither a genuine pre-estimate of 
the claimants' loss in the event of the defendant's breach on paying any of the 
instalments nor a true reflection of value of the shares. The defendant defaulted after he 
had paid £140,000 towards the purchase price and subsequently the claimant sued for the 
application of the agreement's provision of retransferring the shares back to him. The 
defendant counterclaimed that the retransfer clause was a penalty. The court of appeal 
held that the clause was not a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered by the claimants 
and so unenforceable. Although the court of appeal decided that the clause was a penalty, 
it has been held that the penalty clause can be enforced to the extent that it does not 
exceed the loss suffered. It was clearly stated in this case that: 
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"It is important in the present case to note that. .. the strict legal position is not that 
such clause is simply struck out of the contract ... remains in the contract and can 
be sued upon, but will not be enforced by the court beyond the sum which 
represents; in the events which have happened, the actual loss of the party seeking 
payment,,151. 
This is to say that the court can assess the losses suffered by the injured party and enforce 
the stipulated sum to the extent that injured party can be compensated for his actual loss. 
This case can be regarded as' a landmark where the court used to strike the penal 
provisions out of the contract and leave the injured party to prove his damages in the 
ordinary way of damages. The conclusion of this case declared that the penalty clause 
would remain in the contract however would not be enforceable beyond the actual loss of 
the injured party. This make a nice distinction between a claim for enforcing a penalty 
clause with limited effect compatible with the actual loss suffered by the injured party, 
and a claim for ignoring the penalty clause and suing for the damages suffered in the 
ordinary way. In reality the result will be the same in the above two ways to obtain 
damages for the loss sustained on breach 152. Such distinction was raised in Jobson v. 
Johnson 153 because the object of the penalty clause in this case was not a payment of 
money but the transfer of a certain item of property (shares). The significance of this case 
being that the court decided to take effect to the clause provided that the value of the 
property concerned did not exceed the claimant's loss. 
Reflecting on the situation under the English case law it can be inferred that after the 
court decides the unenforceability of the stipulated sum as a penalty, the injured party is 
directed to get his damages in the ordinary way of unliquidated damages action. In doing 
so the court will look at the actual loss as the injured party can prove it. This result can be 
achieved by giving the court the right to adjust the amount of penalty to make it in line 
with the actual loss. The Jordanian civil law already gives such power to the court though 
it is criticised from different aspects in the following chapters. 
ISO Jobson v. Johnson [1989] WLR 1026. 
lSI Ibid. At 1040 per NicholJas LJ. 
152 McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 430. 
153 Jobson v. Johnson [1989] WLR 1026. 
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3.3.3.4 Saving trial expenses and time of the parties and courts 
It is well established that contracting parties always agree on damages in advance to 
avoid the negative consequences of going through the judicial process. This object is the 
same in enforcing the penalty clause and reducing its amount in line with the actual loss 
without leaving the injured party to demand his damages in another claim, which costs 
extra time and money. It can be said that English case law denies and invalidates the 
provisions involved with punishment in contracts to the defaulting party. However, this 
can be achieved by giving effect to the penal stipulations and denying any force to them 
by reducing their amount to the extent that compensates the injured party for his loss. The 
injured party, as it was said before, will still profit by this via the court reducing the 
amount of penalty to be in line with actual loss and not the recoverable loss. 
Therefore, when the parties agree on damages in advance their aim is to avoid the court's 
assessment of damages l54, which may take more time and money. 155 This means that the 
penalty doctrine undoubtedly increases transaction costs at the time when it rules that 
agreed damages clause is a penalty and so should be struck out of the contract. The threat 
of subsequent judicial interference to assess the damages for the loss suffered means that 
the parties as well as the court should spend extra time, money and effort to do so. 
Upholding penalty clause and reducing its amount where it is manifestly disproportionate 
to the actual loss would result in reducing the litigation expenses and time for both parties 
and courts. This would also lead to a further positive result, as it would reduce court 
congestion, which benefits the whole society at the end. It is believed that if penalty 
clauses are enforced, at least in theory the power to reduce agreed penalty will result in 
fewer breaches, fewer lawsuits and thus fewer and easier trials. On top of this it will 
IS4 The court grants the injured party under the unliquidated damages action the recoverable loss. In 
contrast he receives damages for his actual loss under the New Approach. 
ISS See for that Clarkson, Kenneth, Miller, Roger and Muris, Timothy. Liquidated damages v. Penalties: 
sense or non sense? Wisconsin Law Review. [1978] 351, at 366-368. Kaplan, Phillip R. A Critique of the 
penalty limitation on liquidated damages. Southern California Review. (1977) 55 1055, at 1057. 
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reduce transaction costs where the parties detennine that the costs of negotiation are less 
than the contemplated costs oflitigation upon breach I 56. 
3.3.3.4 Efficient breach 
Efficient breach occurs where the promisor anticipates that paying compensation will 
make him better off than perfonning his contractual obligations 157. At the present in 
penalty doctrine under English case law if the situation becomes such that the cost of 
perfonnance to the promisor is greater than the compensation, he will find that it will be 
better for him if the contract is not perfonned. This is the effect of the (efficient breach) 
as the present case law to penalties has a tendency to favour. As a result this induces the 
promisor to breach the contract whenever he hopes to make a better profit from a new 
opportuni ty. 
However this research does not go to reject efficient breach theory but prefers to run the 
argument as follows: Efficient breach works in favour of one party is unacceptable. 
However it is more acceptable if it works for both parties. It should be distinguished 
between two situations where there is or there is no agreement between the parties on 
damages. First, where there is no agreement on damages between parties 158, the injured 
party is compensated by resorting to court and all efficiency gains go to the breaching 
partyl59. The consequences of efficient breach can be illustrated in the following example. 
156See Sweet, Justin. Liquidated Damages in California. California Law Review. (1972) 60 84, at 88. Goetz, 
Charles J. and Scott, Robert E. "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: some 
notes on an Enforcement Model and A Theory of Efficient Breach". Columbia Law Review. (1977) Vol. 77 
554, at 578. 
157 See for this theory Goetz, Charles and Scott, Robert. "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just 
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach". 
Columbia Law Review. (1977) 77 554, at 558-560. Warkol, Craig S. "Resolving the Paradox between 
Legal Theory and Legal Fact: the Judicial Rejection of the Theory of Efficient Breach". Cardozo Law 
Review. (1998) 20 321. Craswell, Richard. "Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient 
Breach". Southern California Law Review. (1988) 61 part 3 629. Clarkso, Kenneth, Miller, Roger and 
Muris, Timothy. "Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense". Wisconsin Law Review. [1978] 
351, at 359. Harris, Donald, Campbell, David and Halson, Roger. "Remedies in Contract and Tort", 2nd ed. 
Butterworths. 2002. P 139. 
158 This is also the result of applying the penalty doctrine where the promisor can claim the unenforceability 
of penalty clause, which the court knocks out of the contract and leave the promisee to prove his actual loss 
through unliquidated damages action. 
159 Goetz, Charles and Scott, Robert. "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach". Columbia Law Review. (1977) 
77 554, at 567. 
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Suppose that V, a vendor, agreed to sell a machine to PI, a purchaser, for £20,000. 
Assume further that V gets another offer from P2, a second purchaser, who values the 
subject matter more. V will only breach the contract with PI if the offer from P2 is more 
than the contract price and the damages due to PI (suppose that the damages due to 
compensate PI for his losses are £2000 and so he values performance £22,000). In other 
words, breach is efficient if the P 2 values the machine more than PI. Thus, if P 2 offers 
£25,000 for the subject matter, Vwill be better offifhe breaches, as he will gain £300016°. 
This means that all gains (£3000) from the second contract go to the breaching party. 
Accordingly one might argue that since the injured party will be compensated for the 
defaulting party's breach, then efficient breach will be better to be recognised and upheld. 
The argument is that this theory makes a result superior to performance, so long as one 
party receives the same benefits as performance while the other is able to do even better. 
The allocation of the gains from breach is, therefore, largely a question of wealth transfer 
between the contracting parties. In response, efficient breach in this case works in favour 
of the breaching party and therefore there is no distribution of gains which is the central 
aim of efficient breach. The injured party will not be fully compensated, as the theory 
claims because this party will be prevented from receiving damages for some kinds of 
losses. Therefore he will not be fully compensated. Under the common law damages the 
injured party is confined to damages awarded under what so called the rule of Hadley v. 
Baxendale. As was pointed out above he has no right to be compensated fully for pure 
speculative losses, non-pecuniary losses and the losses which are too remote under the 
second rule of Hadley v. Baxendale rule. This non-recognition of these losses challenges 
the notion of efficiency of common law damages. If common law damages are seen as 
inefficient and inadequate, then the concept of efficient breach becomes less compelling. 
The basis for efficient breach is shattered if one believes that the unliquidated damages 
systemically under-compensates the injured partyl61. Thus, the injured party will be better 
off in the event of performance than claiming the damages under unliquidated damages 
action, which will under compensates him. 
160 25000 - (20000 the contract price + 2000 damages due to P 1) 
161 Sebert. John. "Punitive and Non-pecuniary Damages in Actions Based upon Contract: Towards 
Achieving the Objective of Full Compensation". UCLA Law Review. (1986) 33 1565, at 1566-1584. 
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However what is the situation where there is an enforceable agreed penalty clause in the 
contract between V and PI? 
Second: the existence of agreement on damages allows efficient breach gains to be 
divided between the parties162• This situation can be achieved under the New Approach 
suggested. The New Approach makes penalty clause in contract enforceable and court 
does not intervene to reduce by its own motion but upon the request of injured party. 
Therefore the existence of a high penalty clause is never per se indication of an efficiency 
obstacle. Two situations are examined as follows: where the price offered by P2 is more 
than the performance value plus penalty of PI and where the price is less than them. 
1- Where the price offered by P2 is more than the performance value plus penalty of PI: 
Assume in the example above that the parties agree that in the event of breach V shall pay 
£3,500 as a penalty to PI. The enforcement of penalty clause will not accordingly hinder 
the distribution of efficiency gains between both parties, as PI understands that his 
penalty £3500 might be reduced if V claims and proves that the sum is manifestly higher 
than the actual loss suffered and therefore the breach becomes also of his interest. A large 
penalty clause does not preclude efficient breaches for the extra price of a contract with 
penalties probably also covers the risk of having to waive another subsequent offer. 
Therefore, to get the consequences of efficient breach the subsequent offer should be 
higher than the price as reflected in the contract163• In the above example P2 therefore 
should offer more than what is due to PI under the contract (£20,000 the contract price 
and £3,500 the penalty clause). As was said above that if P2 offers £25,000, the breach 
will be efficient and the gains will be divided between both parties. This is to say that 
£3,500 will go to the injured party, PI, who still receives more from breach than from 
performance of contract and £ 1,500 to the breaching party, V. 
162 Goetz, Charles and Scott, Robert. "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach". Columbia Law Review. (1977) 
77 554, at 567. 
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2- Where the price is less than the perfonnance value and penalty due to PI: Where the 
price offered by P2 is, for example, £22,500, which less than £23,500, which is due to Pl. 
The "obstinate insistence on the enforcement of certain penalties may result in a failure to 
exploit potential efficiency gains by inducing the penalised party [Y1 not to breach"I64. 
The very presence of such unexploited gains represents an incentive to the injured party 
party, PI, to renegotiate the penalty clause in question 165. In this case if the concept of 
renegotiation is introduced, then it can be argued that even the surplus (£2,500) below the 
amount (£3,500) that is needed to pay the penalty may be enough to induce breach. It is 
in the interest of the PI to increase its net utility by negotiating a payment somewhere 
between its actual damages and the penalty amount. The whole process generates an 
. efficient penalty given the amount of surplus to be created by the breach 166. Therefore, in 
the example given, if the parties (PI and V) agree after the negotiations to reduce the 
amount of penalty clause to be higher than the perfonnance value of PI (£22,000) and 
less than the price offered by P2 (£22,500), PI can still receive more from breach than 
from perfonnance and thus the breach is still efficient. Suppose that they agreed167 on 
£2,250 as agreed penalty, then the result of the efficient breach is to distribute the gains 
as follows: £250 to PI and the rest of £250 is to V. Hence it is submitted that: 
"The existence of an overcompensation provision is never per se evidence of an 
efficiency impediment ... as noted above the just compensation fonnula gives all 
of the gains to the breacher. Why should this end result be regarded as any 
"fairer" than one which split the gains fifty-fifty or gives them all to the non-
breacher?,,168 
It might be said that in the event that the negotiation between the promisor, V, and the 
promisee, PI, to cancel the contract fails, it is not certain that the efficiency gains169 from 
163 Mattei, Ugo. "The Comparative Law and Economics of Penalty Clauses in Contracts". The American 
Journal of Comparative Law. (1995) 43427, at 429. 
164 Goetz, Charles and Scott, Robert. "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach". Columbia Law Review. (1977) 
77 554, at P 567-568. 
165 Ibid. 
166 DiMatteo, Larry A. "A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Elimination the Law of Liquidated Damages". 
American Business Law Journal. (2001) vol. 38. Part 4633, at P 696-687. 
167 After the negotiations. 
168 Goetz, Charles and Scott, Robert. "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: 
Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach". Columbia Law Review. (1977) 
77 554, at 568. 
169 The contract price plus the amount of damages that fully compensate the promisee (PI). 
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the deterred breach will necessary be lost. The promisee may be able to gain the breach 
smplus by way of a later resale. Thus, the efficiency gains are the same whether obtained 
by a party through breach or by a resale. However, in response to these two points could 
be observed. Firstly, efficient breach leads to a positive result that the subject matter goes 
to the party who values it more than the other. Secondly, efficient breach allows 
resources to flow freely to the party who values it more at the lowest possible cost 170. Put 
another way, in the event that the promisee rejects to negotiate with the promisor a way 
out of the contract by efficient breach, though the outcome may be the same on a resale 
that will be at the expense of time and cost. In case of efficient breach the promisee does 
not take any action but to accept the cancellation of the contract and the promisor who 
makes all necessary steps to contract with the new Purchaser (P2 in the example) and 
gives the promisee (P 1) his allocation. 
The effect of the New Approach will be noticed throughout and its outcomes will be 
considered in the conclusion of this research. 
170 Clarkso, Kenneth, Miller, Roger and Muris, Timothy. "Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or 
Nonsense". Wisconsin Law Review. [1978] 351, at 359. 
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Chapter Two: What is the Test for the invalidity of penalty clause? 
O-Introduction 
The history of penalty clause and liquidated damages doctrine shows that the courts have 
applied more than one test in ascertaining the validity of agreed damages clause in 
contracts. Thus, the question is: how will the court ascertain the difference between a 
valid liquidated damages clause and an invalid penalty clause? The courts first adopted 
the intention test for determining the invalidity of penalty clause. The application of this 
test meant that the words used by the parties in the contract were conclusive. 
Subsequently the judicial approach shifted towards focusing on whether the sum 
stipulated is a genuine pre-estimate of damages. The application of the new test is based 
on measuring the amount of the sum stipulated in view of the likely actual loss suffered 
by the breach. If the courts decide that the proposed damages are significantly greater 
than the probable actual loss at the time when the contract is made, the sum stipulated is 
generally considered as an invalid penalty clause. Therefore how does the new test 
operate in determining the invalidity of penalty clause? Should the sum stipulated be 
disproportionately high to constitute a penalty? What is the role of disparity of bargaining 
powers in penalty jurisdiction? 
This chapter will now consider the following issues: 
1- The demise test: Parties' intention 
2- Is the words used by the parties still of great importance 
3- The current test: disproportion principle 
I-Demise Test: Parties' intention 
1: 1 The substance ofthe test 
Parties to a contract may at the time when the contract is entered into use a terminology 
to express their intention. It might be stipulated that if one of the parties fails to perform 
its contractual obligations a sum of money will be payable by way of liquidated damages 
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or penalty. However how much attention should be paid to these words used by the 
parties to determine whether a sum provided for is an enforceable or not? 
In light of the old law on this area, the courts justified their intervention in the agreement 
by declaring that they performed the intention of the parties. This means that the courts 
chose to give the terminologies used by parties to a contract the credit in holding whether 
the sum stipulated was valid liquidated damages or an invalid penalty. The intention 
referred to by the courts was usually the actual intention of the parties. However, the 
court sometimes invoked a presumption of parties' intention 171. For example, the court 
might presume that parties to a contract intended that the stipulated sum to be a penalty. 
In Astley v. Weldon l72 the court invoked a presumption that where a sum was payable in 
the event of occurrence of many breaches (one of them involved the non-payment of a 
lesser sum) the parties would have intended a penalty. Rooke J. stated that: 
"The determination of the court in construing this instrument must be guided by 
the intention of the parties. Now it appears very clearly from the stipulation that 
small sums of money should be paid in certain cases, that the parties considered 
the larger sum as a penalty173" 
Therefore the courts in some cases held the sum as a penalty174 or liquidated damages17S 
according to the terms used in the contract without considering the other circumstances, 
which might have impact on the judgment. In other words, if parties to a contract labeled 
the sum stipulated as liquidated damages, it would not be possible for the courts to hold 
that the'sum should not be recovered by the injured party and vice versa. In Reilly v. 
Jones l76, it was said that no case had been adduced in which the sum stipulated had been 
described as liquidated damages by the parties while the court had held that that sum to 
be an unenforceable penalty 177. Conversely, in Smith v Dickenson 178, there was a 
171 Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law Review (1985) 10.503, at 
508. 
172 Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 B& P 346, at 352-354; 126 ER 1318 at 1322-1323. 
173 Ibid. 353 and 1323 respectively. 
174 Smith v. Dickenson (1804) 3 B&P 630; 127 ER 639. 
17S Reilly v. Jones (1823) I Bing 302, at 306; 130 ER 122. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. At 306; 130 ER 122, at 123. per Park J. who stated that: "No case has been adduced in which after 
the parties have themselves employed the expression liquidated damages, the court has held the plaintiff 
should not recover, on breach of the agreement, the sum named as Liquidated damages" 
178 Smith v. Dickenson (1804) 3 B&P 630; 127 ER 639. 
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stipulation in the contract to the effect that a sum of money was to be paid by way of 
penalty. The court confirmed the intention of the parties where it held the clause to be a 
penalty because the use of the term penalty foreclosed the court from holding that the 
stipulated sum was for liquidated damages. However did the court continue to rely on the 
parties' own words to determine the nature of agreed damages clause?, 
2-The importance of the word used by the parties 
2:1 The terms used are not decisive 
The juridical reliance on parties' own terminologies was apparently undermined since 
Kemble v. Farren J79• This case was the beginning of a new era in the subject matter. It 
was a strong call not to depend only on the parties' intention to determine whether the 
stipulated sum is a penalty or liquidated damages. Rather all terms of the contract should 
be taken into consideration. In other words, labeling the stipulated sum in a contract 
liquidated damages should not conclude the matter for the court should look at the 
intention of the parties and all terms and circumstances surrounding the contracting. By 
doing so the court may find that that sum is unenforceable penalty, despite the fact that 
the parties used the term liquidated damages to indicate the nature of the stipulated sum 
and vice versa. In English case law a new tendency has thus appeared. The fact that the 
sum stated in the contract to be payable in the event of breach is named as liquidated 
damages or penalty might be, prima facie, evidence that the sum is as described by the 
parties, but is by no means conclusive. This principle was first stated in Willson v. LoveJ80 
and then reaffirmed in the leading case in the subject matter by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v, New Garage and Motor Co Ltd J8J, where stated that: 
"Though the parties to a contract who used the words penalty or liquidated 
damages may prima facie be supposed to mean what they say, yet the expression 
used is not conclusive. The court must find out whether the payment stipulated is 
in truth a penalty or liquidated damages 182" 
179 Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234. 
180 Willson v. Love [1896] 1 QB 626. 
181 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
182 Ibid. At 86 per Lord Dunedin. See also at 100 per Lord Pannoor. This rule has been confinned in many 
cases. Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16th January 
Court of Appeal (Civil Devision), Weslaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. Jacob J stated in this case that: 
"It is to be noted that the parties agreed that [the clause] was a penalty clause and described it as such. That 
is of course, not conclusive". Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Romos Yzquierdo Y 
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Under this principle the court uses its power to strike down the words used by the parties 
if the sum stipulated is not described in the contract in its true nature. There have been 
many cases in which the courts have interfered with contracts though the parties have 
agreed on a specified sum in the nature of liquidated damages. The courts, having looked 
at the language used in the contract and all circumstances surrounding it, reached the 
conclusion that the stipulated sum was not a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered. 
Consequently, the courts held that the amount was inserted to be paid as a punishment on 
the defaulting party irrespective of the loss suffered and therefore an unenforceable 
penalty. The case of Kemble v. Farren/83 is considered one of the milestones in the area 
of liquidated damages and penalty doctrine for the court struck down the words used by 
the parties. In this case although the parties described the agreed sum as liquidated 
damages, the court, after examining all the circumstances surrounding the contracting 
process, decided that the provision for the payment of that sum of money was a penalty. 
Equally, while the parties might have called a clause as a penalty clause, it could still tum 
out, on analysis, to be a liquidated damages clause. Put another way, in some cases the 
courts ignored the description of the parties to the sum as a penalty 1 84. 
One might argue that in some cases the courts upheld the sum stipulated as the parties 
described it. In response, it should be noted that since adopting this approach by the 
courts, no cases have been found in which the terms used by the parties had turned the 
Castaneda (1915] AC 6. Sparrow 11. Paris (1862) 7 H&N 594, 599; 158 ER 608. At 610 Bramwell B stated 
"The names the parties give the money, Penalty or Liquidated damages are immaterial". Pagnan & Folli 11. 
Coprosol SA. [1981] 1 Lloyd's R 283, at 281". Ariston SRL 11. Charly Records (1990) The independent Law 
Report. 13 April. 
183 Kemble 11. Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234. See also to the same effect Magee 11. La1lell (1870) 
LR 9 CP 107. Bradley v. Walsh (1903) 88 LT 737. Commissionero!Public Workers v. Hill [1906] AC 368. 
In hire Purchase contract the phrase "by way of agreed compensation" has frequently been ignored. E.g. 
Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd 11. Stanford [1953] 1 QB 86. 
Landom 11. Hurrell (1955] 1 All ER 839. 
184 In Robert Stewart & Sons Ltd 11. Carapanayoti [1962] 1 WLR 34, the court held that "Although 
condition 33a imposed a penalty of between 2 and 10 per cent over the market value that was not an 
extravagant or unconscionable payment, but was a genuine pre-estimate of damages". There are many 
cases to this effect, See for example. Crisdec 11. Bollon. (1827) 3 C&P 240; 172 ER 403. Sparrow 11. Paris 
(1862) 7 H&N.294; 158. ER. 608. Clydebank Engineering Co. 11. Dos Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda, 
[1905] AC 6. Diestal1l. Stevenson [1906] 2 KB 345. Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd 11. Widnes Foundry 
(1925) Ltd (1933] AC 20. Alder 11. Moore [1961] 2 QB 57. 
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scales 185. It might have been held that the sum stipulated to be as the parties have 
described in the contract. But in fact the judgment was not decided according to the 
description of the parties. In Ariston SLR v. Charly Record/86, the parties agreed upon a 
sum of money to be paid in the event of breach by way of penalty. However, Lord Justice 
Beldam, who delivered the judgment, placed little reliance on the fact that the clause had 
been described as a penalty. The conclusion was reached that the sum stipulated was a 
penalty, as it was disproportionate to some items and thus did not depend on the word 
used by the parties. Beldam LJ concluded that: "the only sensible construction is that this 
clause would apply even though the items retained were few in number and would not 
cause any particular damage to Charly [the claimant],,187. However, does that mean that 
the terms used of no significance? 
2:2 "Not decisive" does not mean unimportant 
Though the terminology used by parties to a contract is not decisive in determining the 
nature of agreed damages, it is not, however, unimportant. Rather the expression inserted 
in the contract by the parties raises a presumption in favour ofit188• In Willson v. Love189, 
Lord Esher M.R, made this clear by stating: 
"Therefore the parties have themselves called this sum a penalty. That 
circumstance is not in itself decisive of the question. A succession of judges has 
held that the use of the term penalty or liquidated damages is not conclusive, but 
no case, I think, decides that the term used by the parties themselves is to be 
altogether disregarded,,19o . 
A clause is assumedl91 to be as the parties have called it until the opposite is provedl92. 
Where the parties call the sum stipulated a penalty the onus lies upon the party who seeks 
to establish that it is to be payable as liquidated damages. And if the defendant claims 
18S McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17111 ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 432. 
186 Ariston SLR v. CharlyRecords (1990) The independent Law Report. 13 April. 
187 Ibid. per Lord Justice Beldam. 
188 Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank. [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 140 Where Diplock, LJ stated that: "The 
terms of the clause may themselves be sufficient to give rise to the inference that it is not a genuine pre-
estimate of damage likely to be suffered but is a penalty ... it is an inference only and may be rebutted." 
189 Willsons v.Love [1896] 1 QB 626. 
190 Ibid. At 630 per Lord Esher M.R. 
191 It is a weak presumption. 
192 Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank. [1966] 3 All ER 128. 
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that the stipulated sum is a penalty, he should provide an evidence to prove that. As for 
example, in Alder v. Moore l93 , Devlin U said that: 
"Since it has appeared from this case that underwriter have now adopted a new 
form of undertaking which does not use the word penalty and which may in the 
future come up for consideration, I think it wise to say that I have not formed any 
opinion about the construction of the new form. Clearly, it places underwriters in 
a better position ... the burden will then be on the assured to show that the payment 
is in truth a penalty though not so described 194" 
It is appropriate to conclude that the statements used by the parties should not have a 
conclusive effect but that all circumstances surrounding the contracting process and the 
terms of the contract should be taken into account l95 • This is because in some cases, for 
instance, there might be domination from one side over the other and thus the correct 
nature of the agreed sum could be hidden. As a result of this a sum stipulated might be 
labeled as liquidated damages despite the fact that it could not represent a genuine pre-
estimate of loss at the time of entering into the contract. 
Since the judicial approach shifted from relying on the intention test the courts have had 
to introduce a new criterion with new rules to ascertain the compensatory nature of the 
sum stipulated. 
3- The current test: the disproportion principle (extravagant and 
unconscionable sum) 
3:1 Generally 
Lord Dunedin stated 196: 
"The criterion of whether a sum ... is truly liquidated damages ... or is truly a 
penalty .. .is to be found in whether the sum stipulated for can or can not be 
regarded as a "genuine pre-estimate of the creditor's probable or possible interest 
in the due performance of the principal obligation." 
193 Alder v. Moore [1961] 2 QB 57. 
194 Ibid. At 75 per Devlin LJ. See also Will sons v.Love [1896] I QB 626. See also Philips Hong Kong v. 
The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 59 per Lord Woolf. In this case Lord Woolf said 
that: "In seeking to establish that the sum described in ... contract as liquidated damages was in fact a 
penalty, Philips has to surmount the strong inference to the contrary resulting from its agreement to make 
the payments as liquidated damages". 
195 Beatson, J. "Anson's Law of Contract". 28th ed. Oxford University Press. 2002. P 624. 
196 Commissioner of Public Workers v. Hill [1906] AC 368, at 375 per Lord Dunedin. 
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Under this new test the court tended to consider the extent of disproportion between the 
stipulated sum and the loss likely to be suffered on breach as it is envisaged at the time of 
making the contract. Therefore an agreed damages clause is regarded as a valid liquidated 
damages clause if the stipulated sum is a genuine pre-estimate of loss, otherwise it will 
constitute a penalty clause197• Put another way, the agreed damages clause is a power 
given to the parties of the contract as such agreement achieves some purposes that could 
not be done by resorting to the court. Such a power should not be abused, as the sum 
stipulated might not represent a genuine pre-estimate of damage. Therefore it would be 
excessive and improper to allow the injured party to get such a sum as compensation, 
particularly if it was, at the time of making the contract, extravagant and unconscionable 
in comparison with the greatest loss which might be suffered as a result of the breach 198. 
In all cases 199 concerned, their lordships did not pay any attention to the expressed 
intention of the parties to label an agreed sum as liquidated damages or penalty. This 
approach was clearly consolidated in the recent case200 when Chadwick LJ has clearly 
declared that: 
"The correct approach to the question whether a provision of this nature (agreed 
damages clause) is to be treated as a genuine pre-estimate of damages or as a 
penalty remains the set out in the speech of lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic 
Tyre Company Ltd v. New Garage and Motor Company Ltd ,,201 
This means a birth of a new principle and an appreciated and gladly received overthrow 
of an old one. 
197 See for that, Hock-Lai Ho. "The Privy Council on Liquidated Damages". Journal of Contract Law. 
(1995) Vo1.8, No.3 280. 
198 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. This rule was rather 
recently affirmed in Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong. (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
199 For example, Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda 
!1905] AC 6. Also, Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd, [1915] AC 79. 
00 DufJen v.FRA. BO SP (1998) The Times. 15 June. 
201 Ibid. Per Chadwick LJ. In the most recent case of Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet 
Football Club Limited [2003] 16th January Court of Appeal (Civil Devision), Weslaw 116995. [2003] 
EWCA Civ 58 this rule was confirmed when Jacob J said that: "There was no abandonment of the rule that 
the clause must be a genuine pre-estimate of damage". 
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3:2 Analysis of the current test 
3:2:1 Extravagant sum and not merely in excess of likely actuailoss202 
The underlying assumption of the current test must be that the law shall not approve any 
agreement between parties to a contract that varies from the general principle of contract 
law which asserts that damages for breach should be compensatory in nature. Any 
stipulation for a sum of money to be paid on breach exceeds what is considered as a just 
compensation is extravagant and thus unenforceable. However it is impossible to 
detennine the cases in which the sum stipulated will be extravagant in comparison with 
the likely actual loss that might be sustained as a result of breach. Each individual case 
must be examined with reference to its particular facts and circumstances203• Furthennore, 
it has been submitted that the tenninology "extravagant and unconscionable" is 
ambiguous for it may have been used merely to allow the courts to intervene when there 
was such an imbalance of the benefits and burden under the contract204• 
It might be thought that it is adequate to regard the stipulated sum as a penalty clause 
merely because it is in excess of the likely actual loss which might ensue from breach at 
the time of drafting the contract. In Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Stanford 205, there 
was a hire-purchase agreement to hire a motor-car for 30 'months to the defendant, who 
agreed to pay in respect of the hire a sum of money payable by monthly instalment. The 
contract stipulated that the hirer could at any time return the car to the owners provided 
that he must pay all the instalments then falling due and unpaid until that moment. The 
hirer also agreed to pay by way of compensation for depreciation at 40 per cent of the 
amount of the remaining instalments. The court held the clause to be a penalty rather than 
liquidated damages, and thus unenforceable, although that that sum might have been less 
than the actual loss if the car had become valueless. Lord Somervell L.J pointed out 
thar06: "Although it can not be said that the amount exceeds the greatest loss that could 
202 This is also the core of the New Approach suggested in this work in which it is suggested to grant the 
court to reduce the agreed penalty where it is greatly higher than the actual loss suffered. 
203Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Romos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1915] AC 6, at 
10 per Lord Halsbury. 
204 Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law Review. (1985) 10 503, at 
514. 
20S Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Stanford [1953] 1 QB 86. 
206 Ibid. At 98. 
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possibly follow on the breach ... it will exceed it in all except the exceptional case where 
the car has become of no value" 
However, this judgment is open to criticism. The law regarding penalties mirrors a 
conflict between the penalty doctrine and the traditional doctrine of freedom of contract. 
On one hand public policy calls for penalty clauses to be dropped and on the other the 
doctrine of freedom of contract presses to limit interference with contracts freely made 
between the parties207. Public policy is expressed in the compensatory principle via the 
idea that compensation for loss is adequate relief and that punishment is not a role of 
contract law. For this reason the mere fact that the sum stipulated is in excess of the likely 
actual loss sustained does not prejudice the compensatory principle. Also as the penalty 
jurisdiction is a blatant interference with doctrine of freedom of contract the court should 
strike a balance between this doctrine and protection of weak contracting parties to 
achieve fairness. If the court tends to regard a clause entered into by the parties as an 
unenforceable penalty clause merely because the sum stipulated is more than the likely 
anticipated loss, it will make the agreement on damages by parties to a contract 
''impracticable,,208. Hence, the court should apply the test in "pragmatic way" and should 
not be astute in declaring a provision as to agreed damages to be a penalty in order not to 
defeat its intended effect209. In Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong 
KonilO Lord Woolf confirmed that: "The court has to be careful not to set too stringent a 
standard and bear in mind that what the parties have agreed should normally be upheld. 
Any other approach will lead to undesirable uncertainty especially in commercial 
contracts,,211. Therefore courts should not intervene to strike down penalty clauses in 
contracts unless the requisite degree between the sum stipulated and the likely actual loss, 
207 Hock-Lai Ho. "The Privy Council on Liquidated Damages". Journal of Contract Law. (1995) 8(3) 280. 
208 Having regards the fact that: "it is good business sense that parties to a contract should know what will 
be the financial consequences to them of a breach ... Not only does it enable the parties to know in advance 
what their position will be if a breach occurs and so avoid litigation at all, but, if litigation cannot be 
avoided, it eliminates what may be the very heavy legal cost of proving the loss actually sustained which 
would to be paid by the unsuccessful party" Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 142. 
209 Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain, Longman. 2001. P 508. 
210 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General o/Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
211 Ibid. At 59. See also Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 142 per Lord justice 
Diplock who stated that: "the court should not be astute to descry "penalty clause" in every provision of a 
contract which stipulates a sum to be payable by one party to the other on the event of a breach by the 
former" 
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as cases describe it, is "Unconscionable", "extravagant" 212, "out of all proportion,,213 
and "exorbitant,,214. 
Therefore it can be asserted that the term 'extravagance' indicates the idea that the degree 
of disproportion between the stipulated swn and the likely actual loss at the time of 
making the contract is very high and out of all proportion. Put another way, the swn must 
be too great whereby it would not simply be just compensation. This fact is clearly 
verified in Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank 215. This case concerned a contract to hire a 
telephone answering machine. The rental agreement stipulated that if the agreement was 
terminated for any reason whatsoever, the hirer was not entitled to any credit or 
allowance in respect of any payments made by him under the terms of the agreement. 
However, under clause 11 of the agreement, the hirer was to pay to the claimants all 
rentals accrued and also by way of liquidated damages a sum equal to fifty per cent for 
that would be due thereafter. In its decision, the Court of Appeal, took into account all the 
circumstances and particular facts surrounding the contracting, leading to the decision 
that: " ... yet on the evidence cl. 11 of the agreement was not unenforceable as providing 
for a penalty, but the fifty per cent of the rentals, for payment of which cl. 11 provided, 
was a proper estimate of the damage and was recoverable as liquidated damages,,216. 
As a consequence the court established the principle that where the degree of 
disproportion between the agreed sum and likely actual loss is low it will not establish the 
essential proportion of extravagant swn subject to penalty jurisdiction. In other words, it 
is not sufficient to hold the agreed damages as an invalid penalty to show that the swn 
was merely more than the loss suffered217. Lord Diplock confirmed that the fifty per cent 
chosen by the parties as compensation was a "readily ascertainable figure" so long as it 
212Dun/op Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 87. Jobson v. Johnson p 989] WLR 1026. 
13 Philips Hong Kong LTD v. The attorney General o/Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 59. 
214 C/ydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, 
at 10. Imperial Tobacco Co v. Parslay, [1936] 2 All ER 515, at 523. 
215 Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128. 
216 Ibid. At 128,129. 
217 It will often be virtually impossible to anticipate accurately the damages for the loss sustained. 
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was close to the probable actual loss, which might be sustained by the claimants218• Thus 
the mere fact that fifty percent had been regarded in excess of the probable actual loss did 
not prevent the court from holding the sum as a valid liquidated damages clause on the 
ground that: 
"It is capable of prediction, and, if this figure will tend to operate slightly to the 
advantage of the plaintiffs if the contract is terminated early in its life, it will tend to 
operate rather more heavily to the advantage of the defendant if it is terminated late in 
its life. I see no reason in public policy why parties should not enter into so sensible an 
arrangement under which each know where they stand, in the event of the breach by 
the defendant and can avoid a heavy costs of proving the actual damage if litigation 
ensues, and I see no ground in the authority which would permit -much less com~el­
me to hold that this clause is a penalty clause and so unenforceable by the courts ... 19" 
3:2:2 A doubt on the current test rebutted: extravagant amounts cannot be included 
in liquidated damages clauses 
A doubt has been recently cast over the correctness of the existing test. An attempt was 
made to assert that the test included in 1915 case of Dunlop22o is not the correct approach 
since it was weakened in 1993 case of Philipi21 . This argument was consolidated with 
the idea that Philips case suggested that the correct test now is the one that looks at the 
contract as a whole and the risks being undertaken by both parties and ask whether the 
clause was an appropriate clause, having regard to the risk undertaken by the opposite 
party. This is to say that extravagant amounts can be included within liquidated damages 
provisions. In response, this argument is hardly to be sound. Nothing can be found in 
Philips case to indicate that the courts departed from the test laid down in Dunlop case or 
it had virtually abandoned. Rather it was confirmed that the test remains one of making 
certain whether the amount of agreed damages is a genuine pre-estimate of damages or 
not as was established in Dunlop case. In 2003 case of Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver 
International v. Barnet Football Club Limited222 Mr. Justice Jacob made it clear that 
Philips case boils down to this, that: "since Dunlop the courts have continued to apply the 
218 Robophone Facilities Ltd v Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 144 per Lord Diplock. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
221philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General o/Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
222 Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16111 January Court 
of Appeal (Civil Division), West1aw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. 
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rule in Dunlop,,223 and the only added matter was that the court should not be keen to 
drop penalty clause when the parties are of equal bargaining power. 
In Jeancharm case224, which was concerned of a contract to supply football kit, barnet 
Football Club Ltd agreed to purchase replica shirts from Jeancharm. The agreement 
stipulated that in the event of delay in payment the purchaser should pay interest at 5% 
per week and if the seller did not supply the entire order the purchaser had the right to 
receive a penalty for late delivery at rate of 20 pence per garment per day. Almost from 
the beginning there were difficulties in performing the contract. The purchaser, having 
complained about late delivery and the quality of goods supplied, brought an action 
claiming his 20 pence per garment per day clause. The judge accepted some of his claims 
and after making a set off ordered him to pay nearly £5000 to the seller. The latter 
claimed afterwards that the interest clause, which effectively operated as liquidated 
damages for late payment, should be activated at the rate of 5% in accordance to the term 
of the contract. The purchaser (Barnet) contested on that but the judge rejected the 
counterclaim and ordered him to pay the amount as liquidated damages. 
On appeal, the purchaser claimed that the clause was a penalty, as the 5% per week 
amounts to an annual rate of about 260% percent, namely it is enough to take his liability 
from £5000 to nearly £20,000. Therefore, the sum stipulated of £20,000 was extravagant 
and unconscionable, and thus unenforceable penalty clause under the English case law. 
However when the seller counterclaimed he attempted to draw the Court of Appeal to the 
fact that the simple Dunlop case test of looking at the amount of agreed damages (260%) 
is no longer ruling the matter of enforceability of agreed damages clause. This is because, 
as claimed, that the court should fully exam.ine the whole contract and the risks being 
undertaken by both sides225 to ask whether the sum stipulated is enforceable or not. This 
was based on the fact that the law has moved on from what was stated by Lord Dunedin 
223 Ibid. 
224Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16th January Court 
of Appeal (Civil Devision), Weslaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. See also for this case "Penalty Causes 
and Liquidated Damages Clauses". The Buyer. (2003) Vol 25 Number 4 1-6. 
225 The claim was that the seller was at very considerable risk ifhe was in late delivery, having regard to the 
20 pence per garment per day clause, and that should be balanced against the interest for late payments. 
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to be ruled by the conclusion of Philips case226. The Court of Appeal concluded that 
nothing in Philips case supports this allegation. Jacob J, rejecting the argument of the 
seller, stated: 
"There was no abandonment of the rule that the clause must be a genuine pre-
estimate of damage ... on any basis, 260% is an extraordinarily large amount to 
have to pay for the suggested administrative cost, even if the sums involved were 
relatively small. It is purely a matter of speculation, and certainly the clause goes 
wider than that and covers comparatively large debts too. What we have in this 
case alone takes a bill of £5000 to £20,000. I think this is a penalty clause in the 
Dunlop sense and unenforceable,,227 
The courts have always intervened in what the parties have agreed and struck down the 
agreed damages clause as a penalty on the basis of the existence of unfairness. It is now 
evident that the power to strike down a penalty clause is an obvious interfering with 
freedom of contract and is designed for the sole object of providing relief against a 
payment of a sum disproportionately higher than the likely actual loss. Therefore this 
power has no application unless disproportion is clear. It was plain that in this case the 
extravagance of the interest clause is too clear, as it much goes beyond whatever thing 
that could constitute a genuine pre-estimate of the actual loss and therefore amounts to a 
penalty. However how could the court decide whether the sum fixed forms a genuine 
attempt by parties to assess in advance the loss, which might ensue in the event of breach? 
3:2:3 Objective test or subjective one? 
When parties to a contract attempt to fix in advance the damages due in the event of 
breach such an attempt should be considered a "genuine pre-estimate of damage" to be 
upheld228 . However how can that attempt be decided whether it was a genuine pre-
estimate? Is it the actual attempt of parties to a contract in good faith to assess the loss, 
which might arise on the occurrence of breach? 
226 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
227 Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16th January Court 
of Appeal (Civil Devision), Weslaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. See also Lord Peter Gibson who stated 
that: "it is plain that in this case the interest clause far exceeds anything that could be said to be a genuine 
pre-estimate of actual loss and amounts to a penalty". See also DufJen v.FRA. BO SP (1998) The Times. 15 
June. 
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It should be noted that the only attempt to construe the word genuine is in support of the 
subjective test when it is presumed that the word genuine in this context means "A 
serious attempt to estimate loss, one made in good faith, however unreasonable it might 
appear to others,,229. This means that if the injured party can establish that he and the 
defaulting party, with good faith, made every attempt to appraise the actual loss, the 
agreed sum would be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate and thus valid liquidated 
damages clause. In Law v. Local Board of RddUch230, Lopes J supported this view saying: 
"The distinction between penalties and Liquidated damages depend on the 
intention of the parties to be gathered from the whole of the contract. If the 
intention is to secure performance of the contract by the imposition of a fine or 
penalty, then the sum specified is a penalty, but if on the other hand, the intention 
is to assess the damages for breach of the contract, it is Liquidated Damages231 " 
However, the view that the enforceability of a stipulated damages clause still depends on 
the intention of the parties to a contract is being doubted. The courts are not concerned 
with whether or not the parties have honestly believed that they made every possible bid 
to make a genuine pre-estimate of actual loss likely to be sustained on breach at the time 
when the contract is entered into. The sum stipulated might be disproportionately higher 
than the likely actual loss however the parties might have intended it as compensation. It 
is remarkable that Lord Dunedin in the leading case232 did not indicate the intention of 
the parties when he stated: "the question whether a sum stipulated is penalty or liquidated 
damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent 
circumstances of each particular contract,,233. Although it can be suggested that this 
statement is cast in subjective terms Lord Woolf, in Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney 
228 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 86. 
229 Chitty on contract. 29th ed. VoU General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1491-1492. 
230 Law v. Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127. 
231 Ibid. 132 per Lopes J. see also, see Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate [1906] 1 KB 425. 
In this case it was held that: "in deciding whether a sum made payable by way of compensation for breach 
of a contract is to be treated as liquidated damages or as a penalty, the Court must take all circumstances 
into consideration, in order to ascertain the intention of the parties". 
232 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
233 Ibid. At 86-87. 
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General of Hong Koni34, has frankly indicated that "the test is objective,,235, because 
"the issue has to be detennined objectively judged at the date the contract was made".236 
Therefore, it is clear from the relevant cases that it is the objective standard which should 
be taken into consideration in detennining whether or not the attempt of the parties has 
been a genuine attempt at the time of contracting237. In other words, the matter should be 
examined objectively at the time of contracting in order to ensure that the sum fixed is 
not extravagant and unconscionable. In order to do so regard must be paid to the whole 
tenns of the contract and all inherent circumstances, as the parties understand them at the 
time when the contract is made regardless of the words used by them. This might be 
supported also by the fact that English case law in matters of contract fonnation adopts 
the objective test of agreemene38. This means that the whole contracting agreement does 
not rely upon what parties wrote, but rather upon what the court should decide having 
examined the matter objectively. In an important passage Peter Pain J. in Thake v. 
Maurice239, stated: "The test as to what the contract in fact was, doesn't depend on what 
the plaintiff or the defendant thought it meant, but on what the court objectively 
detennines that the word used meant240". 
Therefore the true operation of the agreed damages provision must be detennined as a 
question of substance, which could not be foreclosed by statements of the parties in the 
contract241 . The parties to a contract might have subjectively intended to make a pre-
234Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR41. 
235 Ibid. At 60. 
236 Ibid. At 59. 
237 Hosie, Jonathan. "The Assessment of Damages for Delay in Construction Contracts: Liquidated and 
Unliquidated Damages". Construction Law Journal. (1994) 10(3). 
See: web2.westlaw.comlresultltext.wl? 
238 Anne De Moor. "Intention in the Law of Contract Elusive or Illusory?". Law Quarterly Review. (1990) 
106632. 
239Thake v. Maurice [1986] QB 644. 
240 Ibid. At 657 per Peter Pain. 
241 This principle had been confirmed in the leading case Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd. v. New Garage & 
Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 86 per Lord Dunedin. He stated that: "The question whether a sum 
stipulated is Penalty or Liquidated Damages is a question of construction to be decided upon the terms and 
inherent circumstances of each particular contract, judged of as at the time of the making of the contract, 
not as at the time ofthe breach". 
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estimate of damages in the event of breach. If however the pre-estimate turns out, on 
analysis, to be extravagant the clause will be a penalty. 
3:2:4 What is the meaning of "unconscionable"? 
3:2:4:1 The word unconscionable has no reference to the fact of the disparity of 
parties' position 
The notion of disparity of bargaining powers was first approached by Lord Wright M.R 
in Imperial Tobacco Co v. Parsla/42• His Lordship discussed it when attempted to give 
the meaning of the word unconscionable contained in the leading case~43. In this instance 
his Lordship examined the disparity between the positions of two parties and whether it 
must be taken into consideration to determine the nature of an agreed damage clause. 
Lord Wright explained that this proposition should not have any importance for this issue, 
whereby he stated that244: 
"I do not think the word unconscionable there has any reference to the fact that 
the parties were on an unequal footing. It does not bring in at all the idea of an 
unconscionable bargain .. .it merely a synonym for something, which is 
extravagant and exorbitant" 
This view has subsequently prevailed. It argues that the element of unconscionability 
does not contain any reference to the effect that the disparity between the positions of the 
two parties to a contract is to be considered to determine whether the sum stipulated is in 
the nature of penalty or liquidated damages. The relevant disproportion which should be 
taken into account should be measured by the comparison between the sum stipulated and 
the feasible actual loss sustained on breach without having any regard to the bargaining 
power of the parties. In Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co 245, it had been confirmed that 
"Unconscionable must not be taken to be a Panacea for adjusting any contract between 
competent persons when it shows a rough edge to one side over the other and the courts 
242 Imperial Tobacco Ltd v. Parslay[ 1936] 2 AIJ ER 515. In this case it was held that "The only question to 
be considered was whether the sum claimed as liquidated damages was a fair pre-estimate of the damages 
likely to flow from the breach, and not unconscionable, neither the fact that the plaintiffs were a powerful 
and influential company and the trader a man in a very small way of business .... " 
243 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
244 Imperial Tobacco Co v. Parsley [1936] 2 AIJ ER 515, at 521 per Lord Wright. 
245 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. 
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of equity never undertook to serve as a general adjuster of men's bargain"246. However 
what is the effect of Philips case? 
3:2:4:2 Effect of Philips Case 
A new development in regard to the consideration of the inequality of the bargaining 
power was raised in Philips Hong Kong LTD v. The Attorney General of Hong Koni47• 
This case suggested for the first time that attention could be paid to the disparity of 
parties' powers. However it confirmed that this notion would not have any decisive effect 
on determining the nature of the sum stipulated. Though it might be proved that there had 
been a domination of one party over the other, the test should still remain as clearly laid 
down in Dun/op, namely whether the sum stipulated far exceeds anything that could be 
said to be a genuine pre-estimate the loss which might arise from the breach. In an 
important passage Lord Woolf stated248: 
"Except possibly in the case of situations where one of the parties to the contract 
is able to dominate the other as to the choice of the terms of a contract, it will 
normally be insufficient to establish that a provision is objectionably penal to 
identify situations where the application of the provision could result in a larger 
sum being recovered by the injured party than his actual loss. Even in such 
situations so long as the sum payable in the event of non-compliance with the 
contract is not extravagant, having regard to the range of losses that it could 
reasonably be anticipated it would have to cover at the time the contract was made, 
it can still be a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that would be suffered and so a 
perfectly valid liquidated damage provision" 
The development suggested in this case will now be examined as follows: 
1- The bargaining strength is not of decisive effect 
2- Is the application of unconscionability notion that the Philips case suggested? 
246 Ibid, At 626 per Lord Radcliffe. 
247 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
248 Ibid. At 58-59 per Lord woolf 
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3:2:4:2:1 The bargaining strength is not of decisive effect 
In light of Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Konl49, it can be said 
that the way is now open to the first steps of giving "inequality of bargaining power" a 
role in detennining the nature of the agreed sum. The new development runs as follows. 
In deciding whether the sum stipulated is a genuine pre-estimate of the likely anticipated 
loss, all tenns of contract and other relevant surrounding circumstances are to be 
considered. Therefore, without any abandonment from the existing test it would be better 
to state that the situation in question (inequality of bargaining power) could be regarded 
as one of the important inherent circumstances, which has affected the contract at the 
time of contracting. The unconscionability of the injured party's conduct in seeking to 
enforce the agreed damages should be examined as a significant factor for the purpose of 
deciding the nature of sum stipulated. 
Therefore the activation of the current test after Philips case means that the court in 
deciding whether the agreed damages clause is of penal nature may look at two aspects. 
Firstly the court should consider the relationship between the parties' bargaining 
powers250, i.e. was there an element of domination by one party to impose the tenns of 
contracts over the other? The effect of this approach depends on whether the contracts are 
freely negotiated or have clauses been imposed by virtue of a standard fonn or a superior 
bargaining position of one of the parties. In the fonner case, it would be assumed that the 
party subject to the penalty clause had had the opportunity to examine every single issue 
related to the contracr51 and must have been a good reason to agree on it. It follows from 
this that this party is aware of all the consequences that he might encounter if he had not 
perfonned his contractual obligations. He needs not have made the contract if he would 
not have been able to fulfill his promises. Therefore as there was no serious effect of the 
249Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR41. 
250 If claimed and proved by the party who seeks to establish that the clause is penalty. 
251 He might be experienced or make the contract with a full legal assistance of his advisor, who stands with 
him side by side in all contracting steps. 
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inequality of the parties' powers on a risk of disproportionate compensation, the court 
would not scrutinise the clause with great care to determine whether it is a penalty or not 
However, in the event of pre-arranged contracts by an influence party it is presumed that 
the other side had not had any opportunity to discuss the terms of the deal. In other words, 
though the defaulting party had full foreknowledge at the time of making the contract of 
the consequences in the event of non performance, he had no option but to accept the pre-
drafted deal. This situation might result in risk of awarding the injured party an 
extravagant compensation. The court would therefore be more zealous to scrutinise more 
closely the availability of the main element of the test 252. To do so court should 
investigate all the terms of the contract and events surrounding the contracting process in 
order to ensure that there was no domination enabled one of the parties to control the 
other as to the terms of the contract. In the most recent case of Jeancharm Limited TIA 
Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited253 the Dunlop test was clearly 
reaffirmed however Jacob J has added that in accordance to what stated by Lord Woolf in 
Philips case254 that "One should be careful before deciding whether or not a clause is a 
penalty when the parties are of equal bargaining power,,255. However this does not mean, 
ifit is proved that the contract was not negotiated at arm's length, granting the defaulting 
party a relief for mere the fact that there was inequality of bargaining power at the time of 
contracting. It just gives the court the motivation to move towards the second step of 
finding out the availability of the disproportion principle. 
It should be noted that in investigating the matter of inequality of bargaining power the 
wealth of the parties is irrelevant. What is relevant is the relationship between the parties 
to a contract, which might explain the way by which they arrived to the sum stipulated 
252 Which is: the sum should be extravagant and unconscionable. 
253 [2003] 16th January Court of Appeal (Civil Devision), Weslaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. 
254 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong. (1993] 61 BLR 41. 
255 Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16th January Court 
of Appeal (Civil Devision), Weslaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. In the same case, Jacob also said in 
different place that: "A court should be careful not to strike down as a penalty a clause negotiated between 
willing parties who have similar bargaining strength" 
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and therefore inform the question of whether it was a genuine pre-estimate of damages. 
Lord Wright has clearly set out this fact when stated that he could not: 
"See any reason for introducing into a question of this sort any consideration of 
the relevant wealth and poverty of the two parties. A millionaire may enter into a 
contract in which he is to pay liquidated damages, or a poor man may enter into a 
similar contract with a millionaire, but in each case the question is exactly the 
same, namely, whether the sum stipulated as damages for the breach was 
exorbitant or extravagant" 256. 
Secondly, the court should apply the main element of the test, i.e. the disproportion 
principle. It should seriously look at the disparity between the sum stipulated and the 
possible actual loss which might be suffered as a result of breach of contract at the time 
of entry into the contract. Where there is no case of provision for an extravagant or 
excessive sum to be paid in the event of breach, the court shall not intervene and should 
declare the enforceability of the stipulated sum. The mere possibility that there is a 
disparity of bargaining powers is not adequate on its own to activate the penalty 
jurisdiction. But rather the sum stipulated should be disproportionately higher than the 
likely actual loss. However, does taking the inequality of bargaining power into account 
mean applying the unconscionability notion? 
3:2:4:2:2 It is not the unconscionability notion 
The approach after Philips case by no means suggests paving the way for 
unconscionability to be the basis for the invalidity of penalty clauses. The 
unconscionability idea means that where the parties have freely negotiated the contract 
the agreed damages clause should be enforced despite the prima facie disproportion 
between the compensation provided and the loss suffered on breach. However, where the 
parties have not similar bargaining strength the clause should be set aside as a penalty. In 
this instance the prevention of unconscionable transactions rests on preventing the 
stronger party from imposing a remedy which is not in general permitted under the 
English case law. In contrast, this is not the case under the new development suggested in 
Philips case as the inequality of bargaining power will be just a step to applying the main 
256Imperial Tobacco Co v. Parslay [1936] 2 All ER 515, at 523 per Lord Wright. 
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test as so laid down in Dunlop case, namely whether the sum stipulated is a genuine pre-
estimate damage. 
It might be asked257why should not unconscionability be the basis for the intervention of 
the court to strike down penalty clauses 258 since this would not contain a complete 
relinquishment of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd ?259 It 
is thought that this is so since the identification of an "extravagant" will be the 
introductory step, which will lead to inquiry into whether the contract had been freely 
negotiated. In response, with respect, a close look at its operation can conclude that 
adopting the unconscionability approach will involve a complete abandonment of Dunlop 
case rules, which represents the existing case law as to penalties. Adopting an approach 
based on an unconscionable conduct practised by one party over the other will divert 
attention from the current test as to what is a penalty provision- namely is it a genuine 
pre-estimate of what the loss is likely to be? to the different question, namely is there any 
unconscionable conduct? If there is no such conduct there will be no application of 
penalty jurisdiction even though the sum stipulated is much exceeds the possible actual 
loss. In other words, if the parties at the time of making the contract set an extravagant 
sum in comparison with the loss that could conceivably be proved as a result of breach, it 
would not be more than a sign leads into inquiry of whether there was unconscionability 
involved. This is completely contrary to the operation of the rule as so set out in Dunlop 
case. Furthermore, in adopting the suggested approach after Philips case it is the 
inequality of bargaining power which shall be a sign and motive for the court to look at 
the agreed damages clause more closely. In addition to the non-abandonment of the rule 
that the clause should be extravagant it achieves the notion of justice that the penalty 
jurisdiction is based upon. The approach is applicable to all cases where there is 
257 Downs, T A "Rethinking Penalty Clauses" in "Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-First Century" 
edited by Peter Birks, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. P 249, at 267. 
258 See for a suggestion to base the penalty rule upon the unconscionability notion: Poole, Jill. "Textbook 
on Contract Law". 7111 edition. Blackstone Press. 2004. P 451. Downs, T A .. Rethinking Penalty Clauses" 
in " Wrongs and Remedies in the Twenty-First Century" edited by Peter Birks, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1996. P 249 at 267. See also, Chen-Wishart, Mindy. "ControlIing the Power to Agree Damages". In 
"Wrong and Remedies in the Twenty-First Century" edited by Peter Birks, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996. 
P 271, at 283. 
259Dun/op Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
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disproportionately large sum being recovered even though there is no domination by one 
side over the other in order to keep the aim of damages within the compensatory nature. 
In Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited26o , 
Keene U made clear that: 
"It is quite clear from the authorities that the concept of penalty clause is not 
confined to situations where one party had a dominant bargaining power over the 
other, although it may, of course, often apply in such situation,,261 
3:3 What is the effect of hypothetical situations? 
The party, who seeks to establish that the agreed- damages clause is a penalty, might 
identify hypothetical circumstances where the outcome of the application of the clause 
could result in making a sum payable to injured party wholly out of proportion to the loss, 
which the latter is likely to sustain on breach. In Philips case262 the defendant (Philips) 
admitted that the sum claimed by the claimant (Government) by way of liquidated 
damages was not in fact extravagant in light of what had in fact occurred. Despite this 
fact the defendant argued that the clause was a penalty clause on the ground that there 
were a number of different hypothetical circumstances263 in which the application of the 
clause would result in a disproportionate amount being recovered by the claimant264 . 
However is the argument based on hypothetical situations lead to a satisfactory result? 
This particular argument was firmly rejected for the validity of the clause should always 
rely on what is likely to be a normal operation of the clause rather than an unusual 
operation. Therefore the Privy Council stated that: 
"arguments based on hypothetical situations where it is said that the loss might be 
less than the sum stipulated as payable as Liquidated Damages ... should not be 
allowed to divert attention from the correct test as to what is a penalty provision-
namely is it a genuine pre-estimate of what the loss is likely to be? to the different 
26°Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16th January Court 
of Appeal (Civil Devision), Weslaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Philips Hong Kong LTD v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong. (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 56. See for this 
point also Stebbings, S. "Penalties- in more Sense than One". Construction Law Journal. (2003) vol. 14 
Part 5 20, at 21-22. 
263 None of which had even happened. 
264 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 56. 
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question, namely are there possible circumstances where a lesser loss would be 
suffered?26s" 
Therefore, the use of unlikely situations should not be allowed to defeat the intended 
effect of parties to a contract being able to agree in advance upon damages recoverable as 
a result of breach. In other words, if the approach based on hypothetical circumstances is 
upheld the whole purpose of a provision as to agreed damages would be undervalued for 
this would mean that it would be extremely difficult to formulate any such clause which 
would not be open to attack as being penat266. Such an approach would not be in the 
interest of either of the parties since agreed damages provision may serve both parties. It 
may serve the perfectly proper goal of enabling a party to know beforehand what his 
liability will be and to convince the other party (the promisee)267 of his reliability not 
least when he has no adequate reputation established. The Law Commission in its 
working paper268 confirmed that: 
"The fact that in certain circumstances a party to a contract might derive a benefit 
in excess of his loss does not. .. outweigh the very definite practical advantages of 
the present rule upholding a /Jenuine estimate, formed at the time the contract was 
made of the probable loss.,,2 
It is hereby submitted that it is necessary for the courts when viewing every single case to 
examine the real and existing conditions and circumstances. 
3:4 Time for the application of the current test 
3:4:1 Time of contracting 
The existing principle is that the question of whether the sum stipulated is extravagant or 
unconscionable is judged by reference to all inherent circumstances and events as they 
265 Ibid. At 64 per Lord Woolf. 
266 This is because: "As is the case with most commercial contracts, there is always going to be a variety of 
different situations in which damage can occur and even though long and detailed provisions are contained 
in a contract it will often be virtually impossible to anticipate accurately and provide for all the possible 
scenarios. Whatever the degree of care exercised by the draftsman it will still be almost inevitabl~ that an 
ingenious argument can be developed for saying that in a particular hypothetical situation a substantially 
higher sum will be recovered than would be recoverable if the plaintiff was required to prove his actual loss 
in that situation". Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 54. 
267 Who can be able to know with a reasonable degree of certainty his rights and can also avoid the 
difficulty, delay and expenses of judicial assessment. 
268 No 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 
1975. 
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exist at the time at which the clause of paying a s~ of money on breach is agreed upon 
between the parties to a contract270• To do so, the court should compare the amount of 
compensation provided for in the contract with the greatest loss, which might have been 
reasonably contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting. If the quantum of 
damages stipulated was extravagant the sum stipulated will be classified as a penalty and 
not enforceable. However if the quantum was a genuine pre-estimate of likely loss at the 
time of contracting it is valid and enforceable as liquidated damages even though there is 
no loss suffered. This principle was confirmed in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New 
Garage & Motor Co Ltcf71 by Lord Dunedin, who stated there that: 
"The question whether a sum stipulated is a penalty or liquidated damages is a 
question of construction to be decided upon the terms and inherent circumstances 
of each particular contract; judged of as at the time of making the contract, not at 
the time of the breach272" 
However are all the events, which occur after concluding the contract without 
significance? The fact that the nature of the sum agreed upon in contract must be 
determined at the time when the contract is made, does not mean that the circumstances 
and events, which might occur after that time, must be disregarded. What has actually 
happened after the time of contracting can not be conclusive evidence of the status of the 
stipulated damages clause, as the court should consider the wider range of events which 
were in the contemplation of the parties at the time when contract was made273• In fact 
what actually happened might be considered as a productive element in determining the 
genuineness of agreed damages. It might provide valuable evidence of what could 
reasonably be contemplated by the parties to be the feasible loss at the time of contracting. 
Therefore the estimation of damages by the court without taking into consideration the 
actual loss, which has in reality happened, will be unrealistic and consequently not 
269 Ibid. P 30. 
270 For example, in Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y 
Castaneda [1905] AC 6, at 17 per Lord Davey. He confirmed the principle of the time of determining the 
nature of sum stipulated and this case itself Lord Davey indicated to affirm what have been decided by 
Lord Inglis in Forrest and Barr v. Henderson. (1869) 8 M 187 that: "Of course, the question whether it is 
exorbitant or unconscionable is to be considered with reference to the point of time at which the stipulation' 
is made between the parties". See also Public Works Commissioner v. Hills. [1906] AC 368, at 376 per 
Lord Dunedin. The Victoria Laundry Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528, at 539. 
271Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
272 Ibid. At 86-87 per Lord Dunedin. 
273 McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 5th ed. Macmillan. 20003. P 444. 
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possible. This development was confirmed by Lord Woolf in Philips Hong Kong LTD v. 
The Attorney General of Hong Koni74, when he stated that: 
"The fact that the issue has to be determined objectively, judged of the date the 
contract was made, does not mean what actually happens subsequently is 
irrelevant. On the contrary it can provide valuable evidence as to what could 
reasonably be expected to be the loss at the time the contract was made,,275 
Attention should be paid to the case of Rowland Valentine Webster v. William David 
Bosanquet276• One might argue that the court, in this case, has given its decision in 
accordance to the circumstances as they exist at the time of breach277. This means that 
there is a judicial trend towards judging the validity of agreed damages clause in relation 
to the loss suffered at the time of breach. This case concerned with a clause providing for 
liquidated damages of £500 to be paid in the event that the defendant failed to sell to the 
claimant "the whole or any part of the crop" of his tea estates. The defendant having sold 
five different parcels of the subject matter to a third party amounting to 53,315 Ibs, the 
claimant sued for the amount of damages agreed upon in the contract. The House of 
Lords upheld the clause as valid liquidated damages and granted the claimant the amount 
of£500. 
It should be noted that the point on which the Privy Council relied upon to reach its 
conclusion in this case, was not judging the enforceability of agreed damages clause 
according to the facts and conditions as they existed at the time of breach. Rather it was 
the fact that the council when it gave its decision had, in order to determine the true 
construction of the agreed damages clause, regard to the range of losses the parties would 
anticipate the clause would cover when they made their contract. Taking this into 
consideration the Council decided that the parties, when they agreed on liquidated 
damages must have had in mind that the clause was only applicable to sales to a person 
other than the claimant in that kind of commercial quantity. Thus it should be confirmed 
that the parties did not intend the agreed damages clause to be applicable to all sales 
274 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General o/Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
27S Ibid. At 59 per Lord Woolf. 
276 [1912] AC 394. 
277 See for this The Law Commission, Working Paper No 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies 
Paid". London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office. 1975. P 27. 
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made by the defendant. It would not be possible that they had any intention of applying 
the clause to sale of some packets of the tea. Lord Mersey, confirming this interpretation, 
said: 
"The parties to the agreement were merchants using language in the sense in 
which it is used in their trade. When they speak of a part of a crop they are not 
contemplating packets which might be sold over a grocer's counter, but parcels 
such as were in fact sold in the present case,,278 
Therefore it can be concluded that the parties did not have any intention at the time of 
making the contract, to make a potential penalty clause applicable to every sale contrary 
to a right of pre-emption clause279 (for breach of which liquidated damages were agreed 
to be payable)28o. As a result it would become visible that this case lends little support to 
the view that the matter was decided at the circumstance as they exist at the time of 
breach. Consequently the position of the current law remains that the question whether 
the agreed damages clause is a valid liquidated damages clause or an invalid penalty 
clause is to be judged at the time of the making the contract. However is this attitude still 
acceptable particularly where there is no loss suffered and is it in line with the New 
Approach? 
3:4:2 The no actual loss defence 
The existing principle of the law as to the time of application of test is still open to 
criticism. It should be noted that the requirement that the agreed damage clause is to be 
judged at the time of the contract is quite understandable in the historical perspective. 
This was the situation until Kemble v. Farren case281 where the parties could determine 
the enforceability of the stipulated sum according to the word they used in their 
agreement282. The difficulties, which this principle presents, arises from the fact that the 
intention of the parties' test no longer concludes the matter, and whether the sum 
278 Webster v. Bosanquet [1912] AC 394, at p 398-399. 
279 The condition in this case was that the defendant would not sell the whole or any part of the crop of his 
estates to person other than the claimant. 
280 See for this interpretation Cenargo Ltd v. Empresa Nacional Bazan de Construcciones Navaves 
Militares SA. 2002] EWCA Civ 524. [2002] CLC. 1151. 2002 WL 347020 
281 Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234. 
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stipulated is a penalty depends on rules of law. One consequence is that a sum may not 
represent a penalty at the time of contract whereas it will at the time of breach, and vice 
versa. The law commission283 in its working paper remarked on such a consequence in 
that it does not have any justification to change the present case law in this area. It stated: 
" ... We realise that a possible objection to the present law is that circumstances 
may arise where the penalty clause is enforceable because it was a genuine pre-
estimate, but as things tum out the loss suffered is negligible so that the stipulated 
sum exceeds the loss to a disproportionate extent. .. but our present view is that 
this objection does not justify a radical change in the present law,,284 
However, with all respect to the view expressed by the law commission, the current 
principle in which the court should measure the validity of the damages agreed upon in 
light of the circumstances existing when the contract is made irrespective of the actual 
loss is still objectionable. The sum stipulated might be a genuine pre-estimate of loss that 
might be sustained on breach at the time of the making the contract, however, might tum 
out to be much less than the stipulated sum or might be no loss at all at the time of breach. 
Put another way, sometimes the nature of the agreed damages clause should be 
determined in light of the actual loss suffered. In applying the existing principle the court 
may fall into absurdity when it decides to award the claimant the amount of agreed 
damages clause, though he suffered no loss. The practical impact of this rule has been 
clearly illustrated in Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos 
Yzquierdo Y Castaneda285• In this case the Spanish government (the claimant) made a 
contract with the defendants to build four torpedo boats to be used in the Spanish-
American War of 1898. It had been provided in the contract that the defendant should pay 
£500 per week for each vessel in the event of any delay to deliver them. Delivery was 
delayed by many months after the stipulated period and the price paid. Therefore the 
Spanish government successfully claimed from the defendant payment of £500 for each 
week that the vessels were late. The House of Lords decided that the sum should be 
282 Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law Review. (1985) 10503, at 
514. 
283 The Law Commission in its working paper No. 61 "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". 
London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1975. At 22, suggested that"" .to judge the validity of a penalty 
clause by reference to circumstances as they exist after the breach would mean the introduction of an 
unacceptable amount of uncertainty. 
284 Ibid. 
28S Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6. 
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treated as liquidated damages regardless of the fact that had all four vessels been 
delivered at the specified time, they would have been demolished together with the rest of 
the Spanish fleet. The judgment in this case was based upon what was expected to be a 
genuine pre-estimate of damages at the time of making the contract irrespective of any 
subsequent event which might prove that the claimant has suffered low loss. 
The effect of this outcome means that the defendant was compelled to pay a large sum 
under circumstances where there was no actual loss suffered by the claimant. In other 
words, although the former had argued that the amount agreed upon was not a genuine 
pre-estimate of damages the court refused to accept the argument on the express grounds 
that this is the mere principle of the current law. This absurdity can be overcome by 
considering the actual loss where it is either nothing at all or much less than its amount. 
Therefore it would seem appropriate to suggest that the enforcement of agreed damages 
clause where there is no loss sustained sounds unreasonable. It is impossible to suggest 
that the parties would intend the agreed damages to be payable in the event that no loss 
was suffered from286• Therefore the defaulting party should be given the right to rely on 
the so called the 'no actual loss defence' as recognised by a number of American courts. 
The 'no actual defense' allows an ex post voiding of agreed damages clause that was 
genuine estimate of likely loss at the time of contracting287 • In the American case of 
Massman Const Co v. City Council of Greenville288 the court applied this approach. In 
this case there had been an agreement to build a bridge in which it was provided that the 
286 The outcome of the case of Schuler AG v. Wickman Machine Tool Sales Ltd [1974] AC 235, could 
support this proposition. In this case it was decided that where the consequences of treating a term as a 
condition are unreasonable, having regard to the range of losses or consequences the parties would 
anticipate the clause would cover, it is less likely that the parties intended the use of condition to lend to the 
injured party the right to terminate the contract and claim damages. 
28 See for this DiMatteo, Larry A. "A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Elimination the Law of Liquidated 
Damages". American Business Law Journal. (2001) vol. 38. Part 4 633, at 663-664 where the author also 
stated that: "Alternativelty, the defense can be phrased simply as the failure of anticipated damages to 
materialize. In the language of common law excuse, the clause has been frustrated by a subsequent 
unexpected event. The unexpected event is the failure of a breach to produce any damages". It is well 
recognized under English law a contract is said to be 'frustrated' ifit becomes impossible to perform due to 
unforeseeable circumstances, or if circumstances change to the extent that performance would be 
substantially different from what was anticipated by the parties. 
288 Massman Const Co v. City Council o/Greenville 147 F. 2d 925 (C.C.A.5 th , 1945). This case and this 
whole approach were referred to to criticize the outcome of Clydebank case in the English law Commission 
proposal 1993. See McGregor, Harvey. "Contract Code". Drawn up on behalf of the English Law 
Commision. 1993. P 133. 
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defendant would pay a certain sum of money in the event of late completion of the said 
bridge. When default was committed the claimant brought an action before the court 
claiming the amount agreed upon. The court refused to enforce the agreed damages 
clause on the express ground that the bridge would in any case have been unusable due to 
the lack of a road leading to it which was supposed to have been completed by state 
authorities. 
The court justified its decision on the fact that the agreed damages clause, considering 
that there is no loss, was not designed for the purpose of enriching the injured party. Put 
another way, if there is no loss suffered the award of stipulated damages violates the 
compensatory principle of contract damages. One might raise the following question: Is 
risk allocation unjust enrichment?289 In response, it should be emphasised that when the 
risk allocation in contract results in imposing an unfair and unconscionable damages the 
role of the court to remove the unfairness becomes significantly demanded. The court, in 
applying this approach, appears to have adopted the position that if the injured party 
suffers no loss the stipulated damages clause is a penalty. In the American case of 
Wassenaar v. Panos290 the court fittingly stated this position: 
"Although courts have frequently said that the reasonableness of the stipulated 
damages clause must be judged as of the time of contract formation ... and that the 
amount or existence of actual loss at the time of breach or trial is irrelevant, 
except as evidence helpful in determining what was reasonable at the time of 
contracting ... , the cases demonstrate that the facts available at trial significantly 
affect the courts' determination of the reasonableness of the stipulated damages 
clause. If the damages provided for in the contract are grossly disproportionate to 
the actual harm sustained, the courts usually conclude that the parties' original 
expectations were unreasonable" 
This is also the very circumstance in which the court will have a discretionary power 
under the New Approach to reduce the amount of agreed damages. This is to say that the 
defaulting party will be allowed the defence that the clause is disproportionate or 
extravagant when compared to actual loss suffered. Under the New Approach the pre-
289 DiMatteo, Larry A. "A Theory of Efficient Penalty: Elimination the Law of Liquidated Damages". 
American Business Law Journal. (2001) vol. 38. Part 4 633, at 664. 
290 Wassenaar v Panos 331 N.W. 2d 357 (Wis. 1983). III Wis.2d 518, 40 A.L.RAth 266 
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estimate damages is assumed to be enforceable unless the defaulting party can prove that 
the agreed amount is out of all proportion when compared to the actual loss. 
4-Jordanian civil law 
4:1 Basis for the validity: Article 364 of the Jordanian civil law 
Penalty clause is dealt with in civil law countries quite different compared to case law 
countries. As one of case law countries English law distinguishes between penalties and 
liquidated damages. The agreed damages clause is invalid as a penalty where it is 
disproportionately high in comparison with the likely actual loss that might be suffered as 
a result of breach at the time of making the contract. However, Jordanian law as one of 
the civil law nations establishes a strong presumption in favour of the enforceability of 
penalty clause. 
Article 364 of the Jordanian civil law establishes the validity of penalty clauses. It states 
that "Contracting parties may, in advance, agree upon the amount of damages payable in 
the event that a breach occurs". Although penalty clause is ordinarily inserted in the 
principal contract concluded by the parties at the time of formation, it is equally valid and 
enforceable if it is agreed upon after making the contract by a separate agreement291 . A 
penalty clause is therefore a contractual liquidation of compensation, which the injured 
party suffers through non-performance of principal obligation. Hence, the legislator 
deprived the penalty clause of its penal character by providing in the second paragraph of 
the article that "The courts may, upon the request of either party, increase or decrease, 
such damages to make the estimation equal to the actual damage. Any provision in the 
contract to the contrary shall be of no effect,,292. In looking at the text of this article it can 
be clearly inferred that there should be actual damage suffered by the injured party 
(creditor) in order to have the right to receive the amount of penalty. It is noted that under 
291 Article 364/1 Jordanian Civil Law. Also, Civil Cassation 221191 Bar Association Journal [1993], p 186. 
It should be noted that if parties to a contract agreed upon the penalty clause in a separate act after making 
the contract, that separate agreement should have been made before the occurrence of breach. This is 
because if the agreement on penalty took place after the creditor had suffered the loss as a result of breach 
it would be considered a conciliation and not a penalty clause. See Morgos, Sulaiman. "AI-Wafi in 
Explaining the Civil Law". Vol.4 rules of obligations. 2nd ed. 1992. P 183. Sultan, Anwar. "Rules of 
Obligations". Anahdah Press. 1980. P 71-72. 
292 Article 364/2 Jordanian Civil Law. 
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Jordanian law the courts cannot remove the agreement of the parties, although they can 
amend it in some cases. As a result it can be said that the law is friendly to penal clauses, 
unlike English case law, which has for long been unfriendly to those clauses in contracts. 
Furthermore where the test for the intervention of the court to invalidate penalty clauses 
in English law is based upon the sum being extravagant and unconscionable, the mere 
possibility that the sum stipulated is just more than the actual loss is the basis for the 
intervention of the courts to reduce it in Jordanian law. 
The Court of Cassation clearly affirmed numerous times 293 that should a clause be 
inserted in advance within a contract, upon which it was agreed that a sum of money to 
be paid as a result of breach, this clause will be both permissible and legal. In its decision 
No 214111999 in 2000, the Court of Cassation has clearly confirmed that: 
"It seems sound and valid that one of the parties may provide and the other 
accepts that a sum of money to be paid on breach as damages. If such damages 
are not estimated in the law, the contract's parties may, previously, agree upon it 
in the principal contract or in subsequent agreement. And in all cases the court 
can amend such agreement to make the damages equal to the loss sustained. Any 
agreement to the contrary is to be void in accordance with the article 364 of the 
civil law. Then, since the claimant did not perform its contractual obligations on 
the time stated, and did not evidence that there was no loss suffered by the 
defendant, the latter has the right to receive the amount of penalty,,294 
It can also be inferred from article 364/2 of Jordanian civil law that the rules governing 
the penalty clause are of the public order and therefore any agreement to the contrary of 
them shall be deemed not to have been made. The idea of public order has such a broad 
meaning that it is one of the most complicated legal issues. It has been said that: "it is 
fully difficult to imagine such a precise definition of public order because of its flexibility, 
wide boundaries and its changing from time to time and place to place,,295. However, it 
can be asserted that it refers to the upper principles of society which every single member 
should comply with as they are intended to secure public rights. In other words, it is a 
293 Civil Cassation No 2141/1999. Bar Association Journal. 2001. P 2206. Also Civil Cassation 3326/2000 
Adaleh Centre Publications 2000, available at Info@adaleh.com. Civil Cassation No 39111987. Bar 
Association Journal. 1990. P 234. 
294 Civil Cassation No 214111999. Bar Association Journal. 2001. P 2206. 
295 Morgos, Sulaiman. "AI-Waft in Explaining the Civil Law". YoU. Assalam Press. 6th ed. 1987. P 138-
139. 
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policy related to the political, economic, social and legal identity of the state. Thereby 
Jordanian law looks at the public order as upper rule that should not be violated296• 
In the application of this notion on penalty clause rules, Jordanian civil law gives the 
parties greater latitude than the position in English case law at the time of making the 
contract to determine their future responsibilities. This enables them to make better 
decision on their transaction with no or less disorder to public order. As a result parties to 
a contract have confidence in their agreement on agreed damages clause in advance as 
their agreement will not at the end be wholly disregarded although it can be modified. In 
other words, contracting parties might agree on an excessive sum of money to be payable 
in the event of debtor's breach. Although the law makes such agreement void they trust 
in their agreed damages clause where the court can reduce it to be equal to the loss 
suffered. In contrast under the English case law the parties have less confidence in their 
agreed damages clause as they are always worried of being wholly disregarded by the 
court where it operates as a penalty. 
4:2 Penalty clause is not alternative 
A penalty clause is an accessory method to perform the obligations and does not therefore 
create an alternative undertaking. Therefore, it is not open to the defaulting party to 
discharge himself by paying the penalty instead of fulfilling his principal obligation under 
the contract297• The injured party also cannot demand penalty so long as the defaulting 
party can perform the principal undertaking. Hence, a penalty clause goes with the 
principal obligation in its validity and nullity. It should be noted that a penalty clause 
cannot be resorted to except in the following cases: 
I-If specific performance has become impossible due to the defaulting party's breach. As 
mentioned above the principal method to fulfill the obligations under Jordanian civil law 
is to compel the debtor to carry out his contractual undertakings in accordance with the 
296 Any provision in contradiction with the public order will be deemed illegitimate. See for that Civil 
Cassation No 214111999. Bar Association Journal. 2001. P 2206. See Al Sanhoori, Abdel Razag, 
"Commentary on Civil Law, Theory of Obligations", Arabic Torath Press. P 492. 
297 Abu Aso'od, Ramadan. "Rules of Obligations". Dar Almatbo'at. 1998, P 106. 
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tenns set out in that contract~98. Should specific perfonnance become unfeasible as a 
result of his own fault the court can resort to penalty clause to compensate the injured 
party. Furthennore. the injured party can demand penalty if specific perfonnance is not 
possible or adequate unless it is perfonned by his debtor in person. Therefore, where the 
fonner has contracted to obtain services of a personal quality from the latter, for example, 
to sing or take part in a film. he may obtain the amount payable under a penalty clause 
upon non-performance. 
2-Specific performance will not be awarded where its effect may cause hardship to the 
defaulting party. Thus. he will be responsible to pay the amount of penalty99since this 
amount may compensate the injured party for the loss he has suffered. The main example 
for this case is that when the debtor undertakes not to exceed a certain space in the case 
of construction but then proceeds to do so. In this instance it is not appropriate for the 
injured party to claim a specific performance in which the defaulting party should remove 
the building. as this will cause a heavy burden to the latter. Two limitations are to be met 
to resort to the penalty clause in this case: 
1- There should be a real hardship that results in inflicting an enormous loss on the 
defaulting party. In other words. the court decides the amount payable under penalty 
clause should be awarded instead of specific performance, as the latter would overburden 
the defaulting party. However, he can not resist the order of specific perfonnance simply 
because he is experiencing some financial difficulties, as this is not sufficient to establish 
hardship. Whether or not specific performance will cause a hardship to the defaulting 
party is decided at the discretion of the court. It should be noted that the traditional 
general principles gave the injured party a right to compel the defaulting party on specific 
performance irrespective of whether specific performance may overburden the latter. 
291 Article 355/1 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
299 Article 355/2 of Jordanian Ci\'il Law. For example suppose that X rented the second floor of his 
building, \\'hich is still under construction, to some doctors and engineers. However he could perfonn his 
obligatIOns as under the pressure of political and economic circumstances the prices of building materials 
have unreasonably increased. This made X totally unable to complete the second floor to be used by the 
lessees. Therefore forcing X to perfonn his contractual duties (delivering the second floor rooms to lessees) 
will highly overburden him. This gives X the right to demand paying the amount of penalty instead of 
specific perfonnance. 
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However, by the application of equity and justice principles the legislator has given the 
court the authority to resort to penalty clause and damages in the event that specific 
perfonnance became impossible. Therefore, the defaulting party will be compelled to 
stick to his bargain unless he can prove that this would result in injustice and hardship30o. 
2- It will not inflict serious damage on the injured party301. This means that the court 
should strike a balance between the two opposing interests of the debtor and creditor. If 
the court can avoid the hardship, which the defaulting party may encounter if it grants 
specific perfonnance with a simple loss suffered by the injured party, an award of amount 
of penalty can be granted instead of specific perfonnance. Specific perfonnance may be 
refused against a defaulting party on grounds of existence of a hardship when the cost to 
him is wholly out of proportion to the benefit which perfonnance will confer on the 
injured party. However, if that will lead to inflicting a serious damage on the injured 
party as the award of amount of penalty would defeat his reasonable aspirations and 
expectations, the court should award an order of specific perfonnance. This is especially 
the case when the subject matter is in some way unique, which makes any substitute not 
satisfactory to the injured party. In such circumstances it is better to award specific 
perfonnance as the court should prioritise the interest of the injured party over that of the 
defaulting party. For example a contract for the purchase of antiques, valuable paintings 
and other irreplaceable items as well as in contracts for the sale of land, specific 
perfonnance is readily granted as the law takes the view that a purchaser is not readily 
compensated by damages302• 
4:3 Accessory nature of penalty clause 
It is asserted that the obligation inflicted on the defaulting party under a penalty clause is 
not an independent undertaking but one, which is accessory to the principal obligation. 
The main obligation in the contract is the one which the defaulting party obliges himself 
to perfonn, however penalty clause is a secondary undertaking to pay a certain sum of 
300 The explanatory note of Jordanian Civil Law. Vo!.!. 1975. P 392. AI-Sanhoori, Abdel Razag. "AI-
Waseet in New Civil Law". Vo!.2 Evidence and Rules of Obligations. Arabic Torath Press. 764. 
301 Article 355/2 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
302 Abu Aso'od, Ramadan. "Rules of Obligations". Dar Almatbo'at press. 1998. P56. 
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money in the event of non perfonnance. Since penalty clause is a secondary obligation, 
nullity of the principal obligation results in nullity of this clause but not vice versa303• 
303 Civil Cassation 117/1981 Bar Association Journal [1981], P 1473. In this case the court held that: "Since 
the rule is that if the object is void so is its accessories, the penalty clause included in a void sale contract is 
accordingly void". 
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Chapter Three: Ambit of Application of Penalty Clause Jurisdiction 
O-Introduction 
The distinction in English case law between liquidated damages and penalties is only 
applicable where there has been a breach of contract committed by the contemplated 
payer. Although determined efforts have been made to persuade the court to widen the 
scope of operation of the doctrine of penalties, the arguments advanced in Export Credits 
Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products C0304, have been firmly rejected. The 
controversy is found over whether penalty jurisdiction is applicable in a case where the 
payment of an agreed sum is dependent on the occurrence of a specific event other than 
breach of contract. This rule is especially capable of causing difficulties in the context of 
minimum payment clauses in the event of termination of hire-purchase agreements. This 
unsatisfactory aspect of limiting the ambit of penalty jurisdiction will be critically 
examined. On the other hand, it seems that the policy of the law against penalties can be 
so easily circumvented by a trick of drafting. A skilled draftsman may change the form 
rather than the substance of a clause in a way that takes it outside the penalty jurisdiction. 
How can this be achieved and how does the law deal with such a situation? Is it regarded 
as satisfactory to manipulate the law regarding penalties by changing in forms of the 
clause? 
Under English case law the injured party can not recover all losses. He is limited to 
losses which are recoverable under the so-called Hadley v. Baxendale rules. However, 
what is the position if parties to a contract have pre-estimated the damages that can be 
paid on breach without taking into consideration the remoteness rule? Therefore, the 
following issues will be now examined: 
1- The limit upon ambit of the operation of penalty clause (necessity of breach) 
2- Loss to be estimated 
3- Evasion of penalty clause rules 
304Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] WLR 399. 
84 
1- Limit upon the ambit of the operation of penalty jurisdiction 
1:1 Necessity for breach 
In Philips Bernstein (Successors) Ltd v. Lydiate Textile Ltd305 Lord Diplock stated 
confinning that the penalty area is confined "to cases where there is a prior agreement by 
the parties to the contract as to an amount to be paid by the party in breach to the other 
party in respect of that breach". Therefore, if an agreed sum is penal in nature but payable 
on some event other than breach, it will remain payable306• In other words, the penalty 
jurisdiction does not apply unless the sum specified as agreed damages is payable by the 
defaulting party upon his committing a breach of contract. This restriction in English law 
excludes some cases in which injustice is clear. It makes a distinction between the sum 
fixed in the contract by parties, and payable on breach of a primary obligation under a 
liquidated damages clause and a payment payable on the occurrence of some events not 
constituting a breach of contract by the payer. This distinction may have existed because 
whilst fonnulating the present rules a number of judges in the Dunlop case 307 
"imprudently (but understandably) overlooked the possibility" that an agreed sum could 
be payable on the occurrence of events other than on breach308• However, the application 
of this principle, i.e. breach of contract as a precondition to invoke penalty jurisdiction, 
was justified as achieving the purpose of activation of the penalty rule. The goal is to 
prevent an injured party from recovering a sum of money by reason of a breach made by 
the defaulting party when that sum has little or no link to the loss sustained by the fonner 
as a result of latter's breach. Courts have never undertaken to grant relief to the party 
because of what might be evident, in some events, to be a harsh or unreasonable 
305 Philip Bernstien (Successors) Ltd v. Lydiate Textiles Ltd Unreported, June 26, 1962; Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division) No.238 of 1962. 
306 For general information about breach of contract as a precondition for the application of penalty rule see 
Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 509-512. Lal, Hamish. 
"The Doctrine of Penalties and the "absurd paradox": Does it Really Matter in 2003?" [2003] The 
International Construction Law Review. 50S, at 508-510. Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of 
Afreed Sums". (1985) 10. Sydney Law Review. 503, at 519-522. 
30 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
308 Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". (1985) 10 Sydney Law Review. 530, at 
520. 
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commercial bargain309. This is because there is no "general principle of equity which 
justifies the court in relieving a party to any bargain if in the event it operates hardly 
against him,,310. Moreover, it should be noted that the rule against penalties is an old 
equitable principle and has survived a long time despite involving a strong judicial power 
to override the express terms of a contrace II. As a result an important decision of the 
House of Lords has affirmed the restriction of the operation of the penalty rule to the sum 
payable on breach312. 
In its working paper the Law Commission recommended that the penalty jurisdiction 
should be applied whether or not there is a breach 313. However the courts in this 
recommendation took no action and the House of Lords insisted in Export Credits 
Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products C0314 that penalty jurisdiction is only 
applicable where the agreed sum becomes due as a result of breach by the payer. It was 
pointed out in this case that the breach, which makes the penalty rule applicable must be 
of a contractual promise made by the payer to the payee. Hence, not every breach is 
capable of activating penalty clause rules. It should be between the contracting parties 
and not with a third party who may have a link with the main contract. 
In the case of Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products C0315 A 
had contracted to b~ild a refinery for B. C had undertaken responsibilities as guarantor 
for the financing of project. A and C made an agreement under which A promised to 
reimburse C for any payments that C would have to pay to B under the guarantee. A 
defaulted under the finance agreement with B and so C's guarantee was called upon. As a 
result of this C claimed reimbursement from A, who alleged that the clause concerned 
309 Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399, at 403 per 
Lord Rskill. 
310 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co[l962] AC 600, at 614 per Lord Viscount Simonds. 
311 Atiyah. P. S. "An Introduction to the Law of Contract". 5th ed. Clarendon Press. 1995. P 435. 
312 Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399 
313 The Law Commission in its Working Paper No. 61. "Penalty Clause and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". 
London. Her Majesty stationery Office, 1975. P 18-19. 
314 Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] I WLR 399 [1983] 1 WLR 
399, at 403 
315 Ibid. See for general analysis on this case Fox, 0 W. "Limiting the Ambit of Penalty Clauses". 
Solicitors' Journal. (1984). vol. 128. 179. See also the case of Tool Metal M Co Ltd v. Tungsten Elec Co 
Ltd [1955] 2 All ER 657, at 662. 
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was a penalty. The House of Lords rejected A's claim and decided that the stipulation 
was not a penalty as it provided for the payment of money on a specified event other than 
breach of contractual duty owed by the contemplated payer(C) to the contemplated payee 
(A). Rather the payment was due because of breach committed in another contract 
between A and B. 
This means, the penalty rule was not applicable so long as the clause provided for the 
payment of money on the happening of a specified event rather than a breach of the type 
described. Lord Roskill explained the reasoning for this principle saying: 
"My Lords, one purpose, perhaps the main purpose, of the law relating to penalty 
clauses is to prevent a plaintiff recovering a sum of money in respect of a breach 
committed by a defendant which bears little or no relationship to the loss actually 
suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the breach by the defendants. But it is not 
and never has been for the courts to relieve a party from the consequences of what 
may, in the event, prove to be an onerous or possibly even imprudent commercial 
bargain,,316 
One might argue that the event for which the sum became payable in this case was a 
breach of contract. However it should be noticed that the breach involved was not breach 
of contractual promise between the promisee and the promisor but rather the breach of 
another contract with a third party. This has been clearly confirmed by Lord Roskill when 
he explained the reason of the final judgment that: "the reason why the appellants' 
submissions failed in the courts below can be simply stated. The clause was not a penalty 
clause because it provided for payment of money upon the happening of a specified event 
other than a breach of a contractual duty owed by the contemplated payer to the 
contemplated payee,,311. Consequently, in this case the House of Lords unanimously 
rejected the invitation to extend the penalty rule to include payments conditioned on the 
happening of events other than breach. This leads to examine the cases in which the 
penalty rule does not apply and the problems of this principle. 
316 Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399. At 403. See 
also Tool Metal M Co Ltd v. Tungsten Elec Co Ltd. [1955] 2 All ER 657, at 662. 
317 Export Credits Guarantee Department v. Universal Oil Products Co [1983] 1 WLR 399, at 402. 
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1:2 Cases in which the principle of necessity for breach is upheld 
It is natural to say that according to the foregoing discussion that rules regarding penalties 
and liquidated damages are inapplicable where there is no breach of contract. This is the 
situation even though the sum stipulated is unconscionable or extravagant. As a result the 
penalty jurisdiction has no application in the following situations: 
1:2:1 Reimbursement Clause 
Where the parties stipulate that a sum of money which was paid under the contract is to 
be repaid to the original payer on the occurrence of certain event, no question of whether 
this sum is a penalty or liquidated damages arises. The clause concerned in this situation 
is the reimbursement clause318• 
This situation is clearly illustrated in Alder v. Moore319 where it was affirmed that there 
should be breach of contract to apply the rule against penalty. In this case an injured 
football player received a sum of money from his insurers which was paid in 
consideration of him having to give up professional football. It was provided that the 
same amount was to be repayable if the player started to play football again. The player 
signed a declaration that he would not play professional football again and in the event of 
infringement of this condition, he would be subjected to a penalty of the amount paid to 
him in settlement of his claim. The defendant began playing football four months after 
signing the declaration and the claimant sought a recovery of £500. The defendant argued 
that the clause was a penalty and that the insurers had sustained no loss by his resuming 
playing football again. 
Confirming that rule against penalty does not apply where there is no breach, the 
argument of the player was rejected on the basis that there is no application of such rule 
since he committed no breach of contract when he did play again. This was justified on 
the basis that the contract concerned had reimbursement clause, which stands outside the 
scope of operation of penalty clause rules, as the payment was due on a certain event, 
318 Chitty on Contract. 29 th ed. Vol. 1 General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1499-1500. 
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which was not a breach of contract, and that the event having taken place the sum was 
repayable. 
1 :2:2 Termination clauses in hire purchase agreements 
Where the agreement provides that the owner can determine it on the occurrence of an 
event other than breach, the penalty jurisdiction will have no application. This principle 
has many examples of such events whereby events do not constitute a breach and so 
stand outside the scope of activation of penalty jurisdiction. 
1:2:2: 1 Death and liquidation of the Hirer 
It might be agreed between the parties that the minimum payment clause would be 
payable in the event of death or bankruptcy without any default by the hirer.32o Therefore, 
the clause would be enforced on the occurrence of any of these circumstances. If due to 
the death of the hirer, the owner had determined the hiring agreement and claimed the 
agreed sum, there would be no question of whether the sum stipulated is a penalty or 
liquidated damages could arise in such situation32l• This is because the sum specified 
"was a sum payable in respect of one event, namely, the determination and end of the 
hiring agreement ... ,,322. An illustration of this can be found in Re Apex Supply Co. Llef23 
where there was a hire purchase agreement between two companies. It was provided that 
if the hiring company terminated the contract, the owner company should repossess the 
goods and the former would pay a certain sum of money as compensation for 
depreciation of the subject matter. After the hiring company has gone into liquidation the 
owner company exercised its right given under the agreement and terminated it. 
Considering four unreported cases,324 Simonds LJ held that the question of whether the 
sum agreed to be paid as compensation was a penalty or liquidated damages did not arise 
319 Alder v. Moore [1961] 2 QB 57. 
320 See Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Stanford [1953] 1 QB 86, at 98 per Somervell LJ. 
32\ Chester &Cole v Wright 1930 noted in Jones & Proudfoot's notes on hir-Purchase Law. 2nd ed. P 124. 
312 Ibid. Per Creer LJ. 
323 Re Apex Supply Co. Ltd [1942] Ch 108. 
324 (Elsey and Co Ltd v Hyde, Chester and Cole Ltd v Avon, Roadways Transport Development Ltd. v 
Browne & Gray and Chester and Cole v Wright) These cases were mentioned in Jones & Proudfoot's notes 
on hire-purchase law. 2nd ed. At 107. lIS. 118 and 124 respectively. 
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since "That this is a contract for the payment of certain sum in certain event and, that 
event having happened, that sum is payable,,325. 
1 :2:2:2 Where the hirer himself terminates the hiring agreement 
The hirer may resort to his contractual right and terminate the hiring agreement. In such a 
case will he have a relief against penalties? English case law has settled that the penalty 
jurisdiction in this instance is irrelevant as the hirer exercising his option does not 
constitute a breach326. Hence, if the contract is determined by the hirer in conformity with 
the option given to him under the hiring agreement, the sum which must be paid 
accordingly is neither liquidated damages nor a penalty, but is a sum payable on the 
happening of a certain event327. In Chester and Cole v Wright328 Greer LJ approved this 
principle on the basis that: 
"There is no reason in law why, for a sufficient consideration, there should not be 
in the same document two contracts, one a contract to hire the motor-car on the 
terms of the agreement, and another, a contract that if that agreement comes to an 
end, then a certain sum will be payable by the hirer,,329. 
The question of whether the sum stipulated, which becomes payable as a result of hirer's 
exercising his option to terminate the hiring agreement, is encompassed in the application 
of rule against penalties had come before the Court of Appeal in Associated Distributors 
Ltd v Ha1l33o• In this case the hire purchase agreement was for hiring bicycle for which 
the price had to be paid in 52 weekly instalments. Clause 5 of the agreement gave the 
defendant (Hall) the right to terminate the hiring at any time and return the subject matter 
to the owner. Under clause 7331 the hirer had to pay a sum of money as compensation for 
depreciation of the goods in addition to any other sum payable under the hiring contract. 
The amount paid before for rent had to make up a sum equivalent to not less than one-
half of the total amount. The defendant having exercised his option and returned the 
subject matter after paying just one instalment, the claimant sued for the arrears of the 
325 In Re Apex Supply Co. Ltd [1942] Ch 108, at 119. 
326 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co. [1962] AC 600 
327 See Chester &Cole ltd v Wright 1930 noted in Jones & Proudfoot's notes on hir-Purchase Law. 2nd ed. P 
124. Per Lord Greer. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Ibid. 
330 Associated Distributors Ltd v. Hall [1938] 2 KB 83. 
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rent and any other amount due under clause 7. The claimant alleged that the clause was 
not a penalty as the contract was terminated by the exercise of an option by the hirer. 
The Court of Appeal sustained the claim as it is only where there is a breach of contract 
the penalty rule is relevant. In delivering the judgment Slesser LJ 332 indicated the 
difficulty involved in this case where the owner as a result of default by the hirer could 
also have terminated the contract under clause 7 by the exercise of an option. However, 
"Here the hirer, not the owner, terminated the hiring. He has exercised an option and the 
terms on which he may exercise the option are those set out in cl. 7. The question 
therefore whether these payments constitute liquidated damages or a penalty in the 
instances mentioned does not arise in the present case" 333. 
This situation, where the hirer chooses to determine the hiring agreement, is puzzling and 
an object of controversy as it results in unjust consequences where it favours the less 
deserving hirer who acts in breach and refuses to pay the instalments. This leads to an 
unsatisfactory aspect of exacting a breach of contract by the payer to place the case 
within the ambit of penalty jurisdiction. 
1:3 Unsatisfactory aspect in confining the penalty jurisdiction on breach 
Because the law on penalty clauses applies only when there is a breach of contract, it 
should be conceded that this principle produces some anomalous results by excluding 
from the scope of the penalty rule some clauses, which may be equally penal in effect. In 
other words, this approach excludes from the scope of the penalty jurisdiction a provision 
for the payment of what might be an extravagant and unconscionable sum of money upon 
some event other than breach334• If, for example, the agreed sum becomes payable on the 
purchaser turning out to be insolvent, being jailed, or leaving the country, then the sum is 
331 Ibid. At 84. 
332 Ibid. 88 per Lord Siesser. 
333 Ibid. 88 per Lord Slesser. 
334McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 5th Ed. Macmillan. 2003. P 446. Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". 
First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 510. Downs, T A. "Rethinking Penalty Clauses". In 
wrongs and remedies in the twenty-first century. Edited by Peter Birks. Clarendon presses, Oxford. 1996. P 
255-256. Meagher, R. B. "Penalties in Chattel Leases". In Essay in Equity. Edited by P. D Finn. The Law 
Book Company Limited. 1985. P 46, at 55. 
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not payable on breach and does not constitute a penalty clause. Besides the penalty 
jurisdiction can often be readily avoided by a draughtsman in drafting a provision in a 
way that makes the specified sum payable on an event other than breach of contract335. 
On top of that this principle also produces results which appear undesirable in practice 
whereby the hirer uses his option to terminate the hiring agreement. This issue 
necessitates critical scrutiny and will be tackled in light of Bridge v. Campbell Discount 
Co case336. 
1:3:1 The problem of breach in hire purchase contract 
The problem of breach in termination clauses originates from the following 
unsatisfactory paradox. If hirer gives a notice to owner to rescind the contract early, the 
contract may provide that the former to make the payment of a minimum sum as 
compensation for loss suffered by the latter. Since the agreement is terminated on a 
particular event, which does not constitute a breach of contract, the penalty rule will not 
apply and hirer will be denied relief. In contrast if hirer commits a breach 337by not 
performing his contractual obligations under the contract, the penalty rule will apply to 
this case and render the agreed sum clause unenforceable338. This paradox had been 
335 Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 518-519 where he 
stated that: "This enables a penalty clause to be disguised, for instance, a car hire company concerned to 
ensure the prompt payment of its usual rate of hire of £100 per day might use the following techniques. 
First, by using the alternative considerations techniques, the rate of hire the car might be expressed to be 
£100 per day paid in advance or £200 per day ifpaid in arrears. Second, by using the discount techniques, 
the rate of hire might be expressed to be £200 with a 50 per cent discount for the payment in advance. The 
key to either technique is that the contract must be drafted to ensure that the hirer's failure to pay £100 in 
advance is not a breach of contract". 
336 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. 
337 In hire purchase agreement it has long been accepted that a clause providing for a sum of money payable 
on termination of agreement (in itself not an event of breach) is still within the ambit of rule against penalty 
clause if one of the grounds on which the agreement might be terminated is breach. otherwise it will not do 
so. This is what was initially decided in Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd v. Stanford [1953] I QB 86 before 
being affirmed by the House of Lords in Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. and again by the 
Court of Appeal in Financings Ltd v. Baldock. (1963) 2 QB 104. See also for that Meagher, RP. "Penalties 
in Chattel Leases" in "Essays in Equity" edited by PD Finn, The law book company limited. 1985 46. 
Ziegel, Jacob S. "The Minimum Payment Clause Muddle". Cambridge Law Journal. [1964] 108, at 110-
114. Hughes, AD. " Damages and Penalties in Hire-Purchase". Journal of business Law. [1962] 252. 
338 Poole, Jill. "Textbook on Contract Law". 7th ed. Blackstone Press. 2004. P 452. Beatson, J. "Anson's 
Law of Contract". 28 th ed. Oxford University Press. 2002. P 629. Lal, Hamish. "The Doctrine of Penalties 
and the "absurd paradox": Does it Really Matter in 2003?". The International Construction Law Review. 
[2003] 505, at 510-511. Furmston, M P. "Contract Planning: Liquidated damages, Deposit and the 
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attacked by Lord Denning in Bridge v. Campbell Discount CO. 339, His Lordship remarked 
unfavourably on this paradox saying "Let no one mistake the injustice of this, it means 
that equity commits itself to this absurd paradox: it will grant relief to a man who breaks 
his contract but will penalise the man who keeps it,,34o. In this case the hirer entered into 
a hire-purchase agreement with a finance company to buy a car. Clause 6 of the 
agreement gave the hirer the right to terminate the agreement at any time by giving notice 
to the owners. Clause 9 provided that if the agreement was for any reason terminated 
before the vehicle became the hirer's property the hirer "shall forthwith ... pay to the 
owners ... by way of agreed compensation for depreciation of the vehicle such further 
sums ... equal to two-third of the hire-purchase price" 341 . The hirer paid one monthly 
instalment on the total hire-purchase price and notified the company in writing afterwards 
to the effect that he couldn't keep up paying the instalments. He said that: "Owing to 
unforeseen personal circumstances I am very sorry but I will not able to pay any more 
payments on the Bedford Darmobile .. , I am very sorry regarding this but I have no 
alternative". Shortly after writing this letter the hirer returned the car to the company. 
The Court of Appeal342 decided that the sum stipulated was not a penalty since the action 
taken by the hirer did not amount to breach. The court justified this holding, referring to 
the decision in Associated Distributors Ltd v. Ha1l343, that the hirer's notice amounted to 
an exercise of the option granted in clause 6 to determine the contract. That is, according 
to the orthodox approach that exacts the breach, the penalty is irrelevant in this case. 
Foreseeability Rule". Journal of Contract Law. [1991] I, at 8. Clarke, Mr Justice M JR. Commentary on 
"Contract Planning: Liquidated Damages, Deposit and the Foreseeability Rule", Journal of Contract Law. 
[1991] II, at 12-13. Waddams, S M. "Unconscionability in Contract", Modem Law Review. (1976) Vo1.39 
(4) 369, at 375. 
339 [1962] AC 600. 
340 Bridge v. Campbell Discount [1962] AC 600, at 629 per Lord Denning. 
341 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. 
342Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1961] 1 QB 445. 
343 Associated Distributors Ltd v. Hall [1938] 2 KB 83. 
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However, this decision was reversed by the House of Lords344 which by the majority345 
held that there was a breach of contract by the hirer and there had to be relief against the 
penal sum stipulated. This was because the amount due under clause 9 was not a genuine 
pre-estimate of damages as the amount payable under the clause would decrease the 
longer the vehicle was still under the hirer's possession346• Therefore, the sum stipulated 
would become smaller with each instalment paid while the vehicle became older and its 
value decreases over the passage of time. Accordingly there was no evidence that the 
hirer had any intention of exercising the option granted to him by clause 6. Moreover, it 
was confirmed that the letter written by the hirer that he could not keep up the payment of 
instalments " ... means that the writer feels reluctantly compelled to break his agreement" 
347. Why else should the hirer twice apologise humbly if he thought that he was merely 
exercising an option given to him by the agreement? Since the unjust consequences are 
clear in delimiting the application of penalty rule on breach, how can the problem of 
breach or paradoxical situation in the hiring agreement be solved? 
1:3:2: How can the problem be solved? 
To reiterate under the current law the jurisdiction of penalty clauses applies only where 
there is a breach of contract and not where the one party, in particular the hirer in hire 
purchase contract, uses his contractual option to end the contract. In all cases this leads to 
unjust outcomes as the existing law gives the party in breach the right to seek judicial 
scrutiny of a penalty whilst the party who exercises its option may not. Therefore, which 
approach would be preferable, the existing one or the extension of penalty jurisdiction? 
1:3:2:1 Undesirable extension of the penalty jurisdiction 
In spite of the aforementioned paradox there is an approach, which prefers not to apply 
the penalty rule to cases where the agreed sum becomes payable on event other than 
breach. The argument for this view runs as follows: that the extension of the penalty 
344 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. The same facts were repeated in United Dominions 
Trust (Commercia/) Ltd v. Ennis [1968] 1 QB 54 and again the court was careful to decide that the hirer 
was not actuaJly exercised his option and their lords did not give any decisive view about the applicability 
of rules against penalties on the event if the hirer had really exercised his option. 
345 Lords Morton, Radcliff, Devlin and in the alternative Lord Denning. 
346 Bridge v. Campbell Discount [1962] AC 600, at 623 per Lord Radcliff. 
347 Ibid. At 615 per Lord Morton. 
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jurisdiction would inevitably lead into new general equitable remedies and into new 
break with the old rules of freedom of contract with which the penalty rules have always 
been in conflict. This means that courts without proof of improper conduct by one party 
should not upset the freely made bargains348. 
The' undesirability of extending penalty jurisdiction had been reaffirmed in Export 
Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products Co 349by Lord Roskill. He 
declared that the principle of the applicability of rule against penalties on breach had been 
settled and expressed his desire not to change what has been well established. He quoted, 
with entire agreement, the concluding observation asserted by Diplock LJ in Philip 
Bernstien (Successors) Ltd v. Lydiate Textiles Ltct50: "I, for my part, am not prepared to 
extend the law by relieving against an obligation in a contract entered into between two 
parties which does not fall within the well defined limits in which the court has in the 
past shown itself willing to interfere,,351. Therefore the concluding view of this approach 
is that relief against penalties should be confined to cases where the agreement is 
determined on breach. This view finds some support in Bridge case352. After deciding 
that clause 6 in the agreement is not in the nature of penalty, it had been pointed out that 
the hirer when he agreed to pay a price was given the option to exercise his right to 
determine the hiring agreement, as it seemed appropriate for him. " ... He needs not 
exercise it if he does not want to,,353 or in other words he "is free to exercise it or to 
disregard it, as he thinks fit" 354 . Accordingly, it had been said that the holding in 
Associated Distributors Ltd v. HaU355 - where it was held the inapplicability of rule 
against penalties because the hiring agreement was determined by the hirer in exercising 
his option- was rightly decided. Consequently, unless the sum became payable on the 
348Wedderburn, K. W. "Hire Purchase-Penalties-Freedom of Contract". Cambridge Law Journal. [1961] 
156, at 158. Also Fridman, G.H.L. "Hire-Purchase: Esstoppel-Penalties". Modem Law Review. [1961] 502, 
at 509. 
349 Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Prod~cts Co. [1983] 1 WLR 399 at 404 per Lord 
Roskill 
350 Philip Bernstien (Successors) Ltd v Lydiate Textiles Ltd Unreported, June 26, 1962; Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division) No.238 of 1962. Cited in Export Credits Guarantee Department v Universal Oil Products 
Co [1983] 1 WLR 399 at 404 per Lord Roskill. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. Lord Viscount Simonds.and Lord Morton of Henryton. 
353 Ibid. At 613 per Lord Viscount Simonds. 
354 Ibid. At 617 per Lord Morton of Henryton. 
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occurrence of breach, it could not be struck out as a penalti56• However, what is the 
justification of the approach, which seeks to extend the control of penalty clause to events 
other than breach? 
1 :3:2:2 Extension of application of the penalty jurisdiction 
Since the most frequent and oldest reason or rather the true basis of the penalty and 
liquidated damages distinction is unfaimess357 it is an odd rule to make such distinction 
only applicable on breach. This principle prompts the hirer under a hire purchase contract 
to default in payment in order to be in breach of contract rather than exercising his option 
to determine the contract. Furthermore, as it was pointed out by Lord Denning in Bridge 
case358, the hirer who wishes to return the goods will be better off if he commits a breach 
of contract than he would be if he exercises his option to terminate the agreement. In 
other words, the hirer who breaks the contract by failing to pay instalments may claim 
that the minimum payment clause is in penal nature. However, the hirer who decides to 
use a contractual right to determine the agreement in a lawful manner may not so claim, 
though the consequences of the clause are exactly in penal nature. 
This position is, under the existing law, both "illogical and unjust,,359. Such a distinction, 
namely, between termination on breach and in exercising the hirer his option, seems to be 
of little importance and unreasonable. In either case there is the same non-performance 
355 Associated Distributors Ltd v. Hall [1938] 2 KB 83. 
356 Lord Viscount Simonds and Lord Morton of Henryton in Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 
600. 
357 Which indicates in this place the disproportion between the agreed sum and the actual loss suffered. In 
other words, it is asserted that it is unfair to allow the injured party to extract an excessively large sum from 
a defaulting party. This argument rests on two separate ideas: first: that invalidity of penalty clause often 
stems from abuses in the bargaining process, that is of procedural unfairness. See for this Goetz, Charles J. 
and Scott, Robert E. "Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: some Notes on 
an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach". Columbia Law Review. (1977) 77, 554 at 591. 
Beale, Hugh. "Remedies for Breach of Contract". Sweet and Maxwell. 1980. P 59. Burrows, Andrew. 
"Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract". 2nd ed. Butterworths. 1994. P 329. Second, that to allow the 
injured party to recover damages in excess of its actual loss is simply result in the deviation of the basic 
principles of justice. This rests on the natural justice argument, which adopts the compensatory principle as 
a moral standard and rejects penalty clauses because they are contrary to this principle, that is of the 
substantive unfairness. See for this Kaplan, Philips R. "A Critique of the Penalty Limitation on Liquidated 
Damages". Southern California Law Review. (1977) 55, 1055 At 1070. 
358 Bridge v. Campbell Discount [1962] AC 600, at 629 per lord Denning. 
359 Goode, R.M. "Hire-Purchase Law and Practice". 2nd ed. 1970. 392. Furmston, M P. "Contract Planning: 
Liquidated damages, Deposit and the Foreseeability Rule". Journal of Contract Law. [1991] I, at 8. 
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and the same stipulation for payment of compensation36o. The only difference between 
the two situations is the action taken by every hirer. In the former there is an adept and 
clever hirer who rejects paying the instalment on time and goes through a long process by 
breaching the contract. Although he infringes the law, he will benefit from the advantage 
given to him from the penalty rule. On the other hand, there is an honest hirer who feels 
that he cannot carry on paying the due instalments and writes to the owner with great 
sorrow that he cannot do so and terminates the agreement immediately without any delay 
or deception. Therefore, it is submitted that this compromise is unsatisfactory as it puts a 
hirer who complies with law and acts conscientiously in a worse off position than one 
who breaks the law and avoids liability by invoking the penalty jurisdiction361 . 
The Bridge v. Campbell Discount C0362 affirms that such a distinction will, as between 
two hirers, result in activating the penalty rule in favour of the less deserving one. Lord 
Denning indicated that applying the narrow approach of confining the rule against 
penalty clauses on breach of contract means that: 
"If Mr. Bridge, after a few weeks, finds himself unable to keep up the instalments 
and, being a conscientious man, gives notice of determination and returns the car, 
without falling into arrear, he is liable to pay the penal sum without relief of any 
kind. But if he is an unconscientious man who falls into arrear without saying a 
word, so that the com£any retakes the car for this default, he will be relieved from 
payment ofpenalty,,3 3 
360 McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th' ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 476. Lord 
MacDermott in a Northern Ireland case of Lombank Ltd v Kennedy and Lombank Ltd v. Grossan [1961] NI 
192 Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. In this case the majority of the Court of Appeal held that the hirer 
exercised his option to rescind the contract and so there is no application of penalty rule. However, in his 
powerful dissent Lord MacDermott gave his view (at 207) of the applicability of penalty rule "when non-
performance is not actionable in itself as when it is. In either case the essential question is surely the same-
is the relevant stipulation calculated to secure the performance of the hiring". 
361 Treitel, Sir Guenter. "The Law of Contract". 11 th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1005. McGregor. 
"McGregor on Damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 476. Goode, R. M. "Hire-Purchase Law and 
Practice". 2nd ed. Butterworths. 1970. P 392. McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 5th ed. Macmillan. 2003. 
P 446. Furmston, M P. "Contract Planning: Liquidated damages, Deposit and the Foreseeability Rule". 
Journal of Contract Law. [1991] l,at 8. This point of view has its support in Bridge v Campbell Discount Co. 
Ltd [1961] 1 QB 445 at458. 
362 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. 
363 Ibid. At 629. 
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Consequently, due to the unfairness and undesirable outcomes that appear in practice as 
clarified above, it would be preferable to extend the operation of penalty jurisdiction to 
the case where hirer himself elects to terminate the hiring agreement. 
It has been argued above364 that the penalty rule should not be extended to an event other 
than breach as the equitable principle has now been well established. However, in 
deciding the application of penalty jurisdiction the distinction between the situation in 
which the termination of hire purchase agreement based on hirer's breach and that based 
on hirer's right to exercise his option is not historically justified and has led to 
extraordinary anomalies365. Therefore, this approach, including the situation in which the 
hirer terminates the hiring agreement within the spirit and purpose of the penalty 
jurisdiction, will not be considered as a break within the history and established precedent. 
This situation can be included within the established principles without creating any new 
equity. From the very earliest times equity has granted relief against penalties in the event 
of breach or against penalties where there is no breach, i.e. in the event of non-
performance of a condition 366. The reason for this approach was clearly pointed out by 
Lord MacDermott in Northern Ireland case of Lombank Ltd v. Kennedy and Lombank Ltd 
v. Grossan 367. In his dissenting judgment he indicated that to apply the penalty 
jurisdiction to the situation where the hirer elects to exercise a contractual right to 
terminate the agreement, "the question is not one of extending the principles of the rule 
but of applying them to a modern form of contract dealing with a modern form of 
transaction,,368. 
364 See supra. P 95. 
365 The well-known example for that is the problem of breach in hire-purchase agreement. Supra. P 88. 
366 Take, for example, the common penalty bond where the promisor was usually relieved in the event 
of non performance of a condition. Though there was no breach of contract the court of equity relieved 
the promisor in pursuance of its general power to grant relief against penalties. See for explanation 
about some cases of penalties for non performance of a condition the case of Bridge v Campbell 
Discount Co. [1962] AC 600, at 629-631 per Lord Denning. See also Waddams, SM. 
"Unconscionability in Contracts". Modern Law Review. (1976) 39 (no.4) 369, at 375. 
367 Lombank Ltd v. Kennedy and Lombank Ltd v. Grossan [1961] NI 192 Court of Appeal in Northern 
Ireland. This case was referred to by Lord Denning Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600, at 631 
where he said that: "I find myself in entire agreement with the judgement of Lord MacDermott in Lombank 
Ltd v Kennedy and Lombank Ltd v. Grossan from which I have profited much". 
368 Ibid. At 208 per Lord MacDermott. 
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Other reasons can also be put fOlWard to support this view, which seeks the application of 
the penalty jurisdiction to a case where the hirer himself uses his contractual right and 
terminates the agreement: 
I-When a hirer terminates the hiring agreement in exercising his contractual right, he 
does it deliberately without any force from an owner but under the pressure of the 
circumstances he encounters to avoid further losses. In doing so he makes his decision to 
terminate the agreement after taking into his account all the consequences especially his 
liability for owner's loss. Hence, granting relief against a penalty when the agreement 
has been terminated because of an event other than breach, will not affect the owner's 
entitlement to damages for the loss suffered as a result of the termination of the 
agreement369• 
It is well established that where there is a breach of contract the courts would grant relief 
against penalty clauses. Although the courts would not enforce the penalty clauses at all, 
the loss actually suffered would be recoverable instead. Why does the same effect not 
apply where there has been no breach of contract? Lord MacDermott confirms in the 
Northern Ireland case of Lombank Ltd v. Kennedy and Lombank Ltd v. Grossan370 that: 
"In the case of the breach or non-performance which is actionable what equity 
says to the parties is, in effect, this- 'You have agreed that a measured sum for 
compensation will be payable. That is really a penalty to secure performance and 
will not be enforced. But notwithstanding what you have agreed, the loss actually 
suffered will, as a matter of fairness, be recoverable instead.' There seems to be 
no good reason why equity should not speak in the same terms where the non-
performance is not actionable, and all the more so where the differences between 
what is actionable and what is not depends on a provision which does not really 
affect the equities of the situation.,,371 
2-In the Bridge v Campbell Discount C0372 case, after the House of Lords held that the 
hirer was in breach of contract and so the clause was an unenforceable penalty, Lord 
369 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600, at 632. 
370 Lombank Ltd v. Kennedy and Lombank Ltd v. Grossan [1961] NI 192 
371 Ibid. At 208. 
312 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600 [1962] AC 600. 
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Denning373 indicated that the result would have been the same even if the hirer had not 
been in breach of contract. His Lordship remarked 374, after considering Associated 
Distributors Ltd v. Ha1l375 to be wrongly decided, that penalty jurisdiction is applicable to 
stipulations which requires the hirer to pay a minimum payment sum when the contract is 
determined as a result of using his contractual right. Consequently, the court should not 
apply the aforementioned distinction as "the minimum payment clause is a single and 
indivisible and no just distinction can be drawn between the cases where the hirer is in 
breach and where he is not". Accordingly the courts should relieve against penalty 
provisions whatever the reason in which the hiring is being terminated. Burrows, in his 
book376, has commended this approach taken by Lord Denning on the grounds that the 
agreed sum payable upon termination or breach has the same purpose: 
"Like agreed sums payable on breach, the purpose of agreed sum payable on an 
events closely allied to breach is either to pre-estimate the plaintiffs loss caused 
by the "event" or to punish the defendant for, and hence deter him from, failure to 
perform. To distinguish them from apeed sums payable on breach does, therefore, 
produce unsatisfactory paradoxes,,37 
Lord Devlin approached the matter from a much narrower point of view. He argued that 
since the majority in Bridge case was to hold that the clause was sham and contained no 
genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered by the injured party "it means that it was never 
made and does not exist; if it does not exist, it must be ignored altogether". This is to say 
that if the clause is a sham when the contract is terminated on breach, it can not logically 
be regarded as a genuine when the hirer uses his contractual right and terminates it. 
Therefore, His lordship reached the conclusion that the clause should not be binding on 
the hirer in the Bridge case either and so relief should be granted378. 
373 Ibid. At 631. 
374 Ibid. At 631 per Lord Denning. 
375 Associated Distributors Ltd v. Hall [1938] 2 KB 83. In this case it was held that where the hirer 
terminates the hiring agreement exercising the option given to him under the contract, the penalty rule will 
have no application as there has been no breach of contract committed. 
376 "Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract". 2nd edition. Butterworths. 1994. P 332. 
377 Ibid. P 332. 
378 Bridge v Campbell Discount Co. [1962] AC 600. at 634. 
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3-The proposal of the Law Commission in its working pape~79 supports this view of the 
abolition of the limit upon the ambit of the penalty jurisdiction. It confirmed that the 
penalty rule might be applied whether or not there is a breach of contract. The 
Commission recommended that the penalty jurisdiction "should be applied wherever the 
object of the disputed contractual obligation is to secure the act or result which is the true 
purpose of the contract". 
This approach is also strongly supported by some legislative provisions as will now be 
shown. 
1 :3:2:3 Legislative effect in solving the paradox 
Despite the unsatisfactory results in the non application of the penalty jurisdiction to the 
case where the hiring agreement is terminated by hirer himself, the position remains as 
stated in Associated Distributors Ltd v. Hall case380• Courts do not have the power to 
relieve against penalty clause where hirer chooses to terminate the hiring agreement in 
conformity with the option given by the agreement. Therefore the hirer who breaches the 
hiring agreement in unlawful manner is still better off than the one who terminates the 
agreement in a legitimate manner. It can be asked that, as long as this is the position of 
the law, why does a hirer resort to terminate the agreement voluntarily since he will not 
be relieved? It would be better for him to manipulate the deal until he is in breach. The 
dissatisfaction of this result and the aforementioned paradox prompted the legislator to 
intervene to order to ease the paradox within the area of the penalty rule. 
1:3:2:3:1 Consumer Credit Act 1974 
The Hire Purchase Act was first enacted in 1965 before being replaced by the Consumer 
Credit Act 1974, which applied to all agreements where the hirer is an individual and the 
total purchase price does not exceed £25,000381 • The Hire-Purchase Act 1965 required 
from a hirer to bring his payments up to one-half of the hire-purchase price after the 
379 No. 61 "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1975. P 17-18. 
380 Associated Distributors Ltd v. Hall [1938] 2 KB 83. 
381 S 8(3) and 9(3). 
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tennination of the agreement in any manner whatsoever. Accordingly, it rendered any 
provision void in any agreement making a hirer responsible for paying an amount that 
exceeds one half of the hire purchase price. However, if the loss sustained by owner was 
less than the amount of one half, the court had the power to award a lesser amount equal 
to the loss suffered382• 
The Consumer Credit Act 1974 encompassed the same provisions as in the Hire Purchase 
Act 1965. It con finned the right of the hirer to tenninate the hiring agreement at any time 
before the last instalment becomes due383• Under section 99 hirer should pay to owner, 
the amount (if any) by which one-half of the total price exceeds the aggregate of the sums 
paid and the sums due in respect of the total price immediately before the tennination 
unless the agreement provides for any paymene84• Thus, as the effect of termination may 
well leave the owner with depreciated goods and in order to make a measure of 
compensation, the Act requires hirer to pay such further sum (if any) to bring the total 
payments up to one-half of the total price. Furthennore, the court discretion is affirmed in 
this Act. If the court is satisfied that a smaller sum will adequately compensate the owner 
for his loss it may make an order for the payment of such a smaller sum to be paid in lieu 
of the one-half of the total price 385. Accordingly, the 1974 Act rendered void any 
provision in any regulated agreement under it, if it is inconsistent with a provision for the 
protection of hirer given to him under section 100 (1)(3)386. Subsequently, under these 
provisions hirer who tenninates the hiring agreement lawfully should be better off just as 
he would have committed a breach. This also gets the uncertainties of the case law and 
equity as to whether or not the law regarding penalties is applicable upon termination of 
contract, to some extent, removed381• In spite of this intervention, the unsatisfactory rules 
of Case law are still applicable where the agreement is not regulated as it was provided 
for in the legislation. This is to say if the amount of credit exceeds £25,000 or the hirer is 
not individual the penalty clause rules prevailing in case law are applied388• 
382 S 29 (2)(c) read with S 28 (l)(a). 
383 S. 99 Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
384 S 1 OO( 1) Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
385 S 100(3) Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
386 S 173( 1) Consumer Credit Act 1974. 
387 McGregor. "McGregor on Damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 478. 
388 Treitel, S. G. The Law of Contract. 11 th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1005. 
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1:3:2:3:2 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 
It should be pointed out that the limit upon case law jurisdiction- rules against penalties 
and so granting relief to the consumer would not apply to an event other than breach-
seems to have been repeated389 in the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999390. The regulations provide that in consumer contracts a term may be unfair if it 
requires any consumer "who fails to fulfill his obligation to pay a disproportionately high 
sum in comparison,,391. Such a term is likely to be an unenforceable penalty via case law. 
Thus, the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 and the case law rules 
in regards to penalties shall result in the same outcome392. However, case law related to 
penalties is perfectly applied to all terms of any kind of contract, whilst the Unfair Terms 
in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999 is only applicable to contracts between 
consumers and sellers or suppliers393. The most important matter is that the Regulations 
in some cases might apply to sums payable in an event other than on the occurrence of 
breach. It is possible that a consumer might be regarded as not having fulfilled his 
contractual obligations even though he is not in breach of contract. This might occur 
where the consumer has a legitimate justification for non-performance394 in which case 
the regulations could be said to extend further than the case law rules.395 
1:4 Does Jordanian law require breach as a prerequisite for the operation of penalty 
clause rules? 
The operation of the penalty jurisdiction in Jordanian law is not based on the mere fact 
that there has been a breach of contract. Having established this point the differences 
between English law and Jordanian law can be examined as follows: 
389 Poole, Jill. "Textbook on Contract Law". 7t1t ed. Blackstone Press. 2004. P 452. 
390 Schedual 2(I)(e). 
391 Ibid. 
392 Treitel, S. G. "The Law of Contract". 11 t1t ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1006. 
393 Macdonald, Elizabeth. "Exemption Clauses and Unfair terms". Butterworths. 1999. P 212. 
394 At case law in this situation consumer would not be considered as in breach of contract. 
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1 :4: 1 Fault as a prerequisite for the activation of penalty clause rules 
Jordanian civil law asserts that contractual liability is not raised merely because a 
defaulting party has not performed his obligations, but the liability for non-performance 
is based on fault396. Thus unlike English case law fault is a requirement for the activation 
of penalty clause rules under Jordanian civil law. In English case law the principle is that 
contractual liability is strict. In Raineri v. Milel97 Lord Edmund-Davies stated that: "in 
relation to a claim for damages for breach of contract, it is, in general, immaterial why 
the defendant failed to fulfill his obligations and certainly no defence to plead that he had 
done his best,,398. 
Though fault, under Jordanian law, is a requirement for the availability of contractual 
liability, its scope depends on a distinction between so-called obligation to take care of a 
thing and obligation to achieve a promised result. In the former, the performance 
obligation is having to do no more than to exercise reasonable care and skill. 
Consequently, a debtor will be regarded as having performed his obligation if he 
exercised such care and skill despite the promised result not being achieved 399. For 
instance although a patient (creditor) may not have been cured, a doctor (debtor) will 
normally be regarded as having fulfilled his contractual duty if he has done all he should 
have with reasonable care and skill. It is not sufficient for a creditor to claim damages for 
a breach of such an obligation to prove non-performance and presume a debtor's fault. 
Therefore, when a creditor decides to claim the amount of penalty it is necessary for him 
to prove a debtor's fault, i.e. that he has not used a reasonable care and skill required 
under the contract400• This is contrary to English Law whereby creditor's entitlement of 
agreed damages depends not only on proving the default but also on the damages being a 
genuine pre-estimate and not extravagant. 
395 RaIson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 512. Treitel, S. G. 
"The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1007. Macdonald, Elizabeth. "Exemption 
Clauses and Unfair Tenns". Butterworths. 1999. P 214. 
396 Article 358/2 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
397Raineri v. Miles [1981] AC 1050. 
398 Ibid. At 1086. 
399 Article 358/1 Jordanian Civil Law. 
400 In Bailment, for instance, the Bailor should show that the Bailee was guilty of fault. 
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However, absence of fault in a general sense does not always mean that the debtor is not 
responsible. In regards to an obligation of achieving a promised result, it imposes upon 
debtor an obligation to bring about a promised result. Thus, for example, a vendor of 
goods is liable for non-delivery of the subject matter. It is sufficient for a creditor 
claiming damages of an obligation to show that the promise was made and not 
performed401 . However, it would be grossly unfair if a debtor becomes liable for the non-
performance of a contract if he was excused from its obligation to perform because he 
was prevented from fulfilling his duties by events beyond his control. In other words, the 
liability is strict but not necessarily absolute. A debtor's fault is presumed having it up to 
him to avoid himself from liability by providing proof that performance became 
impossible due to some event, subsequent to the formation of the contract and for which 
the party was not responsible402 . Consequently, the debtor can show that the damage 
sustained was because of external causes, such as to an unforeseeable irresistible external 
cause (force majeure), the act of a third party or the act of injured party403. In such 
circumstances the law provides the debtor with the excuse that the contract has become 
impossible to be performed and he frees himself of blame. 
It can be said that the position of Jordanian civil law resembles English law in regards to 
where the obligation is to achieve a promised result. In both English and Jordanian law 
the liability to achieve what was promised is described as strict, i.e. liability without fault. 
Thus there is no defence available that the non-performance was caused by a 
circumstance beyond the debtor's control unless the unforeseeable event caused a 
contract to be frustrated404, as it is known in English Law. Thus, for example, a builder is 
strictly liable to complete the work (building) on time; however a building contract may 
be frustrated if delays caused by external circumstances make performance "radically 
401 In sale contract, for instance, it is enough for the purchaser to prove the non delivery of subject matter. 
402 Article 448 Jordanian Civil Law. 
403 Article 261 Jordanian Civil Law. 
404 Frustration is an expression indicating that the contract, subsequent to its conclusion has become illegal 
or impossible to perform due to some event for which the debtor is not responsible, i.e. unforeseeable 
circumstance that is beyond his control and discharges the contractual obligations of both parties 
automatically. 
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different from what was originally contemplated,.405. Therefore, breach of contract is a 
precondition for the invalidity of penalty clauses in English law and for the activation of 
penalty clause rules in Jordanian law where the obligation is to bring about a particular 
result. The non-performance of a contractual obligation (such as not completing a 
building on time) without lawful excuse is a sufficient reason for the application of the 
rules related to penalties and liquidated damages under the English Law. As a result 
where the sum stipulated in a contract and payable on breach is characterised as a penalty, 
it will be totally disregarded by the court. 
1 :4:2 Notice as a prerequisite to claim the amount of penalty clause 
In order to claim the amount payable under a penalty clause for non-performance of 
principal obligation, Jordanian law provides that the debtor's liability to pay the amount 
may not arise until he has been given a warning by the creditor to perform.406. This is in 
contrast to English case law407, which does not have any requirement of a notice for 
application of the penalty rule. The Jordanian Civil Cassation Court has clearly 
confirmed also this fact stating: 
"The meaning of notice is to put the debtor into default by serving a notice of non 
performance, as it is not sufficient in an action for damages for delay in 
performance, merely to show that performance had become due and was not 
rendered on the due date. Yet the debtor should be given a notice of default,,408 
No particular form is required and it may be expressed through the notary public, 
registered post or in any other way would serve the purpose409• Furthermore parties to the 
contract may agree in advance that the debtor will have been regarded as warned after a 
certain time without any further act by the creditor410. 
405 Metropolitan Water Board v. Dick Kerr & Co [1918] AC 119. 
406 Article 361 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
407 However it can be said that the notice requirement is satisfied by the very existence of the penalty 
jurisdiction. This means that parties to a contract know in advance the existence of the jurisdiction, which 
invalidate any provision of penal nature. This makes them on notice that courts will have a particularly 
shrewd look at agreed damages clause. 
408 Civil Cassation No.1 036/987 Bar Association Journal 1989. P 3182. See also Civil Cassation No.881/88 
Bar Association Journal 1990. P 1753. Civil Cassation No.45511965 Bar Association Journal 1966. P 247. 
409 Civil Cassation No.881188 Bar Association Journal 1990. P 1753. 
4\0 The explanatory note of Jordanian Civil Law. VoL I. 1975. P 398. 
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The purpose of this provision is to warn and make it clear to debtor that he is requested to 
perform. It is also sometimes to inform him that he is in breach or creditor is not tolerant 
at the time the performance becomes due. It is not sufficient to claim a penal sum merely 
to show that performance has become due and was not accomplished on the due date. 
However, the general rule is that debtor should be informed that creditor still requires 
performance by a notice of defauIt411. This is because performance might become due 
and creditor did not take any action demanding performance. Debtor might interpret this 
silence as a creditor's indulgence or satisfaction and acceptance to postpone performance 
or there was no damage suffered by the latter due to the delay. In other words, if a 
creditor wanted the performance without delay he should make it clear to his debtor in 
the formal way prescribed by the law. 
Two consequences follow when performance has been delayed and a notice of default 
has been given. The most important result of the delay is that it gives rise to a claim of 
damages for delay. Once creditor provides a notice to his debtor the former will be 
entitled to receive the amount payable under a penalty against the damage suffered as a 
result of the latter's delay in performance. The debtor is subsequently liable to pay the 
penal sum from the time he receives a warning to perform. In other words the debtor is 
not responsible to compensate the creditor for the period before receiving a warning. This 
is because the action of creditor, who has a right due and does not give a notice to his 
debtor demanding performance, may be construed in a way that makes the debtor 
envisages that his creditor is satisfied of the delay or may have sustained no loss as a 
result of delay in performance. This fact can be inferred and supported by article 361 of 
Jordanian civil law, which imposes the requirement of a notice of default on all claims for 
damages. Secondly, once creditor warned debtor of his default, certain risks pass to the 
latter. The debtor would bear the liability of the deterioration of the subject matter, which 
was previously on the creditor's shoulder before giving a notice of default. For example, 
the lessee's obligation to return the subject matter after the end of lease. If he did not do 
so the deterioration liability would be passed to him after he had been given a notice from 
the lessor. However, it should be noted that there are cases in which the notice of non-
411 Abu Aso'od, Ramadan. "Rules of Obligations". Dar Almatbo'at press. 1998. P 87. 
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performance as a prerequisite for claiming the amount payable under the penalty clause, 
is not required412. The creditor may be entitled to the damages fixed in the penalty clause 
even though he did not give a notice to the debtor as illustrated in the following cases: 
I-Uselessness of the notice: the general rule requiring creditor to give a notice of default 
does not apply where it will be pointless to remind the debtor to perform his contractual 
obligations. If the performance of the obligation became inconceivable and profitless due 
to the debtor's breach, such as he did not perform on the time stated in the contract, the 
notice will then be of no effective benefit413. Furthermore, the law has given parties to the 
contract the right to agree in advance that the debtor will be regarded as warned at the 
time the performance becomes due without any further action by the creditor414. When 
the parties agreed that the debtor would be regarded as already cautioned, there would be 
no need for the notice 
Furthermore, the notice would be pointless if the debtor declares in writing415 that he will 
not fulfill his undertakings. The law provides that the statement here should be in writing. 
Therefore if a debtor states orally that he will not perform in front of some witnesses such 
statement will not be sufficient for he may be forced under some circumstances to declare 
that he will not perform. However, it might be suggested that if the debtor confesses 
subsequently that he declared that orally, this confession could be enough and so the 
notice would be rendered. 
2-Provision of law: Article 361 of Jordanian civil law provides that: "The damages shall 
not fall due unless the debtor is warned, except that the law ... provides otherwise". There 
are several stipulations in Jordanian civil law in which the general rule of requiring a 
notice of default does not apply416. There is no need to give the debtor a notice of default: 
"if his undertaking was to return something stolen or illegally handed over to him and he 
412 Article 362 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
413 Civil Cassation 32/94 Bar Association Journal 1997. P 72. 
414 Article 361 of Jordanian Civil Law. It provides for that: "The damages shall not fall due unless the 
debtor is noticed except that the law or the contract provides otherwise" 
415 Article 36214 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
416 See Article 362/3 and 4, Article 851/1,858 and 85911 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
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was well aware of that,,417. The requirement of giving notice does not apply to such 
situation, as it would be contrary to the good faith for the debtor to insist on it. The sound 
reasoning of non-application of the precondition of providing a notice to the debtor to 
perfonn is that it is inconceivable to force the creditor to give debtor a notice of default to 
return something stolen, or illegitimately handed over to him particularly when he is 
completely aware of that. In both cases it is supposed that the debtor should return the 
subject matter without any notice, as he will be in bad faith if he insists on receiving a 
notice by the creditor. 
2- Loss which to be estimated 
English law depends on the pre-estimated loss, which may be suffered as a result of 
breach, to detennine the enforceability of agreed damages clause. Consequently, parties 
to a contract, when fixing the agreed damages, might agree on losses that cannot be 
obtained by unliquidated damages action. However, are parties to a contract limited to 
making a genuine pre-estimate of the damages, which the court would award in an action 
if there were no agreed damages clause? Or can they agree that losses, which might be 
sustained as a result of breach, might cover losses that are not recoverable at case law? 
The parties might include losses without taking into consideration the remoteness or 
mitigation limitation on damages. Are they allowed to do so? Therefore, losses which are 
recoverable at English case law will now be considered before exploring those are not 
recoverable. 
2: 1 Losses which are recoverable via English case law 
Not all losses sustained by the injured party as a result of breach of contract are 
recoverable at case law level. Some losses are too remote consequences of breach to be 
caught within the scope of contractual liability. This rule is called the remoteness rule. 
The fonnulation of the law related to this rule can be traced back to the case of Hadley v. 
Baxendale418• In this case, a shaft in the claimant's mill had broken and had to be sent to 
the makers at Greenwich to serve as a pattern for the production of a new one. The 
417 Article 362/3 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
418Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 156 ER 145. 
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defendant agreed to carry the shaft to the makers. He delayed to do so and the work in the 
claimant's mill was prevented several days. The claimant claimed damages of £300 for 
loss of profits during the period and was awarded £50. In his judgment Alderson B 
produced what has since become known as the Hadley v. Baxendale rule in which he 
determined two kinds of losses that might be claimed by the claimant in an action of 
unliquidated damages419: 
1- Natural Losses: These losses are flowing naturally from the breach of contract, i.e. 
according to the usual course of things. This kind of loss covers the inevitable 
consequences of the breach, which fall within the contemplation of both parties. 
2- Exceptional losses: These losses are reasonably supposed to have been contemplated 
by both parties at the time they made the contract as the probable consequences of the 
breach. This kind of loss extends to the losses which do not arise naturally from 
breach but which are foreseeable in particular circumstances provided the defendant 
knows of those circumstances. In other words the greater loss suffered due to special 
circumstances is not generally recoverable unless both parties to the contract were 
aware of the special circumstances at the time that the contract was made420 • 
In applying these two limbs of remoteness rule the court held that the loss of profit could 
not be regarded as a natural loss since the stoppage was not the natural result of the delay. 
Thus, the defendant was not responsible under this limb and so under the second one 
since the latter requires an actual knowledge on the defendant side. 
Furthermore, in deciding whether losses are recoverable by English case law, the court 
should consider the mitigation rule. This rule provides that damages due to a claimant 
and awarded by the court must be for losses, which the claimant could not have avoided 
by taking reasonable steps to minimise them. This is to say claimant should endeavour to 
419 Ibid. 
420 However in The Victoria Laundry Ltd v. Newman Industries Ltd [1949] 2 KB 528 the Court of Appeal 
preferred the view that there was one rule of remoteness applicable in the law of contract that recovery be 
made in respect of " loss actually resulting as was at the time of the contract reasonably foreseeable as liable 
to result from the breach". See also The Heron JI [1969] 1 AC 350. 
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lower the losses, which might be suffered from as far as can be expected from a prudent 
person421. 
2:2 How the law stands for losses outside what court could award? 
To reiterate parties to a contract might agree on damages exceeding what the court would 
award. They might estimate damages taking into consideration neither the remoteness 
rule nor the mitigation rule. As a result, is the clause, which pre-estimates damages at a 
figure commensurate with claimant's likely actual loss, but exceeds the damages that 
court would award on the ordinary way of compensation, valid? 
It can be asserted that this point is still a controversial issue under the existing law. The 
Law Commission422 provisionally thought hat: 
"The proper test by reference to which should be determined whether the 
stipulated sum is a genuine pre-estimate is the damages which a court would 
award. If a party wishes to ensure that he can recover compensation for a loss in 
excess of reasonable damage, he should do so by an express provision not by a 
penalty clause, and if he wishes to declare the existence of special circumstances 
to the other party, he should not simply depend on a stipulation for a high 
stipulated sum,,423 
Unlike what the Law Commission recommended it has been argued that such a clause 
may not be regarded as a penalty where it provides for the recovery of damages that 
wouldn't be awarded under the rule of remoteness. According to his comments in 
Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank424 Diplock LJ was clearly of the view that a stipulated 
sum may provide for special loss sustained by the claimant. His lordship explained that 
the liability of the defendant in this situation might be implied or expressed. In delivering 
his speech he clarified that the basis of the defendant liability under the second limb of 
Hadley v. Baxendale425 was that the defendant implied undertaking to bear the claimant's 
actual loss. The implication of this liability resulted from the defendant knowing the 
421 The doctrine of mitigation was established in the House of Lords in British Westinghouse Elee. Mfg Co. 
v. Underground Elec. Ry. Of London [1912] AC 673 at 689 per lord Haldane. 
422 The Law Commission in its Working Paper No. 61. "Penalty Clause and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". 
London. Her Majesty stationery Office, 1975. 
423 Ibid. At 32-33. The Commission recommended that the liability of the defendant should be extended by 
a clear notice of the loss or a clearer clause. 
424Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128. 
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special circumstances, which might enhance the loss of the claimant, and that he had 
made the contract without a disclaimer of the liability to bear the claimant's actualloss426. 
His Lordship confirmed subsequently in his well- known statement that this implied 
liability that: 
"The onus of showing that such a stipulation is a penalty clause lies on the party 
who is sued on it...it may seem at first sight that the stipulated sum is 
extravagantly greater than any loss which is liable to result from the breach in the 
ordinary course of the things, i.e. the damages recoverable under the so called 
"first rule" in Hadley v. Baxendale. This would give rise to the prima facie 
inference that the stipulated sum was a penalty; but the plaintiff may be able to 
show that, owing to special circumstances outside "the ordinary course of things", 
a breach in those special circumstances would be liable to cause him a greater loss 
of which the stipulated sum does represent a genuine estimate ... the basis of 
the defendant's liability for the enhanced loss under the "second rule" in Hadley v. 
Baxendale is his implied undertaking to the plaintiff to bear it. His actual 
knowledge of the special circumstances is relevant as one of the factors from 
which his undertaking can be implied ... 427" 
However the liability of the defendant to bear the claimant's actual loss can be expressed 
by the words of the parties in the contract. In other words, the defendant may express that 
he will be liable for the entire claimant's actual loss whatever that may be, irrespective of 
whether he knew the special circumstances which are likely to enhance the claimant's 
actual loss428. Diplock LJ went on to say "Such undertaking needs not to be left to 
implication; it can be express,,429 before explaining the frank liability saying that: 
"If at the time of the contract the plaintiff informs the defendant that his loss in 
the event of a particular breach is likely to be £x by describing this sum as 
liquidated damages in terms of his offer to contract, and the defendant expressly 
undertakes to pay £x to the plaintiff in the event of such breach, the clause which 
contains the stipulation is not a penalty clause unless £x is not a genuine and 
reasonable estimate by the plaintiff of the loss which he will in fact be likely to 
sustain. such a clause is, in my view, enforceable whether or not the defendant 
knows what are the special circumstances which make the loss likely to be £x 
rather than some lesser sum which it would be likely to be in the ordinary course 
of the things430". 
425 Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch 341; 156 ER 145. 
426Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 143 per DipJock LJ 
427 Ibid. At 142-143 per DipJock LJ 




It is hereby agreed upon that this suggestion sounds sensible in permitting the agreement 
of the recovery of losses, which are not recoverable at case law because they are too 
remote. This is because the clause in contract, which makes the defendant responsible for 
the whole loss flowing from breach as opposed to the loss which could be recovered 
under the so called Hadley v. Baxendale rule, would in any case amount to notice of 
special losses irrespective of the defendant knew the special circumstances which caused 
these losses or not431 • If at the time the contract is made, the claimant notifies the 
defendant that his probable actual loss is likely to be £X and the defendant expressly 
agrees to contract on this term. By this agreement the defendant knew of the special 
. circumstances which made the loss likely to be IX. However, the sum fixed should form 
a genuine pre-estimate of losses, which might ensue as a result of breach by the defendant. 
Otherwise it would be an unenforceable penalty as the test of determining the validity of 
agreed sum is always that the sum stipulated shouldn't be extravagant or unconscionable 
in any case. This is to say that the sum stipulated should be in line with the loss sustained 
because of the breach, as the justice principles rejects the agreed damages of being 
manifestly higher than the loss suffered (New Approach). 
On the other hand there are losses that in the ordinary way the claimant will not be 
compensated for, but which he could have avoided by taking proper steps. This is the rule 
of mitigation. However, would the agreed sum be valid liquidated damages or invalid 
penalty if this rule was ignored? This question, as yet, has not been clearly addressed by 
the courts. It is argued that the agreed damages clause may provide that the claimant ~an 
recover his actual loss with or without stating frankly this in the contract. However, on 
the other side it might well be unsatisfactory to uphold an agreed sum assessed on the 
assumption that the claimant would fail to mitigate for it. In other words, parties to a 
contract could not agree on damages for losses that the claimant could have avoided by 
431 Downes, T Antony. "A Textbook on Contract". 7th ed. 1999. P 360. Waddams, SM. "The Law on 
Damages". 4th ed. Canada Law Book Ltd. 2004. P 446. Matheou, Michael. "Minimum Liquidated 
Damages-Should the Decision ofthe High Court in Hong Kong be Torpedoed". Construction Law Journal. 
(1992) 8(1) 25, at 30. Beale, H G, Bishop WD and Furmston, MP. "Contract, Cases and Materials". 4th ed. 
Butterworths. 2001. P 581. 
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taking reasonable steps as far as it is expected from a reasonable man432. The justification 
for preventing such losses from being compensated by agreement is that permitting the 
recovery of these losses "would either encourage wasteful failures to mitigate, or would 
over-compensate the wily party who both claimed the liquidated damages and 
mitigated433" . 
It can be concluded that the invalidity of penalty clauses does not prevent the level of 
agreed damages clause from being set above an ordinary award of damages. It should be 
enforced so long as the sum is a genuine pre-estimate of losses, which might be suffered 
by injured party. The agreed sum can be recovered even though it includes losses which 
are too remote. However, it cannot be obtained if it involves losses which could have 
been avoided. 
2.3 Jordanian law and English law distinguished 
In a comparative sense: unlike English case law, Jordanian civil law provides that the 
validity of a penalty clause is posed in relation to the actual loss suffered by the injured 
party. This means that the right to claim the penalty amount is determined by an actual 
loss434 sustained by the injured part/35. 
The established rule in Jordanian law is that damages can be awarded in relation to the 
actual loss provided that the injured party should furnish proof of that loss, i.e., to 
activate the contractual liability in general. However, contrary to this rule the injured 
party needs not prove either his loss or its amount to claim the agreed penalty, as there is 
always an assumption of the existence of such loss436. In a dispute concerning a sale 
contract of which the ministry of supply was the purchaser the Court of Cassation 
confirmed this fact. In the contract the ministry had agreed with a supplier to provide it 
432 Burrows, Andrew. "Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract". 2nd ed. Butterworths. 1994. P 327. 
Downes, T Antony. "A Textbook on Contract". Blackstone Press. 5th ed. 1995. Reprinted 1999. P 360. 
433 Beale, Hugh. "Remedies for Breach of Contract". Sweet & Maxwell. 1980. P 57. 
434 However it should be noted that the recoverable loss, at Jordanian law, means the loss that the injured 
party has suffered from but not the anticipated profits that he naturally missed as a result of non 
performance. 
435 Article 363 Jordanian Civil Law. Civil Cassation 523/82 Bar Association Journal 1982, P 1565. 
436 This can clearly inferred from the article 364/2 of Jordanian civil law which provides that: "The courts 
may, upon the request of either party, increase or decrease such damages to make the estimation equal to 
the actual loss". Civil Cassation 582/91 Bar Association Jouma11993. P 737. 
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with some goods at a certain time. The vendor having failed to deliver the subject matter 
on time, led to the ministry terminating the contract and claiming the penalty. The vendor 
counterclaimed that the ministry had sustained no loss, as it had made another contract 
and received the goods from anot~er supplier. The Court of Appeal held that the damages 
agreed upon in the contracts should be paid to the ministry. However, the vendor brought 
this dispute to the Jordanian Court of Cassation, which upheld the judgment of the Court 
of Appeal stating that: 
"If the damages, which is to be payable in the event of breach, has (previously) 
been agreed upon in the contract, the loss, inflicted on the creditor, will be 
assumed. The creditor will not be asked to provide proof of the loss he has 
suffered, however it is the debtor, in order to get rid of the responsibility, who will 
be asked to show that the creditor has suffered no loss,,431 
In deciding that the Ministry of Supply had the right to receive the amount which was 
payable under the penalty clause, the Court of Cassation held that: 
"Since the claimant (debtor) has not presented any evidence that the ministry has 
sustained no loss and the court of appeal found that the amount of penalty was 
corresponding to the exact loss sustained by the ministry, binding the claimant to 
pay the amount of penalty conforms to articles 363 and 364 of the Civil Law,,438. 
Therefore, if either party claims that the damages payable under the penalty clause is not 
equal to the loss suffered, he should provide proof of that439. If injured party claims that 
the assessment of the damages is not equal to the actual loss, he should show that the 
amount of penalty clause is less than such loss sustained. Defaulting party should provide 
proof that the amount of penalty is excessive in comparison with the actual loss sustained 
by the injured party. However, even where law does not force injured party to prove his 
loss it would be often advisable for him to demonstrate that he has sustained loss and the 
amount of it. This is because the court, under Jordanian civil law, has the power to reduce 
the amount payable under the penalty clause and it shall absolutely take into 
consideration the amount of loss actually suffered by him as a result of non performance. 
There is also always a chance that the court may exercise its discretion to reduce the sum 
of money of the penalty clause. In giving evidence of the actual loss, the injured party is 
437 Civil Cassation 3326/2000 Adaleh Centre Publications 2000, available at Info@adaleh.c~m. 
438 Ibid. 
439 Civil Cassation 582/91 Bar Association Journal 1993. P 737. 
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always in a good position against the court's power to reduce the amount agreed upon in 
the contract as compensation. Proving the actual loss sustained as a result of breach may 
also have some importance in the English case law. After the decision in Philips Hong 
Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Konl40 it became clear that what happened after 
the formation of the contract (including the actual loss) is of some weight as evidence to 
what was within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract was made. In 
other words, proving the extent of loss actually suffered will have no decisive evidence of 
decreeing the validity of agreed sum. However, it may be relevant in an English case law 
distinction between liquidated damages and penalties regarding the question of whether 
the sum stipulated was in fact a genuine pre-estimate or extravagant and unconscionable 
to the loss suffered. 
3-Evasion of penalty jurisdiction 
A skilful draftsman can easily side step the penalty jurisdiction441 • As has been shown 
above the penalty jurisdiction has no application where there has been no breach. 
Therefore, making the agreed sum payable on event other than breach will lead the sum 
being taken outside the ambit of operation of penalty rule. Moreover, the penalty rule can 
be avoided in the following two cases which will now be considered: Promoting a term 
into condition and providing for acceleration clause in contract. 
3:1 Promoting a term into condition 
3:1:1 Generally 
This instance is well illustrated by Mustill LJ speech in Lombard North Central v. 
Butterworth 442 whereby: "A clause expressly assigning a particular obligation to the 
category of condition is not a clause which purports to fix the damages for breach of the 
obligation, and is not subject to the law governing penalty clauses· t443 • 
44°Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General o/Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
441 Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 267, at 280. 
442Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 267. 
443 Ibid. At 273 per Mustill LJ 
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To examine this situation there will be a focus on firstly, the damages recoverable via 
case law in the event of breach of tenn in hire purchase agreement and secondly an 
exploration of how the law stands for avoiding the penalty jurisdiction by promoting a 
tenn into condition. The decisions in Lombard North Central v. Butterworth444 and in 
Financings Ltd v. Baldock 445 cases will be fully considered. In the Lombard case 
breaching a tenn resulted in not to applying the penalty jurisdiction, whilst breaching the 
same tenn in the Financing case gave the defaulting party relief against penalty clause. 
The question why will be the object of this discussion. 
3:1:2 Damages recoverable in case of breaching a term (non repudiatory breach) 
English law has already detennined the measure of damages available to an owner who 
has terminated a contract for breach either he has the right to tenninate under the law 
(repudiatory breach) or by virtue of power contained in a contract (non-repudiatory 
breach). In the fonner situation, if a hirer has repudiated a contract by refusing any 
responsibility of paying rentals owner has the right to treat such repudiation as a breach 
of contract. Accordingly, owner is entitled to recover his actual loss, i.e. loss of bargain 
damages. In the latter situation, where owner has tenninated the hiring agreement by 
virtue to the express tenn of the contract recoverable damages are restricted up to the date 
of tennination, i.e. the instalments in arrears with interest and nothing more446• Such a 
restriction on damages available to owner in the latter case is simply because there are no 
breaches thereafter. Having established the above two rules on damages available to 
owner it is submitted that a contractual tenn stipulating for loss of bargains damages to 
be recoverable where there is no repudiatory breach is to be treated as unenforceable 
penalty. In translating this principle to breach of a tenn (paying the instalments on time 
for example) in an agreement of hiring owner is entitled to damages up to the date of 
tennination. This is because there is no repudiatory breach but it is only non-payment 
which does not amount to repudiatory breach. 
444 Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] I AIJ ER 267. 
445 [1963] 2 QB 104. 
446Financings Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104, at 110-113. Per lord Denning M R. For details see Opeskin, 
Brian. "Damages For Breach of Contract Terminated Under Express Terms". Law Quarterly Review. (1990) 
106293. Hughes, A D. "Breach, Repudiation and Termination of the Hire-Purchase Agreements". Journal 
of Business Law. [1964] 28. 
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Therefore if it was provided in an agreement of hiring that owner could recover his loss 
of bargain damages in the event of breach of a term, such provision would be dealt with 
as an invalid penalty clause for the legal damages available in this case are up to the date 
of determination. This result is well illustrated in Financings Ltd v. Baldock case 447 
where there was a Hire-Purchase Agreement provided that Baldock had to pay the price 
by instalments. Clause 8 stipulated that if Baldock (the hirer) failed to pay any instalment 
within 10 days after becoming due, the Financings (the owner) had the right to terminate 
the agreement. Clause 11 gave the owners a right to recover two thirds of total amount to 
be paid on any termination by them under clause 8. Having the hirer failed to pay the first 
two instalments on time, the owner determined the agreement and repossessed the truck. 
This clause was held to be an unenforceable penalty clause on the basis that the owner 
was entitled to recover damages up to the date of termination, as the breach committed by 
the hirer was a non-repudiatory breach according to case law rules 
However, what will the position be if parties to a hire-purchase agreement promoted such 
a term into the classification of condition? And how does the law deal with this situation? 
3:1:3 How the law stands for classification a term as a condition in contract? 
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Lombard North Central v. Butterworth 448 
unveiled a method for the owner in a hire purchase agreement to avoid the result in 
Financings Ltd v. Baldock449 • Lombard case demonstrates that it is po~sible for the 
contracting parties to provide expressly in their contract that specified breaches, which 
would not of themselves go to the root of the contract, i.e. they are not repudiatory 
breaches, are nevertheless to be treated as if they do so. Take for instance the parties' 
agreement to reclassify cases in which a particular term, e.g. that payment should be 
made on time, is elevated to a condition. As a result the smallest breach of such a term 
would have an effect as if the party in breach has repudiated the contract. Therefore, 
classifying a term into condition becomes of the essence of the contract breach of which 
447 Financings Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104. 
448 Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 267. 
449 Financings Ltdv. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104. 
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entitles the injured party (owner) to claim the recovery of loss of bargain damages. This 
outcome leads to say that penalty jurisdiction might be easily eluded by skilful draftsman 
in categorising a term as a condition. This situation differs from what took place in 
Financings case450 for in this instance the parties stipulated that punctual payment of 
each rental was to be of the essence of the agreement. Therefore making term condition 
by virtue of the time factor enabled the owner to recover the loss of bargain damages, 
although on the authority of Financing the result would have been otherwise, if such a 
clause was absent451 . In Lombard North Central v. Butterworth 452 by Mustill LJ stated 
that: 
" ... 1 acknowledge of course, that by promoting a term into the category, where all 
breaches are ranked as breach of a condition, the parties indirectly bring about a 
situation where, for breaches which are relatively small, the injured party is 
enabled to recover damages as on the loss of bargain, whereas without the 
stipulation his measure of recovery would be different. But I am unable to accept 
that this permits the court to strike down as a penalty the clause which brings 
about this promotion,,453 
Lombard case provides an interesting example of a time stipulation made a condition by 
virtue of an express term in contract. In this case the claimant, a finance company, leased 
a computer to the defendant for a period of 5 years on payment of an initial sum of £584 
and 19 subsequent quarterly instalments of the same amount. Clause 2(a) of the 
agreement made punctual payment of each instalment of the essence and clause 5 stated 
that failure to make due and punctual payment entitled the claimant to terminate the 
contract. Clause 6 provided that, on termination, the claimant was entitled to all arrears 
and to all future instalments, which would have fallen due, had the contract not been 
determined. The first two payments of rent were punctually made, the next three were 
only paid after some delay and when further delay occurred in making the sixth payment, 
the claimant terminated the contract under clause 2(a) by giving notice to the defendant. 
Accordingly, the court had to deal with clause 6 whether it is a penalty or not454. 
450 Ibid. 
451 This is what was held in Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] I All ER 267. See Chitty on 
Contract. 29th ed. Vol.l. General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1497. Koffman, Laurence and 
Macdonalds, Elizabeth. "The Law of Contract". 4th ed. Tolley. 200 I. P 491. 
452 Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] I All ER 267. 
453 Ibid. At 273 per Mustill U. 
454 Ibid. At 267. 
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It should be noted that clause 6 in this case was, in reality, a penalty clause and could not 
be enforced. However, the court when viewed clause 2(a) (which had made punctual 
payment of the essence of contract) in conjunction with clause 6 (which entitled the 
owner to all arrears and to all undue payments) led to the compelling conclusion that a 
default in paying on time was to be regarded as a repudiatory breach going to the heart of 
the contract455. Nicholls LJ observed that: "This conclusion emasculates the decision in 
Financing Ltd v. Baldock, for it means that a skilled draftsman can easily side step the 
effect of that decision. Indeed that is what occurred here,,456 
3:1:4 Unsatisfactory aspect: difference in form not in substance 
What made the claimant's position in the Lombard case capable of evading the effect of 
Financing case was something in form and not in substance. It was the skill of draftsman 
who drew the provision in a way that makes the requirement as to time of the essence of 
contract. In such an adept policy a term was classified into the category of condition and 
then prevented the penalty jurisdiction from being invoked. 
The result of the Lombard case (the supremacy of form over substance) was not a 
satisfactory outcome even in the views of the Lords Justice in Lombard North Central v. 
Butterworth457• Mustill LJ considered it "without much satisfaction" 458. The claimant 
obtained by changing in words a consequence which the law of penalties could have 
precluded if there had been no provision making an express right of termination in the 
event of non-payment a condition. Nicholls LJ was also critical of the result, as there was 
"no practical difference" 459 between the contract including a power to terminate it by the 
owner on non-payment of instalments460 and the contract including a provision to the 
effect that the payment of each instalment on time must be strictly complied with461 . "The 
455 Ibid. At 268. 
456 Ibid. At 280 per Nicholls LJ. 
457 Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 267. 
458 Ibid. At 275 per Mustill LJ. 
459 Ibid. At 280 per Nicholls LJ. 
460 In this situation the owner would have the right to recover damages for any breaches up to the date of 
termination. This would be caught by penalty clause rules. 
461 In this situation the owner would have the right to recover the loss of bargain damages, as the breach 
goes to the root ofthe con~act. this would not be caught by penalty clause rule. 
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difference between these two agreements is one of drafting form and wholly without 
substance,,462. This is to say that the difference in form produced such different remedial 
consequences and that was something his Lordship viewed with "considerable 
dissatisfaction".463 
The intention test464 as a basis for loss of bargain damages might be introduced in favour 
of the conclusion in the Lombard case. This test is based on the fact that one of the 
consequences of termination after breach is the recovery of damages and its assessment, 
like other consequences of termination, depends on the intention of the parties. When the 
parties expressly provide for the loss of bargain damages to be recoverable, effect should 
be given to parties' agreement as it represents the injured party's loss as the parties have 
envisaged. When the parties do not make an express provision the injured party's 
entitlement of loss of bargain damages may be inferred from the contract465. 
Problems may arise when the parties classify a term as a condition because termination as 
a contractual right is activated by a breach which would not give rise to a right to 
terminate at common law466. In other words, in doing so the parties elevate a term into the 
category where all breaches are classified as a breach of condition. In principle where 
there is a breach of condition in a contract the injured party is entitled to accept the 
breach as repudiation and thus terminate and get his loss of bargain damages. However 
the presence of a provision by which a term is promoted into the category of a condition 
confers a right to terminate upon the injured party, but says nothing about the assessment 
462Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 267, at 280 per Nicholls U. 
463 Ibid. 
464 This test asserts that the remedial consequences flowing from termination of the contract by virtue of 
termination clause "depends upon the true construction of the relevant provision". However if the contract 
"purport[s] to confer on one ofthe parties a right to recover a sum of money from the other, a question may 
arise whether this right is unenforceable as constituting a penalty". Financings Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 
104, at 121. For details see Opeskin, Brian. "Damages for Breach of Contract Terminated Under Express 
Terms". Law Quarterly Review. (1999) 106293, at 304-308. 
46S See Carter, J W. "The Effect of Discharge of a Contract on the Assessment of Damages for Breach of 
Contract". Journal of Contract Law. [1989] 249, at252. Opeskin, Brian. "Damages for Breach of Contract 
Terminated Under Express Terms". Law Quarterly Review. (1999) 106 293, at 304-305. See also the 
renowned dicta of Diplock U in Robophone Facilities v Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 142-143 where he 
nicely explained that the liability of the defendant to bear the claimant's actual loss might be implied or 
expressed. For Diplock U's view explained see supra. P 106. 
466 Treitel, S. G. "The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. PP 802-805. 
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of damages467. It has been argued468 that the assessment should be linked to the presumed 
intention of the parties. "It is simply more likely for the parties to have intended loss of 
bargain damages to be recoverable where termination is based on a [repudiatory] breach, 
so that an express statement of what breaches are to be so regarded is merely an indirect 
way of describing when, by the terms of their agreement, the parties have envisaged loss 
of bargain damages to be recoverable,,469. This proposition is supported by Lombard 
North Central v. Butterworth case470 where it was held that a provision of elevating a 
term into condition is a sufficient basis for the injured party to recover damages for the 
whole transaction in the event of breach. To sum up, this argument states that where 
parties to a contract have promoted a term into condition it is sufficient to confer upon the 
injured party the right to terminate and receive loss of bargain damages. However, this 
conclusion is open to the following criticism. 
I-As the parties' intention to make a term condition may be implied, this gives the 
injured party the opportunity to argue471 that it is simply sufficient to stipulate in contract 
that instalments should be paid on time in order to classify a term as a condition. Thus, 
the effect of this agreement provides that failure by promisor to make punctual payment 
shall be regarded as repudiation on his part. As a result a promisee may rely on the 
presumed intention to claim loss of bargain damages based on the termination for breach 
of a condition. This is to say that the conclusion in the two cases472 concerned should 
have been the same by allowing the injured party (owner) to terminate and receive the 
loss of bargain damages. This outcome is not preferable as will be pointed out below. 
467 Financings Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104, at 108. 
468 For details of this argument see Carter, J W. "The Effect of Discharge of a Contract on the Assessment 
of Damages for Breach of Contract". Journal of Contract Law. [1989] 249, at 253-254. 
469 Ibid. At 261. 
470 Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 267. 
471 This is what has been argued in Financings Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104, at 108. However such an 
argument was rejected by Diplock LJ who stated (at 120) that: "he [the hirer] was clearly in breach of his 
contractual obligation to pay two instalments on the due dates but, in the absence of any express provision 
to the contrary in the contract, these breaches of a contract of hire ... would not of themselves go to the root 
of the contract or evince an intention on the part of the hirer no longer to be bound by the contract". also in 
Charterhouse Credit Ltd v. Tolly [1963] 2 QB 683 where Upjohn LJ indicated that in Financings Ltd v. 
Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104 there was a right to terminate, but not a right to "treat the contract as repudiated". 
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2-Such an approach (granting loss of bargain damages) would involve an element of 
injustice against promisor, such as the consumer in Lombard case itself, for it will 
sometimes result in the imposition of a liability which he will find financially intolerable. 
This is particularly the case where the termination of the contract is motivated by the fact 
that the contract turned out to be a bad bargain for the injured party. Put another way, the 
injured party would seek to put an end to the contract not least when he knows that such 
an action would substantially benefit him by gaining damages for the whole transaction473 • 
Therefore the classification of a term into condition in this way would encourage 
termination of contracts rather than their performance. This contradicts the rule that 
contracts are entered into to be fulfilled and not to be escaped from. As Roskill LJ stated 
in The Hansa Nord case474: 
"In principle, contracts are made to be performed and not to be avoided according 
to the whim of market fluctuation and where there is a free choice between two 
possible constructions I think the court should tend to prefer that construction 
which will ensure performance, and not encourage avoidance of contractual 
obligations" 
3-Moreover, Financings Ltd v. Baldoce75 was distinguished on the ground that the 
contract merely contained an option to terminate on non-payment rather than a clause 
which made punctual payment of the essence. The position in the Lombard case was, in 
substance, the same in giving the owner the right to terminate under the contract with the 
only difference being that the contract in the latter case affirmed this right twice476 rather 
than once in the former case477• It was acknowledged that the result of the Lombard case 
(avoiding the penalty rule by elevating a term into condition) has given a chance for any 
party who wishes to extract penal damages to do so by drafting the contract in such a way 
472 Financings Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104 and Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All 
ER267. 
473 The injured party can benefit twice: evading penalty clause rule and getting the loss of bargain damages. 
See McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 5th ed. Macmillan 2003. P 225-226. Treitel, S. G. The Law of 
Contract. 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P807. Carter, J W. "The Effect of Discharge of a Contract on 
the Assessment of Damages for Breach of Contract". Journal of Contract Law. [1989] 249, at 261. 
474 [1976] QB 44. 
475 Financings Ltd v. Baldock [1963] 2 QB 104. 
476 The twice in Lombard case to confirm the right to rescind were in clause 2(a) the hiring agreement made 
punctual payment of each instalment of the essence of the agreement and Clause 5 provided for that failure 
to make due and punctual payment entitled the claimants to terminate. 
477 In Financings case the right to terminate was given under clause 8 which stated that if the hirer should 
fail to pay any instalment within 10 days after it had become due the owner may terminate the agreement. 
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that all tenns are deemed to be conditions breach of which is regarded as repudiatory. 
This result allows the injured party to recover damages for the whole transaction, namely 
loss of bargain damages, even where the breach which has occurred was a non-
repudiatory breach at common law478• Whether the tenn which obligates a hirer to pay 
instalments on time is of the essence or not detennines the damages recoverable in such 
situations. By reason of the provision making the time of payment of the essence the 
owner would recover damages (loss of bargain damages) which are disproportionately 
higher than which could be recovered if the provision was drawn otherwise. This 
confinns that a skilled draftsman could easily avoid the penalty rule. 
Consequently, it could be concluded that the result which was achieved in the Lombard 
North Central v. Butterworth479 case - avoiding penalty jurisdiction by providing that the 
time was of the essence and thereby making a tenn condition, breach of which gave the 
owner the right to receive damages for the whole transaction, which would not be 
achieved otherwise 480 - should not be preferred 481. Therefore the penalty jurisdiction 
should not be evaded merely because the parties stipulate that paying instalments on time 
is of the essence. The owner should not be allowed to collect damages for the whole 
transaction rather than damages up to the date of detennination if the hirer breaks a tenn 
in the contract. Therefore, the outcome in the aforementioned two cases (Lombard case 
and Financings case) should have had the same result of giving the owners the right to 
get damages up to the date of tennination making the provision of giving loss of bargain 
damages an unenforceable penalty clause. In other words, the express agreement of the 
parties' classification of a certain tenn as a condition would be preferable to only confer 
upon the injured party the power to terminate the contract, but not an entitlement to 
receive loss of bargain damages. 
478 See the view expressed by Nicholls LJ in Lombard North Central pic v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 
267, at 280. See for details Bojczuk, WiIIiam. "When is a Condition not a Condition". Journal of Business 
Law. [1987]353, at 359- 362. 
479 Lombard North Central v. Butterworth [1987] 1 All ER 267. 
480 Financing Ltd v. Baldock (1987) 1 All ER 267. 
481 Treitel, G. "Damages on Rescission for Breach of Contract". Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial Law 
Quarterly. [1987] 143 at 146. Bojczuk, William. "When is a Condition not a Condition". Journal of 
Business Law. [1987] 353, at 361. Chitty on Contract. 29 th ed. Vol.l. General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 
2004. P 1497-1498. 
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3:2 Acceleration clause 
Acceleration clause states that the remaining balance becomes due immediately should 
the debtor fail to pay any of the instalments. The effect of this clause does not place any 
extra liability upon the debtor but presupposes the continuation of the contract as planned 
apart from that it compels the debtor to pay the whole balance482• However what is the 
possibility of the application of penalty jurisdiction to this clause especially in that it 
might contain an interest payable with the principal? The application of penalty 
jurisdiction to a clause, which accelerates the existing liability, depends on the following 
situations. 
3:2:1 Where acceleration clause is for the principal only 
The penalty jurisdiction is not applicable to a clause in a loan agreement which merely 
accelerates liability for payment of principal. The total sum in this instance is construed 
as a debt presently owing to creditor at the time of making the agreement but only 
payable on default. It is a kind of indulgence to defer payment of debt and may be 
withdrawn at the discretion of creditor483 • In other words, the creditor has at the outset the 
right to postpone payment of due sum by making regular quarterly instalments equivalent 
to the principal. On the other hand, he has the right to withdraw this indulgence and 
accelerate the whole amount to be payable at once in the event of debtor's default. 
Accordingly, there is no question of penalty may arise if the indulgence is withdrawn. 
This is because the debtor is not being made to pay any amount more than he contracted 
to pay; it is only an acceleration of the amount which was already postponed. This fact 
was well illustrated in John Wallingford v. Mutual Society484 by Lord Selbome LC where 
stated that: 
"I cannot think that such an acceleration of payments has anything common with 
a penalty. It was a contract for certain payments which were debita in presenti 
482 However, where the debtor fails to pay an instalment when due, the creditor, in the absence of an 
acceleration clause, may only sue for the unpaid instalment because breach as to future instalments has not 
yet occurred. 
483 Protector Endowment Loan and Annuity Company v. Grice (1880) 5 QB 592. John Wallingford v. 
Mutual Society [1880] 5 AC 685 at 710 per lord Watson. See Chitty on Contract. 29th ed. Vol.! General 
Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1496-1497. McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 5th ed. Macmillan. 
2003. P 445. Koffman, Laurence and Macdonald. "The Law of Contract". 4th ed. Tolley. 2001. P 493. 
Treitel, Sir Guenter. "The Law of Contract". lith ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1001. Goode, RM. 
"Acceleration Clauses". Journal of Business Law. [1982] 148, at 150. 
484 John Wallingford v. Mutual Society [1880] 5 AC 685. 
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although solvenda in futuro; and, being such, it is consistent both with principle 
and with authority to hold, that if the party who ought to have paid them, or any 
of them, at the proper time failed to do so, the default was his own, and the time 
might lawfully be accelerated for the other payments which were originally 
deferred. ,,485 
The case of Protector Endowment Loan and Annuity Company v. Grice486 is usually cited 
as the authority for this proposition. It is a clear example of creating an existing debt and 
of the inapplicability of penalty clause rules to this situation. In this case the claimants 
lent money to the defendant with interest and the latter gave the creditor a bond for the 
total amount repayable, i.e. £70. (This sum was covering the principal of the loan, interest 
thereon, the expenses of negotiating it, and a margin representing a premium for the 
insurance of the debtor's life). The contract provided that failure to pay any single 
instalment makes the balance of instalments payable promptly. Default having been made 
in payment of one instalment, the claimants brought an action and claimed the 
outstanding balance. The Court of Appeal held (reversing the judgment of Bowen, J.) that 
the claim by claimants to recover the whole amount was lawful and there was no question 
of treating the stipulation to pay immediately as a penaltl87• 
3:2:2 Where acceleration clause is for the principal and interest 
A clause which merely makes debtor liable to pay the balance outstanding and interest 
accrued on the due instalments is not subject to the penalty jurisdiction. This situation is 
envisaged where the interest is to be paid upon each instalment. In Oresundsvarvet 
Aktiebolag v. Marcos Diamatis Lemos (The Angelic Star) 488the claimant agreed to build 
a bulk carrier named Angelic star and to sell and deliver her to the purchasers. 20 per cent 
of the price had to be paid in advance and the balance on delivery by means of delivery 
credit. The delivery credit had to be repaid over 8 years by 16 instalments with interest of 
8.5 per cent payable on the outstanding balance of the loan. Article 7(13) of the contract 
provided that in the event of default the whole amount of the loan and all other moneys 
485 Ibid. At 696. Per Lord Selborne Le. 
486 Protector Endowment Loan and Annuity Company v. Grice (1880) 5 QB 592. 
487See also Oresundsvarvet Aktiebolag v. Marcos Diamatis Lemos (The Angelic Star) [1988] I Lloyd's LR 
122. This case will be fully considered in the next situation where acceleration clause is for principal and 
interest. 
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owed to the lenders should be paid at once. The purchasers defaulted and the claimant 
applied for a summary judgment against the defendants. The Court of Appeal decided 
that clause 13 was not a penalty clause as there was an acceleration of paying a sum due, 
i.e. the capital and the outstanding interest due (interest for the accrued instalments). The 
court construed the words "All other moneys due to the Lenders by the Owners", as 
meaning "all other moneys due at the time of happening an event of default" and could 
not be construed as "all other money which would otherwise become due by the owners 
in the future489• 
The parties could pre-compute the interest and integrate it with the instalments of 
principal. In this situation the position would be different if it is stipulated for the whole 
amount to be payable. A provision in a contract is supposed to provide for the whole 
principal and its whole interest to be paid forthwith without giving any discount for 
unaccrued interest490• In such a case the penalty jurisdiction is applicable for the debtor is 
being made to pay immediately a future interest, i.e. payment not yet due and so the court 
has the power to award a fairly lower figure commensurate with the creditor's IOSS491. 
However, if an acceleration clause does allow a discount for unaccrued interest it will not 
be subject to the rules relating to penalties and liquidated damages. 
This is also the situation where the transaction is concerned with conditional sale 
agreements (instalments sale). When concluding a sale contract the parties might agree in 
advance that the price would be payable by instalments. Just as in the interest in a loan 
agreement, such agreement contains a finance charge component that it is simply a "time 
price differential" representing the cost to a prospective purchaser of the privilege of 
paying by instalments 492. Consequently, an acceleration clause in conditional sale 
488 Oresundsvarvet Aktiebolag v. Marcos Diamatis Lemos ( The Angelic Star) [1988] 1 Lloyd's LR 122 
[1988] 1 Lloyd's Law Report 122. 
489 Ibid. At 125 per Lord John Donaldson, M.R., at 126 Lord Justice Neill and at 127 per Lord Justice 
Ralph Gibson. 
490 Oresundsvarvet Aktiebolag v Marcos Diamatis Lemos (The Angelic Star. [1988] 1 Lloyd's Law Report 
122. 
491 Ibid. 
492 Goode RM. "Hire-Purchase Law and Practice". 2nd ed Butterworths 1970. P 275. 
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agreements will be subject to penalty jurisdiction if it has not provided a discount of the 
finance charge component for the unexpired period493 • 
It might be argued that Protector Endowment Loan and Annuity Company v. Grice494, an 
authority against the proposition, that the whole principal with its integrated interest is 
subject to the rules relating to penalties and liquidated damages. This is because the 
parties had not made any rebate for the unaccrued interest and provided for to be payable 
at the acceleration clause. This was based on the grounds that the amount claimed £(70) 
was covering in addition to the principal of the loan, the interest thereon, the expenses of 
negotiating it and a margin representing a premium for the insurance of the debtor's life. 
However when the court held that the rule against penalties was not applicable to this 
case it justified its decision on the basis that the provision to be held as a penalty clause, 
it should stipulate for a larger sum to be paid in the event of default. In this case it was an 
agreement of paying a precise sum of £70, i.e. a debt, and there was no additional sum 
mentioned to be paid on the occurrence of the default. The defendant did not take the 
point that the amount claimed included unaccrued interest; and the judgment was based 
on the notion that the claimant did not claim more than the amount which he had 
bargained. They agreed that the whole amount of £70 was the global sum that did not 
refer to interest or any expenses495 • Thus, it was an "agreement for the discharge by 
quarterly instalments of the whole debt", but the event of failure to comply with the 
agreement the whole sum of £70 had to become payable at once496• This leads to the 
suggestion that this case does not seem to be an authority to support the proposal that the 
full amount of pre-computed interest can be recovered and out side the penalty clause 
rule. 
493 Wadham Stringer Finance Ltd v. Meaney [1980] 3 All ER 789. 
494Protector Endowment Loan and Annuity Company v. Grice (1880) 5 QB 592. 
495 Goode, R. M. "Acceleration Clauses". Journal of Business Law. [1982] 148, at 151. 
496 Protector Endowment Loan and Annuity Company v. Grice (1880) 5 QB 592, at 594 per Cockburn, c.J. 
and see also at 596 per Brett, L.l. 
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3:2:3 How is the penalty jurisdiction applicable to acceleration clause? 
Lord Dunedin stated in the leading case497 the test for the invalidity of penalty clauses in 
English law498• The sum stipulated might be liquidated damages if it is a genuine pre-
estimate of the loss that is likely to be suffered as a result of breach at the time of making 
the contract. However, it will be held as a penalty if it has no relation to the loss likely to 
be suffered. The effect of the above critical analysis in which two cases were examined 
(where the acceleration for the principal alone; and the other where it is for the principal 
and its interest) leads to the assertion that acceleration clauses are subject to rules relating 
to penalties and liquidated damages. In other words, the conclusion is that acceleration 
clauses are subject to the penalty jurisdiction but will be held to constitute valid 
liquidated damages clauses, would seem to be a straightforward application of Lord 
Dunedin's test. Thus, the validity of acceleration clause should be determined by the 
general disproportion principle. 
An example of this would be, if £5000 was due to creditor under a contract in which it 
was provided the sum was to be paid in £500 monthly instalments. If debtor defaulted in 
punctual payment of any of those instalments, he would be responsible to pay the whole 
amount immediately. That is, if debtor did not pay the monthly £500 he would, under the 
acceleration clause, be requested to pay the whole outstanding balance of £5000 instantly. 
This clause confers upon creditor the right, while keeping the agreement alive, to recover 
from defaulting debtor the full unpaid balance payable under the contract. Therefore 
under acceleration clause the liability of the debtor is still the same by paying the entire 
amount of £5000, but, earlier than otherwise. In such a situation it is argued that an 
acceleration of liability is not caught by the penalty rules though it makes the payment 
more expensive for debtor by paying it at once instead of instalments499• This is the only 
situation where the amount is liquidated damages. 
One might criticise this position as follows. The crucial ingredient in such clauses is that 
there should be a present debt, which by the indulgence can be paid by instalments, 
497 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co v. New Garage & Motor Co [1915] AC 79. 
498 Ibid. At 87. 
499 Treitel, S. G. ''The Law Of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1001. 
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provided that each instalment must be paid on time. This means a further drafting 
exploitation of the difference between substance and form results in evading penalty 
clause rules50o• In response, an argument of form and substance in this instance can not be 
strengthened or make any unjust consequence as seen in the event of promoting a term 
into condition. This is because acceleration clauses do not compel the debtor to pay a 
penny more than he contracted to pay at the outset; he is merely being required to pay it 
sooner. In other words, his right to postpone payment is withdrawn. 
However, suppose that the parties, in the instance given above, agreed that an interest of 
£2000 to be payable with the principal. They integrated the £2000 with £5000 by adding 
£200 to each instalment. Having the debtor or purchaser defaulted in paying one 
instalment, the creditor or vendor, under acceleration clause, claimed the whole amount 
of £7000 to be paid immediately. In this instance the debtor is being asked to pay an 
extravagant sum in the event of not paying a one instalment. This may be said to 
constitute an invalid penalty. Therefore it is suggested that the acceleration clause in this 
situation should be subject to the penalty rule for it has some compulsion and hardness 
towards the debtor. In Oresundsvarvet Aktiebolag v. Marcos Diamatis Lemos ( The 
Angelic Star 501 Lord John Donaldson, M.R stated.: 
"Clearly a clause which provided that in the event of any breach of a contract a 
long term loan would immediately become repayable and that interest thereon for 
the full term would not only be still payable but would be payable at once would 
constitute a penaltr as being "a payment of money stipulated as in terrorem of the 
offending party"SO . 
In summing, if the debtor agreed to pay an interest or a financial charge component that 
was because he was given the right to pay the principal or the price by instalments. If this 
right was withdrawn without giving a proper rebate for the unaccrued interest the 
acceleration clause would be regarded as a penalty. 
500 Jacobs, Sydney. "Damages in a Commercial Context". LBC Information Services. 2000. P 270. 
501 Oresundsvarvet Aktiebolag v. Marcos Diamatis Lemos (The Angelic Star) [1988] I Lloyd's LR 122. 
s02lbid. At 125. 
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As far as Jordanian law is concerned there is no provision in the code on the question of 
whether the penalty clause rules are capable of being applicable to an acceleration clause 
in all kind of transactions. The law, for example, gives parties to a contract the right to 
agree in advance that the price in conditional sale agreement should be payable in 
instalmentsS03 • However it does not tackle the situation in which the parties may provide 
in their agreement that in the event of default, namely non payment of any instalment on 
time, the whole unpaid instalments will be accelerated. In other words, the law regards 
this agreement as valid and leaves no power for the courts to apply the rules relating to 
penalty clauses. Article 483 of the law compels the purchaser to pay the price 
immediately however it legitimatises the parties' agreement to make the price payable in 
instalments. As a result it upholds any agreement between the parties to pay the price in 
any way at their will unless such agreement is invalid by law 504 • This also means it 
upholds their agreement on acceleration clause for this clause does not conflict with the 
law505• However, the existing position of the Jordanian law regarding acceleration clause 
lays itself open to criticism as it sometimes encourages parties to evade penalty clause 
rules. It is suggested that the position in English case law is preferable and capable of 
being followed to improve the way of tackling such clauses in Jordanian law. This is to 
say making the penalty jurisdiction applicable to acceleration clauses particularly where 
there is no rebate for the unaccrued interest or financial charge component. 
503 Article 483 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
504 See article 164/2 Jordanian Civil Law. 
505 See for this meaning Civil Cassation 64/960 Bar Association Journal 1960. P 62. 
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Chapter Four: Courts Power over Penalty Clauses 
O-Introduction 
The rule in English case law is simple, and the technical application of current rules of 
the law leads to a clear outcome. Where the agreed sum, whatever it is called in the 
contract, is held by the courts to constitute a penalty it "cannot be enforced so as to 
enable a party to recover ... more than his actual loss,,506. In other words, the penalty 
clause is of no legal effect and should be considered, as though it had not existed in the 
contract at all. As a result the injured party is relegated to having his damages for the 
losses he has suffered to the ordinary way of unliquidated damages action. The court will 
declare the agreed damages clause unenforceable according to the disproportion principle 
in three cases: where there is a possibility to calculate likely anticipated loss at the time of 
contracting, where a single lump sum is payable on one of several events (presumption) 
and where a graduated sum slides to the wrong direction. However, is agreed damages 
clause a "dead letter" in all cases or are there cases in which the court can uphold this 
clause? The courts have over the time identified some cases in which the stipulated sum 
might be regarded as valid liquidated damages. 
It is also important to emphasise that the New Approach's impact appears mostly in this 
chapter. The approach operates from the presumption that penalty clauses should be 
given effect, as reflecting the will of the parties to a contract. This does not mean denying 
any power of control over such clauses. Rather the court will have the power, which 
however should be seen as exceptional, to modify their amounts. The effectiveness of the 
New Approach will be demonstrated by examining the following two possibilities: 
enforcement of all agreed damages clauses and non-enforcement as opposed to the 
. existing bifurcation of these provisions. 
Therefore this chapter seeks to deal with the courts' power over penalty clauses in 
English law as to penalties in comparison to Jordanian law. To do so the following issues 
will now be considered: 
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1- Courts intervention to declare the invalidity of penalty clauses: examining the cases 
where courts should declare the unenforceability of penalty clauses in order to 
distinguish them from liquidated damages clauses 
2- The position of Jordanian civil law compared to English law 
3- Effect of New Approach on courts power over penalty clauses 
I-Courts interyention to declare the invalidity of penalty clauses 
In Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blanl!°7 Diplock LJ said that: "The court has no general 
jurisdiction to re-form terms of a contract because it thinks them unduly onerous on one 
of the parties ... "penalty clauses" are simply void". Therefore the court should not allow 
the injured party to recover under a penalty provision in contract a sum of money 
manifestly in excess of his likely actual damages. It should declare the unenforceability 
of the penalty clause leaving the injured party to sue for damages regarding the loss he 
suffered as a result of breach as he can prove in the ordinary wayS08. Consequently "In 
practice a penalty clause in a contract...is effectively a dead letter"S09 or "from another 
point of view a "brutum fulmen""SlO. Therefore although they maintain a supervisory 
jurisdiction on contracts made by the parties, the courts have no power to rewrite such 
contracts, but they can relieve the injured party against the provisions, which are of penal 
nature. 
In essence agreed damages clause might be penalty or liquidated damages according to 
the degree of disproportion between its amount and the likely actual loss suffered at the 
time of making the contract. The mere fact that agreed damages clause is in excess of the 
probable loss does not excite the court to hold such clause as a penalty. Rather it should 
be extravagant and unconscionable to the loss likely to be sustained on breach. The 
506 Jobson v. Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026, at 1038. 
507 Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128, at 142 per Diplock LJ. 
508 Jobson v. Johnson [1989] 1 WLR 1026, at 1032. Commissioner o/Public Works v. Hills. [1906] AC 368. 
This case was said in Jobson v. Johnson at 1038 to be "further illustration ... " that penalty clauses are 
unenforceable. See also McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th edition. Sweet & Maxwell. 
2003. P 429-430. Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. 2001. P 516. 
McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 5th ed. 2003. P 442. 
509 Jobson v. Johnson [1989] WLR 1026, at 1040. See also Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General 0/ 
Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, where Lord Woolf said that: "the courts have always avoided claiming that 
they have any general jurisdiction to rewrite the contracts that the parties have made". 
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distinction between liquidated damages and penalty clauses has not always been an easy 
task for the courts to decide. It is occasionally a matter of some difficulty to ascertain 
whether agreed damages are, in the individual facts of the case, penalties or liquidated 
damages, but the principles applied by the courts are well established. The courts have 
developed specific rules to make such jobs easier by determining the cases in which the 
court may intervene to knock a penalty clause down. Lord Dunedin effectively set out 
cases relying upon the previous decisions of the courts. He stated that in the leading case 
of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltcfll : " .. .1 shall content 
myself with stating succinctly the various propositions which I think are deducible from 
the decisions which rank as authoritative". Then he set out these rules which would be the 
guidelines in establishing circumstances that justify the court's intervention to invalidate 
penalty clauses and making the distinction with liquidated damages clauses. It should be 
noted that all these cases are activated in conformity with the chieftest512 in determining 
the invalidity of penalty clauses in English case law. Accordingly the following rules for 
distinguishing and determining the unenforceability of penalty clause will be now 
considered: 
1.1 Cases where courts should declare the invalidity of penalty clauses 
Three cases may be mentioned to constitute the circumstances in which the court would 
declare the unenforceability of penalty clause if its amount was an extravagant and 
unconscionable: 
1- Where there is a possibility to calculate likely loss at the time of contracting 
2- Where a single lump sum is payable on one of several events (presumption) 
3- Where a graduated sum slides to the wrong direction 
1.1.1 Where there is a possibility to calculate the anticipated actual loss 
Where there is, at the time when the contract is made, no difficulty in calculating the loss, 
which might be sustained as a result of breach, namely in an instance where the loss 
inflicted on an injured party from breach could be reasonably or accurately calculated in 
S10 Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude (1915] 3 KB 66, at 73 per Bailhache I. 
SII Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 86. 
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money, the task of the court would be straightforward to detennine the enforceability of 
agreed damages clause. If the injured party seeks to enforce the sum stipulated as 
liquidated damages, he should provide proof that the sum is equal, or not represent 
extravagant or exorbitant sum, to the sum which might have been produced from 
calculating the likely anticipated loss. This principle is justified on the grounds that the 
loss can be readily calculated in money at the time of contracting. Therefore it can be 
argued that the standard in this case may be regarded as an objective one. This is because 
the task of establishing the test of the sum being an extravagant and unconscionable is 
made in an easy and simple way. It does not depend on what the parties have stipulated in 
the contract, but on the comparison between the sum stipulated with the genuine 
estimation that should have been given, where there had been a genuine attempt of the 
parties to provide for the anticipated loss. In other words, where there is no difficulty in 
pre-estimating the likely anticipated loss suffered, the concept of loss is easy to 
understand and the calculations can be based on figures which can be verifiable and 
reliable. This case is particularly relevant where the obligation accrued on defaulting 
party is paying a sum of money, or this obligation is one of different undertakings. 
However where there is a difficulty in calculating the anticipated loss the clause is more 
likely to constitute valid liquidated damages. The three cases will now be examined. 
1.1.1.1 Where paying a sum of money is a single obligation 
The most obvious instance for this case is where the defaulting party fails to pay a sum of 
money, whereby a larger sum will be payable. This sum will be treated as a penalty since 
it does not represent a genuine pre-estimate of loss. It will not· constitute liquidated 
damagess13 on the grounds that this rule is based on the principle that the exact amount of 
loss is known, and fixing a greater one payable can not be regarded as a genuine pre-
estimate of damageS 14. Nevertheless, it should be noted that not paying the sum stipulated 
on time might become serious or rather harmful to the injured party because of 
consequential losses. In other words, the injured party might be ruined because of non-
512 The main test is the sum being extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss 
which might be suffered as a result of breach at the time of making the contract. Supra. P 52. 
513 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company LTD v. New Garage and Motor Company LTD. [1915] AC 79, at 87. 
514 Furst, Stephen and Ramsey, Vivian. "Keating on Building Contracts". 7th ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2001. 
P 284. 
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paying the sum agreed upon in the contract on time, and so the damages might be 
enormous. In spite of that, Lord Dunedin has stated in the leading case515 that" it will be 
held to be a penalty if the breach consist only in not paying a sum of money, and the sum 
stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been paid 516". Therefore, 
according to this rule, if the debtor promises to pay the creditor £ 1 000 at a certain time 
and the contract provides that on default in punctual payment the debtor should be liable 
to pay £3000. The creditor can not recover the £3000 for non-timeous payment as it is a 
penalty in accordance with the above rule. 
However, this rule can be considered rather harsh in some cases517• Paying a sum of 
money on time might be of great significance to the injured party. For instance it might 
be needed to pay a deposit in a deal containing an enormous value and the defaulting 
party knows this fact518• Thus, it might be said that the parties might stipulate for the 
likely actual loss even though the sum stipulated is more than the sum which represents 
the original obligation, on the condition that it is not too extravagant or exorbitant. To 
this result it would be appropriate 519 to say that the rule contained in Lord Dunedin 
SIS Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
516 Ibid. At 87 per Lord Dunedin. It has been found many, obiter dicta, supporting this rule. In Law v. 
Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127 per Lord Esher M.R at 130 he stated: " On rule which appears 
to be recognised ... where the parties to a contract have agreed that, in case of one of the parties doing or 
omitting to do some one thing he shall pay a specific sum to the other as damages, as a general rule such a 
sum is to be regarded by the court as liquidated damages and not a penalty. One recognised exception to 
such rule is where a sum of money is to be payable upon the non payment of smaller specified sum, in 
which case the courts have treated the larger sum as a penalty". Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 B& P 346; 126 
ER 1318,at 1323 per Lord Chambre J. 
517 McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th edition Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 434. Treitel, S. G. 
"The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 1000. Ogus, A I. "The Law of Damages". 
Butterworths. 1973. P 45. Muir, Garry A. "Stipulations for the Payment of Agreed Sums". Sydney Law 
Review. (1985) 10503, at 515. 
SI8 Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch.D 243,257 where Lord Jessel delivered the strongest attack upon that rule 
when said that: " Now it may well be that the court thought that it was absurd to make a man pay a larger 
sum by reason of non payment of a smaller. It has always appeared to me that the doctrine of the English 
Law as to non-payment of money, the general rule being that can not recover damages because it is not 
paid by a certain day, is not quite consistent with reason. A man may be utterly ruined by the non-payment 
of sum of money on a given day, the damages may be enormous, and the other party may be wealthy. 
However that is our law. If however, it were not our law the absurdity would be apparent. .. it is not 
unreasonable as it appears to me in these cases to say if you don't pay the £500, or it may be £50, on that 
date you shall pay £5000 for damage I shall sustain" 
519 For details to this end see Ogus , A I. "The Law of Damage". Butterworths. 1973. P 45. Treitel, S. G. 
"The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 1000. 
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statement would be preferable not to be applied to all cases520 on the grounds that the 
injured party's obligations may mean that the loss sustained exceeds the sum due and the 
sum stipulated. Then the latter should be recoverable as liquidated damages if it is a 
genuine pre-estimate of likely loss, which might be sustained by non-payment even 
though it is in excess of original sum. This has been supported by recent judicial trends521 
where the courts have allowed the injured party to be entitled to a "Special damages,,522 
(other than interest)523 against the loss suffered by him on the ground that the non-
payment on time might negatively affect him in any way. This is particularly the case 
when the defaulting party knows that the injured party will be badly affected. Reasons to 
know should be concluded from the conditions and circumstances surrounding the 
contract. In Wadsworth v. Lydal! 524 the Court of Appeal upheld this proposition by 
granting special damages, despite the fact that they were in excess of the sum stipulated. 
In this case Brightman L.J confirmed the right of the claimant to be entitled to such 
damages as liquidated damages: 
"If a plaintiff pleads and can prove that he has suffered a special damages as a 
result of the defendant's failure to perform his obligation under a contract and 
such damage is not too remote on the principle of Hadley v. Baxendle , I can see 
no logical reason why such special damage should be irrecoverable merely 
because the obligation on which the defendant defaulted was an obligation to pay 
money and not some other type of obligation525" 
S20 The rule is .. it will be held to be a penalty if the breach consist only in not paying a sum of money, and 
the sum stipulated is a sum greater than the sum which ought to have been paid". Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre 
Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 87. 
S21 Trans Trust v. Danubian Trading Co [1952] 1 All ER 970, at 975. Wadsworth v. Lydal/[1981] 1 WLR 
598. The President of India v. Lips Maritime Corporation [1988] 1 AC 395. 
S22 This term indicates the loss which does not result directly from the breach but which is still not unlikely 
consequence of the breach, i.e. consequential losses. 
S23 The President of India v. Lips Maritime Corporation [1988] 1 AC 395, at 429 where Lord Mackay of 
Clashferm stated there that: "the reasoning of this house in President of India v. La Pintada Cia Navigacion 
SA ([1985] AC 104) make it clear that the damages other than interest may be recovered for breach by late 
payment". It should be noted that in President of India v. La Pintada Cia Navigacion SA [1985] AC 104. 
the House of Lords affirmed the common law rule that interest is not payable by way of general damages 
for delay in payment of debt, unless there is an express provision to do so in the contract. See also for 
details Yoshida, Ikko. "Comparison of Awarding Interest on Damages in Scotland, England, Japan and 
Russia". Journal of International Arbitration. 17(2) 41, at 53-58. 
S24 (1981) 1 WLR 598. The House of Lords had approved this approach by allowing the recovery of 
special damages in its decision in President of India v. Lips Maritime Corporation. [1988] 1 AC 395. See 
also Downes, Antony. "A Textbook on Contract" . 5th ed. Blackstone Press. 1997. Reprinted 1999. P 347. 
Chitty on Contract. 29 th ed. YoU general principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1509-1502. 
S2S Wadsworth v. Lydal/. [1981] 1 WLR 598, at 603 per Brightman. 
137 
Based upon this the Court of Appeal held that: 
". .. Since the defendant knew or ought to have known that the plaintiff would 
need to acquire another fann or smallhold, using the £10,000 payable under the 
contract for the purpose. and that if the £ 10,000 was not paid, the plaintiff would 
be compelled to incur expense in arranging alternative finance and paying interest, 
the claim for £335 and £1620 were not too remote and were payable by the 
defendant,,526 
1.1.1.2 Where paying a sum of money is one of several obligations 
Where one of several obligations can, at the time when contract is entered into, 
reasonably or accurately be computed in money, fixing a larger sum as an agreed 
damages will prima facie be treated as a penalty. This penal nature will also apply to all 
other probable breaches, irrespective of maybe having a larger loss, calculable or not527. 
In Kemble v. Farren528 an actor contracted with a manager of a theatre and under the 
contract the manager agreed -inter alia - to pay to the actor £3 per night that the theatre 
was open. They laid down in the contract £1000 to be payable by either if it failed to 
perform the agreement, or any part of it, or any stipulation contained in it. This sum was 
held to constitute a penalty clause for from the tenor of the agreement the provision 
meant that the £ 1 000 would have to be paid by the manager if he had failed to pay the 
actor £3 for one night. In holding the penal nature of the sum Tindal CJ stated that when: 
"a very large sum should become immediately payable in consequence of the non-
payment of a very small sum, and that the former should not be considered as a penalty 
appears to be a contradiction in terms" 529. In this case since one of the different 
undertakings could be exactly calculated in money, there was no difficulty in the 
calculation thereby fixing a larger sum payable in the event of any breach of which the 
sum become payable, would be treated as a penalty. 
Therefore, the rule concerned - paying a larger sum in the event of non-payment of a 
smaller sum either in the situation in question or where the paying a sum of money is a 
526 Ibid. At 298-299. And see also Muhammad Issa Sheikh Ahmad v. Ali (1947] AC 414. And Trans Trustv. 
Danubian Trading Co [1952] 1 AIJ ER 970. Herbert v. Salisbury and Yeovil, (1866) LR 2 EQ 221. 
527 This has been clearly affinned in general tenns by Heath J in Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 B&P 346;126 
ER 1318: "where articles contain covenants for the perfonnance of several things, and then one large sum 
is stated at the end to be paid on breach ofperfonnance that must be considered as a penalty". 
528 Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234. 
138 
single obligation - should be applied if a sum stipulated was excessively high in 
comparison with the loss, which might be suffered as a result of breach at the time of 
contracting. Otherwise it is liquidated damages but only if it represents a genuine attempt 
to pre-estimate the probable actual loss which might ensue upon breach. As has been seen 
before, the mere fact that the sum stipulated is merely in excess of the probable actual 
loss should not motivate the court to strike down the sum as a penalty. As a penalty 
. jurisdiction is a blatant interference in the doctrine of freedom of contract, the court's 
intervention should be available where there is a clear injustice involved. This is because 
the court, in general, should not be allowed to interfere in a freely made agreement unless 
there is a clear disproportion between the agreed sum and the loss likely to flow from 
breach. 
1.1.1.3 Where there is a difficulty to calculate the anticipated actual loss 
The principle is that the greater the difficulty of estimating or proving damages, the more 
likely the stipulated damages will appear genuine estimation of the loss that might be 
suffered. The very uncertainty of the likely loss sustained at the time of formation the 
contract is the main reason, which motivates the parties to agree beforehand on 
compensation of damages sustained on breach53o• Basically, any sum agreed upon by 
parties in these circumstances is supposed to be considered as liquidated damages, when 
from the nature of the case and tenor of the agreement, it is clear that the damages have 
been the subject of actual and fair calculation and adjustment between the parties. This 
fact was embodied in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltef3/. 
In this case Lord Dunedin stated that: 
"It is no obstacle to the sum stipulated being a genuine pre-estimate of damage, 
that the consequences of the breach are such as to make precise pre-estimate 
. almost an impossibility, on the contrary, that is just the situation when it is 
probable that pre-estimated damage was the true bargain between the parties.532" 
529 Ibid. See also in Astley v. Weldon (l801) 2 B& P 346; 126 ER 1318. 
530 Clydebank Engineering Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, at 11 per Lord 
Halsbury. 
531Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
m Ibid. At 87 per Lord Dunedin. 
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The mere fact that the damages for breach of contract would be very difficult and 
complex to be assessed does not mean that the stipulated sum could not be liquidated 
damages. For example, in contracts with public organizations such as for construction of 
roadworkes or defence supplies or the like, where it is often impossible to quantify the 
loss suffered by delay or non-performance, liquidated damages clauses are almost 
universally useds33. In Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. The Attorney General of Hong Kont34, 
Lord Woolf stated: 
"It would be obvious that substantial loss would be suffered in the event of delay 
but what that would be would be virtually impossible to calculate precisely in 
advance. In the case of a government body the nature of the loss it will suffer, as a 
result of the delay in implementing its new road programme is especially difficult 
to evaluate"S3s 
It might be argued that liquidated damages may not be applied for following late 
completion of a project because the employer (injured party) suffers no loss. This is 
however doubtful because in law the difficulty of precise calculation has long been 
recognised in the courts and provided that a genuine attempt is made at pre-estimating 
loss, such loss would be accepted as liquidated damages. Furthermore the argument is 
wrong in fact as the injured party will usually have suffered a loss, if only in extra 
supervision costs or financing chargess36• In Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co 
v. Don Jose Ramos yzquierdo Y Castaneda 537, the contracts contained liquidated 
damages clause for late delivery specifying the damages payable per week for each vessel 
that was delivered late. The House of Lords refused the argument of the contractors that 
the amount paid for late delivery could not be a genuine pre-estimate of loss since there 
was no loss as "a warship does not earn money"S38. Therefore the sum was liquidated 
damages and not a penalty in spite of the fact that it was not possible to put a commercial 
value of the loss of use of such a vessel. However under the New Approach the stipulated 
sum can be reduced where it is disproportionately greater than the actual loss. It is the 
533 Atiyah. P. S. "An Introduction to the Law of Contract". Sth ed. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1995. P 43S. 
Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong. (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
534 (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
535 Ibid. At 60. 
536Eggleston, Brian, "Liquidated Damages and Extension of Time in Construction Contracts". 2nd ed. 1997. 
P6S. 
537 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Romos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [191S] AC 6. 
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defaulting party who should prove the extravagance of stipulated sum for the loss 
suffered by the government should always be presumed. 
The conclusion is that if there is any difficulty, at the time of contracting, to estimate the 
loss likely to be suffered on breach, due to some special circumstances, it is a sign that 
the sum stipulated is valid liquidated damages, provided that there was a fair calculation 
between the parties. 
1.1.2 Where a single lump sum payable on one of several events (presumption) 
Parties to a contract might agree on a single lump sum to be payable in the event of 
breach of anyone of the undertakings in the contract. The enforceability of such a sum 
depends on whether or not it is extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the 
probable actual loss sustained on breach. Previously, the courts have tended to regard as a 
rule oflaw that the single lump sum is strictly a penalty. Whenever the contract contained 
more than one undertaking, and a single lump sum was provided to be payable for a 
breach of anyone of them, the sum was treated as a penalty without any exceptions. This 
is to say that the sum could not form valid liquidated damages under any shape or 
circumstance. In Astley v. Weldon s39 this trend was clearly pointed out when Lord Eldon 
C.] stated that: 
"Where a doubt is stated whether the sum inserted is a penalty or not, if a certain 
damage less than that sum is made payable on the face of the same instrument, in 
case the act intended to be prohibited be done, shall be construed to be a penalty". 
This approach was open to doubt. It is not reasonable to hold that the parties intended the 
whole amount to be payable in the event of any breach of several stipulationss4o• The 
single lump sum might be regarded as a true and honest attempt to pre-estimate the likely 
actual loss as will be shortly illustrated. Therefore, there had to be a more reasonable 
approach in order to temper such rigorous rule, which was capable of making the 
538 Ibid. At 12 Lord Halsbury. 
539 Astley v. Weldon (1801) 2 B& P 346; 126 ER 1318. This principle was framed in a slightly different 
fonn in Law v. Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127 by Kay L.J when he stated in this case that the 
courts would refuse to give effect to a provision" where the damages were made payable not on a single 
event but on number of events, some of which might result in inconsiderable damage". 
S40 Galsworthy v.Sstrutt (1848) 1 Ex 559, 666; 154 ER 280. 
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stipulated sum irrecoverable in almost all cases of different contractual undertakings541 • 
Then the courts have tended to embrace a fairer approach by considering the single lump 
sum as a penalty a presumption and not a rule of law. Therefore, there is an inference that 
the single lump sum is to be treated as a penalty in the event of breach of anyone of 
several undertakings if it is excessively higher than the lowest loss, which might be 
suffered from different breaches. This presumption was first pointed out by Lord Waston 
in Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal C0542 and then incorporated by Lord Dunedin in 
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd 543, by saying that: 
"There is a presumption-but no more- that it is a penalty when a single lump sum 
is made payable by way of compensation on the occurrence of one or more or all 
several events, some of which may occasion serious and others but trifling 
damage544" • 
This presumption supposes that the test to determine whether the single lump sum 
stipulated in contract is a penalty or liquidated damages, should be measured and 
compared with the lowest loss which might be sustained by the injured party from 
various breaches545• Therefore, where a contract contains several obligations and damage 
likely to result from the breach of anyone of them is capable of being measured by a 
precise sum, then, if the sum stipulated is disproportionately higher than that sum, it 
would be inevitably treated as a penalty. It is no more than an inference in favour of 
penalty, which might be rebutted in several ways, as will now be tackled. Therefore, 
where the court looks at a case involving a single lump sum it will be a sign that the sum 
stipulated is a penalty unless the injured party provides proof of the sum being valid 
liquidated damages. 
541 McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17111 ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 436. Ogus. AI. "The 
Law of Damages". Butterworths. 1973.43. 
542Elphinstone v. Monk/and Iron & Coal Co [1886] 11 AC 332, at 334 per Lord Waston. This sum then was 
followed and approved by Lord Davey in Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Ramos 
yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6. 
543 [1915] AC 79 
544 Ibid. At 87 per Lord Dunedin. 
54S Ibid. At 89 per Lord Dunedin where he stated that "If there are various breaches to which one 
indiscriminate sum to be payable in breach is applied, then the strength of the chain must be taken at its 
weakest link.". See also Astley Y. Weldon (1801) 2 B& P 346; 126 ER 1318. 
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1.1.2.1 Where courts declare the validity of a single sum 
Lord Dunedin in Dunlop case stated that a "presumption is raised in favour of a penalty 
where a single lump sum is to be paid by way of compensation in respect of many 
different events, some occasioning serious, some trifling damage,,546. However such a 
single lump sum might turn out to be valid liquidated damages and enforceable in some 
circumstances where the presumption is rebutted in favour of the injured party. This 
might be achieved in several ways, which will now be considered: 
1- Where the losses are difficult to assess 
2- Where the stipulated sum is taken as an average of the likely loss 
3- Parties' agreement to confining the field of the stipulated sum 
1.1.2.1.1 Where losses are difficult to be assessed 
This way supposes that losses, which might arise from breach of various undertakings, 
are unfeasible to be assessed owing to certain circumstances. Therefore, it cannot be 
known, at the time of contracting, that losses from one breach would be greater or less 
than those losses which might flow from another breach. In this situation the sum 
stipulated should be treated as valid liquidated damages, as "[I]t is well known that 
damages ... though very real may be difficult of proof and that proof may entail 
considerable expenses547". The very uncertainty of the amount of probable recovery and 
the difficulty of precise pre-estimate of the loss likely to arise as a result of breach, have 
always been treated as factors lending weight to arguments for enforcement of the agreed 
damages clause548. 
Where the losses are difficult to assess making the amount of damages uncertain the court 
should not be ready to discover the penal nature of the clause for this is the base at which 
546 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company LTD v. New Garage and Motor Company LTD [1915] AC 79, at 96 
f.er Lord Atkinson 
47 Rowland valentine Webster v. William David Bosanquet. [1912] AC 394, at 398. Per Lord Mersey. 
548 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v Don Jose Ramos Yzequiedo Y Castaneda. [1905] AC 6, 
at 11. See also Rowland valentine Webster v. William David Bosanquet. [1912] AC 394, at 398. Per Lord 
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the parties always justify their agreement on damages beforehand. However, the sum 
stipulated as a result of the agreement should be a genuine pre-estimation of the likely 
loss. The consequence of the stipulation should not be to award the injured party a 
disproportionately larger sum whereby it would be regarded as a penalty. In Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd549 Lord Atkinson indicated 
frankly this situation, where the presumption in favour of penalty operates with some 
latitude, saying: 
"Although it may be true ... that a presumption is raised in favour of a penalty ... it 
seems to me that that presumption is rebutted by the very fact that the damage 
caused by each and every one of those events however varying in importance, 
may be of such an uncertain nature that it cannot be accurately ascertained550". 
In Dunlop case itself551 the presumption was rebutted as it was difficult "to estimate 
precisely in money, the exact amount of damages which might be caused,,552. In this case 
Dunlop agreed not to tamper with the markings on Ps tyres, nor to sell the tyres below the 
listed price, nor to sell to persons whose supplies Ps had decided to suspend, nor to 
exhibit or export them without Ps consent. A provision was included in the contract to the 
effect that £5 was to be payable for every tyre sold or offered in breach of the agreement. 
There were many ways in which tyres could be sold or offered in breach of the contract, 
but loss probably to result from any such breach was difficult to assess and therefore £5 
was regarded as a reasonable speculation and thus valid liquidated damages. 
Mersey. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company LTD v. New Garage and Motor Company LTD [1915] AC 79, 
at 87 per Lord Dunedin. 
549 [1915] AC 79. 
550 Ibid. At 96 per Lord Atkinson. See also Galsworthy v. Strutt. (1848) I EX 659; 154 ER. 280 where this 
instance was first put. Lord Parke stated there that "Now it is perfectly competent to parties to make a 
stipulation to pay a fixed sum for the breach of a covenant, the damage arising from which it is extremely 
difficult to ascertain, and I think that it is not an unreasonable stipulation which the defendant has made that 
he should pay £1000 upon the event of either of matters mentioned in this agreement." As well as Lord 
Atderson B at 282 stated there that "The amount of damage which a person might sustain by another's 
practising within 7 miles for the period of 7 years would not be the same in amount as if he was to practise 
within 40 miles, or next door, nor the same if he had set up in business in the first, second or sixth year. In 
one case the fixed damage might be small and in the other large but the parties have agreed to a certain 
fixed sum in order to prevent the necessity of being at the expense of procuring the attendance of witnesses 
for the purpose of giving evidence upon these matters". 
551Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
552 Ibid. At 96. 
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1.1.2.1.2 Where the stipulated sum is taken as an average of likely losses 
This case supposes that, though the sum is construed to apply to the breach of different 
undertakings, it can still be valid liquidated damages if it is an attempt to average out the 
loss probably sustained from breach of all obligations 553. In Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co 
Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltcf54 Lord Parker of Waddington, clearly affirmed the 
case of rebutting the presumption in favour of penalty when a single sum is provided for. 
His Lordship raised an instance in the case itself confirming that averaging the feasible 
losses, which might be suffered on breach, can displace this presumption . 
. "Supposing it was recited in the agreement that the parties had estimated the 
probable damage from breach of one stipulation at from £5 to £15, and the 
probable damage from a breach of another stipulation at from £2 to £ 12, and had 
agreed on a sum of £8 as a reasonable sum to be paid on the breach of either 
stipulation, I cannot think that the court would refuse to give effect to the bargain 
between the parties555." 
However, it should be noted that to put this situation in action, namely making the sum 
stipulated valid and thus avoiding the activation of penalty jurisdiction, two factors 
should be met556• Firstly, it must not be a great difference between the largest possible 
loss and the lowest possible loss. Secondly, there should have been a difficulty in 
assessing the loss, which might be sustained as a result of breach. This is because if one 
of the losses is capable of exact evaluation, at the time of contracting, the agreed damages 
should represent a genuine pre-estimate of that loss. In delivering the judgment in Ariston 
SLR v. Charly Records557 Beldam U held the sum stipulated as a penalty, as, inter alia, it 
has not been any difficulty to make an accurate or reasonable estimation. He stated that: 
"It would not have been difficult to have made the daily sum proportionate to what was 
55) Halson. Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman 2001. PSIS. McGregor, 
Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 442-443. Ogus. AI. "The Law of 
Damages". Butterworths. 1973. P 44. 
554Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
555 Ibid. At 99 per Lord Waddington. But it should be just noted that His Lordship, when made the 
calculation process, has not reached to the exact average, which should have been 8.5, as (10+7) 12=8.5. 
556 See for these factors, see Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128 where Diplock LJ 
where stated that" ... such estimate depend upon number of factors incapable of precise prediction and can 
never be more than approximate within fairly wide limits". And see also English Hop Growers v. Dering 
[1928] 2 KB 174, 182 per Lord Scutton LJ. When stated that "Damages of the same kind, but difficult to 
value exactly may be averaged to avoid the difficulty it seems ... also reasonable". 
557 Ariston SLR v. Charly Records [1990] The Independent Law Reports .13 April. 
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detained by providing for a sum to be paid per item per day, or for each title which 
couldn't as result of such detention be manufactured elsewhere. ,,558 
In Robphone Facilities v. Blank559 these two factors were applied. In this case the 
contract was for the hiring of a telephone-recording machine for 7 years. It was provided 
that if the agreement was terminated for any reason, the hirer should pay to the owner 
company all rentals which had fallen due and also by way of liquidated damages a sum 
equal to 50 per cent of all rentals for the unexpired period. The defendant (hirer) failed to 
take delivery of the machine or to pay any of the hire rentals. The claimants successfully 
claimed damages of £245, 14s as a 50 per cent of the rental machine. Lord Diplock LJ 
worked out an average of the approximation of claimants' actual loss. He asserted that 
the likely loss ranged between 47 per cent of the aggregate rents for the unexpired period 
of the contract if it is terminated at the beginning of the contract period, and 57 per cent if 
it is terminated in the last year of the 7 years. Based upon this he stated, regarding his 
choice of 50 per cent that: 
"The parties have selected a readily ascertainable figure which reasonably close to 
the actual loss likely to be occasioned to the plaintiffs so far as it is capable of 
prediction, and if this figure will tend to operate slightly to the advantage of the 
plaintiffs if the contract is terminated early in its life, it will tend to operate rather 
more heavily to the advantage of the defendant ifit is terminated late in its life560". 
Consequently, it can be said that the sum stipulated will be held as liquidated damages 
and so avoid the penalty rule, if the aforementioned two factors are met. Otherwise the 
sum will be treated as an invalid penalty. Therefore the sum stipulated should be a proper 
reflection to all losses, which may be suffered on breach, whether that be a serious or a 
mere trifle. However, if the amount specified can be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate 
of the loss which may be caused by serious breach, the sum can still be considered as 
penalty since it is extravagant and unconscionable for the other losses though they may 
558 Ibid. 
sS9Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [1966] 3 All ER 128. 
560 Ibid. At 1449 per Lord Diplock. 
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not have occurred in realitl61 . This unsatisfactory result needs to be considered more 
closely. 
1.1.2.1.2.1 Unsatisfactory aspect (danger) where the range of losses is broad 
The presumption in favour of penalty where a single lump sum is provided to be payable 
on breaches of different stipulations of different kind of damage may be displaced in 
using an average of the possible losses. However the difference in likely losses should 
not be large. Lord Woolf stated that "A difficulty can arise when the range of possible 
loss is broad"s62. Therefore if, for instance, the largest probable loss, which might be 
suffered from a certain breach is of £30,000 and the lowest one is of £100, it is not 
reasonable to agree that a sum of £15,050 should apply to both of them. Therefore there 
is still a possibility that the single sum can be a penalty where the range of losses is broad. 
In this case the consequences of the overthrown, old approach (which strictly considers a 
single sum as a penalty where the loss probably to be sustained on breach of various 
stipulations are different in kind) would tum up again. The dangerS63 is that if an agreed 
damages clause could be held to apply to breaches which might occasion a trifling loss, 
the entire provision could be regarded as a penalty. This is so despite the clause 
potentially being a proper reflection and therefore a genuine pre-estimate of loss if the 
breach which actually occurred was in its most serious form. In other words, where the 
range of possible loss is broad there is always a possibility that the agreed damages will 
be entirely out of all proportion in relation to some of the losses, which might be suffered 
from, and thus a penalty for all cases. In Ariston SLR v. Charly Records564 though the 
claimant had argued that the agreed sum was an average of the loss which might be 
suffered and thus valid liquidated damages, it was held that the single lump sum was a 
penalty. This is because it was not a true averaging of all losses so long as it would have 
been regarded as out of proportion to some of them. As a result this case is vital in 
demonstrating the danger pointed out above. The agreed damages clause was a genuine 
561 This is what happened in Ariston SLR v. Charly Records (1990) The independent Law reports .13 April. 
S62Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General o/Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 59. 
563 Halson. Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman 2001. P 516. Treitel, S. G. 
"The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 1002. 
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pre-estimate of the loss that had actually occurred as a result of the breach. In spite of this 
fact the whole sum was struck down as a penalty for it was a disproportionately large sum 
to certain losses which have not in fact occurred. Beldam LJ rebutted the claimant's 
argument saying: 
"Though it was not an unreasonable to take such an overall figure as a suitable 
basis for genuine pre-estimate of damage should Ariston [claimant] fail to return 
all or many of parts, that sum would clearly have been out of proportion to any 
loss suffered if Ariston failed to return only a few of comparatively unimportant 
items, and as such was a penalty ... 565 
1.1.2.1.2.2 How to avoid such danger 
If a danger arises where the different possible losses are broad the important issue, which 
should be examined is whether the unsatis.factory consequences resulting from that may 
be avoided. Could presumption raised in favour of penalty, where a single sum is 
stipulated to be paid on breach of different undertakings of different importance, be 
avoided where there is a great difference between the largest possible loss and the lowest 
one? There seems to be two different solutions to evade the difficulty in question 
according to the existing law566: ascertaining the true construction of agreed damages 
clause, and stipulating different sums for different breaches. 
1.1.2.1.2.2.1 Ascertaining the true construction of agreed damages provision 
Where the losses are of greatly different significances, the court would interpret the 
construction of the agreed damages clause in a way to keep a perfectly fair bargain 
alive567• To do so the court should consider the range of losses that could have been 
anticipated the agreed damages clause would cover at the time of making of the contract. 
As a result the court will have to make every possible attempt to construe that the agreed 
564 (1990) The independent Law reports .13 April. This case was referred to, in Philips Hong Kong LTD v. 
Attorney General of Hong Kong. (1993) 61 BLR 41, to confinn the situation of displacing the presumption 
in favour of penalty where a single lump sum is provided for to be paid. 
565 Ibid. 
566 This does not also conflict with the consequences of the New Approach. 
567 Treitel, S. G. "The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 1002. 
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sum is not intended to be payable on the occurrence of trifling breaches but on those 
causing the most injurious damage568• 
If parties to a contract stipulated that the amount of £ 1 0,000 was to be payable on breach 
of different undertakings, some of which may cause serious and others less injurious loss 
and of which the lowest loss was of £500 and the largest was of nearly £10,000. If there 
has been a breach and the latter loss (£10,000) which has actually resulted from the 
breach, the application of the presumption concerned will leave the whole agreed 
damages clause vulnerable to be knocked down as a penalty. This is because the 
stipulated sum was extravagant and unconscionable to the less serious loss, which has not 
actually occurred. In avoiding this danger569 the court should do its best to construe that 
the whole £10,000 was payable only on the occurrence of the most serious loss. To do so 
the court should have regards to all possible losses that were within the contemplation of 
the parties at the time of contracting. As a result it can be inferred that the parties, when 
agreeing in advance on damages, could not have had in their mind that the £ I 0,000 would 
be held to apply to small breaches of contract which result in trifling losses o~ £500. In 
other words, the court should conclude that the sum stipulated had only been intended to 
be payable on breach which result in major losses. If this construction was not followed 
by the courts, the consequences would simply be that the whole clause would fall as a 
penalty for the sum stipulated was grossly extravagant to a minor loss (£500). This is 
despite the fact that what has actually occurred (New Approach) was adequate to make 
the sum stipulated (£10,000) a genuine pre-estimate of loss sustained and so a perfectly 
valid liquidated damages provision. 
This approach has been, more recently, upheld in Cenargo Limited v. Emparesa Nacional 
Bazan de Construcciones Navales Militares SA570. In this case it was contended that the 
agreed damages clause in the contract would only be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate 
of the loss suffered if it was interpreted as applying solely to permanent deficiencies in 
568 See Philips Hong Kong LTD v. Attorney General of Hong Kong. (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 59 per Lord 
Woolf. 
569 The danger is the following: upsetting freely made bargain and court's time being wasted. 
570 [2002] EWCA Civ 524. [2002] CLC 1151. 2002 WL 347020. 
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the capacity of the trailers of the vessel. Based upon this it was submitted that if the 
clause was to be interpreted as covering temporary and minor deficiencies it would be a 
penalty and so unenforceable. Lord Longmore, in delivering the judgment, stated that: 
"It is important to have in mind the range of losses the parties would anticipate 
the clause would cover when they made their contract. I do not consider that the 
parties in this case, when agreeing liquidated damages in relation to trailer 
carrying capacity, could have had in mind defects in design or workmanship 
which could be rectified without incurring major expense, even if it could be said 
that until such defects were rectified the vessel's spaces were, in breach of 
contract, not fully available"s71 
In applying this principle the Court of Appeal concluded that the deficiencies concerned 
in this case were minor and could have been remedied in a matter of hours for a 
minimum cost. Therefore where a substantial sum was payable in respect of deficiencies 
a court should lean naturally to the conclusion that the agreed damages clause had not 
been intended to apply to minor breaches resulting in trivial losses but only to major 
breaches. Namely the true construction of the agreement on damages beforehand was that 
the agreed damages were only intended to be payable in the event of major breaches 
which result in major deficiencies. 
1.1.2.1.2.2.2 Agreement on different sums 
As parties to a contract might at the time of contracting know that the losses, which might 
be suffered from, are of great and different importance, they should take into 
consideration the presumption raised in favour of penalty in this situation. Therefore the 
parties to a contract may provide for different sums to be payable on different breaches. 
In Imperial Tobacco Co v. Parslei72 there was an agreement of "price maintenance" in 
which the defendant promised not to sell the goods of the claimants lower than what they 
571 Ibid. 
S72 Imperial Tobacco Co v. Parslay [1936] 2 AIl ER 515. See also Philips Hong Kong Ltd v. The Attorney 
General of Hong Kong. (1993) 61 BLR 41. In this case there were two liquidated damages. One was $74, 
104 per day payable for not completing the whole of the works within the specified time and the other was 
varied between $60, 655- $77, 818 per day for the delay in meeting Key Dates. Lord Woolf stated there 
that: "Philips argues ... it can and most probably will result in the Government receiving at least double 
compensation. It is suggested that this can happen because the Government will receive liquidated damages 
both for the delay which causes a Key Date to be missed and again when the same delay result in the date 
for the completion not being met. It is suggested it can also happen as a result of the same delay causing 
two or more Key Dates to be missed. (Liquidated Damages will continue to be paid in respect of the earlier 
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decided. It was provided in the agreement that for every breach by the defendant he 
would pay to the claimants the sum of £ 15 as liquidated damages in respect of each sale. 
Breaches having been made by the defendant, the claimants brought action to recover 
£ 165 as liquidated damages for 11 of such breaches. In this case the court paid attention 
to the particular breach that occurred and the sum provided for to be payable in the event 
of the occurrence of that breach. Therefore the only point in this case was to determine 
whether the sum stipulated £15 was obviously larger than any loss that might be suffered 
by the claimant as a result of any breach of the contract. The court's view was that the 
£15 was liquidated damages for each breach committed by the defendant. Accordingly, 
the court held the sum to be liquidated damages because it was a genuine pre-estimate of 
the loss suffered and not a penalty. As Lord Wright stated: "I see nothing at all in this 
case to justify the court in saying that this sum of £15 is unconscionable or extravagant 
when as applied to each particular instance in which the breach has been committed"s73. 
This result can be translated to the situation in question where the range of losses is broad. 
Should the parties not have a regard to such a great range this may lead, as they 
understand the penalty jurisdiction, to upset their agreement on damages in knocking the 
sum stipulated down as a penalty not least where the range of likely losses is broad. One 
solution to avoid the penalty jurisdiction in such a situation is by stipulating for different 
sums. The size of each sum determined according to the size of the possible loss. In other 
words, there should be a stipulated sum payable on the occurrence of a trifling breach 
which results in trifling losses, as, in the words of Lord Woolf: 
"The failure to make special provision for those losses may result in the liquidated 
damages not being recoverable"s74. 
Where different sums are stipulated to be payable on different breaches is provided for, 
the court concentrates upon the breach that has occurred and the particular sum stipulated 
in relation to it (New Approach). If that sum is a genuine pre-estimate of loss suffered 
(either the largest or the lowest) it will constitute valid liquidated damages irrespective of 
Key date after the later date is missed)". See for the analysis of this point Hock-lai Ho. The Privy Council 
on Liquidated Damages. Journal of Contract Law. (1995) Vo1.8, No.3 280. 
573 Imperial Tobacco Co v. Parslay [1936] 2 All ER 515, at 521 per Lord Wright. 
574Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 59. 
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any other breaches that may have occurred since each one has its own stipulated sum. 
However, if the sum is extravagant and unconscionable in comparison to the loss suffered 
as a result of the breach to which the sum is provided for, it will still be held as a penalty. 
1.1.2.1.3 Parties' agreement to confining the field of stipulated sum 
In looking at the true construction of the agreement it may appear that the sum was made 
payable for the breach of a single obligation or a number of similar obligations575 • In this 
case the sum stipulated is to be considered valid and enforceable, despite it being 
provided for as payable for different breaches, if parties to a contract detennine the cases 
in which that sum becomes payable. This might be done by confining the sum to be paid 
in only certain breaches or even only in certain aspects of a single breach. However, the 
stipulated sum should still not be extravagant and unconscionable. The main examples of 
this situation are illustrated in the two famous cases of Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. 
New Garage & Motor Co Ltcf76 and Ford Motor Co v. A rmstroni 77. In these two cases 
the courts reached different judgments regarding the sum stipulated, in spite of both 
having the similar facts. 
In the Dunlop case578, the parties agreed to delimit the agreed damages to be payable in 
certain breaches rather than the other. In this case the purchaser adhered not to tamper 
with marks on the goods, not to sell or offer the goods to a certain prohibited customers 
and not to resell them for less than a certain price and not to exhibit or export without the 
consent of the claimant. Otherwise the defendant should pay £5 for every tyre, tube or 
cover which was sold or offered in breach of the contract. The defendant sold a tyre cover 
to a co-operative society below the listed price. The House of Lords held the £5 to be 
liquidated damages on the basis that the parties agreed on the sum to be payable in the 
event of a certain breach which is not to resell the goods below the listed price579• In the 
S7S Ogus, AI. "The Law of Damages". Butterworths 1973. P 44. McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on 
Damages". 171h ed. Sweet &Maxwell. 2003. P 436. 
576 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
577 Ford Motor Co v. Armstrong (1915) 31 TLR 267. 
578 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
579 In spite of the fact that there was another obligation, which was not to exhibit them without consent. 
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Ford Motor case580, though the facts in this case are the same of those in Dunlop case, the 
Court of Appeal reached another result by holding that the sum was a penalty, because 
the sum had to be payable for any breaches without any delimiting. 
It should be observed that the parties in DunlopS8l case had, in reality, agreed the sum to 
be payable in breach of a single undertaking582• They delimited the stipulated sum to 
apply only if there was a breach in selling the goods below the listed price, and not by 
exhibiting them without consent. In contrast, if the parties had agreed that the sum to be 
payable in any event, the sum would have been considered a penalty. This is what 
actually occurred in Ford Motor case583, in which the sum stipulated was to be payable in 
the event of several breaches of variant importance, without any limit to the sum to be 
payable on one, or some of them. 
Furthermore, the courts always refuse to accept any attempt by defendants to narrow the 
meaning of what constitutes a single obligation584• It might be argued that, relying on the 
third of the rules raised by Lord Dunedin in the Dunlop case under which a clause is 
presumed to be a penalty when a single sum is made payable on the occurrence of one or 
all of several events, the sum stipulated is a penalty where there is one obligation in 
contract breach of which might be caused by several events. It should be noted that in this 
case it is supposed that there are several undertakings inflicted on the injured party, 
however, the breach of which is a breach of single obligation, but "capable of being 
broken than once, or more ways than one ... 585". This situation has always been dealt with 
in the event of the delay in completion586 in which the only event gives rise to the liability 
to pay liquidated damages is delay, which may be caused by any number of different 
580 Ford Motor Co v. Armstrong (1915) 31 TLR 267. 
581 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Company LTD v. New Garage and Motor Company LTD. [1915] AC 79. 
582 The only obligation, which was intended, was, keeping the price of the goods to the same level. 
583 Ford Motor Co v. Armstrong (1915) 31 TLR 267. 
584 McGregor, Harvey ... McGregor on Damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 438. 
S85 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, At 98 per Lord 
Waddington. 
586 Law v. Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127. See also Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General 
of Hong Kong. (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
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circumstances587. In these circumstances the defendant always argues that the sum is 
provided for to be payable on breach of several obligations and is consequently a penalty. 
Lord Woolf in Philips Hong Kong v The Attorney General of Hong Kong588 rejecting the 
argument relied on by Philips to establish the provision in the case as penal on the 
grounds that there was a single sum payable on several events, held, consistently with 
authoritiesS89 that: 
"In this case the only event giving rise to the liability to pay liquidated damages is 
delay. Although that delay may be caused by any number of different 
circumstances, this is not a case of different causes of loss being compensated by 
the same figure ofliquidated damages"S90 
The foundation stone to this instance was well illustrated in Law v. Local Board of 
Redditchs91 • In this case, the court rejected the attempt and argument of the defendant that 
the sum stipulated was payable on several obligations, referring to the provision in the 
contract that: "The works shall be completed in all respects and cleaned of all 
impediment, tackle implements and rubbish". The court decided that the sum was to be 
regarded as liquidated damages. It justified its decision on the basis that, the sum agreed 
to be paid as liquidated damages was payable on a single event, namely non-completion 
of the works. 
587 For more details see McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 
438-440. 
588 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993)61 BLR 41. 
589 Law v. Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127 was cited. See also Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron & 
Coal Co [1886] 11 AC 332, at 342 where lord Herschell expressed himself in strong language saying: "I 
know of no authority for holding that a payment agreed to be made under such conditions ... is to be 
regarded as a penalty only; and I see no sound reason or principle or even convenience for so holding". 
Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda [1905] AC 6, at 
16 where Lord Davey said that: "I confess I know of no other ground ... upon which a clause fixed under 
conditions ... for breach of a particular stipulation in an agreement can be held to be a penalty and not 
li~uidated damages". 
59 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993)61 BLR 41, at 62. See also The 
foundation stone to this case was well illustrated in Law v. Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127). In 
delivering the judgment Kay LJ had clearly stated confirming the principle that: "I can not agree with the 
ingenious argument that, because there may be many matters, some very small, which would constitute 
non-completion, these sums may be regarded as payable on several breaches. According to that argument, 
there must be considered to be several different non-completions of the works. There may be different 
causes of non-completion, but non-completion is only single event" 
591Law v. Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127. 
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1.1.3 Where a graduated sum slides to the wrong direction 
Parties to a contract might provide for a graduated sum to be paid in accordance to 
significance of breaches. The clearest example for such a case is where the breach is a 
delay in performance (which is common in building contracts), whereby the sum will 
continue to increase over time, so far as, there is a breach. In other words, "Liquidated 
Damages will continue to be paid in respect of the earlier Key Date after the later date is 
missed,,592. The leading case which illustrates this situation is Clydebank Engineering 
and Shipbuilding Co v. Don Jose Ramos Yzquierdo Y Castaneda593• In this case the sum 
stipulated was $500 per week for each vessel that was late in being delivered. This meant 
that that sum, as in any such case in the event of breach by delay to complete, would be 
increased much more, so far as, the vessels had not been delivered yet. The House of 
Lords in this case confirmed this fact by upholding the sum as valid liquidated damages. 
For instance should the delay be for two weeks the sum will increase £1000 and if the 
breach, i.e. the delay, goes on for more weeks then the sum will increase still further. The 
longer the delay continues the more the sum will increase, which demonstrates that the 
sum is for legitimate damages due to the losses suffered on the continuing breach. 
As a principle the graduated sum must be increased in proportion to the size of breach to 
be upheld as valid liquidated damages. Therefore, if that sum slides conversely, namely, 
it was decreasing in proportion to the size of breach, it will be treated as a penalty and 
irrecoverable594. The depreciation apparently increases over time, which makes the sum 
said to be compensation for depreciation, not a genuine pre-estimate of loss if it decreases 
over time595 . On this basis, an attempt to use the principle of graduated damages to 
support the minimum payment clause was rejected in Bridge v. Compbell Discount Co596• 
592 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
593 Clydebank Engineering and Shipbuilding Co. v. Don Jose Romos Yzquiedo Y Castaneda [1915] AC 6. 
See also Law v. Local Board of Redditch [1892] 1 QB 127. Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd v. Widnes 
Foundry (1925) Ltd [1933] AC 20. Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 
BLR41. 
594 Burrows, Andrew. "Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract". 2ed.Butterworths. 1994. P 325. Treitel, 
S. G. "The Law of Contract". 11 th ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 1006. Ogus, A I. "The Law of 
Damages". Butterworths. 1973. P 48-49. 
595 Chitty on contract. 29th edition. Vol. 1 General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P1494. 
596 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. 
155 
In this case a minimum payment clause was included in a hire-purchase agreement. It 
provided that if the hirer for any reason terminated the contract, the car should be 
returned and also the rentals already paid should be made up to two-thirds of the hire 
purchase price by way of an agreed compensation for depreciation. In its decision the 
House of Lords held the sum to be a penalty and so unenforceable. In particular, the 
House opposed the argument that the stipulated amount was compensation for 
depreciation. This was because the longer the subject matter remained in the possession 
of the hirer, the more its value would depreciate. Yet the clause operated in such a way 
the estimated amount payable would decrease progressively as the period of the hire 
continued and more instalment payments were paid. Thus: 
"It is a sliding scale of compensation, but a scale that slides in the wrong 
direction ... the fact this anomalous result is deliberately produced by the formula 
employed, I think, that the real purpose of this clause is not to provide 
compensation for depreciation at all but to afford the owners a substantial 
guarantee against the loss of their hiring contract597" 
Furthermore, the graduated sum might be regarded as liquidated damages on the basis of 
a consideration other than the time. Namely, it might be vindicated as valid according to 
the number of items in question, whereby it will be so much according to the items, 
which they were not delivered on time598• In the case of Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron 
and Coal C0599 lessees, granted the privilege of placing stay from blast-furnaces on land 
let to them, covenanted to pay £1 00 for every acre of the land that was not restored at a 
particular date. The House of Lords in its decision held that the sum was liquidated 
damages and so recoverable. This judgment was also based on the fact that the stipulated 
sum increases so far as the amount of loss resulting from breach is subject to increase. 
The sliding scale in this place runs in the right direction, which is increasing in sum and 
loss sustained simultaneously. If it is supposed, in this case, that 3 acres of the land were 
not restored, then the sum would be increased accordingly to £300 and so on. If there was 
no such graduation the sum fixed is more likely to be upheld as a penalty. 
597 Ibid. At 623 per Lord Raddditch. 
598 Chitty on Contract. 29th edition. Vol. 1 General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1494. 
599 Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co [1886] 11 AC 332. 
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2-Jordanian civil law 
2.1 General principle: literal enforcement subject to adjustment of agreed penalty 
The general rule in Jordanian civil law is that when the tenns of the operation of penalty 
clause are met, the court should enforce the amount agreed upon in favour of the injured 
party. In other words, the law in article 36411 adopts the literal enforcement where the 
injured party may not be awarded a larger or smaller amount than the penal sum. 
However in order to prevent the possibility of abuse, the same article in paragraph 2, 
gives the court the power to adjust the amount of penalty. It states that "the courts may, 
upon the request of either party, increase or decrease, such damages to make the 
estimation equal to the actual damage,,6oo. Therefore it empowers the court to award more 
or less than the stipulated sum to be equal to the recoverable loss suffered. By giving it a 
power to modify the penalty, the court uses this discretionary authority guided only by 
the amount of damage actually suffered by the injured party and independent of the 
intention of the parties. The same paragraph makes it clear that the parties may under no 
circumstances exclude such a possibility of reduction. It declares that any provision in the 
contract to rule out the power of the court to modify will be considered null and void. 
The validity of penalty and the possibility of amending its amount, were confinned by the 
Court of Cassation through several decisions601 , but perhaps most clearly asserted when it 
stated that: 
"When the parties to a contract agree on a certain sum of money to be payable in 
the event of non perfonnance, the court should, in principle, enforce agreement 
and award the sum no more no less. However, if the promisor claims that the 
agreed penalty is manifestly excessive or in excess of the actual damage sustained 
by the promisee, the court has the power to make penalty equal to the damage 
sustained in accordance to article 363 and 364 of Civil Law,,602 
It should be noted that article 36412 specifies the considerations, which should be taken 
into account by the court when exercising its power of modification. The court may not 
600 According to Jordanian law the actual damage means the loss the injured party has suffered exclusive 
the profits he has missed on breach. It seems that it is better to call it the recoverable damage instead, as it 
does not include some losses which actually suffered. 
601 Civil Cassation No. 391187 Bar Association Journal 1990. P 234 -235. Civil Cassation No. 560/983 Bar 
Association Journal [1984]. P 1097. Also Civil Cassation No. 702/982 Bar Association Journal [1983]. P 
127. 
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exercise the authority of adjustment by its own motion but there should be a demand 
from the party who claims a reduction or increasing. Furthermore, court's power to 
reduce the damages estimated in penalty clause at the request of the defaulting party, or 
increase it at the request of injured party, is not unconditional. The party claiming 
modification should provide legal evidence to prove his claim; otherwise the court will 
not modify the stipulated sum at his request603• Consequently if the party, who claims 
reduction or increasing of damages, does not furnish proof of his demand he will be 
bound to the damages agreed upon in penalty clause. 
Attention should be paid to the power given to courts under Article 364/2, in reducing or 
increasing the stipulated sum. Two situations need to be explored: firstly it gives courts 
the power to reduce agreed penalty in all cases and secondly a debate was raised with 
regard to the power given to courts to make damages payable under a penalty clause 
equal to the recoverable loss, which is actually sustained by injured party. This power, 
under article 364, will be dealt with in detail after approaching the following question: is 
there any difference between civil contract and administrative one in exercising the 
power of reduction? 
2.1.1 Does the courts' power of reduction apply to both civil contract and 
administrative contract? 
Firstly it should be noted that all rules regarding penalty clause were first organized in 
article 178 of the Jordanian law of civil procedures 1952. Article 178 was stating that: 
"Courts do not have a power to wholly disregard, but to reduce an agreed penalty 
clause upon the request of debtor except in the case that the clause was inserted in 
favour of governmental establishment". 
This was the case until the enactment of article 364 of Jordanian civil law 1976, which 
re-regulated penalty clause rules. After the 1976 Code the court's power to reduce the 
amount of penalty became firm, either penalty clause was stipulated in favour of ordinary 
person, or of the government. 
602 Civil Cassation No. 560/983 Bar Association Journal [1984]. P 1097. 
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Despite this fact it was argued that article 178 of Jordanian law of civil procedures of 
1952, which involved regulating penalty clause rules, was not amended by article 364 Qf 
civil code. Accordingly it was asserted604 that the courts' authority of reducing an agreed 
penalty does not apply to those cases where the government is one of the contracting 
parties, namely to administrative contracts. Put another way, it means that courts cannot 
reduce the amount of penalty clause, though it is excessively high, when it was in the 
interest of the government by virtue of article 178 of law of procedures. To consolidate 
this claim it was said that this law is still in effect and is a private law compared with 
civil law. Given article 1448 of the latter law includes an imperative rule to prioritize the' 
private codes; it was thus asserted that the judgment of article 178 of law of procedures 
should be considered an exception from article 364 of civil code. 
This is imprecise primarily because when Jordanian legislator enacted article 178 of the 
law of procedures of 1952, which organised the rules with regards to the damage and 
compensation, it followed the same style of the legislator of the Ottman Government, 
which dominated Jordan at that time. Therefore the legislator included these rules in civil 
procedures law and not in Medgella AI-Adlieah, which was then the civil law, following 
in the footsteps of Ottman counterpart. This confusion was noticed by the Jordanian 
legislator when the civil law of 1976 was established and so it re-regulated the rules of 
compensation including those related to penalty clauses in article 364 of civil law. By 
doing so the legislator rescinded article 178 of law of procedures605 . In its decision No. 
391187 the Court of Cassation 6o~eld that: 
"The rules pertaining to penalty clauses which were contained in the Civil 
Procedures Law were canceled by the enactment of Civil Law ... and it was agreed 
upon that it is the civil law which is a private law and not the law of procedures". 
As a result the situation became that the power to reduce the amount of penalty given to 
the court under civil code applies to both contracts civil and administrative. 
603 Civil Cassation No. 391187 Bar Association Journal [1990]. P 234. 
604 See for that Civil Cassation No. 391187 Bar Association Journal [1990] P 234, at 236. 
60S This fact was clearly confirmed when the new Law of Civil Procedures of 1988 was enacted without any 
indication to the provisions related to the penalty clause rules. 
606 Civil Cassation No. 582/91 Bar Association Journal [1993] P 737. See also Civil Cassation No. 391187 
Bar Association Journal [1~90] P 234. 
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However in rather a recent judgment concerning a sale contract in which the Ministry of 
Supply was the purchaser, the Court of Cassation held that the agreed penalty may not be 
reduced if it is provided for the interest of one of the governmental departments607• In this 
case the Ministry of Supply made a contract with a supplier company to import 200,000 
boxes of powdered milk from New Zealand. It was provided that if the supplier company 
did not meet the established delivery deadline it should pay JD 1, 500 for every day of 
delay in the delivery of the goods. Due to a problem in the engine of the vessel that 
carried the goods, the supplier (claimant) had to return the vessel again to Auckland port 
in New Zealand after a day running. Subsequently the goods had to be transferred to 
another ship. This resulted in the supplies being 10 days late in delivery. Having the 
supplier made this breach of the contract, the Ministry of Supply sued for, and got a 
judgment of, JDl, 500, which was the agreed penalty provided in the contract. On appeal 
the supplier claimed that the agreed penalty was disproportionately high, as there was no 
damage suffered by the ministry as a result of the delay. The Court of Cassation reached 
the conclusion over this claim saying that: 
"The amount of damages set out in advance, in a contract that the government 
was one of its parties, could not be reduced upon the request of the supplier due to 
the nature of such contract, its relation to public interest and its effect on the 
proper running of public utilities .. 608 
This is to say that the Court of Cassation decided that the judicial authority of reduction is 
only applicable to civil contracts. In holding to this the court returned back to the position 
obtained during the application of article 178 of law of civil procedures. However it 
should be noted that the court did not justify its judgment on applying this article because 
it became of no effect. It justified itself on the fact that it had the right to construe the law 
when it interpreted article 364 of civil law and which as a result does not apply to this 
case. This is because the damage suffered by the government is presumed and so it is not 
allowed to provide proof that there was no damage suffered or that it was less than the 
agreed penalty609. However does this interpretation sound correct and legal? 




2.1.1.1 Unsound interpretation 
This interpretation of the extent of the power of reduction appears unsound. In other 
words, there is nothing frank in article 364 of civil law to support the court's conclusion. 
This article does not give courts the right to abstain from reducing the agreed penalty 
even when it is in excess of the loss suffered where the government is one of the 
contract's parties. As was seen above the law of procedures 1952 gave the court such 
power if the clause was inserted in civil contracts, but not into contracts where the 
government was one of its parties. If the legislator wanted to reaffirm this position it 
would have done so when it re-regulated penalty clause rules in the civil code 1976. It is 
not believed that this was an oversight as the legislator was aware of the fact that the 
court did not have the power of reduction in relation to administrative contracts in the 
former legislation. Furthermore when the legislator gave the court the power to reduce 
the amount of agreed penalty, he aimed to restore the scales of balance and justice, which 
are violated by imposing unfair clauses in contracts. 
It should be noted that most of the contracts in which the government is one of the parties 
are contracts of adhesion610 and as a result it imposes its terms upon the other. For 
economic reasons the supplying companies always find themselves have no option but to 
accept the terms of the government not least where there are many firms competing to 
win the bid of the government. The government can sometimes resort to impose a very 
excessive sum of money to be payable in the event of non-performance by the other party. 
As a result it may receive a disproportionately high sum not least that the Court of 
Cassation in its judgment raised irrefutable presumption61I in favour of government. 
However it is thought that this position of the Court of Cassation is unfounded as it is full 
of unfairness which the discretionary power of reduction given to the judicial authority to 
remove its effects. The judgment cannot be founded on the fact that the administrative 
610 Contract of adhesion seeks always to impose severe and onerous conditions on an person who has no 
choice but to agree to them. very often the weaker party will find himself in a position that he can not both 
negotiate the contract and go elsewhere since such contracts may be common to all operator within a 
particular industrial activity. 
611 That its loss is presumed and may not be displaced. 
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contracts are of high significance, due to their relation to public interest612, and thus the 
justice scale does not apply. It is accepted and legal to say that the damage suffered by 
the government is presumed, but it is unacceptable to deprive the claimant the right to 
rebut this presumption. This means that there is no need for the government body to 
prove its actual loss, however it is fair to provide the other contracting party with the 
opportunity to show that the agreed penalty is excessively greater than the actual loss 
sustained. It might be asserted that the government body suffers no loss, for example, in 
the event of delay. However that is wrong in fact as it usually suffers a loss if only in 
extra supervision costs or financing charges or expenses incurred to find another supplier. 
Thus in giving the courts the power to reduce the agreed penalty in administrative 
contracts does not mean to deprive the government body the right to receive the amount 
of penalty. The court can exercise its authority of reduction only if the defaulting party 
can supply a proof that the sum stipulated is disproportionately high in comparison with 
actual loss sustained. In other words, it is presumed that the government establishment 
always has the right of receiving the whole-agreed penalty for its actual loss unless 
otherwise proved. 
As a result, and from the tenor of article 364, it can be concluded that Jordanian law does 
not differentiate between civil contracts and administrative ones. Therefore article 364, 
governing the penalty clause, should apply to both kinds of contracts. This leads to the 
conclusion that the court should have the power to reduce the agreed penalties in all cases 
inclusive of where the penalty clause is provided for the government in administrative 
contracts. 
612 It might be argued that when things are related to public interest the law should allow the government to 
exact a high sum to make sure that the running of public utilities is not affected by anything. However that 
can be done by another way than to permit a manifestly large penal sum to be exacted. The court can assess 
the damage that sustained by the government including that suffered from as a result of not working out 
another arrangement, i.e. not finding another supplier to supply the subject matter on time, or from paying 
more money to ensure the supplying on time. Also the government may take its own motion by excluding 
the X firm which has caused much trouble in not doing the job on time. 
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2.2 Analysis of courts' power to intervene under article 364 
2.2.1 Courts power to reduce penal sum: in all cases and make penalty equal to 
judicial damages 
Article 364 of Jordanian law only pennits a moderation of a penalty clause, not its 
complete elimination. What is noticeable that this article gives the court unconditional 
power to modify the agreed penalty. On one hand, it simply leaves the amount of 
reduction to the discretion of the court or to its sense of what is required to make equality 
between agreed penalty and the recoverable loss suffered. Meanwhile on the other hand, 
it does not detennine the cases in which the court can exercise its power to adjust the 
penalty amount. The fact that the agreed penalty is in excess of loss suffered is a 
sufficient reason for the court to exercise its discretionary power of reduction. In other 
words, there is no need for a defaulting party to show that the stipulated sum is 
disproportionately excessive in relation to the damage actually sustained on breach in 
order to claim the reduction of a penalty. 
This rule is justified in the explanatory notes of Jordanian law on the grounds that: 
"If agreed damages is in excess of actual damage the court has a power to reduce 
it as the Islamic jurisgrudential judgment states that the compensation must be 
equal to the damage,,6 3 
However, is it really that Islamic Jurisprudence doesn't recognize the rule that agreed 
damages could not be more than the actual damage? And does it seem sound for the court 
to base its intervention merely because the sum stipulated is more than the actual loss? 
These two questions will now be considered in the next section. 
2.2.1.1 Illogical and unreasonable justification 
Though Islamic Jurisprudence does not consider the penal provision as integral theory, 
some jurisprudential diligences which dealt with this matter can be found. These views 
convey the fact that part of the Islamic Jurisprudence endorses penalty clauses as well as 
respects the assessment of damages detennined in advance by the parties. For example 
AI-Bokhary reported from Ibn Sireen that a man agreed with another to travel with him to 
613 Explanatory note of Jordanian Civil Law of 1976. P 403. 
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a certain place and that if he did not travel on such and such a day, he would pay to the 
injured party 100 Dirhams. The promisor not having performed, the judge decided that he 
"who stipulated on himself willingly must execute,,614. In addition, part of the Islamic 
Jurisprudence had a rule that new conditions, which have not been in existence at AI-
Risalah age61S, may be put forward for the tradition states that "Muslims are obliged to do 
their provisions, except if they forbid lawful things or legalise sins,,616. As a result of this 
so long as the penalty clause is a contractual one the parties should apply it. 
Moreover, as the Islamic Jurisprudence is characterised as progressing and able to 
develop and respond to the recent demands of the people it should demonstrate such 
ability to develop over the time. This has prompted some Muslim jurists to pass the 
following rule that "The change of the legal rules changes with time,,617 and it therefore 
became important that the legal rules should also progress with the current, huge 
developments. Because of this some Muslim scholars have delivered views, which accept 
simple unfairness that may occur at the time of contracting. Consequently the partiality of 
Jordanian legislator to the point of view which says that the compensation must always 
be equal to the damage sustained has no justification. This is because the legislator, when 
enacted the Jordanian civil law, does not restrict itself to a particular ideology of the. 
Islamic Jurisprudence. Therefore the view618 which allows the agreed penalty to be more 
than actual loss should be preferable. 
Accordingly the existing penalty clause rules under Jordanian law are open to a number 
of objections: 
I-The rule that gives courts a power to reduce agreed penalty in all cases without 
limitations is flawed. The stipulated sum will be subject to reduction merely because it is 
614 This event has been included in the decision issued by the Council of greater scholars and trustees in 
Kingdom ofSuidia Arabia about the legality of penalty clause. This decision is published in Islamic Journal 
vol. 1 No.2 1975/1976. P 140. 
615 The time in which the Islamic principles were first established. 
616 Ibn Teemah. AI-Fatawa AI-Kobra". Compiled by the scholar Abd-Arahman bn Gassim and his son 
Mohammed. Vol.29 No.9. Arabian Dar for publication and distribution. Beirut. 1st ed. P 147. 
617 AI-shatiby AI-Mowafigat. Vol.3. Dar AI-Ma'rifah. Beirut. 2nd ed. 1975. P 17. 
618 Which the legislator seems to have not paid any attention to it. 
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in excess of the actual loss suffered as a result of breach. The application of this rule will 
lead the clause to lose its true meaning and function, for the parties might have different 
reasons to stipulate for agreed penalty clearly more than the actual loss suffered upon 
breach. Parties to a contract might agree that an agreed penalty clause is to cover what 
court does not award damages for619• The legal rules for the assessment of recoverable 
loss under Jordanian law envisage that the injured party can only claim the loss he has 
suffered but not the loss of prospective profits, which he has missed upon non-
performance. Therefore, the agreement on damages in advance on compensating him for 
such missed profits should be regarded as sound and valid. Besides the penalty clause 
might seem quite excessive at the time of breach and trial, though it was not at the time of 
contracting. The promisee might have paid a higher price for the subject matter to buy a 
high-agreed penalty clause that should be paid by the promisor on default. Such 
agreements should be considered as otherwise the injured party will be 
undercompensated, as supported by the New Approach suggested for English law, 
provided that the injured party could not avoid his losses by taking reasonable steps as 
expected from a reasonable man. 
Therefore the question which should be asked is whether the sum to be paid is 
disproportionately large in amount when compared with the actual loss that has followed 
from the breach. If there is such clear disproportion, the court will then use its 
discretionary power to reduce the agreed penalty in line with the actual loss. The mere 
fact that the agreed sum is in excess of the actual loss should not be a sufficient reason for 
reduction. This judgment affirms and respects of the freedom of contract doctrine and the 
value of pre-estimated damages not least where the loss is difficult to assess. Put another 
way, this suggestion could be justified on the fact, as Diplock LJ put it, that: "It is good 
business sense that parties to a contract should know what will be the financial 
consequences to them of a breach on their part, for circumstances may arise when further 
performance of the contract may involve them in loss. And the more difficult it is likely 
to prove and assess the loss which a party will suffer in the event of breach, the greater 
619 See for more details the interpretation of New Approach introduced in the first chapter. Supra. P 23. 
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the advantages to both parties fixing by the terms of the contract itself an easily 
ascertainable sum to be paid in that event,,620. 
2-As for giving court a power to make agreed penalty equal to loss sustained the 
following objections should be noted. If this rule was based on the justice principle, as 
argued by legislator; the application of the absolute justice will put people in an 
embarrassing position and trouble. It is not always possible to accurately measure the 
meeting of obligations so that the contracting party can take exactly what he gives. Put 
another way, it is asserted that the problem of the notion of equity of damages with the 
recoverable loss is the difficulty of determining the equity with the necessary degree of 
accuracy and certainty. Moreover what is the point of inserting article 364, which entitles 
parties to a contract to determine in advance, the damages payable in the event of 
defaulting party's non-performance since such damages will be, at request of either party, 
modified by court to be equal to unliquidated damages?621 In other words, it will always 
be a matter of estimating the damages by court due to the fact that there is always a right 
for defaulting party to claim the reduction of damages payable under penalty clause to be 
equal to what court awards in the normal way of damages. This makes the pre-estimated 
damages pointless, despite practical imperative for it and destructive of the principal 
purpose of it, which is to avoid the judicial estimation that may undercompensate injured 
party and court's time and more money being wasted. Therefore, as mentioned above, 
greater latitude should be given to parties to agree on damages that can not be claimed 
under unliquidated damages action. 
2.2.1.2 Result of the analysis 
As a result of the above analysis it may be concluded that Islamic Jurisprudence 
principles generally respect the will of the parties who agree upon a penalty clause. The 
parties are finally more aware of the elements of the assessment of the damages for the 
actual loss and so the court should not intervene to modify the parties' agreement unless 
620 Robophone Facilities, Ltd v Blank [1966] 3 AlI ER 128, at 142. 
621 AI.Abadi Mohammed and Abu Shana, Ahmed. "Effects of penalty clause". Almanarah Journal. (2000) 
vo1.5, 61 at 80. Also Sultan, Anwar. "Commentary on the Theory of Contract in the Jordanian Civil Law". 
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the disproportion between the agreed penalty and the actual loss is clear. Therefore it is 
submitted that in giving courts the power to reduce its amount in all cases the role of 
inserting a penalty clause in contract will be canceled. This is because the power to 
reduce an agreed penalty to be equal to unliquidated damages makes the authority of 
court, an authority of nullification rather than of modification622• In other words, when a 
court has the power to reduce a stipulated sum to be equal to damage sustained, the 
situation will become as if no penalty clause was stipulated in the contract. Such power 
totally invalidates the purpose of a penalty clause and renders null and void the 
agreement of the parties on damages. As a consequence, the situation will be the same as 
in English case law, which grants the courts the power to wholly disregard penalty 
clauses in contracts. Therefore it is suggested article 364/2 be amended by giving courts 
the power to reduce agreed penalty to be in line with the actual loss suffered by the 
injured partl23 inclusive the profits he has missed on default. Otherwise, the agreement 
on penalty clause would be pointless and hold the same role of judicial damages under 
which courts have no more power than to hold equality between damages and loss 
suffered. 
2.2.1.3 What is suggested? 
It would be preferable to amend article 364 of Jordanian law to allow the court to make, 
when exercising its power of reduction, the agreed penalty in line with actual loss 
inclusive of the profit that the injured party naturally missed as a result of breach and 
determine the circumstances under which the court may reduce the sum stipulated624• The 
court when it exercises its power of reduction, should always aim to grant the injured 
party a just compensation. Thus, it should not be enough for the defaulting party to prove 
that the penal sum is merely larger than the actual loss in order to claim the reduction. 
Rather the sum should be disproportionately larger than the actual loss. This case is 
Bar Association Journal. (1987) 2. P 213. Swar, 'Mohamed Waheed Aldeen. "Effects of Contracts and 
Damages in Law of Civil Procedures". Bar Association Journal. [1977]. P 138-139. 
622 Swar, Mohamed Waheed Aldeen. "Effects of Contracts and Damages in Law of Civil Procedures". Bar 
Association Journal. [1977]. P 138-139. 
623 See the decision of the Council of greater scholars and trustees in Kingdom of Suidia Arabia about the 
legality of penalty clause. This decision is published in Islamic Journal vol. 1 No.2 197511976. P 140. 
624 See the proposal suggested according to the New Approach. Supra. P 23. 
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suggested for both legal systems concerned in the comparison after considering the effect 
of New Approach, which will be dealt with after approaching the next section. 
Besides this case the commentators625always suggest a reduction of the penal sum where 
there is partial non-performance. This is already one of the cases that the court has a 
power of reduction under the current article 364 of Jordanian civil law. In the event of 
partial performance of obligation the court has the judicial authority to reduce the amount 
of penalty clause in proportion to the part that was performed, provided that the 
defaulting party supplies evidence of the partial performance. This is totally a direct 
application of article 364 of Jordanian law, which allows the court to modify agreed 
penalty clause in all cases. There has never been a case in which the Court of Cassation 
has exercised its discretionary power to reduce the agreed penalty where the obligation 
has been performed in part. However it should be noted that the test remains that the 
agreed damages being manifestly greater than the part that was not performed by the 
defaulting party. Therefore this case is included within the one where the agreed penal 
sum is manifestly higher than actual loss, and thus there is no need to be an independent 
case626• To clarify this interpretation this case is now examined. 
2.2.1.3.1 If the obligation is performed in part 
The penalty clause was established for cases of total breach. However the law, in certain 
cases, permits the court to reduce the amount of penalty where there is a partial 
performance. If the promisor performs a part of the obligation, the court will respect the 
will of the parties if it reduces the agreed penalty in proportion to the part that has been 
performed627 • In this case the court assesses the promisee's interest that he has from 
partial performance, and the interest which he ~ould have in the event of the promisor 
625 Al-Juboori, Yaseen. "Commentary on the Jordanian Civil Law". Vol. 2. Effect of personal rights (Rules 
of Obligations). First edition. Irbid-Jordan. 1997. P 159. Adel Majeed AI-Hakeem. "Rules of Obligations". 
Baghdad. 3th ed. P 42. Abu Aso'od, Ramadan. "Rules of Obligations". Dar Almatbo'at press. 1998. P87 
A1.Abadi Mohammed and Abu Shana, Ahmed. "Effects of penalty clause". Almanarah Journal. (2000) 
vol.5, 61 at 79 
626 This case will be suggested for both legal systems concerned in the comparison after approaching the 
effect of New Approach. Intra. P 166. 
627 Al-Sanhoori, Abdel Razag. "AI-Waseet in The New Civil Law". Vol.2. Evidence and Rules of 
Obligations. P870. 
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completely perfonned his obligation. Then the agreed penalty is reduced in proportion to 
the difference between the two interests and obliges the defaulting promisor to pay the 
rest of the sum to the promisee. 
Thus partial perfonnance is the reason for the reduction and according to the general 
rules it is the defaulting party who should provide proof of this part perfonnance. 
However even if he does so, the court is not obliged to reduce the amount of penalty, as 
reduction's power is only applicable where the stipulated sum is disproportionately high. 
If the court decided what was perfonned was insignificant, derisory or the injured party 
did not get any interest, it would not reduce the agreed penalty. Moreover even in the 
case where the injured p'arty benefits from a partial perfonnance the court cannot exercise 
its discretionary authority to reduce the agreed penalty unless he profits from the partial 
perfonnance and can proceed with his contract in making another arrangement. To say 
otherwise means that the defaulting party, especially who acts in bad faith, may resort to 
perfonn a part of his obligation in order to avoid paying the whole agreed penalty. This 
leads to the tennination of contracts before their times without achieving the purposes for 
which they have been made. Eventually such a result hanns the parties' will which was 
originally focused on the total perfonnance of the obligation and leads to both private and 
public damage. 
3-Effect of New Approach on court's power over penalty clause 
It has been pointed out in this chapter to the rules that have been developed by the courts 
to distinguish penalties from liquidated damages. To reiterate the technical application of 
these rules result in knocking down all penalty clauses in contracts leaving the injured 
party to resort to the court again to claim his damages for the loss he has suffered on 
breach. However all this can be evaded, as was shown, by adopting the New Approach. 
To show the effectiveness of the New Approach it is worthy to examine the other 
possibilities as solutions for the unsatisfactory existing law. Therefore can the 
enforcement all stipulated damages clause without any judicial intervention be the 
solution or the non-enforcement of all these clauses is the best treatment for the current 
law rules of penalties? In other words, the effectiveness of the New Approach will now 
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be shown in exploring the two possibilities of preventing the contracting parties of 
agreeing on damages in advance and leave the matter to the court or allowing them to do 
so and enforcing all agreed damages without court intervention. 
3.1 Enforcement of all stipulated damages clauses 
This approach seeks to enforce all agreed damages clause without any intervention by the 
courts. Where parties to a contract agree in advance that a certain sum of money is to be 
payable in the event of breach and the defaulting party does not perform his obligations 
he is obliged to pay the agreed amount to the injured party without any court intervention. 
Under this approach if there is to be any such intervention it is only to uphold the clause 
and binding the defaulting party to pay what he has agreed upon even if it is manifestly 
excessive. The benefits to the parties of this approach of avoiding the judicial process of 
determining the damages is self-evident via saving time and money. It also allows the 
parties to correct what the parties perceive to be inadequate judicial remedies by agreeing 
upon a rule which may include losses that too remote to be recovered under unliquidated 
damages action. The essence of this approach is the application of freedom of contract by 
leaving the parties to their own devices. However does such an approach achieve justice 
between the parties? Unfortunately enforcing all agreed damages clause will not 
sometimes result in achieving justice between the contracting parties. 
This is because firstly, the contracting parties will often not have the same bargaining 
power, which can result in the imposition of a great sum of money by the stronger party 
to be payable in the event of non-performance by the weaker party. This is a particular 
problem where the stronger party has the economic advantages of controlling the 
contracting process such as having adequate information, monopolising supplies of the 
subject matter of the contract or using a pre-drafted contract to make any deal with 
others628• Consequently it would be unjust to apply the absolute doctrine of freedom of 
contract to this a situation for the weaker party will hav~ no choice under the pressure of 
circumstances, but to accept the proposal extended by the stronger one with all its terms 
628 Very often the weaker party is forced to accept and also cannot go elsewhere so long as such contracts 
may be common to all contractors (stronger party) within a particular industrial activity. 
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and consequences. In such circumstances it would be preferable to pursue the policy of 
upholding what the parties have agreed upon, accompanied with the policy of judicial 
interference with agreed damages clauses on the grounds of unfairness. This is because it 
is not always reasonable to treat the agreement of the parties as a conclusive and 
definitive decision. There is nothing in freedom of contract doctrine that requires one 
party to accept without question the validity of agreed damages clause sirriply because it 
is agreed upon by contracting parties. This is in spite of whether they are consumers or 
even commercial organizations629• 
Secondly even where the parties enjoy an equality of bargaining strength they could still 
face burdensome costs as the advantages of agreeing on damages are, to some extent, 
exaggerated. The saving of money and time of the court and parties is unconvincing as it 
ignores the transaction costs of negotiating the clause as well as any response to it; eg 
force majeur exculpatory provisions to protect the promisot30. As a result it should be 
noted that the enforcement of all clauses, for which stipulated damages are clearly much 
higher than actual damages may increase overall costs of economic actions. An important 
cost of these clauses results from wasteful activities such as breach inducement and 
activities to prevent breach inducement. Their enforcement will lead to contracting 
parties paying out extra resources to attain information about probable consequences and 
about possible actions of the other party631. In other words, an injured party will always 
resort to breach-inducing activity whenever he sees632 the performance is less valuable for 
him than breach. He interferes to make performance difficult for the defaulting party 
whenever he would benefit from non-performance. This leads to not only unjust 
consequences but also gives more advantages to the stronger party in controlling 
contractual relations and unjustly enriching him at others' expense. Therefore, the 
6~9 See for the idea of freedom of contract, Atiyah, P. S. "Freedom of Contract and the New Right". In 
Essays on Contract. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1986. P 355, at 362-363. 
630 Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 507. 
631 Clarkson, Kenneth and others. "Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense? Wisconsin Law 
Review. [1978] 351, at 374 and 378. Rubin, Paul H. "Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and 
Specific Performance". The Journal of Legal Studies. (1981) Vol. X 237, at 242. 
632 The injured party might know that the actual losses will be less than the stipulated sum at the time of 
making the contract or during the performance according to circumstances change which may make the 
sum stipulated more than the actual damage. 
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defaulting party will be forced to spend money and time monitoring the behaviour of the 
injured party in order to stop his interference to deter performance. 
It would seem fair to conclude that this possibility of upholding all agree damages clause 
consolidates in a limited sense the doctrine of freedom of contract. However, enforcing 
all what the parties have agreed upon unconditionally633 is significantly flawed for the 
above reasons. However is the non-enforceability of all stipulated damages clause 
preferable? 
3.2 Non-enforcement of all stipulated damages clauses 
Under this policy the courts should reject the enforcement of all stipulated damages 
clauses blindly without carefully scrutinizing them. All the disadvantages of enforcing all 
these clauses are avoided by adopting this approach. It means there is no place for 
breach-inducing actions as the injured party knows that' such clauses will not be 
enforceable, and also there will be no litigation over the enforceability of agreed damages 
clause. Moreover the court does not have to inquire whether the sum stipulated is valid 
liquidated damages clause or invalid penalty clause. However this approach leaves the 
process of determining the compensation completely in the hands of the courts which is 
financially costly, takes a long time and may undercompensate the injured party. 
Consequently this has its effect on both contracting parties and on society. Effects include 
reducing many economic activities since the agreed damages clauses will no longer be 
used where losses are costly to prove or can not be proved. This means the absence of 
stipulated damages clause will have detrimental effects in cases where losses sustained as 
a result of breach are very difficult or complex to be estimated634• 
As demonstrated via the possibility of the enforcement of all agreed damages clauses for 
which the freedom of contract is the basis, absolute freedom has some disadvantages. 
633 It means the application of absolute freedom of contract, i.e. without any judicial intervention to keep 
justice between the parties. 
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However the current approach ignores this principle at all by not paying any regard to the 
latitude of the parties to agree on their tenns in the contract. 
Therefore it may be concluded that the above two approaches, i.e enforcing all or non 
enforcing all agreed damages clause are considered less attractive than the New 
Approach. In other words, the New Approach that suggested in this work stands as the 
more preferable one to deal with penalty clauses. Accordingly it is apparent that the 
enforcement of agreed penalty clause, subject to reduction, is to be the straightforward 
_ and clear solution, as it will increase certainty and govern the matter of agreed damages 
clause on the real fact that occurs and not on guessing. The New Approach avoids 
uncertainty when the matter is left to the court to decide and avoid times and costs of 
judicial process63S • However it should be emphasized that the court's power to reduce the 
agreed penalty is not unconditional power. Yet it would be preferable for the court to 
exercise its discretionary power in the case where the agreed sum is manifestly 
disproportionate to actualloss636. 
3.3 When can tbe court exercise its power of reduction? 
3.3.1 Wbere tbe agreed penalty is manifestly disproportionate to the actualloss637 
This situation presumes that the defaulting party has not perfonned his obligation at all or 
has delayed in perfonnance. According to the New Approach the court should enforce the 
penalty agreed upon in favor of the injured party as the penalty clause was included in 
contract to compensate him for his loss because of non-perfonnance. However, where the 
agreed penalty is manifestly disproportionate to the actual loss suffered it should be 
regarded as a proper justification for the court to reduce the amount to be in line with the 
damage that is actually inflicted on the injured party638. The exaggeration in assessing the 
634 Clarkson, Kenneth and others. "Liquidated Damages v. Penalties: Sense or Nonsense?" Wisconsin Law 
. Review. [1978] 351, at 374 and 378. Rubin, Paul H. "Unenforceable Contracts: Penalty Clauses and 
Specific Perfonnance". The Journal of Legal Studies. (1981) Vol. x. p 237, at 374. 
63S See for the advantages of the New Approach see supra P. 29. 
636 The same test for the invalidity of penalty clauses under the existing law, but under the New Approach 
the sum stipulated would be compared with the actual loss. 
637 This circumstance should be read with the part that explaining in details the test for the invalidity of 
penalty clause in the existing Law. Therefore what has been showed there should be repeated in this place. 
The only difference that the sum stipulated should be compared with actual loss. Supra P. 54. 
638 Supra P .28 to find out what the actual loss might include under the New Approach. 
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amount of penalty to be manifestly disproportionate will make the clause function a task 
other than compensating the injured party for his losses. It will make its purpose 
threatening and pressurizing towards the defaulting party to perform or make it a 
punishment imposed by the injured party on his debtor in the event of non-performance. 
Therefore it would deem commensurate with justice principles to restore the balance to 
the contract in giving the court the power to lift the unfairness concerned by reducing the 
penalty amount to be proportionate to the actual loss sustained. This is because in binding 
the defaulting party to pay a manifestly large sum has the meaning of enriching the 
injured party at the expense of his debtor which justice and equity rules refuse to accept. 
It should be emphasised that though the penalty is manifestly disproportionate to actual 
loss, the court cannot exercise its discretionary authority of reduction by its own motion. 
Rather the defaulting party should expressly demand the reduction. 
The agreed sum might become manifestly disproportionate to the loss sustained for 
different reasons. The exaggeration in assessing the damages in advance might result 
from domination. It might originate from social or economic domination of one of the 
parties thereby enabling him to impose a manifestly disproportionate agreed penalty by 
way of damages. The outcome of this is that the particular stipulated sum is not the result 
of a bargain between the two contracting parties, but it is usually inserted in the contract 
without the consent of the promisor. In this situation, there is, of course, no real 
agreement between the parties concerning penalty clause, which is, in reality, the result of 
monopoly environment. Therefore the agreed penalty is regarded as arbitrary one set high 
without a genuine consent of the promisor and without relation to the actual damages639• 
This is particularly prevalent in adhesion contracts where the stronger party always 
inserts a penalty clause with a disproportionate sum and the other party finds himself 
compelled to accept this situation, as he has no choice but to do so. Therefore the clause 
in this form works as an effective method of pressure to force the promisor to fulfill his 
obligation. 
639 Hatzis, Aristides. "Having the Cake and Eating it Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil 
Contract Law". International Review of Law and Economics. (2003) 22 381, at 393. 
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On the other hand the amount in a penalty clause might reflect the true agreement on 
damages between the parties at the time of contracting. This is the case when the parties 
at the time of making the contract attempt to detennine as fairly as possible the 
compensation that the injured party will collect as a result of non-perfonnance. As is 
always pointed out, the parties resort to such an agreement of compensation in advance in 
order to avoid the judicial process and the difficulties surrounding it. However their 
agreement on damages in advance is still arbitrary when it is very difficult for them to 
pre-estimate the loss that might be suffered on breach. This results in the agreed damages 
clause to operate in favour of either party. Consequently, and due to subsequent and 
unexpected circumstances, the agreed damages might become more than the actual loss 
sustained. In this situation the clause works to the injured party's interest and its effect to 
put pressure and intimidate the defaulting party is considered as unexpected, unintended. 
This is illustrated in lease contracts containing a penalty clause of paying a rent of 4 
months in the event that the lessee tenninates the contract before the end of its period. 
Initially such an arbitrary pre-estimation of damages cannot be regarded as grossly 
disproportionate to the loss sustained as the lessee can move-out of the property at any 
time. This is because when he decides to tenninate the contract suddenly the lessor will 
start desperately looking for a new tenant whom the lessor may not find and thus cause 
him a loss in proportion to the agreed penalty or more. However the situation is different 
if the lessor finds a new tenant shortly after the lessee rescinds the tenancy agreement 
making the damage in this situation ridiculous in comparison with the agreed damages. 
Thereby the agreed penalty in this situation is clearly manifestly disproportionate to the 
loss sustained by the lessor. Therefore in this situation the role of the court comes to 
remove such sort ofunfaimess and restore the balance of contract by reducing the amount 
of penalty. 
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Chapter Five: Can more than penalty be claimed? 
0- Introduction 
Where an agreed sum is struck down as a penalty, the injured party can always recover 
his actual loss when it is less than the penalty. However, the mechanical application of 
the tests neatly put forward by Lord Dunedin in Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New 
Garage & Motor Co Ltcf40 might result in a penal sum turning out to be less than the 
actual loss sustained. This paradoxical situation can arise either where a single lump sum 
is made payable on the occurrence of one or more or all of several events of varying 
importance or in circumstances where the conditions at the time of making the contract 
are different from those at the time of breach. 
In the ordinary course the question of whether or not the sum stipulated is a genuine pre-
estimate of damages arises when the sum fixed is grossly more than actual loss suffered 
as a result of breach. However, in the case in question the sum is conceived to be smaller 
than the actual loss sustained on breach. This leads to the question of: In the normal case 
relief against penalty is given to the defaulting party, but in this situation can this sum be 
dealt with as a penalty against the injured party and thus grant him a relief? Can the 
injured party ignore the penalty or liquidated damages and sue to recover the actual loss 
sustained? These issues will be now examined in two sections firstly by tackling the case 
where the sum stipulated is liquidated damages and secondly where it is a penalty set at 
less than actual loss. 
1- Liquidated damages set at less than actual loss 
In this situation the stipulated sum is, at the time of contracting, a genuine pre-estimate of 
the probable actual loss which may be suffered as a result of breach. However, due to 
some circumstances the loss sustained turns out to exceed the sum fixed by the parties to 
a contract. For example parties to contract might have stipulated for £1000 to be paid in 
640 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltdy. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 86-87. 
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the event of breach but the actual loss might have turned out to be £4000. Therefore can 
the stipulated sum be regarded as a limitation clause? 
1.1 Distinction between a liquidated damages clause and a limitation clause 
A small agreed sum of this kind is akin to a clause limiting the extent in damages of a 
party's liability 641 . However, there are still some differences between a liquidated 
damages clause and a limitation clause. The latter is quoted in the agreement to protect 
only the defendant from increasing his liability 642 , i.e. it limits the liability of the 
defendant643. Also in the limitation clause "the liability for damages is limited by a clause 
then the person seeking to claim damages must prove them at least up to the limit laid 
down by the clause,,644. In other words, limitation clause specifies that damages should be 
limited to the maximum figure and the claimant must prove his actual loss. This figure 
can be exceeded under no circumstances. As a result the other party (defendant) can 
refuse to pay beyond the fixed sum. On the other hand, agreed damages clause is said to 
benefit both parties, "The party establishing breach by the other needs prove no damages 
in fact, the other must pay that no less no more,,645. Hence, if the sum is a genuine pre-
estimate of likely loss the injured party can recover the whole amount even though there 
is no loss suffered. 
It should be emphasised that the question of whether a clause inserted in the contract is a 
limitation clause or an agreed damages clause (either a valid liquidated damages or 
invalid penalty) is a question of construction. The court should determine its nature by 
examining all events and circumstances surrounding the contracting process646. In Suisse 
Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale647 , The 
641 For details see Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman, 2001. P 517-
518. McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17t1t ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 460. 
642 Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 
361 ,at 420 Per Lord UpJohn. 
643 Ibid. At 421 Per Lord UpJohn 
644 Ibid. 
645 Ibid. At 420 per Lord UpJohn. Cellulose Acetate Silk Co Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (/925) Ltd [1933] AC 
20, at 25 per Lord Atkin. 
646 Ogus, A.1. "The Law of Damages". Butterworths. 1973. P 51. 
641 Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361 
177 
House of Lords unanimously interpreted a demurrage clause 648 in the contract as a 
liquidated damages clause. What assisted the house to reach its verdict, other than the 
clause being so as a matter of commercial practice, the construction of this clause. A 
demurrage clause constitutes the exact amount payable so that no more no less than its 
amount may be awarded. Besides it is capable of benefiting both parties in the contract 
and that this is, as said in the Suisse case, one of distinguishing points between liquidated 
damages and limitation clause. A demurrage clause benefits the shipowner when there 
might be a delay of few days in uploading the cargo in which case the owner might lose 
nothing, as he could not have arranged employment for it or the freight might have 
dropped to be less than demurrage. On the other hand it will benefit the charterer where 
the lost freight for the owner will be in excess of the amount which he will receive under 
the demurrage clause649• Lord Wilberforce reasoned their verdict when declared that: 
"The form of clause is of course not decisive, nor is there any rule of law which 
requires that demurrage clauses should be construed a clauses of liquidated 
damages, but the fact that the clause is expressed as one agreeing a figure, and not 
as imposing a limit; and .. .I reach the conclusion that the owners are clearl~ bound 
by it and can recover no more than the appropriate amount of demurrage" 50 
However, what is the effect a liquidated damages clause? 
1.2 No less no more can be claimed 
Where the court holds the stipulated sum as liquidated damages the law is clear as to the 
recovery of this sum. The injured party should be granted the entire amount, no more no 
less. In Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltcf51 a contract for the 
delivery and erection of an acetone recovery plant, provided that if the work was not 
completed within a certain time, the contractors should pay to the purchasers, by way of 
penalty, a sum of £20 for every week that they were in default. The contractors were 30 
weeks late in completing the work and in an action by them for the contract price, the 
648 A demurrage clause is sum of money agreed by the charterer to be paid as liquidated damages for delay 
beyond a stipulated or reasonable time for loading or unloading. Supra. P 31. See also Halson, Roger, 
Bradgate, Robert and others. 'The Law of Contract' . 2nd ed. Butterworth. 2003. P 1499. 
649 Ibid. At 436 where the shipowner claimed that his lost freight would be £900,000 and the amount due 
under demurrage clause was £ 150,000. 
650 Ibid. At 436-437 per Lord Wilberforce. See also Lord UpJohn at 421, who stated there that" the 
demurrage clause with which we are concerned is a clause providing for agreed damages and is different 
from a clause excluding or limiting liability for damages by breach of contract by one party". 
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purchasers contended that their actual loss was £5,850. The Court of Appeal upheld their 
contention. However the contractors took the case before the House of Lords and argued 
that they were only liable for £600 damages. On this stage it was held that the clause was 
not a penalty and the purchasers were only able to recover £600 and no more. The parties 
should have known that the actual loss would exceed £20 a week652 • One might say that 
the clause seems to resemble a limitation clause. However the clause was by no means a 
pure limitation clause. Lord Atkin stated that" I entertain no doubt that what the parties 
meant was that in the event of delay the damages and the only damages were to be £20 a 
week no less and no more653". Therefore the clause was a valid liquidated damages clause 
and the purchasers were entitled to nothing more than the sum stipulated654• 
Thus where the actual loss exceeds agreed damages, the claimant is confined to the 
stipulated amount655 • It follows from this that in such a situation the claimant is not 
entitled to claim unliquidated damages besides liquidated damages to increase his 
compensation. Nor is he entitled to ignore the liquidated damages clause and sue only for 
unliquidated damages. However, what will be the position if the sum stipulated is held as 
a penalty? 
2- How does the law stand for penalty set at less than the actual loss? 
2.1 When this situation arises? 
The main characteristic of the penalty clause is that the actual loss suffered is to be less 
than the sum stipulated in the contract. The test that governs this case is that the sum 
stipulated must be extravagant and unconscionable in comparison with the greatest loss 
which could be suffered as a result of breach at the time of making the contract656 • 
65 I Ce/lulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd [1933] AC 20. 
652 Ibid. At 25-26 where Lord Atkin stated, " I think it must have been obvious to both parties that the 
actual damages would be much more than £20 a week but it was intended to go towards the damage, and it 
was all that the sellers were prepared to pay" 
653 Ibid. At 25 per Lord Atkin. 
654 This fact was supported by Lord UpJohn in Suisse Atlantique Societe D 'Armement Maritime v. N. V 
Rotterdamsche Kolen Centrale [1967] AC 361. He stated there that "In my opinion the demurrage clause is 
a clause which the contract being affirmed, remains an agreed damages clause for the benefit of both 
rarties and it is not a clause of exception or limitation .. " 
55 To this effect see Diestal v. Stervenson [1906] 2 KB 345. Also Talley v. Wolsey-Neech (1978) 38 P & 
CR4S. 
656 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd. [1915] AC 79, at 87 per Lord Dunedin. 
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Therefore the penalty is held unenforceable and the injured party is limited to only 
recovering his actual loss, which is never more than the penal sum657. This has been 
clearly affirmed in the leading case658 by Lord Parmoor who frankly pointed out that 
where a sum is: 
" .. .inserted as a punishment on the defaulter irrespective of the amount of any 
loss which could at the time have been in contemplation of the parties, then such 
sum is a penalty, and the defaulter is only liable in respect of damages which can 
be proved against him,,659. 
However, in some circumstances the loss sustained as a result of breach might exceed the 
penalty. In other words, the clause may become a penalty though the agreed damages fall 
short of the injured party's loss. The possibility is not as remote as it might seem and it 
may apparently arise in two instances. It occurs when a single lump sum stipulated is held 
to constitute a penalty because it is provided for to be payable in event of any breach, 
regardless of whether it is serious or trifle. The claimant's actual loss may have resulted 
from the breach of the most important obligation66o. It may also arise in the event that the 
conditions at the time of contracting are different from that at the time of breach661 . This 
situation supposes that parties to a contract agree at the time of making the contract on a 
manifestly large sum of money, however due to changing conditions such an originally 
extravagant sum become inadequate, i.e. less than actual loss662. For inst~ce suppose 
that X agreed to erect a building for Y. They provided in the contract that in the event of 
breach liquidated damages of £ 1500 per week. The market rate at the time of making the 
contract for comparative project is £500 per week. It seems that the amount of agreed 
damages is penalty. Assume that X commits a breach of contract, and that when this 
breach occurs, due to political and economic circumstances, the market rate becomes 
657 Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 KB 66, at 72-73 per Bailhache J who stated there that: 
"the result of suing for the penalty is therefore that the plaintiff recovers proved damages, but never more 
than the penal sum fixed ... one easily sees why in Charterparty cases no one sues on the penalty now. You 
cannot under it recover more than the proved damages, and if the proved damages exceed the penal sum 
you are restricted to the lower amount". 
658 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd. [1915] AC 79. 
659 Ibid. At 100-101 per Lord Parmoor. 
660 Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co [1886] 11 AC 332 per Lord Waston, cited in Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd. [1915] AC 79. 
661 As the injured party has domination at the time of negotiation he imposes an extravagant agreed 
damages, however it turns out to be less than his actual loss due to change in circumstances. 
662 Treitel, S.O. "The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1003. 
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£3000 per week. This is to say that the injured party's actual loss exceeds the amount of 
damages agreed upon in the contract. Therefore, should the injured party be limited to 
damages up to the sum stipulated or be allowed to ignore the penalty and sue for his 
actual loss? 
2:2 The current position: Ignoring penalty and suing for actual loss 
The situation in which the penal sum might be less than the actual loss is well illustrated 
in charterparty cases. The reason for this is that such kind of transactions has long 
included a clause to the general effect that the penalty for any breach of its provision, 
grave or trifle, is to be the amount of freight663• This clause in a number of cases664, in the 
event that the actual loss exceeds the amount of freight, was held to be penalty and may 
be ignored. The issue that was an object of debate in these cases is the variation of words 
of the agreed damages clause in the charterparties. The common form of this clause was 
"Penalty for non-performance of this agreement estimated amount of freight". This clause 
was treated as a penalty even before establishing the rule against penalties as it covers all 
breaches of various importances by either party. Subsequently the clause changed to run 
as follows "Penalty for non-performance of this agreement proved damages not 
exceeding estimated amount of freight". Such variation by adding new words to the 
clause posed the question: did this addition make the clause into a sort of limitation 
clause? 
In Wall v Rederiakiebolaget Luggude 665 the law in this area was cleared. The case 
confirms that a clause limiting the damages to the amount of freight cannot be reasonably 
regarded as a provision determining the damages the charterer may recover as a result of 
shipowner's breach. There should be a clear vision and knowledge that what the charterer 
will suffer is not a loss of freight. It is readily foreseeable that the loss will exceed the 
663See Chitty on Contracts. 29 th ed. Vol. 1 General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1498 where it has 
been said that it is unsettled whether the principle of ignoring the penalty and suing for the actual loss when 
it exceeds penalty in charterparties could be applied of the other types of contracts. See also McGregor, 
Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 445. Furst, Stephen and Ramsey, 
Vivian. "Keating on Building Contracts". 7th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 2001. P 288. Hudson. "Penalties 
Limiting Damages". Law Quarterly Review. [1975] 25. 
664 Sotrms Bruks Aktie Bolag v. Hutchison [1905] AC 515. Wall v Rederiaktiebolget Luggude [1915] 3 KB 
66. Watts, Watts and Co Ltd v. Mitsui and Co Ltd [1917] AC 227. 
665 Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 KB 66. 
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estimated amount of freight. Losses of profits or uses of the commodities for the purpose 
of his business are expected losses666. Therefore, the Wall case confirms that the variation 
on the clause didn't alter the nature of it. It was still a penalty and not a limitation of 
liability or liquidated damages. The effect of this was to give the claimant the right to 
disregard penalty and recover his actual loss even though it exceeded the estimated 
amount of freight. It should be noted that the new clause "is nothing more than the 
common form writ large,,667. In his reasoning of holding the clause as a penalty Bailhache 
J added that: 
"I should require the strongest arguments to induce me to hold that a clause so 
like the common and undoubted penalty clause has been transformed by the 
addition of few words into a limitation of liability clause, to which in form it bears 
no resemblance .. .1 would never strike (businessmen) that a clause beginning in 
that way was a limitation of liability clause,,668 
The English law position boils down that the injured party may ignore penalty and claim 
his full damages. The position in Jordanian civil law seems to be the same. Jordanian law 
gives the court in such a situation an authority to ignore the agreed penalty and increase 
the amount to what compensates the injured party for its actual loss. The court has, in this 
situation, unconditional power. The law empowers the court to increase in all cases669. As 
a result of this there is no need for the injured party to show that the sum stipulated is 
manifestly low to claim the increase of it. The court may increase a penal sum merely 
because it is less than the actual loss sustained by the injured party670. 
This approach is criticized671 on the grounds that it has adopted the extreme position of 
Islamic jurisprudence. Therefore for this case per see, where penalty is less than actual 
loss, a new suggestion will be tentatively proposed to apply to both English and 
666 Ibid. At 69. 
667 Ibid. At 74 per Lord Bailhache. 
668 Ibid. 
669 It should be noted that until the moment of doing this research it has been found no case in which the 
court exercised its discretionary power to increase the penal sum. 
670 Article 364/2 of civil law. 
671 The analysis and the criticism of this approach, which has been examined in the situation where the 
penalty is more than the loss suffered, may be fulIy repeated here. Supra. P 156. 
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Jordanian law. This suggestion will be underneath showed672 after analysing the position 
of English case law? 
2.2.1 Analysis of the law after Wall case 
2.2.1.1 Penalty clause must be unenforceable for all cases 
According to the Wall case673 it has been concluded that the penalty is penalty in all cases 
and the clause that is unenforceable because it is a penalty must necessarily be 
unenforceable for all purposes. This approach asserts that a penalty clause cannot be dead 
for one purpose when it is struck out of the contract and alive for another when it 
operates as a "cap". In other words, it is a penalty if as to one breach it is greater than the 
probable loss, and it is immaterial that, in the events that happen, another breach occurs 
encompassing an actual loss greater than the sum stipulated674• This view is consistent 
with the legal principle that invalidity of penalty clause should be determined by 
reference to the time at which the contract is made, i.e. it is unenforceable ab initio67S• 
Under this principle, if an agreed damages clause was originally struck out as a penalty in 
view of the circumstances at the time of contracting, it could not become valid as a 
limitation simply because of the change of circumstances. Since penalty clause is void 
and unenforceable from the outset, it does not function as an upper limit to the sum 
stipulated. As a result the claimant can ignore penalty and sue for his actual damages. 
However this view favours the party who stipulate for a penalty over the one who inserts 
a liquidated damages clause in the contract. 
2:2.1.2 The current English case law is unsatisfactory 
The situation in question leads to bizarre and different consequences from the ordinary 
course of the operation of penalty clause. The defaulting party, who is supposed to be 
penalised by the clause, benefits from it and seeks to uphold. And the injured party who 
672 When approaching the Effect of New Approach. Infra. P. 187. 
673 Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 KB 66. 
674 Furmston, MP. "Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract". 15 th ed. Butterworths 2001. P689. 
Treitel, Sir general. "The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1003. Jacobs, Sydney. 
"Damages in a Commercial Context". LBC Information Services. 2000. P 263. Brown, Nicholas. 
"Liquidated Damages: Is One Man's Floor Another Man's Ceiling?" Construction Law Journal. (2001) 
17(4) 302, at 304. 
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is supposed to benefit from seeks to ignore it and claim his full damages. Therefore, the 
view (ignoring the penalty and suing for the actual damages) which, has been decided in 
Wall case676 (with respect) should not be preferred because the view expressed in this 
case is contrary to principle and productive of injustice. One might argue that the penalty 
clause when it is struck out of the contract becomes as though it was never formed part 
therein, and thus it should be unenforceable and of no effect for all purposes. In response, 
it should be noted that in restricting the damages recoverable up to the penalty, the law 
can avoid the absurdity and paradoxical element that arises from preferring the party who 
intentionally inserts a penalty over the one who inserts a genuine pre-estimate of loss677. 
This situation is illustrated when one of the parties to a contract works in compliance 
with the legal rules and acts accordingly. He includes in his contract a liquidated damages 
clause at the time of making the contract, however subsequently its actual loss exceeds 
the agreed sum. In this instance the injured party may, under the existing law, recover his 
damages up to the sum stipulated, no more no less. In contrast if one party stipulates a 
penalty he can benefit from such provision twice. Firstly in terrifying the other party to 
force performance and on the other by ignoring penalty when it works against his 
advantage, i.e. when the actual loss sustained turns out to be more than sum fixed678. 
Furthermore, it can also be argued against the view of ignoring penalties and claiming for 
actual loss that basically the unenforceability of penalty clauses is a rare departure from 
the freedom of contract and is designed to prevent unfairness to the defendant. Therefore, 
where there is no such unfairness, there is no justification for holding penalties invalid679. 
675. Treitel, G. H. "The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1003. Beatson. J. "Anson's 
Law of Contract". 28th ed. Oxford University Press. 2002. P 630. 
676 Wall v. Rederiaktiebolaget Luggude [1915] 3 KB 66. 
677 Hudson, AH. "Penalties Limiting Damages". Law Quarterly Review. [1974] 31. Hudson, AH. "Penalties 
Limiting Damages". Law Quarterly Review. [1985] 480. Burton. "Penalties and Damages". Law Quarterly 
Review (1976) 92 20, at 25-26. 
678 See The Law Commission. Working Paper No 61 "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". 
London. Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 1975. P 35. The Commission remarks that "striking down the 
clause because it appeared to penalize the party in breach at the earlier time will be to his disadvantage at 
the later time because instead of only having to pay the agreed sum he will be liable for the full amount of 
damages suffered by the party who sought to impose the invalid penalty". 
679 Burrows, Andrew. "Remedies for Tort and Breach of Contract". 2nd ed. Butterworths. 1994. P 327. 
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Hence, the idea of giving the claimant a right to sue for his damages limited up to the 
amount of penalty seems more persuasive680. There are many dicta this proposition. In 
Wi/beam v. Ashton681 there was an agreement in which the defendant contracted to serve 
as a dresser of Spanish leather for four years under a penalty of £50. Lord Ellenborough 
affirmed that the penalty constitutes the upper amount that the injured party can sue for 
by stating: "the legal construction of such an agreement is this: beyond the penalty you 
shall not go; within it, you are to give the party any compensation which he can prove 
himself entitled to,,682. In addition there is the dictum of Lord Dunedin in Commissioner 
of Public Works v. Hills683• In this case the contract included a provision to the effect that 
if the contractor failed to complete the construction of a railway within the time agreed 
upon, he would pay a certain sum of money as liquidated damages. However, when the 
contractor failed to perform its obligation the Privy Council held that the government was 
not entitled to the sum fixed as it was not a genuine pre-estimate of loss suffered. Then, 
the Council gave the Government the right to sue for the damages however to: "prove 
such damages not exceeding the sums in the penalties, as they can make.out,,684 
In reality this approach accords also with the most effective and important decision of the 
Canadian Case of Elsley v. JG Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd 685 • This case was 
concerned with an employment agreement in which the employee undertook not to 
compete with his employer. It was provided that if the employee breached the agreement 
he would be liable to pay $1000 as liquidated damages. The default having been made, an 
action brought before the Supreme Court of Canada, which held that the sum was not a 
680 Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 517. Burrows, 
Andrew. "Remedies for Tort and Breach of Contract". 2nd ed. Butterworths 1994. P 328. Hudson, AH. 
"Penalties Limiting Damages". Law Quarterly Review. [1974] 31. Hudson, AH. "Penalties Limiting 
Damages". Law Quarterly Review. [1985] 480. See also Burton. "Penalties and Damages". Law Quarterly 
Review (1976) 92 20, at 25-26. 
681 (1807) 1 Camp 78. 
682 See also in Elphinstone v. Monkland Iron & Coal Co [1886] 11 AC 332, at 346 where Lord Fitzgerald 
stated that: "The penalty is to cover all the damages actually sustained but it does not estimate them, and 
the amount of loss (not, however, exceeding the penalty) is to be ascertained in the ordinary way". Also In 
Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd [1933] AC 20, at 26. Lord Atkin left: "open 
the question whether, where a penalty is plainly less in amount than the prospective damages, there is any 
ler,al objection to suing on it, or in a suitable case ignoring it and suing for damages". 
68 Commissioner of Public Workers v. Hill [1906] AC 368. 
684 Ibid. At 376 per Lord Dunedin 
685 Elsley v. JG Collins Insurance Agencies Ltd (1978) 83 DLR (3ed) 1. 
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genuine pre-estimate of likely actual loss and so was an unenforceable penalty. The 
question of whether the penal sum, which is smaller than the actual loss suffered, 
constitutes a ceiling, beyond which the injured party cannot have damages for his loss, 
was raised before the court. In delivering the judgment of the court, Dickson J pointed 
out that, where the penal sum is smaller than the actual loss sustained, there were 
authorities in which it was held that the injured party could ignore the penalty and sue for 
actual damages even though it exceeded the penalty. His Honour commented that: "To 
that extent, the proposition appears to me to be contrary to principle and productive of 
injustice,,686. He went on to express his view of applauding the proposition of considering 
the penalty as 'cap' by stating that: 
"If the actual loss turns out to exceed the penalty, the normal rules of enforcement 
of contract should apply to allow the recovery of only the agreed sum. The party 
imposing the penalty should not be able to obtain the benefit of whatever 
intimidating force the penalty clause may have in inducing performance, and then 
ignore the clause when it turns out to be to his advantage to do so. A penalty 
should function as a limitation on the damages recoverable, while still being 
ineffective to increase damages above the actual loss sustained when such loss is 
less than the stipulated amount,,687 
Therefore the justice principle calls for giving the same effect to penalty clause and 
liquidated damages clause688 when actual loss turns out to be more than stipulated sum in 
contract. In other words a penalty clause would operate as an upper limit upon the 
damages recoverable by the injured party, i.e within the penalty, no more no less. This 
approach has paved the way for tentatively suggesting the New Approach. In other words, 
application of the notion of the New Approach as suggested in this work, i.e the literal 
enforcement of agreed penalty in granting the injured party the amount of penalty no 
more. However in one case, i.e. a narrowly restricted circumstance, the court is to have 
the authority to increase the agreed penalty where its amount is too low to be a just 
compensation provided that there is an inequality of bargaining power. 
686 Ibid. At 9. 
687 Ibid. At 15. 
688 The liquidated damages clause fixes the maximum amount recoverab Ie. Supra. P 171. 
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2:3 Effect of New Approach: Power to increase in a narrowly restricted case 
It should be mainly pointed out that this case, where agreed penalty clause is less than the 
damages that could be recovered in an unliquidated damages action, is a rare possibility 
in the area of penalty clause. Under the New Approach the court should still award the 
agreed penalty to injured party. However where the amount is manifestly derisory, 
subject to the underneath points, the court may augment the agreed penalty but 
nevertheless less than actual loss689. The fact that the agreed penalty is merely less than 
the injured party's actual loss will not excite the court to award more than the penalty. 
The power given to court should be very limited. This is because the party imposing 
agreed penalty should not be able to obtain the benefit of whatever intimidating force a 
manifestly disproportionate penalty clause may have, and then give him the right to claim 
the increase of its amoun.t when it turns out to be to his advantage to do so. Therefore the 
court, when exercising its power to increase the agreed penalty, should take into account 
the following: 
1-The court should not be too adroit to conclude whether or not the stipulated sum is 
manifestly derisory to actual loss, to exercise its power of increasing. The parties' 
freedom to settle for themselves the rights and liabilities on breach should be protected in 
such a case. Therefore the derisory character should be clear. The character of the agreed 
penalty being manifestly derisory should be immediately obvious to anyone considering 
it. 
2-The court should consider the amount at stake and the subject matter of contract. It is 
impossible to lay down any abstract rule as to what mayor may not be derisory agreed 
penalty to insist upon without reference to the circumstances and particular fact of each 
case. However it is supposed it would be possible in the most ordinary case, where 
parties know what the loss will actually be suffered and what is agreed to be paid, to say 
whether the amount is manifestly derisory or not. For example, suppose that X agreed to 
erect a building for Y. Y's actual loss might be Million pounds. The contract stipulated 
689 The court may award the recoverable loss. or simply leave it to the discretion of the court or to its sense 
of what is equitable. 
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that a £1000 should be payable in the event of breach. It seems that from the particular 
facts, terms and surrounding circumstances the agreed damages appears to be manifest! y 
derisory and the court should intervene to award just compensation. But who can force a 
builder to accept such a loss penalty? In this situation the fact that the sum is manifestly 
derisory is inadequate to excite the courts' intervention. Therefore what should the court 
consider other than the amount of the clause? 
3-Considering the particular facts of the case and conduct of the parties: under the New 
Approach the general rule is that all agreed penalty clauses are enforceable. The court 
will therefore award no larger or smaller amount. As the promisee may misuse this 
principle when stipulating for a manifestly disproportionate sum it may also be misused 
by the promisor in stipulating for a manifestly derisory sum. This largely depends on 
which party has the greater bargaining power over the other. Accordingly as the promisor 
is given the right to recourse to the court to have the agreed penalty reduced, the 
promisee has the same right to be effectively protected as a victim of the inequality of 
bargaining power. Thus the first step, in order to depart from the presumption that the 
agreed penalty clause should be given effect and that no larger sum can be awarded, is to 
determine whether the contract has been individually negotiated. If it is not so then the 
court would look at the stipulated sum to see whether it is manifestly derisory to have the 
right to exercise its power of increase. In construction contracts, for instance, a clause 
might be included to provide for a minimum penaltl90 to be payable in the event of 
contractor's non-performance or delayed performance. Such a penalty clause results from 
the promisee having inferior bargaining power which should be protected against. 
However even in the case where there is an unequal bargaining power the court should 
still award the stipulated penalty if it is merely less than actual loss suffered. The criterion 
is the sum being manifestly derisory to the actual loss suffered. A hypothetical instance is 
given in point 2 above. As the extravagance is quite clear the court would find itself 
compelled to intervene in order to increase the stipulated sum. 
690 Because of the fact that the promisee has inferior bargaining position. 
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However penalty clause might be inserted in the contract after a fair negotiation between 
the parties. This is to say that in the presence of equal bargaining power it could be 
presumed at least that the parties have had the intention of agreeing to a low penalty, as 
they should have known that the actual loss would exceed their figure. Therefore it is 
generally reasonable to carry through the parties' intention. To reach this conclusion the 
court should consider the construction of the contract, its inherent circumstances and any 
other matter as it think fits to reach justice. The court may consider the following 
factors691 : the genesis of the clause and discussions related to it692 and whether a penalty 
clause was imposed upon a party with inferior bargaining position and whether the party, 
who seeks to ignore the clause and get his actual loss, appreciated the likely imposition of 
stipulated sum on breach, but nevertheless agreed to the clause because of some 
perceived benefits. This is illustrated not in a hypothetical instance but in the English 
case of Cellulose Acetate Silk Co Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925/93• In this case all agreed 
damages that the parties have agreed on were £600 and the actual loss suffered on breach 
was £5850. After examining all particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case 
from point of negotiation to making the contract694 the court reached the conclusion that 
what the parties meant was that in the event of delay the damages and the only damages 
payable to the injured party was £600. The parties should have known that the actual loss 
would exceed the amount agreed upon. On the basis of the foregoing discussion it would 
seem fair to conclude that the court will not also have, under the New Approach, a power 
to increase agreed sum in such situations. The court should not be astute to upset what the 
parties have agreed upon in order to preserve the weight and value of agreeing on 
damages in advance. This is especially the case where there is a contract negotiated at 
arm's length. The fairness inquiry should address itself to the fairness of the whole 
contract process from negotiation until the time of breach. 
691 See for these factors the case of Multiplex Constructions v. Abgarus Pty Ltd (1992) 33 NSWLR 504, at 
513. See also Jacobs, Sydney. "Damages in a Commercial Context". LBC Information Services. 2000. P 
261-262. 
692 It could be detected from the documents used at the time of negotiations. 
693Cellulose Acetate Silk Co. Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd [1933] AC 20. 
694 According to the documents provided by the parties. When the fact of the case at 21-24 is read through 
it can be discovered that the parties were negotiating at arm' length and reached the agreement on damages 
with full satisfaction of the parties. In other words, there was no pre-drafted contract imposing one parties' 
terms and the other had no choice but to accept them. 
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Chapter Six: Forfeiture of Money Already Paid (Deposit and Paid 
Instalmen ts )695 
O-Introduction 
In a liquidated damages clause parties to a contract agree in advance on the damages due 
to the injured party should a breach of contract occur. Such a provision without doubt 
runs the risk that the parties' original estimation will be held to be a penalty clause. 
Closely related to this rule are those, which govern the grant of relief against forfeiture of 
advance payment. Parties to a contract may agree that one party is to immediately pay a 
certain sum of money at the time of formation of the contract696 or to pay the price by 
instalments. The payee then might, in the event of the payer breaking the contract, refuse 
to return the money he has obtained in advance. 
In such a case what relief is there for the payer? It is established that where the payment 
is held to be a deposit it is generally irrecoverable by the party in breach. The forfeiture 
of such a payment might operate in a similar way to penalty clauses and be out of all 
proportion to the likely loss suffered. Therefore in the case of Workers Trust & Merchant 
695 The researcher is aware of the fact that the forfeiture clause might also go, in addition to the money 
already paid, to the forfeiture of the equitable interest of the subject matter. In brief, equity has jurisdiction 
to grant relief against forfeiture if the forfeiture clause was inserted to achieve a stated result other than the 
payment of money and this result could effectively be attained when the matter comes before the court. A 
nice consideration ofthis subject was provided in the leading case of Shiloh Spinners Ltd v Harding [1973] 
AC 691. See also Nutting v Baldwin [1995] 1 WLR 201, where Rattee J decided that the court had no 
jurisdiction to grant relief against the forfeiture clause because though the clause was inserted to secure a 
stated result, this result was not attainable when the matter came before the court. Though it has been 
mostly developed through them, the jurisdiction has not been confined to the cases of an interest of land but 
the court has "power to relieve against forfeiture under any conceivable lease of a chattel". See for this 
Barton Thompson and Co. Ltd v Stapling Co. [1966] 1 Ch. 499. Stars ide Properties Ltd v Mustapha [1974] 
All ER 567. BICC Pic v Burndy Corp [1985] 1 All ER 417. The exercise of this jurisdiction will depend on 
certain factors including the conduct of the parties, the nature and gravity of the breach and its relation to 
the value of the property which is to be forfeited. In the leading case of Shiloh Spinner the House of Lords 
decided that the case was not suitable for relief because of the respondent's clear and wilful breaches of 
covenant and his inability to make good the consequences of his breach. The form of relief that the court is 
entitled to grant will vary. Relief against forfeiture of property is normally provided in the form of 
declaring specific performance or granting the debtor, who is willing and able to perform, extra time to 
proceed with the contract. The court might, in exceptional cases where granting extra time is not possible, 
order a sale of the property subject to forfeiture with payment out ofthe proceeds (Jobson v Johnson [1989] 
1 WLR 1026). Further consideration of this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
696 It is generally cal1ed deposit. 
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Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments L((f97 the Privy Council limited the right of the payee for 
forfeiture of deposit up to 1 0% of the purchase price. This percentage is widely accepted 
as is likely to form a genuine pre-estimate of damages. However, is the 10% deposit a 
reasonable percentage for the vendor to forfeit in the event of default by the purchaser in 
a sale of land? 
Where the payment is held to be a part payment it is generally recoverable by the party in 
breach. However, what will be the position if parties to a contract provided in their 
agreement that in the event of failure to pay anyone of the instalments, those already 
paid by the purchaser would be forfeited in favor of the vendor? In such cases is it 
appropriate to apply penalty clause jurisdiction to those payments already paid? 
The purpose of this chapter is to scrutinise the position of the law regarding forfeiture of 
money already paid and the possibility of application of penalty rules to them. Therefore 
the following issues will now be considered: 
1- What is advance payment 
2- Distinction between forfeiture clauses and penalty clauses 
3- Forfeiture of instalments already paid 
4- Forfeiture of deposits 
I-What is advance payment? 
Advance payment is payment of a sum of money paid beforehand by the payer to the 
other party under the contract. Such payment might be paid as a deposit thereby acting as 
a guarantee for performance or as a part payment on account. The recoverability of the 
advance payment depends upon the purpose for which it is required698• The deposit is 
regarded as a guarantee that the contract shall be performed and a part payment of the 
contract price in the event of performance. Where the advance payment serves this 
691 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
698 Gallagher v. Shilcock [1949] 2 KB 765, at 768. See also Beatson, J. "Discharge for Breach: The 
Position ofInstalments, Deposit and other Payments due before Completion". Essay is "The Use and Abuse 
of Unjust Enrichment, Essays on the Law of Restitution". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1991. P 47. 
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purpose it is a deposit699• A deposit is generally (unless it is unreasonable7oo) forfeited on 
a payer's default, unless there is a provision to the contrary in the contract701 • A part 
payment on the other hand is not forfeited and can be recovered even if the person who 
paid it is himself in defaule02 • 
Thus, the recoverability of advance payment depends upon the purpose for which it is 
required. The contract might state frankly that the payment is exacted as a security for the 
performance, but this is often inferred from the parties' language used in the contract. 
This is to say that the actual words of the contract should be taken into account to 
determine the recoverability of advance payment. Therefore parties to a contract may use 
the word "deposit" to indicate the nature of the advance payment 703. However, placing 
the word deposit in the contract is not decisive in determining the recoverability of the 
advance payment for using this term might hide the true nature of penalty704. As a result 
it should be emphasized that the difference between a deposit and a part payment is a 
matter of construction. Where the language of the contract is neutral, i.e. there is no 
indication to infer whether the advance payment has the purpose of being a deposit, the 
. 
payment will be dealt with as a part payment and so recoverable. This has been clearly 
affirmed in Dies and Another v. British and International Mining and Finance 
Corporation Ltd 705 • This case concerned a contract to purchase certain rifles and 
ammunition for the total price of £270,000. The contract was written in French but 
subject to English Law. The purchaser paid £100,000 and then admitted that he could not 
proceed with the contract. In breach of his contractual obligations he refused to accept 
delivery. The vendor terminated the contract and the purchaser took an action in order to 
reclaim his money back. It was held that the £100,000 was not in the nature of a deposit, 
but rather a part payment as there was nothing in the contract to indicate that the 
699 Howe v. Smith. (1884) 27 Ch.D. 89, at 95 per Cotton LJ. And at 101 per Fry LJ. 
700 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
701 Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D 89, at 95 per Cotton LJ. And at 101 per Fry LJ. Union Eagle Ltd v. 
Golden Achievement Ltd. [1997] AC 514, at 518. 
702 That follows from Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D 89. Dies and Another v. British and International 
Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd [1939] I KB 724. Also Gallagher v. Shilcock. [1949] 2 KB 765, at 
768. 
703 Gallagher v. Shilcock [1949] 2 KB 765. 
704 Linggi Plantations v. Jagatheesan [1972] 1 Malayan LJ 89; available also on <web.lexis-
nexis.com/professionaVdocument? _ m.>. 
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£100,000 payment was intended as a guarantee of perfonnance. On this basis the court 
decided that the purchaser was entitled to recover the money paid. This was clearly 
inferred from the words of Stable J. who delivered the judgment stating that: 
"Where the language used in a contract is neutral, the general rule is that the law 
confers on the purchaser the right to recover his money, and that to enable the seller 
to keep it he must be able to point to some language in the contract from which the 
inference to be drawn is that the parties intended and agreed that he should,,706 
2- Forfeiture clauses and penalty clauses 
2.1 Forfeiture clauses and penalty clauses distinguished 
Both forfeiture clauses and penalty clauses are closely related707. In a forfeiture clause, 
parties to a contract agree to immediately pay a sum of money, which shall be forfeited 
on the payer's default. This, like penalty clauses, might result in intimidating the payer 
and therefore the treatment, which should be given to such clauses by the courts, should 
be' the same 708. However, special rules have been put forward to govern the forfeiture 
clauses, namely, the separation of the rules that control the forfeiture clauses from 
penalty clause rules. This is clearly revealed in Linggi Plantations Ltd v. Jagatheesan 709, 
where Lord Hailsham stated: " ... The truth is that a reasonable deposit has always been 
regarded as a guarantee as well as a payment on account, and its forfeiture has never been 
regarded as a penalty in English Law or common English usage,,710. Again it should be 
noticed that there is a common feature between forfeiture clauses and penalty clauses and 
the dissimilarities between them are of fonn rather than of substance. Both of them can 
operate in terrorem of the defaulting party to fulfill his contractual obligations. However, 
forfeiture clauses of deposit and part payment can be distinguished from liquidated 
damages and penalties in the following ways: 
70S Dies and Another v. British and International Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd [1939] I KB 724. 
706 Ibid. At 743. 
707 Atiyah, P. S. "An Introduction to the Law of Contract". 5th edition. Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1995. P437. 
Waddam, S M. "The Law of Damages". Canada Law Book Limited. 2004. P 448. 
708 McGregor, Harvey ... McGregor on Damages". Sweet and Maxwell. 17th ed. 2003. P 463. 
709 Linggi Plantations v. Jagatheesan [1972]1 Malayan Law Journal 89. For this case see: web.lexis-
nexis.comlprofessionaVdocument? _ m 
710 Ibid. 
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I-Penalty clause is a sum of money which becomes payable after breach, while forfeiture 
clause is a sum of money that parties to a contract might agree to be forthwith paid at the 
time of making the contract71l • The sum of money under forfeiture clause is paid before 
the breach and considered as a part payment of the purchase money for which it is 
deposited. The payment of penalty is something different from the payment of the 
transaction money in the contract. 
2-In agreed damage clauses it is the claimant, who is the victim of the breach and seeks to 
uphold the sum stipulated as liquidated damages and the defendant who seeks to be 
relieved from penalties. In contrast the claimant who breaks the contract and seeks the 
recovery of his deposit and part payment in the event of forfeiture clause712. 
3-The advance payment is not the maximum that can be sued for as one can claim for 
more damages according to the loss he has suffered. However under liquidated damages 
the claimant cannot claim more than the stipulated sum. 
4- In the event of penalty "one party713 seeks to exact a penalty from the other, he is 
seeking to exact payment of an extravagant sum either by action at law or by 
appropriating to himself moneys belonging to the other party,,714. This contrasts to a 
forfeiture of deposit and part payment where the sum paid in advance belongs to the 
payee as soon as it is paid. The payee in this case seeks to keep money, which had 
previously belonged to him. Thus "It is not the case of a seller seeking to enforce a 
penalty, but a buyer seeking restitution of money paid,,71s. However, the payee might be 
the claimant, as in the liquidated damages case in the event that the sum of money, which 
should have been paid as a deposit, has not been paid at the time of the principal breach 
upon which suit is brought before the COurt716. 
711 Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman. 2001. P 519-520. Treitel, G. 
H. "The Law of Contract". Sweet and Maxwel1. 11 th edition. 2003. P 1008. 
712 Ogus, A I. "The Law of Damages". Butterworths. 1973.52. 
713 The contemplated payee. 
714 Stockloser v. Johnson. [1954] 1 QB 476, at 488 per Lord Denning. His Lord gave an instance for that as 
in Commissioner of Public Workers v. Hill [1906] AC 368. 
71S Stockloser v. Johnson. [1954] 1 QB 476, at 489 per Lord Denning. 
716 Hinton v. Sparkes (1868) LR 3 CP 16, at 166 per Willes 1. 
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5-Jt is a practical difference that in forfeiture clause, the payer of a deposit is more 
conscious of the fact that he is at risk of not getting his money back in the event of his 
default to perform his contractual obligations. This is because parties to a contract expect 
that the contract shall be performed. On the other hand, in penalties the party agreeing to 
pay a sum of money on his breach is less conscious than the one in forfeiture of deposit. 
This is because he merely promises to pay that sum in the future which might be 
considered remote and unlikely eventuality 717. Therefore what is expected is that the 
contract might not be performed as agreed damages are supposed to be compensation in 
the event of non-performance. 
2.2 The differences disappeared 
In spite of the above points it should be clarified that all the aforementioned differences 
are of form and not of substance. As a consequence there might be little or no practical 
distinction to justify the radical difference in treatment between the two forms of clauses. 
This is particularly the case where the deposit has fallen due for payment under the 
contract but remains unpaid by the purchaser. In spite of this fact the courts, until 
comparatively recently, have been slow to grant relief in cases of forfeiture 718. The 
reasons for such reserve by the courts are suggested to be there because in forfeiture 
clause it is the contract-breaker who is the claimant trying to undo a situation, which is 
blessed by the maxim that possession is nine-tenths of the law719• There is no doubt that it 
is the policy of the law that wrongdoers must not be heard to complain, but this policy 
should not be applied uncritically720. As a result it has been said that even in the case 
where the deposit has not been paid until the time of the principal breach,(so that the 
victim of the breach becomes once again, as in the normal liquidated damages case, the 
717 The law Commission. Working paper No. 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". Her 
Majesty Stationery Office. 1975. P 44. 
718 McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 171h ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 463. The law 
commission. Working Paper No. 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". Her Majesty's 
Stationery Office. 1975. P 44. 
719 McGregor, Harvey. " McGregor on Damages". 171h ed. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 463. 
720 Ogus, A I. "The Law of Damages". Butterworths. 1973. P 53. 
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claimant,) this should not prejudice him. In Hinton v. Sparkes 721, the vendor sued to 
recover £50, which should have been paid by way of deposit, after a default was 
committed by the purchaser. The default was worth £ 10. The court enforced the provision 
of contract to pay the money as a deposit and held that if £50 had been agreed to be paid 
as liquidated damages, the provision would have held to constitute an invalid penalty 
clause. Therefore the £50 was still regarded as a deposit and the vendor should not have 
been in any worse position because the money was not paid when it should have been. 
Lord Walles's stated that: "I cannot see why the rights of the vendor should be affected 
by the purchaser's having committed two breaches of contract instead of one,,722. This 
means that the contract-breaker (the payer) should not be better off by the fact of having 
committed two breaches 723 instead of one. 
3- Forfeiture of instalments already paid 
It is common that parties to a contract might provide for the price to be paid by 
instalments whereby the subject matter does not transfer from the vendor to the purchaser 
unless the last instalment is paid. The purpose of this sale is to let the vendor keep the 
ownership of the subject matter until the purchaser pays the entire price. This means that 
before paying all the instalments the purchaser cannot sell the subject matter to another 
party as it is not his. Accordingly, if the contract is determined before the completion of 
performance724, the parties should come back to the position that they were in had the 
contract not been made in the first place. In other words, the vendor should return the 
instalments already paid to the purchaser and can seek damages for the loss he has 
sustained by subtracting it from the instalments and return the rest 725. However, the 
721 Hinton v. Sparkes (1868) LR 3 CP 16. See also the fact of Damon Compania Naviera SA v. Hapag-
Lloyd International SA [1985] 1 WLR 435 where the vendors were given the right to recover a greatly large 
deposit. 
722 Ibid. At 166. 
723 The first breach is the non payment of a sum of money which should have been paid by way of a deposit 
and the second one is the failure to perform his contractual obligations. 
724 Even for the purchaser's breach. 
m Dies and Another v. British and International Mining and Finance Corporation Ltd [1939] 1 KB 724, at 
744 per Stable J. however, in Hyundai Heavy Industries Co Ltd v. Papadopoulos. [1980] 1 WLR 1129 the 
house of lord said that the advance payments made in a shipbuilding contract could not be recovered. This 
judgment was justified by the nature of the contract where in the contract of sale the right of the vendor to 
retain the money is conditional on subsequent performance by delivery. This result should be met in order 
the vendor to keep the money, otherwise it would be returned to the purchaser. But in shipbuilding contract 
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parties might provide in the contract that in the event of default in paying any of the 
instalments, those already paid would be forfeited in favor of the payee. Where there is 
such express forfeiture clause, the payee, upon the payer's breach, becomes entitled to 
terminate the contract and forfeit the payment already paid. In such a case can the payer, 
who is the party in breach, recover the pre-paid instalments? 
As far as Jordanian civil law is concerned its judgment is clear in this situation as it 
regards the instalments as rent payments. As a result if purchaser fails in a hire-purchase 
contract to complete the instalments, all previous instalments would be considered as rent 
payments to the subject matter726• However, what will be the position of the law if the 
instalments are not reflecting the true rent of subject matter? In other words, what will be 
the position if the instalment excessively exceeds the damage the vendor has sustained as 
a result of breach by the purchaser? Therefore the following discussion as regards the 
position in English law will be of great significance and benefit to Jordanian law. 
Two sorts of relief are particularly relevant to be discussed: Firstly: the extension of time 
to make payment. Secondly: the recovery of paid instalments, i.e. ordering the repayment 
of instalments already paid. 
3.1 Extension of time to make the unpaid instalments 
The courts have the jurisdiction to grant the defaulting purchaser a relief against the 
forfeiture clause by giving him extra time to proceed with the contract727• This would be 
the money already paid was viewed as unconditional payment as it includes payment for services in the 
inspection, test, classification of survey and al1 costs and expenses for designing and supplying of the 
vessel. The same result was reached in Hyundai Shipbuilding & Heavy Industries Co. Ltd v. Pournaras. 
[1978] 2 Lloyd's LR. 502. See for that Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. 
Longman. 2001, PP 523-524. Beatson, J. "Discharge for Breach: The Position ofInstalments, Deposit and 
other Payments due before Completion". Essay in "The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment, Essays on 
the Law of Restitution". Clarendon Press. Oxford. 1991. P45. Beale, H G; Bishop, W D and Furmston, M P. 
"Contract Cases and Materials". 4th edition, Butterworths 200 I. P590. Chitty on Contracts. 29th ed, vol. 1 
General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1503. 
726 Article 487 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
727 This jurisdiction was unequivocally observed in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476. After he had 
nicely reviewed all cases concerned (at 496-498), Romer L.J (at 499) reached the point that: "The cases 
establish that if a purchaser defaults in punctual payment of instalments of purchase-money the court will, 
in proper case, relieve the purchaser from his contractual liability to forfeit instalments (apart from the 
deposit) already paid to the extent of giving him a further chance and further time to pay the money which 
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on the grounds that the forfeiture clause will prejudice him as he stands to lose all pre-
payments irrespective of the loss sustained by the vendor because of the breach. 
This method of relieving the purchaser in breach by way of an extension of time to pay 
the unpaid instalments has obtained clear judicial support728• It is implicit in these cases 
that the payment within the extended period would preserve all contractual rights for the 
purchaser as he has made the payments in the original time of the contract729• In other 
words, the purchaser proceeds with the contract as nothing has happened. 
The first authority of genuine significance with regard to the equitable jurisdiction to 
granting such kind of relief is the decision in Daghenham (Thames) Dock Co. RE73o. In 
this case a relief was given to the defaulting purchaser by way of extra time to perform 
his contractual obligation. This case was concerned a contract for the sale of land for 
£4000 to be paid in two instalments. It was provided that £2000 should be paid at once 
and the remaining £2000 on a certain date in the future. As well as with a provision that if 
the entire of second instalment was not paid on time (paying on time was of the essence 
of the contract), the vendors would have the right to re-possess the land and forfeit the 
£2000 instalment already paid. The purchaser did not pay the second instalment on time 
and the vendors as entitled under the contract, repossessed the land and retained the 
money already paid. The vendors brought an action for ejectment. 
It was suggested that the agreement in this case on the forfeiture clause was ultra vires 
and void73 ). Consequently, The Court of Appeal in Chancery, regarding the conduct of 
vendors in the nature of penalty, granted the defaulting purchaser an extra time to make 
the unpaid instalment of £2000732• It appears that the court in this case has granted an 
is in arrear ifhe is able and willing to do so; but the cases do not, in my judgment, show that the court will 
relieve such a purchaser to any further extent than this ". 
728 Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. RE (1873) LR 8 Ch. App. 1022. John H. Kilmer v. British Culombia 
Orchard Lands Ltd [1913] AC 319 and this case was cited in Union Eagle Ltd v. Golden Achievement Ltd. 
[1997] AC 514, at 521. Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 497-499 per Romer LJ. Starside 
Properties v. Mustapha. [1974] 1 WLR 816. 
729 Chitty on Contracts. 29th edition. YoU, General Principles. London Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1503. 
730 Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co, RE (1873) LR 8 Ch. App. 1022. 
731 Ibid. At 1025 per Sir W. M. James. 
732 Ibid. At 1025 per Sir W. M James LJ and Sir G. Mellish, LJ. 
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extension of time to the purchaser, who was able and willing to proceed with the contract, 
in spite of the stipulation in the contract that ~ime was to be of the essence of the contract. 
However what are the requirements of giving this sort of relief? 
3.1.1 Prerequisites for granting relief by way of an extension of time 
If the purchaser seeks to claim for relief against the forfeiture of his instalments already 
paid, it is necessary for him to demonstrate that the forfeiture clause is in the nature of 
penalty and that he was willing and able to perform the contract. 
3.1.1.1 Forfeiture clause should be in the nature of penalty 
When the defaulting purchaser resorts to the courts to seek relief against the forfeiture 
clause he should prove that the retention of the instalments already paid constitutes a 
penalty. This means that the court should take into account that it has no jurisdiction to 
grant extra time for the defaulting purchaser unless the forfeited payment is 
disproportionately high in comparison with the loss suffered by the vendor as a result of 
breach. Therefore if the forfeiture is successfully construed as a penalty, the court then 
has the power to disregard the stipulation and grant the purchaser extra time for 
performance733 • In Starside Properties Ltd v. Mustapha 734 a contract for the sale of a 
house at £5,950 provided for the payment of a deposit by instalments. After the payment 
of £ 1250 of the purchase price the purchaser was to be entitled to completion on payment 
of the balance. A clause in the contract provided that if the purchaser defaulted on 
payment of an instalment for more than 14 days the vendor would be entitled to terminate 
the contract and forfeit all the sums paid by the purchaser. The purchaser having fallen 
into arrears, the vendor terminated the contract and retained all money that had been 
733 Dagenham (Thames) Dock Co. RE (1873) LR 8 Ch. App. 1022. In this case when their Lordships 
considered the matter emphasized that the claimant should be relieved from forfeiture clause on the ground 
that such clause, in reality, "is an extremely clear case of a mere penalty for non-payment of the purchaser-
money at 1025 per Sir W. M. James, L.J. See also John H. Kilmer v. British Culombia Orchard Lands Ltd 
[1913] AC 319. In this case Lord Moulton delivering the judgment of the board stated, at 325-326, that: 
"The circumstances of this case are such to bring it entirely within the ruling of the Dagenham one. it 
seems to me to be an even stronger case for the penalty if enforced according to the letter of the agreement, 
becomes more and more severe as the agreement approaches completion, and the money liable to 
confiscation becomes even larger". See also John H. Kilmer v. British Culombia Orchard Lands Ltd [1913] 
AC 319. Stars ide Properties v. Mustapha. [1974] 1 WLR 816. 
734 [1974] 1 WLR 816. 
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made. In this case the Court of Appeal decided735, confinning the jurisdiction of the court 
of granting such relief, that the justice of this case required to grant the purchaser relief 
against forfeiture by way of an extension of time. In considering the ground of granting 
such relief, Edmund Davies L.J. stated that: "The contract between the parties imposed a 
penalty is unchallengable, and the nature or dimension of the penalty were such as to 
satisfy the court that justice required the relief therefrom should be granted ... ,,736. 
3.1.1.2 The purchaser should be ready and able to perform the contract 
The second requisite, which the court should ascertain from to grant relief against 
forfeiture clause by way of extra time, is that the purchaser should show evidence that he 
is ready, willing and able to perfonn the contract. 
One might argue that the purchaser is supposed to be ready and able to immediately pay 
the arrears for this kind of relief is given as another chance to him to perfonn his 
contractual duties. However, it should be noted that this condition "is applicable not only 
when an extension of time is asked for but also when the original application for relief is 
made,,737. Therefore, it is submitted that it is adequate for the purchaser to provide a 
"reasonable prospect" or anticipation that he will be able to payoff the arrears to the 
vendor if he is granted an extension of time to do so. Otherwise, there is no convincing 
reason to give the purchaser already in debt a further opportunity to perfonn the 
contract738• In other words, once the purchaser is given such relief it does not mean he 
should be able to pay immediately. It is a relief, which grants the purchaser extra time to 
pay the outstanding instalments within the period of extension. It would not be 
appropriate if it is conditioned that the purchaser should be able to pay forthwith. In other 
words, why should, and what is the point of the court granting the purchaser a period of 
time to perfonn the contract if he is supposed to be immediately able to pay the 
73S Ibid. At 824 per Edmund Davies L.J. 825 per Cairns LJ and Lawton L.J. 
736 Ibid. At 820 per Edmund Davies LJ. 
737 Starside Properties v. Mustapha. [1974] 1 WLR 816. Per Cairns LJ. See also for this condition 
Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 499 per Romer LJ. his Lord after he had stated the possibility of 
granting the purchaser an extra time to pay the arrears, he emphasized that that would be given to the 
purchaser "ifhe is able and willing to do so". 
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outstanding balance? Therefore, if the court grants the defaulting purchaser a relief to pay 
the arrears in 4 months this means that he may be able to pay after days or weeks or by 
the end of the period. In one case the tenants failed in obtaining relief against forfeiture 
clause by way of extra time to perform their contractual obligations, as they had not 
showed any evidence or indication that they would ever be able to pay the unpaid 
instalments739. Hence the prerequisite of readiness and willingness "is a requirement of 
law rooted in the principle on which relief is granted. It follows that readiness to pay 
arrears within such time as the court shall think fit is a necessary condition of the tenants 
for relief,74o. This is a key point for otherwise, why should the court grant a defaulting 
person a relief to proceed with the contract if he cannot, in reality, do so? Is it to reward 
such person on breaching the contract? Therefore if the defaulting party is unable or not 
anticipated in being able to perform and he is in breach of contract at the same time, he is 
in a negative situation in the both respects. As a result there is no point of relieving him 
by way of an extension of time, as there is no indication that its position will change. 
Therefore both preconditions, namely, the forfeiture of instalments in the nature of 
penalty and the defaulting party is willing and able to pay the arrears, should be met to 
grant the purchaser an extension of time to proceed with the contract. Therefore, if the 
defaulting party performs the contract within the period of extension, i.e. paying the 
delinquencies within the extra time granted, he shall be permitted to proceed with the 
contract by resuming instalment payments under the contract as it nothing had happened. 
In other words, justice requires that credit should be given to the instalments already paid 
by the purchaser741 . 
738 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QS 476, at 497 per Romer L.J. Harpum, Charles. "Relief against 
Forfeiture and the Purchase of Land". (1984) 43(1). Cambridge Law Journal. 134, at 146-147. 
739 Barton Thompson Ltd v. Stapling Machine. [1966] 2 All ER 222. 
740 Ibid. At 225 per Pennycuick J. 
741 Mussen v. Van Diemen 's Land Co [1938] 1 Ch. 210, at 218. 
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3.2 Recovery of paid instalments forfeited by the vendor 
Sometimes the court may grant a positive relief to a defaulting party in the fonn of an 
order to recover the pre_payment742 in the event of his failure to benefit from the chance 
given to him by way of extra time to pay. However the recovery of instalments already 
paid is subject to the subtraction of damages for the actual loss sustained by the injured 
party as a result of breach of contrace43 • This situation was clearly illustrated in the case 
of Steedman v. Drinkle744• This case concerned a contract of sale of land worth $16000, 
of which $1000 was paid at the time of making the contract and the rest was agreed to be 
paid by six annual instalments. The contract provided that if the purchaser defaulted in 
paying any of the instalments the vendor had the right to tenninate the contract and keep 
the payments already paid as liquidated damages. Time was of the essence of the contract. 
The purchaser defaulted to meet the first payment leading the vendor to tenninate the 
contract. However the purchaser claimed specific perfonnance, as he was willing and 
able to proceed with the contract. The Privy Council ruled out the possibility of specific 
perfonnance, as this remedy is not granted to a purchaser who breaks a stipulation of 
which time was of the essence. However the Council accepted that the forfeiture clause in 
the agreement was of penal nature and the purchaser should receive a relief against 
forfeiture of the sum paid by him745 • 
According to the decision of the Steedman case 746, it has been asserted that in order to 
grant relief to a purchaser by way of returning his money, he should be willing and able 
to proceed with the contract and the vendor refuses to accept late perfonnance747• At this 
742 This kind of relief has been completely rejected by Romer LJ in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, 
at 501. To confirm that no relief other than extra time to pay the arrears, he stated (at 499) that: "The cases 
do not, in my judgment, show that the court will relieve such a purchaser to any further extent than this". 
743 Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] AC 275 .. See also, Treitel , G. H. "The Law of Contract". 11th edition. 
Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1009. 
744 [1916] AC 275. 
745 The Privy Council has applied the decision of (Steedman v. Drinkle) in the case of Brickles v. Snell 
[1916] 2 AC 599, where the Council expressed regret that the purchaser failed to claim for the return of the 
money already paid by him as it appears that the Council would have ordered its repayment if the purchaser 
claimed such relief. 
746 Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] AC 275. 
747 This is what has been explained and taken by Farwell, J in Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co [1938] 1 
Ch. 210, at 219. He stated that: "I think, however- 1 say it with the utmost regards- that that case (Steedman 
v. Drinkle) really turns on the particular circumstances there existing ... the appellant was ready and willing 
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view if the purchaser is unable to perfonn the contract, he will not become entitled to 
return the money already paid by him to the vendor. Is the ability of purchaser to perfonn 
really relevant to claim the recovery of his money? 
3.2.1 The relevance of defaulting purchaser's ability 
3.2.1.1 Mussen case748 affirms the relevance 
Mussen v. Van Diemen 's Land C0749 was concerned a contract for the sale of land worth 
£321,000 to be payable in instalments. Time was of the essence and it was provided that 
the purchaser to be let into possession of certain parts of land according to the instalments 
paid. As well as upon purchaser's default the vendor was given the right to tenninate the 
contract and retain all money paid by the purchaser. After the purchaser paid £139,500 he 
was pennitted a possession of land worth £99,300, i.e. the value of the part of the land 
was smaller than the sum paid. Default having been made by the purchaser, the vendor 
tenninated the contract and retained about £40,200 being the amount that the purchaser 
paid in excess of the value of the part of land that conveyed to him. The purchaser 
demanded his money back after two years but the vender refused. He claimed the pre-
payment again after six years but the vendor also rejected this demand. Finally the 
purchaser brought an action suing for ~ relief against the forfeiture on the basis that the 
forfeiture clause was of penal nature. The court accepted that there was jurisdiction to 
grant relief against a penal provision in unconscionable circumstances (where it is 
unconscionable for the vendor to retain the money)7S0. However, this jurisdiction to grant 
relief against forfeiture can be only applied in the event that there is readiness and ability 
on the purchaser'S part for specific perfonnance. Thus, on the basis that the purchaser 
was unable to perfonn the contract and delayed to ask for specific perfonnance 6 years 
without any smallest attempt to ask for such relief/sl it was held that: "The plaintiff 
to perfonn the contract and the respondents were refusing to pennit specific perfonnance, and the court 
itself was unable to decree specific perfonnance because of the tenn of the contract (which made time of 
the essence) ... the board thereupon thought that it was unconscionable for the respondents to take up the 
attitude of saying, "we will not complete, but we will retain the money," and on that ground the board 
~anted relief'. 
48 Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co [1938] 1 Ch.D. 210. 
749 [1938] 1 Ch.D. 210. 
7S0 Ibid. At 217. 
7S1 Ibid. At 219. Farwell, J said that: "the mere delay, which is due wholly to the plaintiff, renders it quite 
impossible for the court to consider specific perfonnance, even if the plaintifTasked for it. The plaintifThas 
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should have no relief, and the defendants are entitled to retain the money, which they 
have received from the plaintiff,752. 
Therefore, in this case753 and according to the Farwell J. who delivered the judgment that 
such kind of relief (ordering the repayment of money already paid) should not be granted 
unless the defaulting purchaser is ready, willing and able to proceed with the contract. 
Consequently, regards should not be given to the fact that the purchaser is unable to 
proceed with the contract as he found some difficulties in keeping up with paying the 
instalments or became unwilling to proceed with the contract as it turned out to be a poor 
bargain according to his interests. There are no grounds for invoking relief against 
forfeiture of instalments paid in such circumstances as the purchaser should have been 
aware that if he fell into this position he would not have the chance to return his money 
back754. In brief the view runs as follows: readiness, willingness, ability of the defaulting 
purchaser to proceed with the contract is a precondition to grant equitable relief against 
forfeiture of instalments already paid755 • However this view is open to a number of 
objections, which will now be stated. 
3.2.1.2 The relevance undermined: it is only essential in specific performance 
The prerequisite756, which has been argued by Farewell J in Mussen v. Van Diemen's 
Land C0757 when discussed the crucial decision of the only case (Steedman case7.58) in 
which the defaulting party received an order for the return of his money, was refuted in 
chosen to stand by for all these years, and has not made the smallest attempt to complete the contract, and, 
in those circumstances, for myself, I am wholly unable to see any ground on which the plaintiff can say that 
it is unconscionable for the defendants to retain the possession of the money which he had agreed by the 
contract that they should have in the events which have happened" 
752 Ibid. At 220. 
753 Mussen v. Van Diemen's Land Co [1938] 1 Ch. 210. 
754 Ibid. At 217-218. Where Farwell J stated when rejected to grant the purchaser relief against the 
forfeiture of the instalments already paid by him that: "It is no ground for giving relief to a person from the 
effect of the contract which he himself has made to say that he has, through no fault of the defendant 
whatsoever, found himself in difficulties, or that it may tum out to be not a good bargain from his point of 
view. considerations of that sort are wholly irrelevant" 
755 Ibid. At 217 per Farewell. J. 
756 Readiness, willingness and ability to perform. 
757 Mussen v. Van Diemen 's Land Co [1938] 1 Ch. 210. 
758 Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] AC 275. 
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Stockloser v. Johnson 759. In this case it was confinned that the decision in Steedman 
case 760 had not been based on the ground that the purchasers were ready and willing to 
proceed with the contract. But Denning L.J stated that: 
"The basis of the decision in Steedman v. Drinkle and another was, I think, that 
the vendor had somewhat sharply exercised his right to rescind the contract and 
retake the land, and it was unconscionable for him also to forfeit the sums already 
paid. Equity could not specifically enforce the contract, but it could and would 
relieve against the forfeiture,,761. 
Thus the approach, which makes willingness and ability a pre-condition to grant relief by 
way of returning the paid instalments, is not free from doubt and accordingly can be 
undennined by the following reasons: 
I-The outcome of Steedman case 762 suggested that the court would not grant specific 
perfonnance to purchaser, who breaks a stipulation of which time is of essence. As a 
result of this if a vendor tenninated a contract on a purchaser's failure to pay on time the 
latter would know that he could not obtain thereafter a decree of specific perfonnance. It 
would be an exercise in futility to require such' purchaser to prove his ability to proceed 
with the contract763. Therefore the precondition which requires a defaulting purchaser to 
be ready and willing to perfonn the contract is relevant and essential in the event of 
demanding a specific perfonnance or granting an extra time to perfonn. Somervell, LJ, 
Stockloser v Johnson764 confinned this fact stating that: "In my opinion the cases do not 
establish (1) that relief could never be given unless the plaintiff could show that he is 
financially in a position to complete and would be willing to do so if the defendant were 
himself prepared to waive the breach and complete the contract,,765. This is to say that if a 
vendor is not prepared to waiver the breach and tenninated the contract, the ability of a 
759 [1954] 1 QB 476. 
760 Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] AC 275. 
761Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 491. 
762 Steedman v. Drinkle [1916] AC 275. 
763 Harpum, Charles. "Relief Against Forfeiture and The Purchaser of Land". Cambridge Law Journal 
P984) 43(1) 134, at 158. 
64Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476. 
765 Ibid. At 487-488. 
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purchaser to perfonn became immaterial for claiming relief from forfeiture of pre-
payment766• 
Therefore the view that no relief can be granted in the event that the defaulting purchaser 
is unable to perfonn the contract ignores the fact that what is demanded by the defaulting 
party in such a case is an order to return his money. The purpose of this kind of relief is 
to return the money already paid by the defaulting party subject to subtraction by the 
injured party of his damages for the loss suffered because of the breach. That is to place 
the defaulting party in a position, which he ~ould have been in had the contract not been 
made. Therefore so long as the grant of specific perfonnance is concerned, it is easy to 
see what relevance the defaulting purchaser's ability to perfonn can have, otherwise it is 
not. 
2-Though the defaulting purchaser's manner may have a role on whether relief is granted, 
the court when viewing a demand by a defaulting purchaser to relieve him from a 
forfeiture clause is mainly concerned to detennine whether the injured party claims to 
retain a sum disproportionately high in comparison with his actual loss. If the amount is 
so the court will be keen to grant the defaulting party relief against forfeiture by ordering 
the repayment of instalments already paid subject to giving the injured party damages 
against his actual loss. However if the sum forfeited is merely in excess of the loss 
sustained the court will not hesitate to deny the defaulting purchaser relief. 
3-Denying relief to the defaulting party who is not ready and able to proceed with the 
contract will affect the distinction between penalty clauses and forfeiture clauses of a 
penal nature. It leads to inessential and harsh distinction between the two kinds of 
clauses 767. 
766 Ibid. At 489 and 491 per Denning L.J. who clearly affinned the irrelevance of such precondition in 
granting relief to the purchaser by returning the instalments already paid. He declared that: "Readiness and 
willingness is essential in specific perfonnance, and in relief from forfeiture of leases, but not in relief from 
forfeiture of sums paid". 
767 Ogus, A.1. "The Law of Damages". Butterworths. 1973. P 56. 
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If willingness and ability of the defaulting party to perform is confirmed as a precondition, 
this will make the penalty clauses unenforceable against all defaulting parties whilst 
forfeiture clauses might be enforced against a defaulting party who is not willing and able 
to proceed with the contract. In other words, the defaulting party can claim relief against 
forfeiture of instalments already paid if he is willing and able to perform the contract 
whereas relief can be granted against a penalty clause and it is immaterial whether or not 
the defaulting party is willing and able to perform. 
Therefore equity is necessary even though the defaulting party is not ready and willing to 
proceed with the contract. For example, suppose that the purchaser has contracted to buy 
a vehicle of £25,000 and agreed to pay the money by instalments of £5000 per month as 
payment. It was provided that if the purchaser defaulted in paying anyone of the 
instalments, the vendor had the right to terminate the contract, retake the subject matter 
and forfeit the instalments already paid. Thus, if the purchaser paid 4 instalments, i.e. 
£20,000, and failed to pay the last one as he became unable to perform the contract 
because he could not find the money. The vendor was able to terminate the contract, 
retake the subject matter and resell it at a higher price. It has been said that: "Surely 
equity will relieve the buyer against forfeiture of the money on such terms as may be 
. st,,768 JU . 
3.2.2 The penal nature is sufficient to grant relief: unconscionability condition is 
without great advantage 
The principle is that in order to grant relief against forfeiture of instalments already paid, 
the sum forfeited must be of a penal nature, in the sense that the forfeited instalments are 
wholly out of all proportion to the likely loss suffered by the vendor769. There is ajudicial 
approach to assume, without discussion, that the forfeiture clause is penal in nature since 
the defaulting party stands to lose all previously paid instalments irrespective of the 
768Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 490 per Denning U. 
769 Ibid. At 484 where Somervell LJ mentioned that in order to grant relief against forfeiture of instalments 
already paid, "Two conditions must be satisfied. First, the effect of the clause must be penal. .. ". And at 490 
where Denning LJ said that "Two things are necessary: first, the forfeiture clause must be of a penal 
nature ... " 
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extent of the loss suffered by the injured party as a result of the breach77o• In detennining 
the penal nature of the sum forfeited, the court should apply the principles laid down in 
Dunlop case 771. Since the established rule in the ordinary case of penalty clause is to be 
viewed at the time when the contract is entered to, this condition (the forfeiture clause 
should be of penal nature) therefore depends on the circumstances existing at the time 
when the contract is made772• However this does not mean that what occurred after the 
fonnation of contract is immaterial. 
It has been asserted that it is not adequate for the defaulting party to succeed in his claim 
for relief against the forfeiture of instalments already paid by him to show that that 
forfeiture was of penal nature. However, that condition should be met with another to the 
effect that it must be unconscionable for the injured party to forfeit the instalments, which 
the defaulting party has paid under the contract 773. As a consequence, if the sum was of a 
penal nature and however conscionable for the injured party to retain the pre-payment, no 
relief could be granted to the defaulting party, as the two necessary conditions have not 
been met. This situation has been clearly well defended in Stockloser v. Johnson774 where 
the purchaser failed in his action to return his money back. In this case the contract was 
concerned with a purchaser who agreed to buy a plant and machinery at two quarries on a 
royalties basis. The contract provided that the purchase price would be paid in 
instalments and so the ownership of the subject matter would not be passed to the 
purchaser until he has paid all the required instalments. And in the event that the 
purchaser defaulted in paying any single payment, the vendor had the right to tenninate 
the contract, retake the subject matter and forfeit the paid instalments. Default having 
been made by the purchaser, the vendor tenninated the contract and forfeited the 
previously paid instalments. The purchaser did not offer or express his ability or 
willingness to proceed with the contract, but claimed relief against the forfeiture clause to 
710 This was illustrated by the majority of the court of appeal in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476. 
See also McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 469. 
111 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79, at 86-87 per Lord 
Dunedin. 
772 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 484 per SomervelJ U. 
773 Ibid. At 490 per Denning L.J and at 484 per Somervell L.J. 
774Stockloserv. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476. 
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have his money returned. He based his claim on the ground that the forfeiture clause was 
penal and unconscionable. 
The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the claimant's claim, as he failed to show that 
it was unconscionable for the vendor to retain the instalments paid because he had 
himself received substantial benefits by way of royalties 775. However, the fact that the 
purchaser has gambled on the royalties to pay the instalments is irrelevant and does not 
make what the vendor received was unconscionable to keep. Denning LJ stated that: 
"The buyer seems to have gambled on the royalties being higher than there were. 
He thought that they would go a long way to enable him to pay the instalments; 
but owing to bad weather they turned out to be smaller than he hOj?ed and he 
could not find the additional amount necessary to pay the instalments" 6. 
The reasoning of the verdict in this case, with all respect, seems unconvincing. When the 
court decided that the retention of the previously paid instalments was not 
unconscionable, it seemed that it added a new condition to endorse its reluctance to apply 
penalty clause jurisdiction to forfeiture clause. This is because when the court held that it 
was conscionable for the vendor to keep the pre-payment, the amount was not actually a 
penal in nature. Namely, the forfeited instalments were not disproportionately greater 
than the loss sustained by the vendor. This comment will now be proved in the following 
points. 
I-It is important to highlight that the supporters of the view that unconscionability777 is 
the basis for granting relief by way of returning the instalments already paid argue that it 
should not rest solely on the terms of the contract. To establish unconscionability, the 
court takes into account the actual loss suffered by the vendor when he exercised his right 
of forfeiture. Thus, it is examined with reference to all conditions and circumstances 
existing at the time when the relief is invoked. Somervell LJ stated when mentioned the 
two conditions for granting this relief that: 
775 Ibid. At 484 Somervell LJ and at 492 per Denning LJ. The same conclusion was reached in Mussen v. 
Van Diemen's Land Co [1938] 1 Ch.210. 
776 Ibid. At 492. 
777 It means that it should be unconscionable for the vendor to retain the pre-payment. 
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"The court must be satisfied that, in the circumstances of that particular case, that 
is, looking not merely at the contract, but at the circumstances at the time of the 
breach, it would be unconscionable to allow the recipient to retain the money 
notwithstanding the power to do so contained in the clause,,778. 
The reason for testing the unconscionability at the time when the relief is invoked is that 
the subsequent circumstances, which occur after making the contract, largely affect the 
determination of whether or not it is unconscionable for the vendor to retain the money779. 
Thus, when the contract provides that instalments are to be paid over a certain period of 
time and the purchaser uses or benefits from the subject matter, it becomes difficult to 
show that the forfeiture of instalments paid and keeping them by the vendor is 
unconscionable 780. In response to this argument, it can be observed that the time to 
determine whether the sum stipulated is penal or not is the time of contracting and the 
events occur afterwards are not disregarded. What happened after the time of formation 
might be of valuable evidence of what was within the contemplation of the parties then. 
In the Stockloser case itself when the purchaser profited from the subject matter, the 
penalty nature was undermined by the fact that the benefits he had gained made the sum 
retained by the vendor compatible and not excessively higher than the actual loss 
sustained. 
2-Also the purchaser might delay in applying relief against that forfeiture, which will 
mean that it is not unconscionable for the vendor to retain the instalments already paid. In 
Mussen case781 it seems that the court was much influenced by the fact that the purchaser 
delayed for six years to claim his money back. During those six years he might have had 
a good deal of the land conveyed to him in proportion to the money he had paid and the 
value of the land has changed (fallen) so that it might be that he had had his money's 
worth. Does that not mean that the sum retained was not disproportionately higher than 
the loss suffered? And therefore penalty clause rules have not been applicable. 
778 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] I QB 476, at 484. 
779 See for more details Pawlowski, Mark. "Relief against Forfeiture of Instalments". Estate Gazette. 27 
March, Issue 9312. [1993] 122, at 123-124. 
780 Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 484 per Somervell U. 
781 Mussen v. Van Diemen 's Land Co [1938] I Ch. 210. It has been referred to this case to explain this point 
by somervell LJ in Stockloser v. Johnson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 492. 
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It might, also, be thought that in the application of penalty rule to forfeiture clause, many 
forfeiture clauses of instalment contracts will be categorised as penalties and there is a 
judicial tendency to assume that the forfeiture clause is of penal nature. In most cases the 
retention will be disproportionately higher than the loss suffered as a result of breach 
especially where the purchaser has paid many instalments and the subject matter was still 
resold. Therefore the forfeiture clause is of a penal nature not least where the sum is 
forfeited without giving a proper credit to the number of instalments paid and the profit 
of the resale of the subject matter. In response, it should be emphasized that the 
. application of penalty jurisdiction will not affect the injured parties' right to claim his 
compensation. Where the forfeiture of pre-payment amounts to a penalty the courts will 
apply penalty jurisdiction subject to the right of the vendor to receive damages for the 
loss he has suffered as a result ofbreach782. 
It is appropriate to conclude that it is often enough for the forfeiture clause to be of penal 
nature to grant a defaulting purchaser relief. The second condition of that it should be 
unconscionable for the vendor to retain the money already paid783, would be suggested to 
be of "no great advantage,,784. Where the money already paid is held to be of penal nature 
it always means that it would be unconscionable for the vendor to forfeit the instalments 
already paid. Moreover it has been proved above that the word unconscionability 
included in the test for the invalidity of penalty clauses is no more than a synonym to the 
word extravagant. 
This view is vastly strengthened if the New Approach is to be applied to forfeiture clause. 
In other words, the principle becomes that all forfeiture clauses are enforceable, but if the 
instalments forfeited were excessively higher than the loss suffered by the injured party, 
the court has the power to reduce the amount in line with the actual loss sustained. 
782 This is quite strengthened by the fact that the vendor wilJ be granted damages for his ACTUAL loss 
under the New Approach suggested in this thesis. 
783 Stockloser v. Johanson [1954] I QB 476. 
784 See The Law Commission. Working paper No 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies paid". 
London. Her majesty's Stationery Office. 1975. P 47. 
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4- Forfeiture of Deposit 
4.1 What is deposit? 
Parties to a contract usually include a provision to the effect that one of the parties is to 
pay a certain sum of money as a deposit. This is usually occurs at the time of making a 
sale contrace85 where purchaser agrees to pay a deposit to vendor in order to demonstrate 
his seriousness about proceeding with the transaction and to provide extra guarantee to 
vendor in the event of breach786• Put another way, the basic reason for the deposit is to 
impress the payee that the payer 'earnestly' intends to purchase the property. However, 
does the provision for the payment of a deposit affect the birth of contract or is it merely 
a tenn of the contract? This question was only first directly in issue in Myton Ltd v 
Schwab Morris 787, which was in favour of holding that the provision for the payment of 
deposit states a condition precedent to the contract taking effect. The effect of this 
approach means that paying a deposit is a pre-requisite to the fonnation of the contract, 
failure to fulfill of which will result in preventing the contract from coming into the 
existence at all. As a result the vendor is not entitled to recover the sum which should 
have been paid by way of deposit. However the outcome of this case was strongly 
criticised on the grounds that the Goulding, J who delivered the judgment in Myton case 
"did not have, and, indeed, could not have had, before him the guidance afforded by the 
judgement[s]" 788 of the cases cited to support its proposition. Consequently, the 
obligation to pay a deposit on the signing of the contract should only be regarded as a 
tenn of the contract and accordingly the contract is treated as having come into existence 
even though the deposit was not paid. However failure to meet the payment of deposit 
will entitle the vendor to consider the purchaser in breach of contract. As a consequence 
the vendor will have a right to tenninate for breach and to sue for damages including the 
sum, which should have been paid by way of deposit789• However there is nothing to stop 
the parties from expressly agreeing that the payment of deposit will constitute a condition 
precedent. This position was well illustrated in Damon Campania Naviera SA v. Hapag-
785 Also in lease contracts. 
786 "The vendor, in the normal case, never intends to be bound by the contract without having the deposit in 
his own or his stakeholder's possession as a protection against possible loss from default by the purchaser". 
Per Goulding, J in Myton Ltd v Schwab Morris [1974] 1 WLR 331. 
787 Myton Ltd Schwab Morris [1974] 1 WLR 331. 
788 Millichamp v Jones [1982] 1 WLR 1422, at 1431 per Warner J 
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Lloyd International SA 790. In this case an argument, that failure to pay the deposit meant 
that there was no enforceable contract, was presented before the Court of Appeal. The 
Court unanimously rejected this argument. Lord Justice Fox confirming the view that the 
payment of deposit is not condition precedent stated that: 
"I see no reason for inferring that no contract arises until the deposit is paid. The 
provision for the payment of a deposit is simply a term of the contract. In the 
absence of a special provision it does not seem to me to carry with it any 
implication that it is a condition precedent to the existence of contractual 
relations,,791 
It is concluded that the contract is still binding upon the payer (purchaser) in the event of 
not paying the deposit for the stipulation for the payment of a deposit is merely regarded 
as a term of contract. Therefore on breach the payee (vendor) becomes entitled to rescind 
immediately and sue for damages, which "Must include the value of the right to recover 
and retain the deposit and hence the value of the deposit itself,792. 
4.2 Nature of deposit 
The historical origin of the law of deposits can be traced to the Roman law of arrha, and 
possibly further back still it is an earnest money given at the time when the contract is 
entered into to guarantee793 performance of a contract duty794. 
It has settled that the deposit, under this nature, serves two purposes. It plays the role as 
an earnest to protect payee against a certain event, namely the failure to perform by payer. 
In that event payee is intended to be secured by forfeiture of the sum, which will have 
been paid as a deposit. This means that the deposit creates an incentive to payer to 
perform the rest of the contract and in the event of non-compliance the deposit will be 
forfeited. Therefore, the deposit symbolizes the seriousness of the payer's intention to 
fulfil his contractual obligations. If a purchaser enters into a contract to buy real property 
789 Ibid. 
790Damon Compania Naviera SA v. Hapag-Lloyd International SA [1985] I WLR 435. 
791 Ibid. At 446. 
792 Ibid. At 449. 
793 This is still a deposit's nature even in the absence of a frank stipulation on this. 
794 See for the history Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D 89, 102 per fry L.J. For more discussion see also 
Stoljar, S.J. "The Defaulting Purchaser: The Recovery of Deposits and Instalments". The Australian Law 
Journal. (1957) Vol. 31. 510, at512. 
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without taking in to account whether he can pay for it or not, that this is the classical 
circumstance in which a deposit is rightly forfeited795. The purchaser when enter into 
transaction to buy something should know, either actually or through his advisers, that 
certain consequences will follow, i.e. the risk of losing his deposit, in the event of his 
failure to complete the contract. On the other hand, a deposit also acts as a part payment 
if the contract was performed in accordance with its term. Lord Macnaghten in Soper v. 
Arnold796 stated that: "Everybody knows what a deposit is ... The deposit serves two 
purposes- if the purchase is carried out it goes against the purchase money- but its 
primary purpose is this, it is a guarantee that the purchaser means business 797". 
Hence the payment of deposit has two advantages to vendor. On one side he may use or 
benefit from the sum, which has been paid by way of a deposit in another transaction. He 
on the other side, if the contract is not completed by purchaser, has full and immediate 
access to the deposit whether or not there is an express stipulation to this effect in the 
contrace9S and whether or not he has suffered any loss799. In other words, it has been 
clearly established that in the event of a vendor terminating the contract as a result of a 
purchaser's breach, the sum which has been paid by way of deposit is forfeited in full by 
the formersoo. In Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltcf'°l Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson made it clear that: " .. .in the event of the purchaser's failure to 
complete in accordance with the terms of the contract, the deposit is forfeit."so2. However 
in case of forfeiture of deposit what relief is there for the payer? 
795 Tennaro Limited v Majorarch Limited [2003] EWHC 2601; [2003] 47 E.G.C.S. 154 (Ch D). Omar v. EI-
Wakil [2001] EWCA Civ 1090. (2001) Times, November 2,2001. It is available on West Law website 2001 
WL 753309. Soper v. Arnold. [1889] 14 AC 429, at 435. 
796 Soper v. Arnold [1889] 14 AC 429. 
797 Ibid. At 435. See also Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, at 
578 -579 per lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
798 Hall v. Burnel [1911] 2 Ch.D 551. 
799 Linggi Plantations v. Jagatheesan [1972] 1 Malayan LJ 89; available also on <web.lexis-
nexis.comlprofessionaVdocument?_m.>. Hinton v. Sparkes. (1868) LR 3 CP 161. See Harpum, Charles. 
"Deposits as Penalties", Case and Comment. Cambridge Law Journal. [1993] 389, at 390. Oakley, A J. 
"Deposits: Still a Guarantee of Performance". Part 2. The Conveyance and Property Lawyer. [1994] 100. 
800 Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D 89. 
801 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
802 Ibid. At 578-579 per lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
214 
4.3 Relief against forfeiture of deposit 
To reiterate a defaulting purchaser stands to lose his deposit on default. In such a case can 
he return such a forfeited deposit? As the nature and purpose of a deposit is a security for 
perfonnance, it was recognised at an early time in Depree v. Bedborough803 by Sir John 
Stuart V.C that: 
"How can the person who is in default, upon that default, acquire any right to the 
money which he parted with as a security that there should be no default, it is 
difficult to conceive" 
However is this true in all cases? For instance the deposit might be grossly in excess of 
the loss suffered by the injured party, so how is the defaulting party entitled to get relief 
against the forfeiture of such deposit? Is there any possibility for the application of 
penalty clause jurisdiction to grant relief to the defaulting side? The courts have 
developed various methods of relief against the forfeiture of deposit and will be discussed 
in the following sections. This will be approached in accordance to the position of the law 
before and after The Workers Trust case. 
4.3.1 Law of deposit before Workers Trust case 
In spite of the fact that one of the oldest doctrines in English case law is the relief against 
penalties, the traditional view of the courts have been to treat the forfeiture of deposits as 
quite distinct and separate from rules relating to liquidated damages and penalties. The 
English courts have showed an obvious reluctance to apply the law of penalties to 
forfeiture of deposits. This is even in circumstances where a deposit was wholly 
disproportionate to the likely loss sustained. Instead the judicial view has concentrated on 
whether or not the parties intended that the deposit should not be recoverable in the event 
of defaulting partis default. This is illustrated in Wallis v. Smith: 804: 
"There is a class of cases relating to deposits. Where a deposit is to be forfeited 
for the breach of a number of stipulations, some of which may be trifling, some of 
which may be for the payment of money on a given day, in all cases the judges 
have held that this rule does not apply, and that the bargain of the parties is to be 
carried out ,,805 
803 Depree v. Bedborough (1863) 4 GifT. 479; 66 ER 795. 
804 Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch.D 243. 
80S Ibid. At 258. Per Jessel MR 
215 
Combined with this case there were another two cases, Hinton v. Sparkes806 and Lock v. 
Belt07 which they were concerned a contract of sale of public house. In both instances 
the purchaser paid a deposit and agreed to forfeit its amount on default. Once the 
purchaser defaulted in performing his contractual obligations, the vendor forfeited the 
deposit. In both cases the courts rejected the recovery of the deposit. Both decisions were 
strongly founded because the contracts contained a stipulation that a further sum must be 
paid on default. However, the court in both instances, while allowing the vendor to forfeit 
the deposit, decided that the further sum could not be considered recoverable damages 
but rather a penalty which the vendor cannot claim. 
As was discussed in the second chapter, the criterion which, the courts have adopted in 
early cases of determining whether the stipulated sum was of a penal nature, was the 
intention of parties to a contract808• In looking at the existing position of the courts with 
regard to deposit it has been confirmed that the courts have applied the same line in 
seeking to implement the intention of the parties collecting from the whole contract809• 
However this approach has been criticized on the grounds that the cases cited in Wallis v. 
Smith810 for this approach do not obviously back its outcome811 • Therefore this case, and 
also this approach have offered no compelling reason for excluding deposits from the 
I I · I' 812 genera ru e agamst pen a tIes . 
806 Hinton \I. Sparkes (1868) LR 3 CP 16. 
807 Lock \I. Bell [1931] 1 Ch 35, at 46 per Maugham J. 
808 Supra. P 49. 
809 In Palmer \I. Temple (1839) 9 Ad & E 508, it was clearly stated (at 520) that: "In absence of any specific 
provision, the question, whether the deposit is forfeited, depends on the intent of the parties to be called 
from the whole instrument". See also to the same effect Hinton \I. Sparkes (1868) LR 3 CP 16, at 165 per 
Bovill, C.J. In general it has been emphasized in Union Eagle Ltd v. Golden Achievement Ltd. [1997] AC 
514 by Lord Hoffmann that: "In many forms of transaction it is of great importance that if something 
happens for which the contract has made express provision, the parties should know with certainty that the 
terms of the contract will be enforced". 
810Wallis v. Smith (1882) 21 Ch.D 243. 
811 Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate, Ltd. [1906] 1 KB 425, at 430 per Bigham J. 
812 Harpum, Charles. "Relief against Forfeiture and the purchases of Land". Cambridge Law Journal. 1984 
(43)1 134, at 163-164. 
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As a consequence in the early twentieth century the courts developed a new method to 
grant equitable relief where the deposit is of penal natureS 13 • At this stage it has been 
pointed out that the fact that the sum in question had been deposited when the contract 
was entered into does not force the court to treat it as liquidated damagesSl4• Therefore, 
the courts had the power to grant relief against deposit forfeiture in circumstances where 
the forfeiture of the deposit would be of penal nature. In Commissioner of Public Works v. 
Hills 815 the Privy Council held that claimant, who had failed to complete a building 
contract punctually, was entitled to the return the deposit for the forfeiture provision in 
contract was of a penal nature and not a genuine pre-estimate of loss subject to a 
deduction in respect of the actual loss suffered by the defendant. 
This case is an effective example of the application of penalty clause rules to forfeiture of 
a deposit. The fact that the parties in this case have used in their condition that a certain 
sum should be paid as a liquidated damages, should not prevent the sum of being a 
deposit. Parties to a contract might include a provision in their agreement to the effect 
that if the purchaser does not comply with the terms of the contract all money already 
paid (by way of a deposit) shall be forfeited as liquidated damages. Such an agreement 
does not deprive "the deposit of its character as a deposit, an earnest of performance, 
which was liable to forfeiture on rescission"SI6. 
813Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate [1906] 1 KB 425 and Commissioner o/Public Workers 
v. Hill [1906] AC 368. Steedman v. Drinkle and another [1916] AC 275. Where it has been held that the 
forfeiture of the money paid was a penalty from which relief should be granted. It was said also that 
Brickles v. Snell [1916] 2 AC 599 supports this approach. In this case the Privy Council expressed regret 
that claim for the return of the deposit had not been made by the purchaser. Thus it may be inferred from 
this that if the deposit had been paid the court would have ordered its repayment on the basis that the 
forfeiture clause was of a penal nature. See also, Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600, at 631 
per Lord Denning when said that: "Likewise, even when the sum had already been paid over in the shape of 
a deposit to secure performance, equity would be prepared to grant restitution ifit was a penal sum." And at 
624 per Lord Radcliffe. See for this view Pawlowski, Mark. "Relief against forfeiture of deposits". Estate 
Gazatte. Issue 9246. [1992] 76. 
814 Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate [1906] 1 KB 425. 
81S [1906] AC 368. 
816 Union Eagle Ltd v. Golden Achievement Ltd. [1997] AC 514, at 518. 
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4.3.2 How the law of deposit stands after The Workers Trust caseSl7? 
It was affirmed that the deposit is subject to the forfeiture under the contract, whether or 
not that the injured party suffered any loss, if the defaulting party fails to perform his part 
of the contract. A reasonable deposit has always been regarded as a guarantee of 
performance and its forfeiture has never been subject to the rules of liquidated damages 
and penalties in English lawS1S• The existing position of the law is best illustrated in 
Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments819• Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
made it clear, when delivered the opinion of the board, that the deposit: "In the event of 
purchaser's failure to complete ... the deposit is forfeit, equity having no power to relieve 
against such forfeiture"s2o. Therefore this case will now be subject to the following 
analysis. 
4.3.2.1 The facts of the Workers Trust case 
This case 821 was about a contract for the sale of bank premises in Jamaica at an auction. 
Clause 4 of the contract provided for payment of the deposit of 25% and the balance 
within 14 days of the date of the auction. It was provided that such a deposit would be 
forfeited to the bank in the event that the purchaser failed to perform his part of the 
contract. Having the purchaser failed to make the payment on time, the bank terminated 
the contract and forfeited the sum paid by way of a deposit. The purchaser claimed for 
equitable relief against forfeiture of the deposit from the Supreme Court of Jamaica. 
Zacca C.J refused to grant such relief. However, on appeal the Court of Appeal in 
Jamaica granted part relief from forfeiture by allowing the return of 15% of the originated 
purchase price. The bank appealed against the verdict and the purchaser extended a cross-
appeal on the partial relief that have been granted to him. The judicial committee of the 
Privy Council held that since 25% was not a reasonable deposit, the court has the 
jurisdiction to grant full relief to the purchaser by ordering the repayment of the whole 
deposit as the forfeiture was a penalty. This decision reinforced the fact that deposit is 
817 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd. [1993] AC 573. 
818 Linggi Plantations v. Jagatheesan [1972] 1 Malayan LJ 89; available also on <web.lexis-
nexis.comlprofessionaVdocument?_m.> and Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd. 
P993] AC 573. 
19 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
820 Ibid. At 578-579. 
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only subject to forfeiture where its amount is reasonable even thought it can bear no 
relation to the contemplated loss of the vendor. It is important firstly to highlight that the 
position with regard to the deposits under contracts for the sale of land remained 
uncertain until the recent consideration of this issue in Workers Trust & Merchant Bank 
Ltd v Dojap Investmenti22• Thus, how does the law stand after the decision in this case? 
4.3.2.2 General rule 
The position of a deposit after the Workers Trust case has become based upon the 
following rule. In general any stipulation agreed upon between parties to a contract to pay 
a sum of money as damages or to forfeit a sum of money paid by way of deposit823, is 
subject to the general rule against penalties. Such provision is regarded as invalid penalty 
clause unless it is proved that it is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss, which might flow 
from breach of contract824• However, a deposit on the purchase and of sale of land, is 
exempted, by ancient practice, from the equitable rule against penalties, i.e. it is not paid 
back to purchaser. It is normal practice for a purchaser to pay 10% of the purchase price 
and for the contract to stipulate forfeiture of that deposit if such purchaser defaults in 
performing his contractual obligations. This rule is based on the fact that such percentage 
is likely to constitute a genuine pre-estimate of loss sustained. Therefore it is agreed that 
the courts will accept the forfeiture of 10% deposit even though it is more than the actual 
loss suffered by the vendor. This exemption from the general rule of granting relief 
against penalties was described as anomalous in the Workers Trust case82S• Lord Browne-
Wilkinson stated that: 
"One exception to [the] general rule is the provision for the payment of a deposit 
by the purchaser on a contract for the sale of land. Ancient Law has established 
that the forfeiture of such a deposit (customarily 10 per cent of the contract price) 
does not fall within the general rule and can be validly forfeited even though the 
amount of the deposit bears no reference to the anticipated loss to the vendor 
flowing from the breach of contract"S26 
821 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
822 Ibid. 
823 Unreasonable deposit. 
824 Ibid. At 578. 
825 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, at 578. 
826 Ibid. At 578. 
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However what is the test for the validity of the forfeiture of a deposit in transaction of 
sale of land? 
4.3.2.3 Test for the validity of forfeiture: deposit should be reasonable 
The courts established that in order to entitle a vendor to retain a deposit on the default of 
a purchaser it should be reasonable. Stockloser v. Johnson 827 confirmed that the court 
would have an equitable jurisdiction to relief against the forfeiture of a deposit of 50% of 
the purchase price. The courts would not accept the conduct of disguising a penalty in the 
form of deposit by describing an extravagant sum as a deposit828. This was reflected in 
Linggi Plantations Ltd v. Jagatheesan 829• where the contract frankly provided for the 
forfeiture of the 10% deposit paid by the purchaser in the event of his failure to perform 
his contractual obligations. The default having occurred meant the vendor forfeited the 
deposit in spite of the fact that he had suffered no loss. The purchaser sought relief 
against forfeiture on the grounds of the forfeiture clause was actually a penalty clause. 
However, Lord Hailsham affirmed the position that the forfeiture of reasonable deposit 
"has never been regarded as a penalty in English law or common English usage,,830. It 
was this dicta which the Privy Council relied upon in the Workers Trust case831 to decide 
that a relief is given against forfeiture of a deposit where its amount is in excess of a 
reasonable sum in order not to allow the vendor to abuse the special treatment832 offered 
to a deposit. 
The special treatment afforded to such a deposit might be abused if parties to a contract 
affixed the brand "deposit" to any penalty in order to avoid the application of penalty 
jurisdiction. However, heed has been riveted to such a situation in The Workers Trust 
case833 which confirmed that: "It is not possible for the parties to attach the incidents of a 
827 Stockloser v. Johanson [1954] I QB 476. 
828 Ibid. At 491. 
829 Linggi Plantations v. Jagatheesan [I 972] 1 Malayan U 89; available also on <web.lexis-
nexis.com/professionaVdocument? _ m.>. 
830 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, at 94. 
831 Ibid. At 578. 
832 That deposits are not subject to equitable relief against penalties. 
8J3Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltdv. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
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deposit to the payment of a sum of money unless such sum is reasonable,,834. In other 
words, despite the fact that the sum paid by way of deposit is not in general subject to 
penalty jurisdiction, this is only the case where the amount of the deposit is reasonable. 
Thus, where the deposit is reasonable it can be forfeited particularly if the loss cannot be 
accurately estimated in advance83s. However, there is some difficulty in establishing what 
constitutes a reasonable deposit. This is because even a reasonable deposit does not need 
to be a genuine pre-estimate of the loss likely to be suffered by the injured party. In fact, 
he can forfeit the reasonable deposit even though he has suffered no loss. 
The starting point for determining and assessing the reasonable deposit would be the 
ancient practices in the United Kingdom of a 10% deposit. This percentage first came 
into the law by the Privy Council in Linggi Plantations Ltd v. Jagatheesan836 when it has 
been decided that: "There is nothing unusual or extortionate in a 10% deposit on a 
contract for the sale of land". Some years later this was reaffirmed in Windsor Securities 
Ltd v. Loreldal Ltd and Lester837 and in 1993 a rule of this percentage has been well 
established in the workers Trust case838. However, it is admitted that this method of 
assessment was carried out "without logic" but felt that it could be justified "by the long 
continued usage" in the United Kingdom839. In the Workers Trust case itself the sum 
demanded was 25% of the purchase price, which the vendor claimed to retain when the 
purchaser defaulted in performance. The Privy Council held that a deposit of 25% was 
unreasonable, despite evidence that it was usual for financial institutions in Jamaica 
selling property at auction to ask for a deposit ranging between %15 and %5084°. The 
Council rejected such evidence as reasoning for such deposit because: 
"In order to be reasonable a true deposit must be objectively operating as "earnest 
money" and not as a penalty. To allow the test of reasonableness to depend upon 
the practice of one class of vendor, which exercises considerable financial muscle, 
834 Ibid. At 579-580 
835 Pye v. British Automobile Commercial Syndicate [1906] 1 KB 425. 
836 Linggi Plantations v. Jagatheesan [1972] 1 Malayan LJ 89; available also on <web.lexis-
nexis.comlprofessionaVdocument? _m.>. 
837 Windsor Securities Ltd v. Loreldal Ltd and Lester (1975) Times LR. Sept 9. 
838 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
839 Ibid. At 580 per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
840 Ibid. At 579. per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
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would be to allow them to evade the law against penalties by adopting practices of 
their own"S41 
Even in the situation where a reasonable deposit is detennined to be 10%, this true 
deposit might still operate as a penalty since the vendor is able to forfeit the reasonable 
deposit even though it bears no relation to the loss suffered842. In this instance it is hard to 
distinguish between a penalty, which is pennissible by the law (10% deposit) and one, 
which is not. This means that the deposit might not be a genuine pre-estimate of the loss 
suffered, however it is still reasonable and its forfeiture is still valid by the law and there 
is no relief granted against such forfeiture. 
Furthennore even the rule, which regards any deposit in excess of 10% as unreasonable 
and consequently in the nature of penalty can be departed from if special circumstances 
are showed to justify the departure of this rule by taking a deposit of higher level843. In 
the Workers Trust case844 an attempt was made to justify the larger deposit (%25) on the 
grounds that there were special circumstances for stipulating for such a deposit. The 
vendors claimed that such a deposit demanded because of the %7.5 transfer tax, which is 
in practice the vendor had to pay within 30 days of the date the contract was made. This 
claim failed as it was reasonable to provide for an advance payment to cover this tax but 
it was not reasonable for it to be forfeited since the tax would be returned if the contract 
had not been completed. 
841 Ibid. At 580. per Lord Browne-Wilkinson. 
842 See for example Damon Campania Naviera SA v Hapag-Lloyd International SA [1985] I WLR 435. in 
this case the vendors were awarded damages of $ 236, 500 (The amount of deposit) in spite of the fact that 
their true damages was worth $60, 000. In his contrary opinion Lord Goff (At 458) expressed his dissent to 
grant the vendor the %10 deposit as follows: "If the sellers are entitled to recover the deposit, they can 
recover $236, 500 being 10 per cent. of the purchase price; but if they are only entitled to recover damges, 
they can recover only $60, 000, being the sum so assessed by the arbitrator as the damages suffered by 
them ... in that way they would be over-compensated for the loss". This dissenting opinion was supported 
by Carter, J. W. "Deposits, Accrued Rights and Damages". Law Quarterly Review. (1988) 104207, who 
stated (At 212) that: "Had the contract contained an agreed damages provision, requiring the buyers to pay 
$236, 500 after termination for breach on their part, it would have been unenforceable as a penalty. The 
sellers would have recovered only $60, 000" 
843 Stockloser v. Johanson [1954] 1 QB 476, at 491. Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap 
Investments Ltd [\993] AC 573, at 580. 
844 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [\993] AC 573, at 580. 
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4.3.3 Analysis of the law after Workers Trust case 
The following issues will now be addressed to clarify the law after The Workers Trust 
case and make the proper suggestions. 
1- Which rules should be applied to unreasonable deposit? 
2- What is the position when deposit paid in contracts other than land sale? 
3- Did penalty clauses and deposit rules amalgamate after Workers Trust case? 
4- Deposits as penalties 
5- What is concluded? 
4.3.3.1 Which rules should be applied to deposits beyond 10 per cent? 
It remains unclear whether unreasonable deposit is subject to the penalty jurisdiction or to 
equitable relief against forfeiture 845 as suggested by Denning and Somervell L. JJ in 
Stockloser v Johnson 846• In the latter both L.JJ suggested two conditions to grant relief 
against forfeiture of instalments. The forfeiture should be of penal nature and it should be 
unconscionable for the vendor to retain the previously paid amount. As the second 
condition (unconscionability) was above undermined, the matter is best viewed for the 
application of penalty doctrine to unreasonable deposits. Some reasons can be put 
forward to support this proposition847• According to the current law where a deposit is 
held to be unreasonable the entire sum should be returned to the defaulting purchaser. 
Therefore if the whole sum cannot be regarded as a deposit, but a penalty, the vendor is 
not even entitled to retain 10% as the courts cannot rewrite the contract848 by inserting 
into it a reasonable deposit. This inability by the court to rewrite the terms of the contract 
serves as a caution to the contracting parties not to set a deposit above that which is 
considered a reasonable. Namely, parties to a contract are to expect that a deposit will be 
regarded as unreasonable and so unenforceable if it is more than 10%. Since the vendor 
845 Beale, Hugh. "Unreasonable deposits". Law Quarterly Review. (1993) Vol. 109524, at 528. Beale, HO, 
Bishop, WD and Furmston, MP. "Contract Cases and Materials". 4th edition. Butterworths. 2001. P 794. 
Poole, Jill. "Casebook on Contract", 6th edition. Blackstone press. 2003. P 391. 
846 [1954] 1 QB 476, at 
847 This discussion should be read with the approach titled (deposits as penalties) where it is suggested the 
application of penalty rules to all kind of deposits. Infra. P 228. 
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fails to stipulate for a reasonable deposit in the first place, he will have no right to forfeit 
even that amount. This is completely the effect of the application of penalty clause 
jurisdiction. The application of this jurisdiction simply makes penalties invalid and thus 
the entire disproportionate sum would always have to be returned and then the injured 
party has the right to sue for the loss he has actually suffered on breach. In the Worker 
Trust case itself the vendor was ordered to return the whole %25 deposit and then he was 
given the right to claim damages for the loss has suffered. 
Besides, the Workers Trust case position that unreasonable deposit is subject to the 
penalty rule has been followed in a subsequent case. Although it has been asserted that 
the Workers Trust case has not been followed in any English case 849, this case still 
represents the law of deposit. In other words, it has been surprisingly said850 that the 
Privy Council in Bidaisee v. Sampeth and Otheri51 has withdrawn from the position that 
it adopted in Workers Trust case. However this view seems to be unconvincing and hard 
to endorse852 for it is settled that penalty jurisdiction was applied to unreasonable deposit. 
4.3.3.2 Wbat is tbe position wben deposit is paid in contracts other tban sale of land? 
The law is still puzzling with regard to deposits that are paid in contracts other than the 
sale of land. In such transactions there is no established custom as there with transactions 
848 As with penalty clauses: "The courts have always avoided claiming that they have any general 
jurisdiction to rewrite the contracts that the parties have made ... " Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney 
General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
849 Hams, Donald, Campbell, David and Halson, Roger. "Remedies in Contract and Tort". 2nd edition. 
Butterworths. 2002. P 60. 
850 Ibid. 
851 Bidaisee v. Sampeth and Others Transcript available through WestLaw. 3 April 1995. 
852 It should be noted that when the Privy Council cited the Workers Trust case in the Sampeth case it did 
so to demonstrate and apply the principles laid down in that case. It confirmed that a reasonable deposit, 
which is paid by the purchaser, is regarded as a security for the completion of the contract and therefore can 
be retained by the vendor in the event of purchaser's default. Thus the Privy Council in Workers Trust case 
did not regard only the traditional 10% deposit as a penalty against which it grants relief. But this is not the 
case as to what exceeds this percentage. It therefore may be said that the Privy Council did not cite the 
Workers Trust in Sampeth case only as an authority to confirm that equity has never determined deposits as 
a penalty against which it granted relief. This is because the judgment of the Council in the Workers Trust 
case was so clear regarding what can be considered as a penalty and thus worthy of relief. It clarifies that an 
unreasonable deposit, which exceeds the traditional deposit of 10%, should be subject to penalty doctrine 
and thus hold the return of the entire deposit in such an event. As a result it can be said that the workers 
Trust case has been followed in Sampeth case and it seems to be unconvincing and hard to endorse the 
view that the Privy Council has departed from its 1993 position in the Workers Trust case. 
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of sale and purchase of land. Therefore, what will the position be if the injured party 
forfeited a 10% deposit or more in transaction other than sale of land? Suppose that X 
contracts to purchase a vehicle from Y and agrees to pay a deposit of 10% of the 
purchase price and the balance on delivery. X does not proceed with the contract, i.e. 
breaches his contractual duties to deliver and pay the balance. As a result Y forfeits the 
10% deposit and resells the vehicle for the agreed price. In other words, the vendor 
resells the vehicle with no loss853 or its loss is much less than the deposit. In such a case 
can the purchaser claim relief by way of returning the deposit less the difference between 
the contract price and the market or current price? The law as to this situation is unclear. 
It may be interpreted that Lord Browne-Wilkinson in the Workers Trust case854, when he 
stated the general rule above855, envisaged the use of a deposit only in the case of the sale 
of lands. In any transaction of sale of land the injured party can forfeit the 10% deposit 
even though he has suffered no loss. A possible implication from his Lordship'S 
observations reveals the impression that all other deposits, i.e. deposits in transactions 
other than sale of land, are subject to the general rule, which asserts the applicability of 
penalty jurisdiction to deposit856. The courts in such transactions will therefore consider 
whether a deposit is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered in order to decide whether 
the deposit is forfeited. 
As a consequence of this interpretation the distinction becomes that the deposit, paid 
under contracts of sale of land is not subject to the penalty jurisdiction where it is 
reasonable, while the deposit (reasonable or not) that is paid under the other transactions, 
is subject to penalty jurisdiction. One might justify this distinction by the fact that it is 
possible that some purchasers who pay deposits under contracts other than of land (such 
as purchasers of coaches or any other vehicle) do not understand the difference between 
part payments, which are not subject to forfeiture and a deposit. Such purchasers often 
imagine that they pay the deposit to show their seriousness to make the transaction and it 
853 See Charter v. Sullivan [1957] 2 QB 117 where a car was resold without any loss sustained by the 
vendor. 
854 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, at 578. 
855 Supra. P 219. 
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will be a part of the purchase price in the event of the completion of the transaction. That 
is to say the position of the deposit is understood more poorly than in a transaction of the 
sale of land and in most cases there is no accessibility of legal advice, which reduces the 
possibility of domination and oppression in such transactions857. 
The current case law justifies this distinction on the fact that the special treatment or 
status which, was given to the deposit paid in land transaction, derives from an ancient 
custom of 10% of the purchase price. This is true if it is taken into consideration that the 
historical status of such a deposit can be traced back to the law of roman of arra858• 
However, do these grounds justify the difference in treatment between a deposit paid in 
contracts of sale of lands and a deposit paid in other kinds of contracts, considering that 
they are operating the same function as a guarantee for the performance of other 
contractual obligations? As this was the decision of the Workers Trust case, one 
commentator has doubted that this interesting case now represents the English law. He 
asserts that the same principle can be applied to either the transaction concerning a sale of 
land or any other transaction. Oakley AJ states that: "Indeed, the principles contained 
therein may well also be applied to contracts for the sale of goods, where there is no 
"long continued usage" for the payment of a 10 per cent deposit,,859. It could be generally 
agreed with this view, however the Workers Trust case absolutely still represents the law 
for the case was absolutely concerned of sale of lands and there was, as said above, an 
implication that the Privy Council has considered the other transaction subject to the 
penalty clause jurisdiction. However, were penalty rules and deposit rules completely 
merged? 
856 Beale, hugh. "Unreasonable Deposits". Law Quarterly Review. [1993] Vol. 109 524, at 529. 
857 The Law Commission, in its working paper No 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". 
London. Her majesty's Stationery Office. 1975, p 49, has confirmed this when proposed that: "Land 
transaction, however, stand on a somewhat different footing. The position with regard to the status of the 
deposit is probably better understood and in most cases the vendor and purchaser will be acting with legal 
advice. It may therefore be that deposits paid in connection with sales of land and houses merit special 
treatment" 
858 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, at 578. 
859 Oakley, A 1. "Deposit: Still a Guarantee of performance", Part 2. The Conveyancer and Property 
Lawyer. [1994] 100, at 107. 
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4.3.3.3 Did penalty clause and deposit rules amalgamate after Worker Trust case? 
It is difficult to see any sufficient policy rationalises the difference between the rules as to 
penalties and the deposits rules. The judgment of the Privy Council in The Workers Trust 
case recognizes "The inelegance and goes some way to mitigate" 860 the effect of 
distinction between penalties and deposit but not expunging it861 • The decision is a clear 
indication that penalty jurisdiction was applied to a sum of money, which is paid by way 
of a deposit, and so it remains no justification for such difference, which seems to be the 
result of the two sets of rules developing in isolation from each other 862. This is 
particularly the case since the function of the two devices is similar, although one is paid 
in advance and the other is payable on breach. The deposit is operating as a guarantee of 
perfonnance, while penalty clause is a sum of money stipulated in terrorem of the 
defaulting party. Therefore deposit as penalty may act to intimidate the defaulting party 
who will act in response to fears and worries that he will lose his advance payment in the 
event of non-perfonnance. As was said863 it seems that the only difference in activating 
this function lies in the emotive tenns used in the contract by the parties. The law as to 
penalties has therefore been held to apply to deposits. 
However, it cannot be said that penalty clause rules and deposit rules have been 
completely amalgamated, as the opportunity to get rid of the distinction was not taken in 
the Workers Trust case864 at least for the sale of land cases. The sum stipulated in a 
contract is regarded as a penalty where it is extravagant and unconscionable in 
comparison with the greatest loss, which might conceivably be sustained as a result of 
breach. Therefore, the stipulated sum will be regarded as valid liquidated damages if it is 
860 Furmston, MP. "Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract". 15th ed. Butterworths. 2001. P 695. 
861 This is true not least that unreasonable deposit in sale of land transactions was held to be subject to 
penalty rules and if the possible implication is upheld these rules are also applied to deposits in transaction 
other than sale of land. However a reasonable deposit, which might be of penal nature relief against its 
forfeiture would not be granted. 
862 Koffman, Laurence. "The Law of Contract". 4th.edition. 2001 493. McKendrick, Ewan. "Contract Law". 
5th .edition. Macmillan. 2003. P 451. McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th edition. Sweet and 
Maxwell. 2003. P 472. Furmston, MP. "Cheshire, Fifoot and Furmston's Law of Contract". 15th ed. 
Butterworths. 200 I. P 695. Pawlowski, Mark. "Forfeiture and Unconscionability". Litigation. [1999] 24, at 
29. 
863 Treitel, G. H. "The Law of Contract". 11 th edition. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1008. 
864 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
227 
a genuine pre-estimate of the loss sustained. However in the event of forfeiture of deposit 
the vital test to determine whether the forfeiture is legitimate or not depends on whether a 
deposit is reasonable (10% or less). In Union Eagle Ltd v. Golden Achievement Lt~65 the 
purchaser claimed that the deposit was in the nature of penalty and was thus entitled to its 
return as it was not a genuine pre-estimate of damages suffered by the vendor as a result 
of breach. However, on the basis of the Workers Trust case such a claim presented by the 
purchaser failed as the deposit was reasonable and it was considered irrelevant to inquire 
whether or not it was a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered 866. However it is 
tentatively suggested that this approach is unconvincing. In the Workers Trust case867 it 
was observed that in sale of land transaction although a reasonable deposit may not 
constitute a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered by the vendor it is still forfeited868• 
In such circumstances it is clear that there is no practical distinction between deposits and 
penalties. However, the courts have showed a clear reluctance to apply the law of 
penalties to deposits even though they can be wholly out of proportion to the actual likely 
loss sustained. Therefore, what is the possibility of the application of penalty jurisdiction 
to deposits? 
4.3.3.4 Deposits as Penalties 
To remove the idea of having two sets of rules it is tentatively suggested to make all kind 
of deposits subject to penalty jurisdiction. That is to say that a sum of money, which is 
paid by way of deposit, may be considered in all cases as a genuine pre-estimate of the 
loss suffered. However it is open to the party seeking relief to prove otherwise. 
It is true that the parties' main objective when agreeing on damages beforehand is to 
compensate the injured party in the event of default. However though when agreeing on 
deposits they might not go through the same process, the main purpose is also still to 
compensate the injured party in the event that the transaction goes off as a result of 
breach. However, why parties to a contract not take into consideration that a deposit 
865 Union Eagle Ltd v. Golden Achievement Ltd [1997] AC 514. 
866 Ibid. At 518 per Lord Hoffmann. 
867Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
868 Ibid. At 580. 
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should be a genuine pre-estimate of potential compensation? The parties may take into 
account all measures and circumstances that can take place when agreeing upon the 
liquidated damages. In both devices (agreed damages and deposit) the injured party seeks 
to ensure that he will receive compensation for the possible losses that he may 
subsequently suffer. Goulding, J in Myton Ltd v Schwab Morris 869 states that: "The 
vendor, in the normal case, never intends to be bound by the contract without having the 
deposit in his own or his stakeholder's possession as a protection against possible loss 
from default by the purchaser". Therefore the sole aim of providing for a deposit is to 
empower the injured party to have his damages for a breach of contract in his hands870 
and hence avert any necessity to return to judicial proceedings. Consequently, there is no 
appropriate or necessary reason to treat the deposit in a special category governed by its 
own rules. This proposition is based on the following points: 
I-When a law allows the injured party to forfeit a deposit in the event of a payer's default, 
means that the law permits one party to penalise the other particularly where there is no 
loss suffered. The result is that though the law prevents penalty provisions in some cases, 
when the sum is payable after breach, it enforces them in other areas of the law where the 
sum agreed is payable in advance. This raises the question, does the law adopt a policy of 
achieving fairness and thus disallowing the parties to punish each other in one area of the 
law but allow it in others? Does the difference in the time of paying the sum stipulated 
either in advance or on breach justify the application of different rules? Some 
commentators871 remarked on this saying that: 
"It seems strange enough that the innocent party is entitled to retain a deposit, or 
forfeit payments made, even though the effect is to penalise the party in breach; 
stranger still that the innocent party can recover damages as well if the loss he 
suffers exceeds the deposit"s72. 
2- On what base the law allows the vendor to forfeit 10% deposit of the purchase price in 
sale of land transactions on the default of the purchaser? Is it a good or indeed a legal 
reason to justify the forfeiture of deposit by the fact that this has happened so many years? 
869Myton Ltd Schwab Morris [1974] I WLR 331. 
870 Thus he can forfeit his damages in a simple and easy fashion. 
871 Beeale, HG, Bishop WD and Furmston MP. Contract: "Cases and Materials". 4th ed. Butterworth. 2001. 
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Accordingly though the decision in the Workers Trust case873 can be welcomed in finally 
making it clear that the penalty clause rules do have a role to play in the deposit area, 
however, the acceptance that the 10% deposit can still be forfeited by the vendor in a sale 
transaction is perhaps less welcome. The allowance of the forfeiture of this percentage of 
a deposit will often lead the vendor being over compensated at the purchaser's expense. 
Furthermore, the acceptance of the present law, which has settled without logic874, in 
allowing the vendor to extract a penalty from the purchaser on the grounds that this has 
happened for very many years is on the one hand "suggested, to take rather too 
conservative an approach,,875. On the other hand the case in sale of land transactions is 
unacceptable for there is a gross inequality between the positions of the two parties. 
When the purchaser pays his deposit it is supposed that he means business, but what 
safeguards him against the non-completion of contract by the vendor? The purchaser 
should go through judicial proceedings in order to get his deposit back in the event of 
breach by the vendor. Thus the purchaser has, firstly, nothing in his hand to protect him 
against the risk of non-performance by the vendor and secondly the vendor can in a 
simple and easy manner forfeit the deposit on purchaser's default. In sum, it is time that 
the too passive position that defaulting purchasers have been in to be got rid of by law. 
The application of penalty jurisdiction provides rather the protection a purchaser needs 
and is preferable to be applied to all deposit without any exception876. 
3-It might be argued against the application of the penalty jurisdiction to deposits that 
many sums, which are paid by way of deposits, will fall as penalties 877. This is 
particularly the situation in the events of land purchase and sale where the custom 
remains to compel the purchaser to pay 10% of the purchase price. As a result of this a 
872 Ibid. At 795. 
813 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
874 Ibid. 
875 Thompson, MP. "Unravelling Agreement". Conveyancer and Property Lawyer. [1994] 58, at 62. 
876 That is the application of penalty clause rules to the forfeiture of 10% deposit in sale ofland transaction, 
which has become weIl established and strengthened by the customary practice. 
877 Even it might be argued that "deposits are usually arbitrary sums" and do not represent a genuine pre-
estimate of the loss suffered. See The Law Commission. Working paper No 61. "Penalty Clauses and 
Forfeiture of Monies Paid". London. Her majesty's Stationery Office. 1975. P 49. 
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suggestion has been made to reduce the percentage of the deposit to 5% 878 or 7%879, as 
the 10% is still too high and unreasonable. In other words the 10% is still high and 
immune from the equitable rule against penalties in spite of the fact that forfeiture of a 
10% deposit often does not reflect the true compensation of vendor for his loss. This is 
mainly true880 when a purchaser of a high value property fails to complete his contractual 
obligation at a time when there might be other purchasers easily available and who might 
be willing to pay a considerably greater price than agreed with the original purchaser. 
Therefore, in this situation, when the purchaser defaults in performing the contract, the 
vendor can forfeit the substantial deposit and resell at a greater price881 • 
However following to what was said above that the parties should agree on a deposit 
payable at the time of making the contract and its amount should be- as much as the 
parties can- a genuine pre-estimate of the loss that might be suffered as a result of breach. 
If deposit, either in sale transactions or in the other transactions, is subsequently held not 
to constitute a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered it should be wholly returned to 
the purchaser 882 . This is of course subject to the right of the vendor to claim his 
compensation for the loss he has actually suffered. The New Approach comes to the same 
conclusion in the same suit by reducing the clearly large penalty to be in line with the 
actual loss suffered. 
4- It might be thought that as the deposit functions as a security for the completion of the 
contract the application of the penalty jurisdiction would affect the nature of deposit. 
However it should be noted that the nature of deposit as a guarantee for performance does 
not preclude the courts from granting relief against its forfeiture based on penalty 
878 The Law Commission. Working paper No 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". London. 
Her majesty's Stationery Office. 1975. P 50. 
879 JE, Adams. "The Usual 10% Deposit-Can it be Justified still". Law Society's Gazette. [1983] 2811, at 
2812. 
880 Wallace, H. "Deposit or Penalty?- The Price of Greed". Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly. [1993] 207, at 
212. 
881 This was illustrated in Windsor Securities Ltd v. Loreldal Ltd and Lester (1975) Times LR. Sept 9. In 
this case a vendor had forfeited to the claimants a 10 per cent deposit of 235,000 in spite of evidence that 
the property could be resold of 2,500,000. This means at profit of 150,000 taking in the consideration that 
the original price was 2,350,000. Oliver J. said there that: "There was nothing in the facts of the present 
case to show that the forfeiture was unreasonable or in the nature of penalty". 
882 Even ifit is often arbitrary this suggestion is still working for the realisation of justice and equity. 
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doctrine. It is irrelevant to the issue of equitable relief from forfeiture of deposit based on 
penalty doctrine that a deposit is a guarantee of performance, because the same could be 
said with regard to a penalty, which might serve the same purpose. This has been 
effectively supported by Lord Radcliffe who highlighted this issue and suggested in 
Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co 883 that in appropriate circumstances rule against 
penalties might be applied to deposit. He said that: 
"I know, of course that, to travel to another branch of equity's relief jurisdiction, 
the precise reason why a deposit made on a sale of land is not recoverable if the 
bargains goes off by the purchaser's default is that it is treated as a 
guarantee ... but nevertheless every penalty .. .is in some sense a guarantee for the 
due performance of the contract, and 1 do not see any sufficient reason why in the 
right setting a sum of money may not be treated as a penalty, even though it arises 
from an obligation that is essentially a guarantee ,,884 
Thus, penalty and deposit might act as a guarantee and compensation simultaneously. 
The application of penalty rule to deposit will by no means affect the nature of deposit as 
a security against breach and inducement for the contractual parties to perform. Therefore, 
the court can have the jurisdiction to hold whether or not it was in the nature of penalty 
by regarding all the circumstances surrounding the contracting process and those existing 
at the time of breach. This would not conflict with the penalty rule as it is clearly 
confirmed in Philips case88S for what has happened after making the contract might give 
proper evidence of what was within the contemplation of the parties when they agreed on 
paying the amount of a deposit. This notion is strongly supported by the New Approach, 
which adopts the loss actually suffered to apply the power of the court to adjust the 
amount of agreed penalty. 
5- There is a judicial approach supporting the suggested proposal. The Privy Council in 
Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills886 has already applied the penalty doctrine to 
883 Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co [1962] AC 600. 
884 Ibid. At 624 per Lord Radcliffe. 
885 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. 
886Commissioner of Public Workers v. Hill [1906] AC 368. See for supporting the proposed approach the 
powerful dissenting judgment which was give by Hale J. in an Australian case of Coates v. Sarich [1964] 
WAR 2. In this case the plaintiff claimed his deposit back on the ground that its forfeiture was a penalty, 
however, the majority of the Supreme Court of Western Australian held that the return of deposit was 
outside the jurisdiction of equity to grant relief. Hale J. delivered his dissenting view saying (at p 14) that 
"the essential inquiry must, I think, always be whether the payment is a penalty or liquidated damages". 
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determine whether the retention of money already paid can be treated as a genuine pre-
estimate of the loss. As the Council held the sum should be returned to the claimant it has 
been said887 that the Hills case888 is "a further illustration that a clause identified by the . 
courts as a penalty clause cannot be enforced so as to enable a party to recover or retain 
more than the actual loss". Even in this case the Privy Council called the sum, which has 
been paid as security money, as liquidated damages when decided its return less what 
compensate the injured party according to his actual loss. Also the Privy Council in 
Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v Dojap Investments Ltd889 referred to the Hills 
case890 to support its approach in considering the deposits as penalties. In delivering the 
judgment of the board Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated that: 
"There is clear authority that in a case of a sum paid by one party to another under the 
contract as security for the performance of the contract, a provision for its forfeiture 
in the event of non-performance is a penalty from which the court will give relief by 
ordering repayment of the sum so paid, less any damage actually proved to have been 
suffered as a result of non-completion,,891 
4.3.3.5 What is concluded? 
As a result of the above analysis it is hoped that the Workers Trust case 892 can be 
construed as the starting point of demising any rules that make deposit fall outside the 
penalty clause jurisdiction. Penalty should be a penalty either it is a sum of money paid or 
a sum of money retained or forfeited893. 
After proving the possibility of application of penalty jurisdiction to deposit, the New 
Approach suggested in this work will be effectively applied. The application of the New 
Approach of penalty clause to deposits will achieve justice and remove the passive 
Consequently, Hale J view was that the rules provided for to decide whether the sum was a penalty or 
liquidated damages were of general application to all contracts and it was unessential and unsuitable to treat 
deposit as being in some special classification governed by its own rules. 
887 Jobson v. Johnson [1989] WLR 1026, at 1036 per Dillon L.J. 
888 [1906] AC 368. 
889 [1993] AC 573. 
890 Commissioner of Public Workers v. Hill [1906] AC 368. 
891 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573, at 582. 
892 Ibid. 
893 McGregor, Harvey. "McGregor on Damages". 17th edition. Sweet and Maxwell. 2003. P 472. Thompson, 
MP. "Unravelling Agreement". Conveyancer and Property Lawyer. [1994] 58. The Law Commission. 
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position that the purchasers have been in since a long time. One of the advantages that 
this approach delivers relates to the genuine compensation that the vendor can receive 
through the amount of deposit. This is to say that there is no longer a rule that a vendor 
can forfeit %10 deposit even though there is no loss sustained for the court will have a 
power of reduction. Where the amount of deposit is grossly in excess of the loss suffered 
the court will reduce it in line with the actual loss. However the fact that the amount of 
deposit is just more than the loss suffered does not entitle the court to exercise its 
discretionary power of reduction. The application of New Approach of penalty clause to 
deposit is supported by the fact that it is already applied to a kind of deposit paid under a 
tenancy agreement. In such an agreement the lessee agrees to pay a deposit as a security 
to compensate the lessor for any losses occurring to the subject matter throughout the 
period of tenancy. There is no set percentage to be paid but in most cases the lessor 
imposes it. In all cases where the lessor suffers no loss during the tenancy he returns the 
whole deposit to the lessee. However if the damage sustained is less than deposit it will 
be scaled down to the extent that adequately compensates the lessor for his actual loss. 
Thus what prevents the application of the same rules to the other transactions especially 
in sale of land contracts? 
Working paper No 61. "Penalty Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". London. Her majesty's Stationery 
Office. 1975. P 42-45. 
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4.4 Legislative intervention 
Section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925, Unfair Tenns in Consumer Contract 
Regulations 1999 and The Consumer Credit Act 1974 will now be considered. 
4:4:1 Section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 
Section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 provides that: "where the court refuses to 
grant specific perfonnance of a contract, or in any action for the return of a deposit, the 
court may, if it thinks fit, order the repayment of any deposit", The main point of the 
enactment of this subsection appears to have been to remove the difficulty which, had 
previously stood in the way of a purchaser who, though in a position to successfully resist 
specific perfonnance brought by the vendor, was at a law precluded from recovering his 
deposit because of the lack of legal ground for claiming rescission of the contract894, The 
initial reaction to the subsection has been to regard it as being aimed, at least in the first 
place, at certain circumstances. It was thought to be applicable where the court believes 
that it is inappropriate to exercise its discretion to enable the vendor to obtain specific 
perfonnance, in spite of the fact that the purchaser was in breach89s , This restriction on 
the scope of this subsection is rejected on the ground that purchaser's breach may not 
cause vendor any loss; and to allow the latter nonetheless to retain deposit could be said 
to unjustly enrich him, while causing considerable hardship to the purchaser896, There 
will be no point whatever to the subsection if it will not be applied to remove the 
unfairness in such instance. Therefore subsequent cases seemed to have interpreted the 
subsection more liberally. Therefore it has become apparent that the jurisdiction of the 
court under the section 49(2) is not nearly so limited to the situation where the court 
894 James Macara Ltd v. Barclay [1944] 2 AJI ER 31. See for the origin of section 49 (2) and nice 
exposition of the cases concerned Wilkinson, H W. "Returning the Purchaser's Deposit", New Law Journal. 
[1908] 668. 
895 Ibid. At 32. It should be noted that section 49(2) has no application where it is the vendor who is in 
breach of contract for in this case the sum paid by way of deposit must be paid back to the payer without 
any claim. See for this Country & Metroplitan Homes Surry Ltd v. Topclaim Ltd. [1997] I All ER 254. In 
this case it was held that: "the discretion under s. 49(2) of the 1925 Act was to enable the court to order 
return of a deposit to a defaulting purchaser. To exclude s. 49(2) did not affect the purchaser's rights if the 
vendor defaulted. Therefore, [Purchaser] was entitled to the return of the deposit paid", In this case the 
parties agreed to exclude the application of section 49(2). It should be pointed out that such attempt should 
be regarded as void and null for the subsection will pointless if the parties can agree to rule out its effect. 
896 Treitel, G. H. The Law of Contract. 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1008-1009. 
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refuses to grant specific performance897. As the provision is not adequate to perform the 
task for which it was enacted it is certain that the court should therefore construe it in a 
broader interpretation, i.e in a way that is useful to realize fairness between parties898. 
4.4.1.1 The application of the jurisdiction in practice 
The first advocate of a broader and more flexible attitude to section 49(2) was Megarry J. 
in Schindler v. Pigault899• In this case Megarry J. considered that the subsection was 
generally available for use in mitigation of a vendor's right at law to forfeit deposit. In his 
view the provision gives the court a discretionary power to order the return of deposits 
"where justice required it,,9QO and made it clear that the jurisdiction by the statute was: 
" ... exercisable on wider grounds ... including a general consideration of the conduct of 
the parties (and especially the applicant), the gravity of the matters in question, and the 
amounts at stake,,901. In the case itself, a purchaser had failed to comply with a vendor's 
notice to complete the contract. This failure was in a large part attributable to vendor who 
had denied the purchaser access to the property, which caused the impossibility for 
purchaser to conclude a sub-sale on which he was relying to proceed with the contract. 
The Judge reached the conclusion that this was a proper situation to exercise the power 
under section 49(2) to order the repayment of purchaser's deposit. Therefore how was 
this view construed? 
4.4.1.1.1 How was the judgment of Megarry J interpreted? 
Megarry J's holding received two interpretations in subsequent cases. Some considered 
that the subsection is applicable in the event that the purchaser's conduct excites 
sympathy and others decided the subsection applicable where the order of the refund of 
deposit is the fairest course between the parties. The two views will now be examined. 
897 Universal Corporation v. Five Ways Properities Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 552. 
898 Harpum, Charles. "Relief against Forfeiture and the Purchase of land". Cambridge law Journal. (1984) 
43(1) 134, at 171, who said that the court should not construe the provision in a way that is futi Ie. It will be 
futile if the vendor'S damages for breach of contract equal or exceeds the amount of purchaser's deposit, 
because then the court would find itself ordering repayment of the deposit under s. 49(2) with one hand, 
and requiring the purchaser to pay it back as damages with the other. See also, Wallace, H. "Deposit or 
Penalty?- The Price of Greed". Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly. [1993] 207, at 213. 
899 Schindler v. Pigault (1975) 30 P&CR 328. 
900 Ibid. At 336. 
901 Ibid. 
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4.4.1.1.1.1 Where it is unfair for the purchaser to lose his deposit 
In Cole v. Ros/02 Mervyn Davies QC construed the above Mrgarry's judgment that there 
should be a certain condition to exercise the discretionary power given to the court under 
section 49(2). It was considered that the court has the power to order the return of a 
purchaser's deposit where there are special circumstances "suggest that it is perhaps 
unfair or inequitable that the purchaser should lose his deposit". The substance of this 
view gives the impression that the court should only investigate the conduct and 
circumstances of purchaser in order to decide whether his situation excites sympathy. Ifit 
is so the court may exercise its power to return his deposit back. A recent case indicated 
that the court has applied. In the case of Omar v. El_Waki1903 the court rejected the claim 
of purchaser to refund his deposit by virtue to section 49(2) basing its judgment on many 
circumstances904. However a close reflection on the facts of the case reveals that the court 
has only considered the circumstances of the purchaser (Omar). The amount at stake, the 
conduct and circumstances of vendor and whether vendor has suffered any loss or not 
were circumstances the court considered irrelevant. Arden LJ stated that: 
"Mr EI-Wakil. .. may resell the property at a profit. Furthermore, Mr EI-Wakil was 
probably not on the judge's findings able to complete the contract when he served 
notice to complete. Finally Mr El-W akil took possession of the assets transferred 
to Visionhurst. It is also irrelevant that Mr EI-Wakil has not sought to establish 
that he has suffered any loss as a result of the abortive Corringham contract: the 
parties agreed that the £110,000 was a deposit. It would moreover be wrong for 
Mr EI-Wakil to be ordered to pay cash.when the deposit was not paid in cash. The 
deposit is abnormally large but there has been no suggestion that the court could 
direct payment of part only of the deposit,,90S 
902 Cole v. Rose [1978] 3 All ER 1121. 
903 Omar v. E/-Wakil [2001] EWCA Civ 1090. (2001) Times, November 2, 2001. It is available on 
WestLaw website 2001 WL 753309. 
904 "Mr Omar entered into this transaction conscious that he was paying a deposit and he must be taken to 
have known either actually or through his advisers that certain consequences would follow if he failed to 
complete the contract or was unable to do so. It is correct that he caused assets of some value to be 
transferred to Visionhurst [a company controlled by Mr EI-Wakil] but he never granted the lease he 
promised. He failed to pay debts which he had agreed to pay under the business transfer agreement and 
which on the judge's findings Mr EI-Wakil was accordingly forced to pay for him. the judge also found. 
The judge also found that Mr EI-Wakil trusted Mr Omar and that his trust was misplaced. In sum, Mr 
Omar's conduct does not excite sympathy". Per Andren LJ Omar v. E/-Wakil [2001] EWCA Civ 1090. 
(2001) Times, November 2,2001. It is available on WestLaw website 2001 WL 753309. 
90S Ibid. 
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Then Arden LJ decided that: 
"In a situation where a purchaser could not himself perform, the circumstances 
which make it appropriate for the court to exercise its discretion under section 
49(2) in his favour must be exceptional. Inability to complete is exactly the risk 
the deposit was intended to guard against,,906 
It seems that the court has based its judgment on the fact that the vendor should not be 
denied his right to forfeit deposit in the event of non performance as this is the classical 
situation in which a deposit is liable to be forfeited. Accordingly the fact that a purchaser 
would sustain a hardship of losing his deposit should not be a sufficient reason to 
exercise the power conferred on the court under the subsection. However it should be 
noted that the fact that deposit symbolizes a guarantee for performance should not entitle 
the injured vendor to extract a penalty in the shape of deposit. It was admitted that "the 
deposit paid was substantially in excess of the normal deposit. The sum of £110,000 
represented about 31 % of the total purchase price rather than the usual 10%,,907. The 
amount at stake should be one of the most important circumstances, which the court 
should consider in order to decide whether the section 49(2) may be invoked. It would 
not be, it is submitted, a good policy to frankly prevent agreed damages clause of penal 
nature and implicitly upholds the penal nature of clauses elsewhere, i.e. the forfeiture of 
deposit. The court also relied on the fact that there has been no suggestion that the court 
would order to return part of deposit for it is established that the court should order the 
whole deposit or nothing. In response, this point is also not impressive as it has become 
established after Dimsdale case908 that a deduction from the deposit is allowed in favour 
of injured vendor to compensate his wasted expenses. The court could have therefore 
ordered the deposit less compensation in relation to losses suffered by the vendor under 
the abortive contract. However the court seems to have taken "a slightly stricter" view909 
for it would have been preferable to have regard to all circumstances of the case 
906 Omar v. El-Wakil [2001] EWCA Civ 1090. (2001) Times, November 2, 2001. It is available on 
WestLaw website 2001 WL 753309. 
907 Ibid. 
908 Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd v. De Haan, (1984) 47 P&CR 1 (Ch D). 
909 Tennaro Limited v Majorarch Limited [2003] EWHC 2601; [2003] 47 E.G.e.S. 154 (Ch D). 
238 
including the vendor's conduct and the amount at stake. Even when the court held that 
the exercise of courts' jurisdiction under section 49(2) should be exceptional, it did not 
give any indication to construe the meaning of the word exceptional. If in circumstances 
like these, where the penal nature of deposit is clear, the subsection can not be invoked, 
so what are the circumstances or what is the criterion that justifies the invocation of 
section49(2)? However, was this narrow interpretation followed in the subsequent cases? 
4.4.1.1.1.2 Broader interpretation: when it is the fairest course between parties 
It is notable that the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that it should be necessary, in 
order to bring the case under the subsection, to be unfair or inequitable for the purchaser 
to lose his deposit910. Many subsequent cases took a broader view that the provision was 
"designed simply to do justice between vendor and purchaser,,911. This was clearly 
illustrated in Universal Corporation v Five Ways Properities Ltd912 where the court 
confirmed that it has a wide discretion under s.49 (2) to order the return of deposits 
"where the justice of the case requires,,913. In this connection, Buckley LJ added that: 
"The word ''justice'' [is] to be used in a wide sense, indicating that repayment must be 
ordered in any circumstances which make this the fairest course between the parties .. 914. 
In this case the claimants agreed to purchase land in London and paid a 10% deposit. The 
transaction was financed from moneys deposited in Nigeria. The purchasers were unable 
to proceed with the contract on time and were given a 28 days completion notice to do so. 
Due to unexpected delays caused by Nigerian exchange regulations prevented the 
purchasers complying with the notice, as it was not possible to remit the moneys to 
London in time. As the money, even though, duly arrived within a few days of the expiry 
of the notice, the vendors had terminated the contract and forfeited the deposit paid. The 
purchasers brought an action to recover its deposit under section 49(2). The action was 
struck out at first instance by Walton J. 915 justifying that as the subsection was not 
910 Universal Corporation v. Five Ways Properities Ltd [1979] I All ER 552. 
911 Ibid. At 555 Buckley LJ. The outcome of this case was applied in subsequent cases. See Maktoum v. 
South lodge Flats (1980) Times. April 22. Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd v. De Haan. (1984) 47 
P&CR 1 (Ch D). 
912 Universal Corporation v. Five Ways Properities Ltd [1979] I All ER 552. 
913 Ibid. At 555 per Buckley LJ. 
914 Ibid. 
91S Universal Corporation v Five Ways Properities Ltd. [1978] 3 All ER 1131. (at the first instance) 
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applied to cases other than where the court would refuse a decree of specific performance. 
On appeal, the court reversed Walton J's decision. Preferring the view of Megarry J. in 
Schindler v. Pigaulll6, Buckley LJ clearly confirmed that the court had "an unqualified 
discretion to order the return of the deposit,,917. His learned LJ stated that: 
"It is not clear to me that .. .it would not be more just to order repayment of 
deposit, leaving the defendant such remedy in damages as may be available to it, 
than to allow it to retain the very substantial deposit which was paid in this 
case,,918 
It is important to highlight that it is apparently impossible to determine all the standards 
and matters, which the court might take into consideration to exercise its power under 
section 49 (2). The court should therefore consider each case according to its 
circumstances, including the conduct of the parties and the amount at issue, in order to 
decide whether to grant relief or not. Then the subsection will only be invoked if there is 
a clear unfairness in the forfeiture of a deposit. In other words, the court should not 
therefore exercise its power to order the refund of a deposit unless it is the fairest course 
between the parties. However the court should not be astute to discover unfairness in 
every provision of a contract which stipulates for a deposit to be forfeited to vendor in the 
event of a breach by purchaser. The unfairness should be clear to anyone considering it 
and it seems again that all turns on the facts of each particular case. In the more recent 
case of Tennaro Limited v Majorarch Limite~19 the court dealt with contracts related to 
three different flats (37, 31 and 32). In one case (flat 37) the court upheld the claim that 
the vendor should be entitled to forfeit the deposit for the value of the flat concerned had 
declined and the damages due for the vendor would have been close to, or may even be 
greater than the sum paid by way of deposit92o. However in the other two cases (flat 31 
916Schindler v. Pigault (1975) 30 P&CR 328. 
917 Universal Corporation v. Five Ways Properities Ltd [1979] 1 All ER 552, at 555 per Buckley LJ. 
918 Ibid. At 555-556. 
919 Tennaro Limited v Majorarch Limited [2003] EWHC 2601; [2003] 47 E.G.C.S. 154 (Ch D). 
920 "It appears to me that the Buyer's claim for the return of the deposit under the first agreement, in relation 
to Flat 37, is very weak. On the agreed facts. and in light of my conclusions on the first three issues, the 
Buyer should have completed the first agreement by purchasing Flat 37 for £4.4m, and it failed to do so 
because it could not raise the funds ... The value of Flat 37 was £4m, namely some £ 444,000 less than the 
consideration payable under the first agreement, during the second half of 2002, ie when completion should 
have taken place, and when the first agreement was validly rescinded by the Seller. Further, the value of 
Flat 37 has declined to £3.6m by today". Ibid. Per Neuberger J. 
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and 32), the values of the two flats have increased921 and the vendor had the opportunity 
to sell them at price significantly higher than the contractually payable by the purchaser. 
Therefore as it was the fairest course between the parties the court considered that 
deposits, which were paid under the agreements of these two flats, should be, in 
principle922, retumed923• Nevertheless, the circumstances in which the relief will be given 
are by no means clear. Therefore, should the application of penalty jurisdiction be the 
solution? 
4.4.1.2 Relation of section 49(2) with Workers Trust case and penalty jurisdiction 
It has become established that any unsatisfactory limitation (as it was first held in James 
Macara Ltd v. Barclay924) on the ambit of the discretionary power given to the court 
under section 49 (2) was rejected, as it would appear to be inappropriate in view of the 
wording of the section itself. However, it is unfortunate that the cases, in which the 
subsection was applied, gave no clear guidance of the general grounds in which the 
courts would justify the exercise of their discretion under the statutory provision 925. 
Could the decision of Workers Trust case or the application of penalty jurisdiction be the 
solution? 
4.4.1.2.1 Relation between The Worker Trust case and section 49(2) 
The position after Workers Trust case926 shows that relief against the forfeiture of a 
deposit may be given where it is unreasonable on the grounds that it is a penalty. 
However this is not the case where it is reasonable, i.e. does not exceed 10% of the 
921 "The value of Flats 31 and 32 in the second half of 2002 significantly exceeded the respective sale 
prices under the later agreements. The contract price for Flat 31 was £443,740, and it was worth £525,000 
in the second half of2002; the equivalent figures for Flat 32 are £841,259 and £1.075m. Although the value 
of the two flats has now declined to £475,000 and £985,000 respectively, each of them is still worth 
sif.!ificantly more than the respective contract price". Ibid. Per Neuberger] 
92 The court did not order the repayment of deposits for it was possible that the damages claim in relation 
to the contract of flat 37 may exceed the deposits in the contracts of flat 31 and flat 32 and therefore the 
ri,ht of set-off was available. 
92 See the case itself (Tennaro Limited v Majorarch Limited [2003] EWHC 2601; [2003] 47 E.G.C.S. 154 
(Ch D) for a nice explanation why the court decided that the deposits in flats 31 and 32 were to be in 
rrinciple returned. 
24 James Macara Ltd v. Barclay [1944] 2 All ER 31. 
925 The courts in each case applied the subsection have been considering the circumstances of each case 
without any attempt to determine the circumstances in which the subsection can be applied. In brief, there 
is no clear indication that such attempt was made. See all cases examined in the context. 
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purchase price. In contrast under section 49 (2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 the court 
has a wider jurisdiction to relief against forfeiture of deposits. Purchaser may be granted 
relief against the forfeiture of deposit by virtue to the statutory provision, whilst, at the 
same circumstances, may not at case law. This is clearly illustrated in Universal 
Corporation v Five Ways Properities Ltcf27 where the claimants had an order to return 
his 10% deposit that was paid to make the transaction928. This means that it is down to the 
court to decide if even a 10% deposit should be treated as a penalty. 
4.4.1.2.2 Relation between penalty jurisdiction and the court's discretion at s.49 (2) 
It seems that there is a good solution to pave the way for drawing the boundaries and 
grounds in which the purchaser has the right to invoke the discretion conferred on the 
court by the section 49(2) to recover the deposit. There is a real possibility to apply the 
penalty jurisdiction in the same way that was suggested before929 for the position of a 
deposit at case law after the Workers Trust case. In this way, the power of ordering the 
repayment of a deposit under the subsection would be applied in circumstances where its 
retention by the vendor would give rise to a penaltl30• It could even be said that the 
jurisdiction conferred on the court under section 49(2) is very similar to the equitable 
jurisdiction to relieve against penalties931 • Under both jurisdictions the court may grant a 
defaulting purchaser a relief against paying a disproportionately high sum in comparison 
with the loss suffered. Put in another way, it means that the court may exercise its 
discretionary power under the statutory provision if the deposit retained by the vendor 
was substantially greater than what it is needed to compensate him. Further both 
jurisdictions entitle the court to grant such relief on terms that purchaser submitted to a 
926 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
927 Universal Corporation v. Five Ways Properities Ltd [1979] I All ER 552. 
928 Supra. P 230 for the facts of the case. See also Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd v. De Haan. 
(1984) 47 P&CR 1 (Ch. D). 
929 Supra. P 218. 
930 This is, in reality the solution favoured by the Law Commission in its working paper No. 61 "Penalty 
Clauses and Forfeiture of Monies Paid". London Her Majesty's Stationery Office 1975. PP 42-45. See also, 
Treitel, G, H. ''The Law of Contract". 11th ed. Sweet & Maxwell. 2003. P 1009. Pawlowski, Mark. "Relief 
against Forfeiture of Deposits". Estate Gazate. 21 November. Issue 9246. [1992] 76, at 78. 
931 Wallace, H. "Deposit or Penalty?- The Price of Greed". Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly. [1993] 207, at 
214. 
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deduction representing the vendor's loss 932. The court when exercising its inherent 
jurisdiction over penalty clauses, is not, as it was confirmed by the court of appeal in 
Jobson v. Johnson 933, to enforce the penalty beyond the loss suffered by the claimant, i.e. 
scaling down the amount of penalty clause. Relief against forfeiture of deposit under the 
statute is clearly illustrated in Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd v. De Haan 934• In 
this case the court decided to order the return of the deposit under section 49(2), for the 
vendor had sold the subject matter at a highly greater price that it would have received 
under the contract with the defaulting purchaser. Put another way, the court ordered the 
repayment of the deposit as it was greatly more than what was necessary to compensate 
the vendor for his actual loss. However it should be highlighted that the court in this case 
decided the repayment of deposit subject to an undertaking from the purchaser to 
compensate the vendor for the loss he had actually suffered93s. Therefore "It is right to 
add that [the court] made deductions from the deposit, in favour of the seller, in relation 
to expenditure wasted by the seller under the abortive contract,,936. 
Consequently, section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 and the cases, which 
applied it are seen as a step forward in supporting the new proposal adopted in this work 
towards a harmony in the law of penalties and forfeiture of deposit and instalments937. 
What supports this proposition is that in all cases in which the court ordered the refund of 
10% deposit was on the grounds that the deposit was substantially greater than the loss 
actually suffered938. 
932 Initially the courts in exercising its discretion were ordering the return of whole deposit leaving the 
vendor to claim his damages for the loss suffered as a result of breach under an unliquidated damages 
action. This was clear in James Macara Ltd v. Barclay [1944] 2 All ER 31, at 34 where Clauson J stated 
that: ..... the court may order the return of the whole of the deposit. . .it must be all or nothing". 
933 Jobson v. Johnson [1989] WLR 1026. 
934Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltdv. De Haan (1984) 47 P&CR 1. 
935 Ibid. At 12. The outcome of this case was very much suggested to remove the injustice caused by the 
application of case law rules to deposit in terms of the 10 per cent in sale of land transaction. See 
Thompson, MP. "Untrevelling Agreements". Conveyance and Property Lawyer. [1994] 58, at 62. 
936 Tennaro Limited v Majorarch Limited [2003] EWHC 2601; [2003] 47 E.G.C.S. 154 (Ch D) 
937 Supra. P 218. 
938See Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd v. De Haan (1984) 47 P&CR I. 
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4.4.2 Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999 
In the context of transactions between consumers and sellers or suppliers, the artificial 
distinction in treatment at case law, between sums payable on breach and deposit paid 
before breach has been mitigated. The greater mitigation has occurred by the use of 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999. These regulations generally apply 
a fairness test to non-"individually negotiated" terms in contract for the sale or supply of 
goods or services between consumers and sellers or suppliers939. A forfeiture clause in a 
consumer contract may be considered as unfair because "contrary to the requirement of 
good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the rights and obligations of the parties 
arising under the contract to the detriment of the consumer,,940. 
Whether a term in a contract requires a sum of money to be payable as a result of breach 
or for deposit, it will be subject to the fairness test. Therefore, schedule 3 contains a "grey 
list" which encompasses both penalty clauses and deposit. The Regulations provided that 
a clause will be unfair when "permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the 
consumer where the latter decided not to conclude or perform the contract, without 
providing for the consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the 
seller or supplier where the latter is the party cancelling the contract,,941. Such clauses 
might be regarded as unfair, and consequently unenforceable against the consumer. 
Accordingly, it can be said that the court has the discretionary power to order the return 
of a deposit if it is satisfied that it is unfair for the seller or supplier to forfeit it. This can 
be presumed "but not spelt out" in schedule 3 Paragraph l(e)942. However, it is suggested 
that, as the application of section 49(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925 resulted to in 
Dimsdale Developments (South East) Ltd v. De Haan 943, the court may order the 
939 Section 3 (1) Unfair Tenns in Consumer Contract Regulations 1999. 
940 Section 5 (1). 
941 Paragraph (d) Schedule 2. It has been said that this provision is based on civil law system where the 
payer who looses his deposit ifhe withdraws, while the payee returns the double ifhe does so. See for that 
Treitel, G. H. "The Law of Contract". 11 th ed. Sweet & MaxweIl. 2003. P 982. 
942 Halson, Roger. "Contract Law". First published in Great Britain. Longman 2001. P 522 including 
footnote 478. 
943 (1984) 47 P&CR. 1 (Ch. D). 
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repayment of a deposit at the Regulations provisions, with the injured party's provable 
actual loss deducted. 
4.4.3 The Consumer Credit Act 1974 
Under this act the court has the jurisdiction to review extortionate credit bargains to 
achieve justice between the parties944• The court therefore has, under section 139(2) the 
discretionary power under this act to order injured party, to repay the entire or part of any 
sum paid. This is a clear indication that the court has the power to grant relief against 
forfeiture of a deposit where it is grossly greater than what may be considered fair 
compensation to an injured party for the actual loss suffered as a result of breach. This 
judgment also accords with the new proposition that suggested the application of penalty 
jurisdiction to deposits. 
5-Deposit in Jordanian Civil Law 
5.1 Article 107 
Jordanian civil law has different rules from those in English law with regard to deposit. 
The amount paid as a deposit might have one of two functions. Firstly, it gives either 
party the right to withdraw from the contract. If, for example, a purchaser paid 1000 JD 
by way of a deposit at the time of formation of the contract and then withdrew from the 
contract he would lose the 1000 JD. But if it was the vendor who withdrew the purchaser 
would restore 2000 JD. Secondly, it might be a sign of the conclusion of the contract and 
extra security that the contract shall be performed. As a result of this it is assumed that 
neither of the parties has the right to withdraw from the contract. To give the sum, which 
was paid by way of a deposit this effect the parties should provide so in their agreement. 
In contrast English law does not have the rule that in the event of the withdrawal of 
deposit's payer he forfeits it. However in the contracts of the sale ofland if the purchaser 
defaults he loses the customary 10% deposit; if the vendor defaults he should return the 
deposit but there is no rule that that double the amount should be paid back. 
944 Section 138 
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As the deposit at Jordanian law gives each party the chance to withdraw from the contract 
by losing it or return double, it seems that this rule is regarded as imposing a penalty. 
However there are still some dissimilarities between deposit and penalty clause according 
to Jordanian law. 
I-Deposit is in exchange for any withdrawal so that it is always due even though the 
injured party has sustained no loss or the loss was less than the amount of a deposit. This 
is because there is no default, but simply losing a certain sum of money paid by way of a 
deposit in return for the withdrawal from the contract. By contrast, penalty clause is a 
pre-estimate of damages for the losses, which the injured party suffers as a result of non-
performance. Therefore there should be always a fault, damage and causal link for 
penalty clause to become due. 
2-A deposit cannot be reduced as there is no link between it and the loss suffered, 
whereas the court has a full power to adjust penalty clause to be equal to the damage 
sustained. 
3-Each party can discharge himself from the contract by paying the price of withdrawal, 
i.e the deposit. In comparison, in penalty clause system neither party can discharge 
himself from performing his contractual obligations by paying the amount of penalty for 
penalty provision is not an alternative obligation. 
The general rule with regard to the deposit in Jordanian law is included in Article 107, 
which provides for: 
"The payment of deposit at the time of entering into contract means that each party is 
free to withdraw from the contract, unless the contract provides otherwise. In the case 
of the party who has paid the deposit, he loses it, and in the case of the receiver he has 
to return double the amount,,945 
94S For example in sale contract the purchaser has to pay the price and receive the subject matter in the 
place where the sold thing is, however if he does not do so that means that he withdrew from the contract. 
This gives the vendor the right to retain the money he has received by way of deposit from the purchaser. 
See Civil Cassation No. 56611982 Bar Association Journal. 1982, P 1680. Also Civil Cassation No. 
2580/2001, Adalah Centre Publications (www.adalel.com). 2001. 
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5.2 Analysis of rule of deposit at article 107 
5.2.1 Time to use tbe rigbt to witbdraw 
It is inferred from Article 107 that Jordanian law considers the right to withdraw from the 
contract as the foundation rule. However can this right be used at any time? It should be 
noted that the time in which one party can use his contractual right to withdraw is 
regarded as an essential contractual matter. Recognizing the period in which each party 
can withdraw from the contract narrows the time of the contract's suspension and leads to 
the settlement of contractual relations. However, in spite of the significance of the time 
factor, Article 107, which includes the rules of deposit, does not determine the period of 
time in which the right to withdraw can be used. Therefore, the parties can agree upon 
the time during which the right to withdraw from the contract should be used. If it expires 
without either party expressing the intention to withdraw the contract becomes binding 
and neither party can then unilaterally discharge himself from the contract. However 
there might not be agreement between the parties and therefore the right to withdraw is 
still available until the performance of the contract. To avoid any problems that might 
occur as a result of this it would have been more preferable if the law determined the time 
in Article 107 JCL. 
It should be also highlighted that if the contract is terminated by one of the parties before 
a complete performance, the other party has the right to retain the deposit if he is the 
payee or claiming twice the amount if he is the party who has paid the deposit946• As a 
result of this it seems that the deposit operates just like penalty clause, as it binds one 
party to pay a certain sum of money to the other even if there is no loss suffered. The 
only difference between penalty and deposit is (according to Jordanian law) that the court 
has no authority to increase or reduce the amount of a deposit if it is less or more than the 
actual loss sustained. However it is strange that where the loss suffered is excessively 
higher than the sum paid by way of deposit the injured party can sue for more 
946 Even though there is no loss suffered. See Civil Cassation No. 2313/1999 Bar Association Journal 200 I, 
p 2095. This case was concerned with a sale contract of big supennarket. It provided that the vendor should 
vacate his commercial place to the purchaser on certain time. The purchaser paid a sum of money by way 
of deposit, however the vendor then did not perfonn his obligation. Having the vendor broken his contract 
the purchaser sued him for the return of the double deposit. The Court of Cassation held that the vendor 
should restore twice the amount in accordance with article 107 of Jordanian civil law. 
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compensation. This means that the injured party needs to return to the court twice947 to 
receive his just compensation together with the deposit. Unfortunately this costs both the 
parties involved in the case and the community as a whole. Also since the law gives the 
injured party the right to claim his damages where the deposit is less than the loss 
suffered, what prevents the law from giving the defaulting party the right to sue for a 
reduction of amount of deposit where it is excessively higher than the loss suffered? The 
case in English case law is almost the same where the injured party can retain 10% 
deposit in sale ofland transactions whatever the actualloss948. However it is strange that 
if the actual loss is higher than the sum paid by way of deposit the injured party can 
recover the difference, i.e damages for uncovered loss949. 
The effect of the New Approach suggested in this work appears clearly also in this place 
where the writer argues the application of the new approach of penalty clause to the 
amount of money already paid by way of deposit95o. 
5.2.2 Contract should be valid for the application of Article 107 
A problem arises where a deposit is agreed to be payable in sale contracts that requires 
the formal registration of the transaction, but one of the parties withdraws before the 
completion of such formalities. In this instance do rules of deposit laid down in article 
107 of Jordanian law apply, taking into consideration that such contracts are regarded as 
void before meeting the requirement of registration? It has been argued 951 that to judge 
that the sale contract, which is made without formal registration, is invalid is something 
Jordanian law does not adopts. Article 1184 of this law provides that: "The ownership 
does not transfer to the purchaser without registration". Thus the article itself does not 
state that the contract is null and if the Jordanian Legislator wanted this result he would 
provide for that in the same article. This point of view goes on to suggest that sale 
947 Twice in the event of dispute. The first is to claim to have the amount of deposit (if it has not been paid 
yet) ifhe is the payee or return twice the amount ifhe is the payer. The second is to get his compensation if 
the deposit does not suffice to compensate him. This has actually occurred Civil Cassation No. 722/1997. 
Bar Association Journal. 1997. p 1116. 
948 Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D 89. 
949 Lockv. Bell [1931] 1 Ch 35. 
950 As this has been fully and in details approached there is no need to repeat it twice as what has been 
discussed when examined the rules of English Law applies to Jordanian Law. 
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contract in such a situation is valid. It reaches the conclusion that the rules of deposit 
applies when one of the parties breaches his obligation to accomplish the registration 
procedures. In response, it should be noted that the logic and the law require that the 
contract should be in a certain form to be valid. This is illustrated in article 168 of 
Jordanian law. This means that as the deposit is a condition in the contract it will be null 
and void if the contract does not meet the formality required and therefore the rules laid 
down in article 107 of Jordanian law will not be applicable. 
Therefore in order to exercise the right of withdrawal as laid down in article 107 of 
Jordanian law the amount of money which has been paid by way of deposit should have 
been paid by virtue to a valid and legal contract. If the deposit was therefore paid by 
virtue to an invalid and null contract the payer of the deposit would have the right to 
regain his deposit even though he is the party who withdraws from the contract. This 
scenario is confirmed in the Court of Cassation in a case concerning a contract for the 
sale ofIand. The contract provided that the purchaser should pay an amount of20,000 JD 
to the vendor by way of a deposit providing that the latter would complete all the 
necessary procedures to finish the transaction as soon as possible. This agreement should 
have been registered formally as a condition to the completion of the contract. However 
the vendor failed to do so leading the purchaser claiming the money he had paid by way 
of a deposit. The Court of Cassation, after reviewing all facts of the case, held that the 
contract was invalid and: 
"Since the claimant has obligated himself to pay the 20,000 JD as a deposit and all the 
rest of the price at the time of registering the contract, and since the vendor has not 
formally registered the promise of sale, the contract would be void by virtue to article 
168 of Jordanian Civil Law. This fact justifies the claim of the purchaser to have his 
deposit back on the ground that the rule laid down in article 107 of Civil Law does 
apply where the contract is invalid. This is what the Court of Cassation has settled on 
in many decisions, for example 1198/98 and 2367/90.952" 
951 Aserhan, Adnan and khatir, Nori. "Sources of personal rights". 1997. P 104. 
952 Civil Cassation No. 2247/1999 Bar Association Journal, 2000, p 178. See also Civil Cassation No. 
1184/1997, Bar Association Journal, 1997, p 197. 
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5.2.3 Should words used by the parties be of decisive effect? 
It can be asserted 953 that the use of the word deposit by the parties in the contract 
regarding the money paid in advance is of decisive effect. In a contract of sale the 
purchaser has agreed with a vendor to buy some trucks for his business. They agreed that 
the purchaser should immediately pay 7% of the price at the time of making the contract 
whilst the remaining amount would be due on receiving the subject matter. Article 7 of 
the contract provided that the rules of the deposit laid down in article 107 of Jordanian 
civil law would be applied to the first payment of the price. The purchaser withdrew from 
the contract before even paying the 7% deposit, which he had to pay on entering into the 
contract. The purchaser having used his contractual right to withdraw meant the vendor 
sued him for the deposit agreed upon. The Court of Appeal decided that since no payment 
has been made at the time of making the contract the amount agreed upon (7%) was in 
fact part of the price and the rules of deposit does not apply to this amount. On appeal the 
Court of Cassation overruled this decision by stating that: 
"The decision of the Court of Appeal is illegal and baseless as the parties agreed in the 
contract to call the first payment "deposit" and apply the rules of deposit in the event 
of any default by either party,,954. 
However, it should be noted that the judgment of the Court of Cassation in this case 
would not be preferable to be applied to all cases. The deposit should always aim to 
create motivation to the payer and payee to perform their contractual obligations with 
each party understanding that certain consequences would follow in the event of default 
or withdrawal from the contract. Thus the deposit should not be used to avoid the 
application of the rules of another system. In other words, parties to the contract might 
use the word "deposit" or language appropriate to deposit to hide the real nature of the 
advance payment. The Court of Cassation was, with all respect, incorrect when it based 
its judgment on the fact that the parties described in their contract the payment, which 
should have been paid at the time of making the contract as a deposit. Parties to a contract 
may attach the label "deposit" to the payment of a sum of money in order to escape from 
953 Civil Cassation No. 722/1997, Bar Association Journal, 1997, p 1116. 
95. Ibid. 
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the general rule which causes the payment as penalty. As a result the injured party cannot 
receive any compensation other than for the damage he has sustained. 
The position of English law confirms that the language used by the parties does not 
conclude the nature of the sum paid in advance as a deposit. The courts via two 
authorities confirmed that the parties cannot escape the penalty clause jurisdiction by 
affixing the label "deposit" to a disproportionately great sum. The case of Stockloser v. 
Johnson 955 clearly clarifies that the vendor cannot forestall the court's power to relieve 
against forfeiture by describing an extravagant sum as a deposit. Accordingly, as was 
given by Denning L.J, if the vendor has stipulated of an initial payment of 50% instead of 
the usual 10% of the price to be paid as a deposit, he will face the penalty clause. This is 
especially the case if it was provided for in the same contract that on purchaser's default 
the vendor resells the subject matter and sues for the 50% deposit. "Surely the court will 
relieve against the forfeiture. The vendor cannot forestall this equity by describing an 
extravagant sum as deposit, any more than he can recover a penalty by calling it 
liquidated damages,,956. 
In Linggi Plantations v Jagatheesan957 Lord Hailsham concluded that: 
" ... The parties may use language normally appropriate to deposits properly so-
called and even to forfeiture which turn out on investigation to be purely 
colourable and that in such a case the real nature of the transaction might turn out 
to be the imposition of a Eenalty, by purporting to render forfeit something which 
is in truth part payment,,9 8. 
However this does not mean that the word (deposit) or language used by parties should 
not be considered. Rather it should be one of the most important factors to be taken into 
consideration in determining the real nature of the sum paid in advance. It has been 
clearly verified in Gallagher v. Shilcock 959that in every case some factors should be 
considered in deciding whether parties to a contract have intended the sum, which has 
9SS Stockloser v. Johanson [1954] 1 QB 476. 
9S6 Ibid. At 491 per lord Denning L.J. 
9S7 Linggi Plantations v. Jagatheesan [1972] 1 Malayan LJ 89; available also on <web.lexis-
nexis.comlprofessionaVdocument? _ m.> 
9S8 Ibid. 
959 [1949] 2 KB 765. 
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been paid by way of advance payment, to be a deposit or not. These factors have been 
pointed out by Finnemore J. when he declared that: " ... Regard may be had to the 
circumstances of the case, to the actual words of the contract, and to the evidence of what 
was said,,96o. 
960 Ibid. At 768 per Finnemore J. 
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Conclusion 
So far the research examined and investigated the law relating to penalty clauses, together 
with its relationships with similar contractual provisions concerning forfeiture of money 
already paid. It was noted that the power of the parties to a contract to agree on damages 
in advance is controlled by the penalty rule. This rule, contrary to the generally accepted 
doctrine of freedom of contract, sets aside express stipulations on damages agreed upon 
by the parties. For this reason this research has tentatively suggested a New Approach 
which, if implemented correctly, would lead to greater respect for the principle of 
freedom of contract and the agreement on damages in advance. This New Approach961, 
while not denying courts' power over penalty clauses, operates from the presumption that 
such clauses should be given effect and that any intervention by the court to reduce their 
amount should be seen as exceptional in a very limited case962. The support for a New 
Approach could be found in the following statement of Lord Woolf: "The court has to be 
<;areful not to set too stringent a standard and bear in mind that what the parties have 
agreed should normally be upheld"963 
Therefore this section will deal with the following issues 
1- Presenting summary and conclusions of the subject matter 
2- The New Approach and why it would be more preferable than the existing law 
3- Outline of the suggestions 
1- Summary and conclusions 
The original penalty rule had a simple beginning and complex subsequent history. The 
first chapter showed that the penalty jurisdiction grew from the practice in equity to 
amend what were perceived to be inequitable effects of the strict enforcement of penal 
bonds. The current penalty rule964 was not advanced, either in the common law courts or 
in the courts of chancery until the late seventeenth century and then the development 
961 The whole approach is based on the idea of fairness. See footnote 983. 
962 Where the stipulated sum is manifestly disproportionate to the actual loss. 
963 Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, at 59. 
964 Which makes all penalty clauses unenforceable. 
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culminated at the beginning of the twentieth century in the landmark case of Dunlop 
Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltcf65• The courts over the time have 
affinned that the law of penalties as stated in Dunlop case still stands, and therefore it 
may be summarised as follows: 
*How do the courts decide whether an agreed damages clause is unenforceable 
penalty clause? 
English law courts had, until the reception of the current regime, applied the intention test. 
However the juridical dependence on the parties' own words had obviously been 
undennined since Kemble v. Farren966• This case was a strong call that the tenns of the 
parties to the contract should not be of decisive effect in detennining the nature of agreed 
damages clauses. The courts subsequently developed a new approach focusing on a 
comparison between the sum stipulated and the pre-estimated loss judged at the time of 
contracting. This comparison fonns the basis for the differentiation between 
unenforceable penalties and valid liquidated damages clauses. An agreed sum, which 
represents a genuine pre-estimate of the anticipated actual loss should be paid as valid 
liquidated damages. However where the sum stipulated is extravagant and 
unconscionable in comparison with the anticipated actual loss that will sustain as a result 
of breach it should be struck down as a penalty. In spite of the various arguments967 put 
forward before it the Court of Appeal in the 2003 case of Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver 
International v. Barnet Football Club Limited968 reaffinned the law on penalty clauses. 
The court con finned that the classic statement of the law as laid down in Dunlop case still 
stands, and that the sum stipulated should be a genuine pre-estimate of damage to avoid 
being a penalty. The investigation of the main test for the assessment of the agreed sum, 
i.e whether it is a genuine pre-estimate or not, revealed that the existing law969 states that: 
965 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. 
966 Kemble v. Farren (1829) 6 Bing 141; 130 ER 1234. 
967 In this case Jeancharm argued that following the decision of Philips Hong Kong v. The Attorney 
General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41, the principles set out in Dunlop case had been virtually 
abandoned. And argued that the correct test now is the one that looks at the contract as a whole and the 
risks being undertaken by both parties and ask whether the clause was an appropriate clause valid or not 
depended on the risk also undertaken by the party seeking to rely on it. Supra. P 56. 
968Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16111 January Court 
of Appeal (Civil Division), Westlaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. 
969 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79. Philips Hong Kong v. 
The Attorney General of Hong Kong (1993) 61 BLR 41. See also Robophone Facilities Ltd v. Blank [\966] 
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1- Despite the fact that the equality of bargaining power of the parties is not a conclusive 
sign of whether a clause is an invalid penalty, it was acknowledged that the courts 
should take care before striking down as a penalty a provision which is negotiated at 
ann's length970. However where a provision is not negotiated between willing parties 
with similar bargaining powers the courts should scrutinise the clause with great care 
to remove the risk of oppression and abuse of autonomy. 
2- In assessing whether a clause is a penalty clause or a liquidated damages clause the 
courts should not be concerned with what the parties wrote but rather the courts 
should examine the matter objectively. However though the term used by parties to a 
contract is not decisive in determining the nature of stipulated damages, it is not, 
however, disregarded. The expression inserted in the contract by the parties raises a 
presumption in favour of it. A clause is assumed to be as the parties have called it 
until the opposite is proved. 
3- The clause should not be struck down as a penalty merely because in hypothetical 
situations (which have not in fact occurred) the agreed sum may exceed the injured 
party's actual loss. 
4- The court in applying the test considers the disproportion between agreed sum and 
likely actual loss as of the time of contracting. This does not mean that subsequent 
events should be disregarded. In fact what actually happened after the formation of 
contract might provide evidence helpful in determining what was within the 
contemplation of the parties at the time of contracting. All these issues were dealt 
with in chapter two. 
*The "penalty" rule only relevant where there is a breach of contract 
What was noted after investigating the existing law of penalty clause IS that its 
application is capable of causing many theoretical inconsistencies. Chapter three reveals 
that it is only where there is a sum of money payable or a property to be transfered in the 
3 All ER 128. Jeancharm Limited TIA Beaver International v. Barnet Football Club Limited [2003] 16th 
January Court of Appeal (Civil DIvision), WesTlaw 116995. [2003] EWCA Civ 58. 
970 It is nonetheless still open for a court to find, when the parties are of equal bargaining strengths, that a 
clause is a penalty after applying the rules as stated in Dunlop case. 
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event of breach of contract the penalty jurisdiction is relevant. Therefore when a sum is 
payable upon an event other than on breach it simply does not matter whether the 
promisor can convince a court that the penalty jurisdiction applies or that equity has a 
role in order to prevent an "absurd paradox". In both cases it seems that what the parties 
have agreed upon should be fulfilled. As a result it should be acknowledged that this rule 
produces some exceptional consequences by excluding from the scope of the penalty rule 
a condition for the payment of what might be an extravagant and unconscionable sum of 
money upon the occurrence of some event other than breach. This is particularly the case 
in termination clauses in hire purchase contracts. It is unacceptable that the hirer who 
honestly terminates the contract early will be worse off than the one who defaults, as the 
former will have no relief under the current law. 
Beside the fact that the law is only applicable on breach, the ability of the stronger party 
to evade the penalty jurisdiction was criticised in chapter three. He, with the assistance 
of draftsman, may use his adeptness to avoid the penalty rule in classifying a term into a 
condition. Such a difference in form and not substance was capable of giving the injured 
party the chance to evade the application of penalty jurisdiction. As a result it was said 
that: 
"If, in the light of such a clause, any sum specified as damages for breach must be 
tested on the basis that it is a pre-estimate of "the loss to the promisee resulting 
from the loss of his bargain" as a whole971 , the law as to penalties is subverted to . 
such an extent that it is not worth preserving as a separate body ofrules"m. 
This is also the case in the event of acceleration clauses which stipulate that the whole 
principal should be paid forthwith on default of anyone instalment. Such a clause should 
be subject to the penalty clause jurisdiction at least where it provides for the payment of 
undue interest or a financing charge to be paid immediately with the principal. 
971 Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v. New Garage & Motor Co Ltd [1915] AC 79 
972 Chitty on Contract. 29th ed. Vol. General Principles. Sweet & Maxwell. 2004. P 1498. 
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*Penalty clauses: Factors to help determine whether a particular clause is a penalty 
clause 
The power that the courts may have over penalty clauses was the subject of chapter four. 
The principle is that once a provision is held to be an invalid penalty clause, the court has 
no general jurisdiction to re-form the terms of the contract. A penalty clause in a contract 
is always in this sense regarded as a dead letter. The courts have no power of reduction. 
Rather the law permits the courts to completely eliminate the penalty clause and the 
injured party is remitted to the ordinary rules of damages however unsatisfactory they 
may be under the circumstances973. Once a provision is, on the other hand, held to be a 
valid liquidated damages clause, the injured party seeking compensation will recover the 
stipulated amount regardless of whether this sum is less than the actual loss sustained or 
even nil. 
To distinguish an unenforceable penalty clause from a valid liquidated damages clause a 
series of rules were laid down in Dunlop case. Three situations were examined where 
clauses are more likely to be unenforceable penalty: 
I-Where it is easy to calculate likely actual loss: The greater the difficulty of assessing 
damages the more likely it is that the sum stipulated will appear a genuine pre-estimate of 
loss. If from the nature of the terms of the contract and the particular facts of the case, it 
appears that the actual losses are readily ascertainable and that they may be trivial, any 
stipulation for an extravagant and unconscionable sum of money will not appear to 
constitute a genuine pre-estimate ofloss and so would be regarded as a penalty. 
2-Where a single lump sum is made payable on one of different events: this factor states 
that there is a presumption in favour of penalty when a single lump sum is made payable 
in the event of breach of one or several or all obligations, some of which are of trifling 
and others are of serious damages. However courts have over time decided that a variety 
of different possible losses does not preclude an enforceable provision for liquidated 
973 As the injured party may be denied damages for some losses he has sustained. He may not fully be 
compensated especially where the actual loss is not recoverable. 
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damages. As a result this presumption raised in favour of penalty can be displaced and so 
the single lump sum could be regarded as liquidated damages in the following instances: 
A-Where the losses are difficult to assess: the difficulty of estimating or proving 
damages was always regarded as a factor favouring the clause being considered valid 
liquidated damages clause. 
B-Where the stipulated sum is a sort of averaging out subject to the caveat that there 
should not be too a great difference between the lowest possible loss and the largest 
possible loss. A danger arises where the difference between the losses is Broad. In this 
situation two solutions were put forward to avoid upsetting freely made bargains and 
court's time being wasted. Firstly the court should ascertain the true construction of the 
agreed damages clause, i.e. the court would make every possible effort to construe that 
the sum stipulated was only intended to be payable on the occurrence of the most serious 
damage. Secondly the parties should stipulate for different sums payable according to the 
size of breach because failure to stipulate for a sum payable on the occurrence of the 
lowest possible loss might result in liquidated damages not being recovered. 
3-Where a graduated sum slides to the wrong direction: The court would observe to 
which direction the scale is sliding to hold the validity of an agreed damages clause. If 
the scale is sliding in the right direction, i.e. the estimated sum increases so long as there 
is a continuing breach, the sum may be regarded as a genuine pre-estimate of the actual 
loss likely to be suffered as a result of breach and so valid liquidated damages. However, 
if the sum payable slides in the wrong direction, i.e. the sum decreases over the time, it 
will not constitute a genuine pre-estimate of the likely actual loss and so will be an 
invalid and unenforceable penalty. 
Jordanian law permits a moderation of a penalty clause, not its complete elimination. In 
deciding whether to intervene in order to modify the agreed penalty clause a Jordanian 
court should look at the disproportion between the amount agreed upon and the actual 
loss suffered. If the disproportion is either excessive or extravagant the amount may be 
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reduced to be equal to actual loss. This position was criticised on the ground that agreed 
damages should be upheld despite the actual damages incurred being lower than the 
agreed damages clause. This will however be subject to the agreed damages being merely 
excessive and not extravagant and unconscionable. However it is well established that 
where there is no actual loss suffered then an action to sue for a penalty will not be 
allowed. In contrast the English court considers the disproportion between pre-estimated 
damages and the likely actual loss to decide whether the agreed damages clause is a 
penalty. An action for agreed damages may therefore be allowed where the clause is held 
to constitute a liquidated damages clause even though there is no actual loss sustained. 
*Can more than the "penalty" be recovered? 
A problem arises when actual loss turns out to be more than agreed sum. This situation 
may come up in two cases: Firstly where a single lump sum is made payable on the 
occurrence of one or several breaches of different significance and secondly where the 
environment at the time of contracting was different from what prevailed at the time of 
breach. As a result it was asked: can more than the penalty be claimed? The following 
conclusions were reached: 
1- Where an agreed sum of this kind is held to constitute a valid liquidated damages 
clause there is no doubt that the injured party can not recover more than was 
agreed. 
2- It should also be noted that sometimes liquidated damages are deliberately set at a 
too low figure in comparison with the likely loss as a method of limiting liability. 
In English law such a clause does not cease to be a valid liquidated damages 
clause under the penalty rules974. Therefore courts can not simply increase the 
agreed sum as is the case in Jordanian law, which allows the court to increase the 
sum fixed in a penalty clause in all cases in which the sum is less than actual 
loss975. 
974 Cellulose Acetate Silk Co Ltd v. Widnes Foundry (1925) Ltd [1933] AC 20. 
975 This position of Jordanian law was criticised as the law should detennine the limitation under which 
courts can increase agreed penalty. Supra. P 156. 
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3- If the clause is invalid as a penalty and actual loss is larger than penalty, does the 
sum fixed in a penalty clause act as an upper limit? There is some doubt whether 
the injured party can claim the full amount or is limited to the amount of penalty. 
This instance is only illustrated in charterparty cases where the law gives the 
injured party the right to ignore penalty and claim his full damages. This position 
was fully examined and criticised on the ground that the party imposing a penalty 
should not be given the opportunity to benefit from the intimidating force the 
penalty clause may have and then ignore it when it turns to be to his benefit to do 
so, i.e it becomes less than actual loss sustained. All these issues were discussed 
in chapter five. 
*Forfeiture of money already paid 
Perhaps the most anomalous rule in the law of penalties, which was dealt with in chapter 
six, concerns forfeiture clauses of money already paid (deposit and instalments). As a 
general rule a part payment can be recovered from the payee on the default of the payer. 
However the parties might insert a clause to the effect that the part payment already paid 
will be forfeited upon breach. Where there is such an express forfeiture clause, the payee, 
upon the payer's breach, becomes entitled to terminate the contract and forfeit the 
payment already paid. In such a case can .the payer, who is the party in breach, recover 
the pre-paid instalments? It was noted that under English law two kinds of relief may be 
granted: Firstly, the court has the jurisdiction to grant a defaulting payer an extra time to 
proceed with the contract. Secondly: Sometimes the court may grant a defaulting party, 
who is not ready and able to pay within the extension period, a relief by way of an order 
of the repayment of instalments already paid. In contrast as far as Jordanian civil law is 
concerned its judgment is clear in this situation as it regards the instalments paid under 
hire purchaser contracts as rent payments. As a result if the purchaser fails to complete 
the instalments, all previous instalments would be considered as "non refundable" rent 
payments976• 
976 Article 487 of Jordanian Civil Law. 
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Since the decision of Howe v. Smith977 the position regarding the forfeiture of a deposit 
has settled in English law. In this case it was held that the deposit, though it might be 
taken as a part payment in the event of performing the contract, is also a guarantee for 
performance. Therefore, when the claimant fails to perform his contract within a 
reasonable time, he has no right to demand the return of the amount he pays by way of a 
deposit. Lord Cotton confIrmed the nature and the forfeiture of deposit by stating: 
"What is the deposit? The deposit as I understand it ... is a guarantee that the 
contract shall be performed ... if [the purchaser] repudiates the contract, then ... he 
can have no right to recover the deposit"978. 
It seems odd that clauses providing for the forfeiture of deposit and the instalments paid 
by the party who has subsequently broken his contractual obligations, should not be 
subject to the penalty clause jurisdiction. There is no apparent theoretical reason why 
forfeiture clauses should be treated differently from agreed damages clauses. Each may 
be equally intimidating from the perspective of the person subject to them. They are the 
same in substance and have the same function. 
The penalty jurisdiction has been indeed applied to clauses exacting the forfeiture of 
deposit979• But in the Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ll£180 
suggested that this is not the case particularly where the deposit is 10% of the price in 
sale ofland transactions. Where the deposit does not exceed the customary deposit it will 
be subject to forfeiture. But if it is greater than the customary deposit it will be invalid 
and should be returned in full. In other words, in these transactions if the purchaser 
defaults the vendor has a right to retain a 10% deposit regardless of actual loss, i.e. it does 
not matter whether this percentage is a genuine pre-estimate of the loss suffered by the 
vendor981 • It should be acknowledged that a deposit in such a situation is of coercive 
nature and that constitutes a policy of implicitly upholding penalties in this area of the 
law, while expressly prohibiting them in the area of agreed damages clauses. On the other 
977 Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D 89. See also Sprague v. Booth [1909] AC 576. 
978 Howe v. Smith (1884) 27 Ch.D 89, at 95 per Lord Cotton. 
979 Commissioner of Public Works v. Hills [1906] AC 368. 
980 Workers Trust & Merchant Bank Ltd v. Dojap Investments Ltd [1993] AC 573. 
981 Ibid. 
261 
hand, and, surprisingly, if the sum paid by way of deposit is less than the actual loss 
suffered by the vendor he has the right to recover damages for the "uncovered" losses982• 
There is no "customary" deposit in transactions other than those for the sale of lands. In 
these cases the situation remained unclear after the Workers Trust case. However when 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson stated the law of deposit in this case he clarified the position 
with regard to deposits paid in sale of land transactions. As a result it might be possible to 
infer that there is a requirement that the forfeited deposit is to be a genuine pre-estimate 
of the loss in other transactions. 
It is tentatively suggested that penalty clause rules should apply to a clause that requires 
money to be paid by way of deposit or instalment. Forfeiture clauses should be for the 
benefit of both parties and not a privilege for the stronger. 
2-The New Approach983: How would the New Approach operate differently from 
the existing law? 
This research has come to the conclusion that it would be preferable for the law of 
penalties to uphold and enforce all penalty clauses subject to the court's power of 
modification in limited cases. It should be emphasized that there will no longer be a 
distinction between penalty clause and liquidated damages clauses. Rather, under the new 
approach, all agreed damages provisions are treated as enforceable penalty clauses984• A 
presumption is raised in favour of an agreed damages clause that it is the proper recovery 
unless it is rebutted. The burden of proof or rebuttal of the presumption is cast upon the 
party, who seeks to avoid paying the amount of penalty. Where he is unable to displace 
the presumption, i.e unable to persuade court that the amount selected is manifestly 
disproportionate to actual loss, the court should award the amount agreed upon. Where he 
is able to furnish proof that the pre-estimated damages are manifestly disproportionate to 
982 Lock v. Bell [I 931] I Ch 35. 
983 It should be emphasised that the basis for this approach is the idea of fairness. It would be unfair to refer 
the injured party to claim unliquidated damages in which the providing proof of damage might be 
extremely complex, difficult and expensive. This might at the end result in undercompensating him. For the 
meaning of unfairness please see footnote 357 of page 91. 
984 Or whatever the term used to indicate the agreement on damages in advance. 
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actual loss the presumption is displaced and the court would reduce the amount 
recoverable in line with the injured party's actual loss. 
*Comparing the sum stipulated with actual loss does not mean ignoring the 
circumstances, which exist at the time of contracting? 
In pages (28-33) the New Approach provides separate guidance for instances suggesting 
that a manifestly disproportionate penalty clause985 may still be enforceable. Courts will 
not have a power of reduction over such a clause in some instances. The circumstances 
will include the case where one party has paid a higher price to buy an excessive penalty 
clause or this clause has been inserted by the parties, as they knew that in the event of 
non-performance the promisee would not be properly or satisfactorily compensated via 
an unliquidated damages action or the usual practice of a certain trade adopts a policy of 
inserting such penalty clauses negotiated at arm's length986. In such cases987 the penalty 
clause is regarded as a result of a fair and free agreement between the ,parties, especially 
when the market is competitive and! or the contracting parties are experienced, which is 
often the case in commercial contracts. The non enforcement of such agreed damages 
clauses, which are freely accepted by the parties, is inefficient and it "hurts the very 
people it wishes to protect by offering them an alternative they do not want to retain 
(possibility of efficient breach) and expropriating from them an alternative they wish to 
have (adding an enforceable penalty clause to their contract),,988. Efficient breach is not 
really an issue when a penalty clause plays an important economic role (risk sharing, 
reputation signaling, protecting against losses that are irrecoverable under the current law) 
and the agreed damages plays a compensatory function for the injured party's actual 
losses989. However, though in these cases a higher agreed penaltl90 is justified as a way 
985 This clause is efficient and sound at the time of making the contract, but seems quite excessive at the 
time of breach and trial when compared with the recoverable loss. It is enforceable though it is regarded as 
a,manifestly disproportionate in comparison with amount recoverable in the event of the absence of agreed 
~enalty clause. 
86 As it is the case in charterparty cases in the event of the improper detention by the charterer. 
987 These three situations were fully examined under the New Approach suggested in this work. Supra. P 
27-33. 
988 Hatzis, Aristides. "Having the Cake and Eating it Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil 
Contract Law". International Review of Law and Economics. (2003) 22 381, at 394. 
989 Ibid. However efficient breach is not completely deterred as the third party's offer could exceed even the 
higher agreed penalty. 
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to compensate for actual losses it should never exceed a just compensation. This could be 
gauged by looking at the role that a higher agreed penalty plays, i.e. to take into account 
the situations pointed out above. If the injured party can feel secure that a contractual 
penalty will be enforced he will benefit from the certainty and adequacy of compensation. 
*Where penalty is less than actual loss 
With regard to the situation where the court has the power to increase the stipulated sum 
it was suggested that this power may be used in the event that the amount turns out to be 
substantially less than actual loss. Such a situation will not be a frequent occurrence and 
therefore the court .is given a discretionary power to increase only in a restricted 
circumstance991 • 
* Why would the New Approach be fairer than the existing law 
The New Approach, which has been tentatively proposed in this work may constitute the 
first step in looking at the penalty clauses in a different way in English (and Jordanian) 
law. Throughout the thesis the New Approach has been compared with the current 
penalty rule. It was concluded that the New Approach offers the following advantages. 
1- Under the New Approach many transaction costs can be avoided. Under the existing 
law of penalties in the event that a clause is unenforceable as a penalty, it is treated as 
having no legal effect, and the costs of including it are wasted. In addition the injured 
party must bear the costs of bringing an action for unliquidated damages992 • The New 
Approach helps reduce these costs. 
990 Even though it is regarded as, given that the compensatory damages means damages for the recoverable 
loss and not actual losses, overcompensatory at the current legal rules. But under the new approach 
suggested in this research the damages allowed for actual losses should be regarded as compensatory since 
they do not over compensate but compensate the injured party for his actual losses. Of course this applies to 
the three cases, in which a higher agreed penalty would be preferable to be justified. See for this comment 
Posner, Richard. "Economic Analysis of Law". 5th ed. Aspen Law & Business. 1998. P 144. 
991 Supra. P 178. 
992 These costs are liable to be very high and are greatly increased by the current uncertainty over what is 
required for the agreed damages clause to be enforceable and that will not be subject to the rule against 
penalties. 
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2- Avoidance of the absurdity of the existing position of English law as to a single lump 
sum being payable on the occurrence of one or more of several breaches some of which 
are of trifling importance and others of serious importance. The absurdity concerned is 
that the court may reject the award of the agreed sum to the promisee in spite of the fact 
that it is a genuine estimate of the loss suffered as a result of the actual breach. The 
justification of this under the present law is that the agreed sum might be 
disproportionately high in comparison with loss that might be suffered in the event of 
occurrence of another breach, which has not even occurred. In this way the rule may 
invalidate a perfectly fair bargain. This outcome will no longer be there under the New 
Approach, as the court will look at the actual loss suffered, i.e the penal sum will be 
compared with the actual loss suffered as a result of breach that actually has occurred. 
Therefore, the court will not refuse to uphold the stipulated sum if it is in line with the 
loss sustained from the actual breach irrespective of the fact that the sum might be 
manifestly disproportionate to loss which may result from another breach which has not 
even occurred. However, the court will have the jurisdiction to exercise its power to 
reduce the amount of penalty if it is manifestly disproportionate in relation to the actual 
loss sustained as a result of the breach that occurred. 
3-The court has the opportunity to examine the situation at the time of breach rather than 
limiting itself to the time of making the contract. A thorough investigation requires 
consideration of all circumstances including those at the time of breach. The actual loss 
suffered may be a genuine pre-estimate at the time of making the contract, but may 
nonetheless tum out to be less or even non existent at the time of breach. The existing law 
may be criticised when it upholds the entitlement of the injured party to the agreed sum in 
such circumstances. Under the new approach the court will allow the recovery of the 
amount payable under penalty clause and should not intervene to reduce that amount 
unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the actual loss as opposed to being compared 
with the pre-estimate of the likely loss under the current law as to penalties. 
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4- The new approach will create more certainty for the injured party. It should be noted 
that the agreement on damages in advance allows parties to determine their rights and 
liabilities in the event of breach. In making such agreement the parties avoid the 
uncertainties that arise when the matter comes to the court in order to determine the 
consequences of breach. It avoids any difficulties of proof inherent in judicial assessment 
of the loss arising out of breach by providing for a sum of money to be payable in that 
event. This goal is effectively achieved when applying the New Approach. In contrast the 
current rule against penalties renders futile any certainty that the agreement on damages 
beforehand may create. 
In application of the current penalty rule the defaulting party can readily escape from 
performing his contractual obligations by resorting to the court where it is likely that the 
court will strike the penalty clause down when its amount is disproportionately high 
leaving the injured party to prove the loss he has suffered. This is to say that despite its 
very long history there remains considerable uncertainty in the law sufficient to make it 
worthwhile for the defaulting party to challenge the agreement in order to avoid his 
contractual obligations. However, in the New Approach the defaulting party knows that 
he may not get rid of his liability if the matter comes before the court as the best he can 
hope for is to reduce the amount of penalty993 should he be able to prove that it is 
manifestly disproportionate to actual loss. In other words, if the defaulting party 
envisages that he still has the opportunity to escape from the penal sum by resorting to 
the courts, in the event of reduction, the injured party is sure that the court will hold that 
he is entitled of that sum994• In contrast the current penalty rule gives the defaulting party 
assurance that the agreed damages clause will be held as invalid when it is a penalty, 
leaving the position of the injured party full of uncertainties, in proving the loss sustained 
and going through a judicial process to receive his unliquidated damages. This costs both 
money and time. 
993 To be in line with actual loss suffered. 
994 This position would be fairer as the agreed damages clause is always inserted in the contract in favour of 
the injured party as a protection against the losses he might suffer on breach. 
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5- Under the current English law treating a penalty clause as unenforceable may serve as 
a penalty in reverse. This is particularly illustrated in the situation where the injured party 
has paid a higher price to insert an extravagant penalty. Such a penalty is unenforceable 
according to the current English law. This means that the defaulting party will have. 
profited from gaining a higher price for providing illusive insurance in the shape of an 
unenforceable agreed damages clause. This result will be avoided under the New 
Approach as the court will have the power to enforce the agreed damages clause if it is 
satisfied that in the circumstances of the case it is reasonable to award the amount agreed 
upon. (for details please see page 29-31) 
6- The existing the distinction between termination upon breach and the hirer using his 
option, is illogical and unjust. The whole debate in chapter three showed the need to 
extend the application of penalty jurisdiction to the case where the hirer himself rescinds 
the hiring agreement. Under the New Approach the penalty jurisdiction will be applicable 
in case of breach, liquidation or death of the hirer and where he uses his option to 
terminate the contract. 
7 - The enforcement of stipulated damages simplifies efficient breach since the promisor, 
knows more precisely the amount of damages that he has to pay to the promisee in case 
of breach and so more easily determine ifhe would be better off after breach99s • 
8 Upholding the New Approach will like the present law deter a promisee from trying to 
induce a breach of the contract by a promisor. This is because he understands that he will 
not obtain the whole agreed amount when it is manifestly higher than his actual loss 
sustained as a result of breach. Rather he will be confined to his actual loss. 
995 Hatzis, Aristides. "Having the Cake and Eating it Too: Efficient Penalty Clauses in Common and Civil 
Contract Law". International Review of Law and Economics. (2003) 22 381, at 391. 
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3- Outline of the suggestions 
It would be preferable that the law in relation to penalty clause should be amended as 
follows: 
1- Contracting parties may provide in their contract for the amount of damages to be 
payable by a party who fails to perform. 
2- It is presumed that this clause should be enforceable by the court and therefore no 
larger or smaller amount of money may be awarded to the injured party. 
3- The courts should continue to have a control over the penalty clause to modify its 
amount to be compatible to actual loss according to the following: 
(a) Courts may, upon the request of defaulting party, reduce the amount 
recoverable under the clause when it is manifestly disproportionate to the loss that 
he has actually suffered. Thus there should not be judicial control over a penalty 
clause when its amount is merely more than and not manifestly disproportionate to 
the actual loss. 
(b) Courts may, upon the request of injured party, increase the amount of penalty 
in a narrowly limited case 996, i.e when it is manifestly less than actual loss 
sustained provided that the clause was not freely negotiated. 
(c) Any agreement to the contrary should be void. 
4- The courts power over penalty clauses should not be confined to cases where there 
has been a breach of contract. It should be extended to the cases where the 
contract is terminated early as a result of exercising an option under a contract and 
in the event of liquidation or death of the promisor (the hirer). 
5- The above rules should be applied to the money already paid either by way of 
deposit or instalment. 
6- The above rules should be applied to an acceleration clause if the sum payable is 
more than the principal sum and interest earned to date, i.e where there is no 
proper discount for undue interest or financing charge. 
The law relating to penalties and liquidated damages is both complex and 
controversial. It is hoped that if the above suggestions are adopted that the law would 
be simplified, made more coherent and transparent and thereby improved. 
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